Victor Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 24a0200p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐

VICTOR S. COUZENS,

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Plaintiff-Appellant, │

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v. > No. 23-3930

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CITY OF FOREST PARK, OHIO; WILLIAM ARNS, in his │

official capacity; REBECCA EAVERS, COREY HALL, and │

VADA HARRIS, in their official and personal capacities, │

Defendants-Appellees. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.

No. 1:20-cv-00546—Michael R. Barrett, District Judge.

Argued: July 24, 2024

Decided and Filed: August 27, 2024

Before: SILER, COLE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Marc D. Mezibov, MEZIBOV BUTLER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Katherine L. Barbiere, SCHROEDER, MAUNDRELL, BARBIERE & POWERS, Mason, Ohio,

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Marc D. Mezibov, MEZIBOV BUTLER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for

Appellant. Katherine L. Barbiere, SCHROEDER, MAUNDRELL, BARBIERE & POWERS,

Mason, Ohio, for Appellees.

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 2

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OPINION

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JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. “A house divided against itself cannot stand.”1 So too,

it seemed, for a house of worship in this case. Off-duty police made the mistake of involving

themselves in that division, which is the genesis of this suit.

Inspirational Bible Church (“IBC”) faced declining membership and worsening finances

after its pastor, plaintiff Victor Couzens, committed a publicized indiscretion. Leaders within the

congregation organized a vote to oust him from his position. To enforce this decision, they hired

off-duty police officers for the next Sunday service. At that gathering Couzens briefly took the

pulpit, but officers threatened arrest, causing him to leave the church building. Couzens then

sued the officers, their police chief, and the City of Forest Park (collectively, the “Forest Park

Defendants”), as well as certain church leaders, alleging that they conspired to deny him his

constitutional rights. The district court, however, granted summary judgment in defendants’

favor. We affirm.

I

A. Factual Background

Couzens had led IBC as senior pastor since 2000. But, in 2018, he faced public

accusations of an adulterous relationship. After these revelations, there was an exodus of church

members: the congregation shrank from 2,000 to around 200 members. In June 2019, Couzens

held a meeting with church leaders to improve the church’s negative culture and reverse its

declining membership. Despite Couzens’s efforts, though, IBC was late on its mortgage

payments, and the bank—concerned about its borrower’s financial status—issued an ultimatum:

in order to renegotiate lending terms, IBC needed to remove Couzens as pastor. When Couzens

learned of the bank’s ultimatum, he tried to suppress it. But Zacheriah Davis, IBC’s executive

pastor, shared it with others in the church. Couzens responded by firing Davis.

1

Abraham Lincoln, Address at the Republican State Convention, Springfield, Ill. (June 16, 1858); see also

Mark 3:25.

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 3

Some church leaders then quickly organized a vote in which approximately 97% of

participants supported firing Couzens. Alandes Powell and Martin Jones, who previously served

as IBC elders, wrote Couzens a letter informing him that, pursuant to the vote, IBC had removed

him as pastor.

But Davis expected that Couzens “was not going to adhere to his notice to vacate the

pulpit.” Jones Dep., R. 30, PageID 528. So Davis recommended that Jones hire off-duty Forest

Park police officers to “make sure everything runs smoothly” during services on the Sunday

following the notice, which was February 9, 2020. Id. IBC often paid off-duty officers to

provide general security for services to supplement IBC’s own armed security team. When

Jones reached out to the police department to secure an off-duty detail, he explained that he

needed officers to “make sure nothing got crazy on that particular day at the church” because of

“turmoil within the church.” Dryer Dep., R. 29, PageID 419. Jones mentioned Couzens in his

request, but he did not specifically ask that officers keep Couzens off the premises or away from

the pulpit.

Officers Vada Harris and Corey Hall signed up for the off-duty detail. Under the police

department’s standard operating procedures, off-duty officers acted with full police authority

(including the ability to arrest), wear their police badges and uniforms, and carry their firearms.

