Roy L. Tidwell v. City of Memphis

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

September 23, 2004 Session

ROY L. TIDWELL, ET AL. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County

No. CH-01-2221-1 Walter L. Evans, Chancellor

No. W2004-00024-COA-R3-CV - Filed December 28, 2004

The City of Memphis promulgated an On-the-Job Injury Program to handle claims filed by city

employees seeking benefits for on-the-job injuries. Thirteen firefighters and one police officer filed

applications for benefits with the city. When the city denied the applications, the employees filed

appeals to the On-the-Job Injury Appeals Panel which affirmed the city’s denial of benefits. Each

employee appealed the panel’s determination to the Chancery Court of Shelby County by filing a

Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking review under a statutory writ of certiorari or, in the alternative,

a common law writ of certiorari. The chancellor reversed the panel’s decision and held that,

pursuant to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, proceedings before the panel are subject to the

contested case procedures set forth in the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. In

addition, the chancellor held that, pursuant to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, judicial

review of the panel’s decision is neither by common law or statutory writ, but review must be

conducted in accordance with section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code. The city appealed the

chancery court’s ruling to this Court arguing that the chancellor erred in applying section 27-9-114

of the Tennessee Code to the panel. We reverse the chancery court’s ruling.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed

ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. FRANK CRAWFORD , P.J., W.S.,

and HOLLY M. KIRBY , J., joined.

Sam L. Crain, Jr., Memphis, TN, for Appellant

Timothy Taylor, Memphis, TN, for Appellee Roy L. Tidwell

Mark Allen, Memphis, TN, for Appellees Richard Coggins, et al

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

The Appellees (hereinafter “the Appellees” or “the Employees”) consist of thirteen

firefighters currently or previously employed with the City of Memphis Fire Services Division and

one police officer employed with the City of Memphis Police Department (hereinafter collectively

referred to as “the City”). During the course of their employment with the City, each Employee was

diagnosed with an illness or disease each Employee claimed was caused by his or her employment

with the City. The City has elected to not be subject to the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law

pursuant to section 50-6-106(5) of the Tennessee Code.1 Instead, the City, pursuant to its personnel

manual, established an On the Job Injury (“OJI”) Program setting forth the policies and procedures

governing application for OJI b(enefits, an employee’s entitlement to OJI benefits, and appeals of

the City’s denial of OJI benefits.

1

Section 50-6-106(5) provides:

The state of Tennessee, counties thereof and municipal corporations; provided, that

the state, any county or municipal corporation may accept the provisions of this

chapter by filing written notice thereof with the division under the administrator, at

least thirty (30) days before the happening of any accident or death, and may at any

time withdraw the acceptance by giving like notice of the withdrawal. The state,

any county or municipal corporation may accept the provisions of this chapter as

to any department or division of the state, county or municipal corporation by filing

written notice thereof with the division under the administrator at least thirty (30)

days before the happening of any accident or death and may, at any time, withdraw

acceptance for the division or department by giving like notice of the withdrawal,

and such acceptance by the state, county or municipal corporation for any

department or division thereof shall have effect only of making the department or

division designated subject to the terms of this chapter[.]

T EN N . C O D E A N N . § 50-6-106(5) (2003); see also Brown v. City of Memphis, No. 02A01-9803-CV-00069, 1998 W L

742385, at *1 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1998).

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Each Employee at issue filed an application for OJI benefits with the City.2 All of the claims

but two were filed pursuant to section 7-51-201 of the Tennessee Code, known as the Tennessee

Heart and Lung Act.3 The City has adopted a special procedure for dealing with OJI claims for

benefits filed by law enforcement officers and firefighters under this statute. Pursuant to the City’s

OJI policy, the City’s Risk Manager, upon receiving an employee’s application for benefits, is tasked

with the responsibility of compiling the employee’s medical history for a period of ten years

preceding the application date, results of the pre-employment physical examination, and a copy of

the official job description for the employee’s position. These records are then forwarded to a panel

consisting of three physicians, one of whom performs a physical examination of the employee. The

panel of physicians seeks “to determine within a reasonable degree of medical certainty the primary

cause of the Employee’s illness.” The panel submits its written findings to the City’s Risk Manager

who either approves or denies the employee’s application for OJI benefits. In the instant case, the

City denied each Employee’s application for OJI benefits.

Pursuant to the City’s OJI Program policy, each Employee filed an appeal to the OJI Appeals

Panel to contest the City’s denial of benefits. The OJI Appeals Panel consists of the City’s Risk

Manager, the City’s Director of Finance or designee, and the City’s Attorney or designee. The

Employees were permitted to have their union representative present at the hearing before the OJI

Appeals Panel, but OJI Program policy did not permit the Employees to have legal counsel represent

them at the hearings. The OJI Appeals Panel affirmed the City’s denial of OJI benefits to each of

the Employees.