When the officers arrived that Sunday, February 9, Jones presented various documents to the off-

duty officers, including a letter that Jones and Powell had sent Couzens three days earlier, on

February 6. That letter—on IBC letterhead and signed by Jones, Powell, and “the partners of”

IBC—invoked IBC’s constitution, its by-laws, and Ohio law to explain that Couzens had been

fired as pastor, directing him to vacate the premises as of February 7. Dryer Dep. Ex. 3, R. 29-1,

PageID 457–58. With these documents and instructions from a superior officer, Harris

understood that the officers were to treat Couzens “as a patron or a churchgoer,” but that if

Couzens refused a request from officers to leave, then he should be “treated as a trespasser”

subject to arrest. Harris Dep., R. 33, PageID 1017–20. Hall also thought that they were to treat

Couzens as someone who was not allowed on the property.

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 4

That was news to Couzens. Before he arrived at the church, Couzens had received a call

from the head of IBC’s own security team telling him that the church locks had been changed

and that police were at the church. When Couzens arrived, he called the department, informed

them that someone changed the church locks, and asked for an officer to escort him about the

church. Dispatch sent Officer Rebecca Davis née Eavers to do so. Couzens next tried to enter

the church through a private entrance, but Officer Hall refused to open the door secured by a new

lock. Officer Harris then approached Couzens and told him that, while Couzens could attend the

service, he could not act as a bishop (that is, with ecclesiastical authority).

Despite that verbal order, Couzens took the pulpit at the beginning of the service to

address the congregation and lead them in prayer. At that point, Jones and others told the

officers that they wanted Couzens away from the podium. The officers then advised Couzens’s

wife that he would need to vacate the pulpit. So, after Couzens finished the prayer and sat down,

his wife went up to him and told him that “the police said that if [he did not] come off of the

platform now, they’re going [to] come up there and they’re going to drag you out.” Couzens

Dep., R. 28, PageID 201. Couzens avoided that escalation by stepping down from the podium.

Officer Hall then told him that he needed to leave the church building because the letter stated

that Couzens no longer served as pastor. When Couzens resisted Hall’s direction, Hall

threatened to arrest Couzens for trespass. Finally, Couzens left.

B. Procedural Background

Couzens and IBC sued two sets of defendants: (1) the Forest Park Defendants (Forest

Park, Arns, Eavers, Hall, and Harris), and (2) Powell and Jones. Plaintiffs asserted claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 of unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and infringement of free

exercise of religion under the First Amendment, as well as § 1983 and state law civil conspiracy

claims.2 Both sets of defendants moved for summary judgment.

2

The complaint frames plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim as implicating both a search and a seizure, but

on appeal Couzens focuses solely on seizure. Plaintiffs also alleged a substantive due process claim below, but the

district court granted summary judgment to defendants on that claim and this ruling has not been appealed.

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 5

The district court granted both motions. It concluded that—while the record could show

that Officers Harris, Hall, and Eavers seized Couzens—their actions were not unreasonable. The

district court further determined that plaintiffs’ free exercise claim failed because the challenged

police department policy did not target religious conduct. And without constitutional violations

from individual defendants, the district court found no merit to plaintiffs’ municipal liability and

civil conspiracy claims. Couzens timely appealed his claims against the Forest Park

Defendants.3

II

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Morgan v. Trierweiler, 67 F.4th 362,

366 (6th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In this analysis, the court “must view all the evidence

and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”

Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 735 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 255).

III

Couzens argues that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment on his

constitutional, civil conspiracy, and municipal liability claims. We address each in turn.

3

At oral argument, Couzens’s counsel contended that he represented both Couzens and IBC on appeal. But

the notice of appeal must “specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body

of the notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). While the caption of Couzens’s notice of appeal uses “et al.” after

Couzens’s name, as did the district court’s caption, Couzens uses the singularized “Plaintiff” on appeal, in contrast

to the pluralized “Plaintiffs” employed by the district court. And the body of the notice only mentions Couzens’s,

not IBC’s, appeal from the district court order granting summary judgment to defendants. Further, Couzens’s civil

appeal statement filed with this court described “Plaintiff’s” issues, meaning those raised by “Pastor Victor S.

Couzens.” Civil Appeal Statement of Parties and Issues, ECF No. 8. All told, it is clear to us that only Couzens, not

IBC, appealed the district court decision.

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 6

A. Constitutional Claims

Defendants invoke qualified immunity against Couzens’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

based on alleged First and Fourth Amendment violations.4 “Under the doctrine of qualified

immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Williams v. Maurer, 9

F.4th 416, 430 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Thus,

a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment unless the facts, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that:

(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established.” Id.

(quoting Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2011)). “Qualified immunity extends to

government officials’ objectively reasonable mistakes, ‘regardless of whether the government

official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of

law and fact.’” Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “[A]lthough on summary judgment this Court views the

factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, when a

defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment, the

plaintiff must show that those facts and inferences would allow a reasonable juror to conclude

that the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Williams, 9 F.4th at 430–

31.

4

The parties do not dispute that the officers, despite working in an off-duty capacity, constitute state actors

for purposes of § 1983. Facing § 1983 claims, though, officers in other cases have argued that they do not act under

color of state law when they work in off-duty capacities, albeit they often drop these arguments on appeal. See, e.g.,

Pineda v. Hamilton Cnty., 977 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2020); Vanderhoef v. Dixon, 938 F.3d 271, 275 n.2 (6th Cir.

2019). “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action

have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed

with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). So “generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or

while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id. at 50; accord Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d

353, 359 (6th Cir. 2001). Conversely, an officer’s “private conduct, outside the course or scope of his duties and

unaided by any indicia of actual or ostensible state authority, is not conduct occurring under color of state law.”

Waters, 242 F.3d at 359. Although off-duty work sits between official and private conduct, the circumstances here

indicate that the officers acted under color of state law: they wore uniforms and badges, carried arms, served on a

security detail facilitated by the department, and threatened to take the official action of arresting Couzens.

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 7

1. Fourth Amendment Claim

The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. Couzens contends that the officers unreasonably seized him when they threatened

arrest without a court order authorizing them to remove him from the pulpit. The district court,

while finding that the record could show that the officers seized Couzens, determined that their

“actions were reasonable, even if based upon a mistake.” Order Granting Defs.’ Mots. for

Summ. J., R. 54, PageID 1672.

The district court properly determined that the record could show that the officers seized

Couzens under the Fourth Amendment. “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests a person is

seized . . . when a reasonable person would not feel free to remain somewhere, by virtue of some

official action.” Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 834 (6th Cir. 2005).5 “Examples of

circumstances that might indicate a seizure . . . would be the threatening presence of several

officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the

citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s

request might be compelled.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Here,

while the officers did not physically touch Couzens, the record read in Couzens’s favor supports

that they seized him when those officers, bearing their weapons, directed Couzens to leave the

church or else be arrested.

That said, the Forest Park Defendants are only liable for unreasonable seizures. It is on

this requirement that Couzens’s claim fails. The reasonableness inquiry turns on “whether the

officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

5

Appellees, citing Youkhanna v. City of Sterling Heights, argue that police commands to vacate a place,

particularly a private one, do not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure without the use of some physical force.

934 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2019). But Youkhanna limited this principle to “circumstances where the person being asked

to leave is not privileged to remain in the space—either because the space is no longer open to the public (for

example, a building is closing or the space must be cleared of all people for safety reasons) or because the person’s

behavior violated a rule, ordinance, or law (for example, by causing a disturbance).” Id. at 523 (citing Bennett, 410

F.3d at 834 favorably). Here, read in the light most favorable to Couzens, Harris told Couzens that, while he could

not preside over the service as a bishop, IBC permitted him to attend the publicly accessible church service. Thus,

Couzens was privileged to remain in the space, albeit not on the platform. So Appellees’ reliance on Youkhanna is

not persuasive.