The Employees subsequently filed individual Petitions for Writ of Certiorari with the

Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking a review of the decision of the OJI Appeals Panel in their

respective cases.4. In each case, the Employees sought review of the decision of the OJI Appeals

Panel under a statutory writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a common law writ of certiorari. The

2

The claims filed by the firefighters consist of the following: (1) In March 2000, W ayne Moseley was

diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder; (2) In April 2000, Robert Franks was diagnosed with hypertension; (3)

In May 2000, Kim Stout was diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder, depression, generalized anxiety disorder,

and hyperventilation syndrome; (4) In October 2000, Columbus Echols was diagnosed with hypertension; (5) In October

2000, Richard Coggins was diagnosed with hypertension and heart disease; (6) In November 2000, Martin Roberts

suffered a myocardial infarction and was diagnosed with heart disease; (7) In November 2000, Roy Gookin was

diagnosed with heart disease; (8) In July 2001, Terry W ynne was diagnosed with hypertension; (9) In August 2001,

Andrew Hart was diagnosed with hypertension; (10) In August 2001, Lynn Patterson was diagnosed with atherosclerotic

coronary artery disease; (11) From January 2002 to August 2002, John Fralich, Jr. has experienced heart problems and

hypertension; (12) On M arch 19, 2002, Randy Jeanes died after experiencing complications with his blood pressure, and

he is represented by his wife, Laura Jeanes, in the present suit; and (13) Bethany Turner has experienced heart problems

she attributes to her employment with the City. Roy Tidwell, a police officer with the City, suffered a stroke in October

2000 and has been diagnosed with hypertension.

3

The claims filed by W ayne Moseley and Kim Stout were submitted to the City’s Risk Manager under separate

provisions of the OJI policy and were subsequently denied.

4

Two of the petitions were filed in 2000, six were filed in 2001, four were filed in 2002, and two were filed

in 2003.

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chancery court issued a writ in each case ordering that the administrative record be produced for

review. The City filed an answer to each petition contesting that the proper method of review in the

chancery court was by statutory writ of certiorari. The City also filed a motion in response to each

petition seeking partial dismissal of the petitions to the extent they sought review under a statutory

writ of certiorari. For purposes of the City’s motions, the chancery court consolidated the

Employees’ petitions and held a hearing on September 18, 2003. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the chancellor ordered the parties to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for

review. The chancellor subsequently granted the City’s motions excluding review under the

statutory writ of certiorari.

On December 11, 2003, the chancellor entered judgments in favor of the firefighters

incorporating the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the firefighters. Likewise,

on December 12, 2003, the chancellor entered a judgment in favor of the sole police officer

incorporating his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law into the judgment. The

chancery court, by incorporating the findings proposed by the Employees, made the following

conclusions of law: (1) Section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, governing review of the rulings of

boards and commissions, applies to the decisions of the City’s OJI Appeals Panel; (2) The proper

method of review of the OJI Appeals Panel decisions, therefore, is neither by common law or

statutory writ of certiorari, but review must be conducted in conformity with section 4-5-322 of the

Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”); and (3) Proceedings before the OJI Appeals

Panel must be conducted in accordance with the contested case procedures set forth in the Uniform

Administrative Procedures Act, section 4-5-301 et seq. of the Tennessee Code. Since the OJI

Appeals Panel did not conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedures outlined in the

UAPA, the chancery court reversed the decision of the OJI Appeals Panel in each case and ordered

the City to grant each Employee OJI benefits associated with their respective claims.

The City subsequently filed timely notices of appeal in each case to this Court. Pursuant to

Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court granted the Joint Motion for

Consolidation of Appeals filed by the parties after finding that the individual appeals presented

common issues of law. (Order, Jan. 21, 2004). Accordingly, we are presented, by all parties to the

present appeal, with the following issues for review:

I. Whether the chancery court erred in ruling that section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code

applies to the OJI Appeals Panel of the City of Memphis, specifically:

A. Whether the OJI Appeals Panel is a Civil Service Board, and

B. Whether the OJI Appeals Panel sits as a Civil Service Board because its decisions

affect “employment status”; and

II. Should this Court find that the contested case procedures of the Uniform Administrative

Procedures Act do apply to the OJI Appeals Panel, whether the chancery court erred in

entering judgment for the Employees rather than remanding for hearings conducted in

accordance with the applicable procedural standards.

For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the decision of the chancery court.

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Standard of Review

On appeal, the facts in these consolidated cases are not in dispute since both the City and

Employees agree that the procedures used by the OJI Appeals Panel did not comply with the

contested case procedures found in the UAPA. This Court is confronted in this case with issues

involving the interpretation of statutory language. “Construction of a statute is a question of law

which we review de novo, with no presumption of correctness.” Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit

Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924

(Tenn. 1998)); see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) (citing

Estate of Adkins v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)); ATS,

Inc. v. Kent, 27 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

In construing statutory language, we are mindful of the following standards adopted by the

courts of this state which aid us in this task:

A “basic rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give

effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.” Carson Creek

Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2

(Tenn. 1993). In determining legislative intent and purpose, a court

must not “unduly restrict[ ] or expand[ ] a statute’s coverage beyond

its intended scope.” Worley v. Weigel’s, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 589, 593

(Tenn. 1996) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.