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 8

386, 397 (1989). Qualified immunity insulates objectively reasonable mistakes of fact, Hensley,

693 F.3d at 687, and Couzens bears the burden of showing that the Forest Park Defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity, Williams, 9 F.4th at 430–31.

Couzens contends that the officers acted unreasonably because they seized him based on

internally contradictory and suspicious documents that Jones presented to them, including the

February 6 letter. Here and before the district court, Couzens relies primarily on two cases to

attack the reasonableness of his seizure: Hensley, 693 F.3d 681 and Middaugh v. City of Three

Rivers, 684 F. App’x 522 (6th Cir. 2017). But these cases do not support his argument. Couzens

uses Hensley to argue that the officers needed a court order to intervene in private disputes, but

Hensley does not require officers to act pursuant to a court order for their seizure to be

reasonable—rather, it merely recognized that a court order would make a plaintiff’s

unreasonableness showing nearly impossible. Hensley, 693 F.3d at 692. That decision did not

hold that a court order is always required for a seizure to be reasonable. Rather, Hensley

recognized that, without a court order, a seizure still could be lawful if there was other “evidence

substantiating [the party on whose behalf they intervened’s] claim of authority.” Id. Here,

although the officers acted without a court order, they had other evidence on which they relied—

namely, the February 6 letter, which bolstered Jones and others’ claim of authority.

Couzens attacks the officers’ reliance on that letter. He cites Middaugh to argue that

police intervention in a private dispute is unreasonable when (a) the police knew the civil dispute

exists, (b) knew that the party on whose behalf officers intervened lacked a court order

supporting their claim, and (c) relied instead on facially suspicious documents to justify seizure.

Middaugh, 684 F. App’x at 528–29. Middaugh, involving a dispute over ownership of a car, was

an unpublished decision and therefore does not bind us. But even if it did, Couzens’s argument

fails on the third factor cited in Middaugh, because he lacks sufficient proof to show that the

February 6 letter was facially suspicious. In fact, the letter had several indicia of legitimacy: it

used IBC letterhead, was signed by church leaders, and described a vote to remove Couzens as

pastor under church law. The officers acted according to that letter because they did not seize

Couzens until he purported to act as pastor. And both Hall and Harris testified that they believed

the letter to be legitimate. Even if the officers mistakenly understood that they acted under

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 9

legitimate auspices, their reliance on the February 6 letter did not render Couzens’s seizure

unreasonable. Couzens has not met his burden of showing that the officers unreasonably seized

him, so qualified immunity insulates them from his Fourth Amendment claim.

2. First Amendment Claim

Before turning to Couzens’s First Amendment claim, one clarification: although he

argued at summary judgment that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by stopping

him from leading the church service, the district court limited its First Amendment analysis to

whether the City of Forest Park maintained a policy that delegated police power to private

citizens (which violated Couzens’s First Amendment rights). But the district court’s ruling on

this issue relates more to Couzens’s municipal liability claim than his First Amendment

argument against the individual officers. So we will handle the matter this way: we discuss

Couzens’s First Amendment claim against the city in the next section and his free exercise claim

against the individual officers here.

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prevents states from “prohibiting the

free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303

(1940). Couzens contends that the Forest Park Defendants interfered with his free exercise of

religion when the officers threatened to arrest him during a church service. He relies primarily

on Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952).

There, two sides sought to acquire control over a Russian Orthodox Cathedral: an archbishop

appointed by the Patriarch in Moscow and a New York corporation on behalf of an archbishop

chosen by American churches. Id. at 95–96. New York courts ruled for the American side,

relying on a state law that subjected all Russian Orthodox churches in New York to American,

not Russian, authority. Id. at 97–98. The Supreme Court concluded that the state law violated

the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 100, 107, 119. The Court recognized that, under this provision,

churches have the “power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of

church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Id. at 116. So Kedroff extended

constitutional protection over the “[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of

choice are proven, . . . as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.” Id.

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 10

Kedroff’s church-autonomy doctrine, though, guarantees the independence of

ecclesiastical bodies, not individuals. Id. at 116 (constitutionalizing a precedent that guaranteed

the “freedom for religious organizations . . . as a part of the free exercise of religion against state

interference”). So Kedroff would only support IBC’s rights, not Couzens’s, and IBC is not a

party to this appeal. And, unlike in Kedroff, the officers’ actions here did not reflect the state’s

preference for one contender for a church’s control over another. Instead, the officers attempted

to enforce what, from their perspective, appeared to be a settled matter: Couzens’s removal as

IBC’s pastor. Kedroff does not establish that the officers violated Couzens’s free exercise

rights.6

Because Couzens fails to establish a constitutional violation, we affirm the district court’s

rulings on his Fourth and First Amendment claims.7

B. Civil Conspiracy and Municipal Liability Claims

Couzens contends that the Forest Park Defendants conspired with Jones and Powell to

deprive him of his constitutional rights, and that Forest Park maintained a policy that delegated

police power to private citizens who could direct officers to violate the Constitution. Because

the district court found no underlying constitutional deprivation, it also found no merit in the

civil conspiracy and municipal liability claims.8 The district court properly rejected the

6

Couzens’s preoccupation with Kedroff, coupled with his otherwise generic free exercise arguments about

separation of church and state, lead him to forgo other ways recognized in Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597

U.S. 507 (2022) to establish a free exercise violation: a showing “that a government entity has burdened [a] sincere

religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not ‘neutral’ or ‘generally applicable,’” id. at 525 (quoting Emp. Div.,

Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)), or a “that the government has made “‘official

expressions of hostility’ to religion” that “accompany laws or policies burdening religious exercise,” id. at 525 n.1

(2022) (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 639 (2018)). Couzens fails to

point to any government policy targeting religious practice. So, even if Couzens had relied on one of those

examples from Kennedy, his free exercise claims would fail under that case.

7

The Forest Park Defendants also argue that, even if the officers did violate a constitutional right, that right

was not clearly established, so qualified immunity insulates the officers from liability. The district court did not

assess the clearly established prong for either the Fourth or First Amendment claim because it found no

constitutional violation. Couzens bears the burden of establishing that the rights which the Forest Park Defendants

violated were clearly established then. Williams, 9 F.4th at 431. And the cases he cites to establish those rights do

not squarely fit this case. So, even assuming that Couzens established constitutional violations here, those violations

were not clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity.

8

Because Couzens sued Arns in his official, not personal, capacity, the district court correctly treated those

claims as claims against Forest Park. Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 493 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009).

No. 23-3930 Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio Page 11

conspiracy claims under § 1983 and Ohio law on that basis. Bauss v. Plymouth Twp., 233 F.

App’x 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2007) (“To establish a ‘conspiracy’ under a Section 1983 claim, a

plaintiff must first demonstrate a constitutional deprivation.” (citing Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d

935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985))); Universal Coach, Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth., Inc.,

629 N.E.2d 28, 33 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (requiring the “existence of an unlawful act independent

from the actual conspiracy” to support an Ohio civil conspiracy claim). Similarly, Couzens

predicates his municipal liability claim on Forest Park maintaining a policy that led to the

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Morgan v. Fairfield Cnty., 903 F.3d 553, 566 (6th Cir.

2018) (requiring plaintiffs to identify a policy or custom, connected to the municipality, that

caused a constitutional injury in its execution). Because Couzens fails to show that the officers

deprived him of a constitutional right, this claim also does not succeed.

IV

Because Couzens fails to meet his burden of establishing that the Forest Park Defendants

deprived him of his constitutional rights, we affirm.