1995)). Rather, a court ascertains a statute’s purpose from the plain

and ordinary meaning of its language, see Westland Community Ass’n

v. Knox County, 948 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tenn. 1997), “without forced

or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the

language.” Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 2.

When, however, a statute is without contradiction or

ambiguity, there is no need to force its interpretation or construction,

and courts are not at liberty to depart from the words of the statute.

Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn. 1997).

Moreover, if “the language contained within the four corners of a

statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, the duty of the courts is

simple and obvious, ‘to say sic lex scripta, and obey it.’” Id. (quoting

Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 320, 321–22 (1841)).

Therefore, “if the words of a statute plainly mean one thing they

cannot be given another meaning by judicial construction.” Henry v.

White, 194 Tenn. 192, 250 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1952).

Finally, it is not for the courts to alter or amend a statute. See

Town of Mount Carmel v. City of Kingsport, 217 Tenn. 298, 306, 397

S.W.2d 379, 382 (1965); see also Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of

Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995); Manahan v. State, 188

Tenn. 394, 397, 219 S.W.2d 900, 901 (1949). Moreover, a court

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must not question the “reasonableness of a statute or substitute [its]

own policy judgments for those of the legislature.” BellSouth

Telecomms., Inc. v. Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1997). Instead, courts must “presume that the legislature says in a

statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Id.

Accordingly, courts must construe a statute as it is written. See

Jackson v. Jackson, 186 Tenn. 337, 342, 210 S.W.2d 332, 334

(1948).

Gleaves, 15 S.W.3d at 802–03. We also presume that the legislature has “knowledge of the state of

the law on the subject under consideration at the time it enacts legislation.” Hise v. State, 968

S.W.2d 852, 854–55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Jenkins v. Loudon County, 736 S.W.2d 603, 608

(Tenn. 1987); Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Odle, 547 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tenn. 1997)).

Writs of Certiorari and the UAPA

Our analysis in this case must begin with an examination of the progression of the law which

led to the current conflict. The Employees sought review of the decision of the OJI Appeal Panel

by filing a “Petition for Writ of Certiorari” in the chancery court below. The Employees asserted in

their petitions that the chancery court had jurisdiction over the cases “pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 27-8-104,5 and certiorari is authorized by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-8-101, 27-8-102 and 27-9-114.”

“In Tennessee, two types of certiorari exist.” Fairhaven Corp. v. Tenn. Health Facilities

Comm’n, 566 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). Section 27-8-101 provides for review under

the common-law writ of certiorari, stating:

The writ of certiorari may be granted whenever authorized by law,

and also in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer

exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred,

or is acting illegally, when, in the judgment of the court, there is no

other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. This section does not apply

to actions governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

5

Section 27-8-104 provides:

Power of circuit and chancery courts.

(a) The judges of the inferior courts of law have the power, in all civil cases, to

issue writs of certiorari to remove any cause or transcript thereof from any inferior

tribunal, on sufficient cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

(b) The chancellors shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the judges of the circuit

courts of this state in granting writs of certiorari and supersedeas removing causes

from general sessions courts to the circuit courts.

T EN N . C O D E A N N . § 27-8-104 (2003).

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TENN . CODE ANN . § 27-8-101 (2003). Section 27-8-102 provides for review under the statutory writ

of certiorari and is not at issue in this case.6

“Common law certiorari is available where the court reviews an administrative decision in

which that agency is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” Davison v. Carr, 659 S.W.2d

361, 363 (Tenn. 1983); see also Case v. Shelby County Civil Serv. Merit Bd., 98 S.W.3d 167, 171

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). The scope of judicial review under the common law writ is limited to the

following:

Generally, under common law certiorari, the scope of review is

limited to the record to determine as a question of law whether there

is any material evidence to support the agency’s findings. However,

new evidence is admissible on the issue of whether the administrative

body exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, capriciously or

arbitrarily.

Id. Thus, the trial court may reverse or modify the action of the administrative agency when that

agency “acted in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions or in excess of its own statutory

authority; has followed unlawful procedure or been guilty of arbitrary or capricious action; or has

acted without material evidence to support its decision.” Watts v. Civil Serv. Bd. for Columbia, 606

S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1980); see also Gross v. Gilless, 26 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

“The scope of review by the appellate courts is no broader or more comprehensive than that of the

trial court with respect to evidence presented before the Board.” Watts, 606 S.W.2d at 277.

The legislature promulgated the UAPA “to clarify and bring uniformity to the procedure of

state administrative agencies and judicial review of their determination.” TENN . CODE ANN . § 4-5-

103(a) (2003) (emphasis added). The legislature also provided that the UAPA’s provisions “shall

not apply to . . . county and municipal boards, commissions, committees, department or officers.”

TENN . CODE ANN . § 4-5-106(a) (2003). “A person who is aggrieved by a final decision in a

contested case is entitled to judicial review under [the UAPA].” TENN . CODE ANN . § 4-5-322(a)(1)

(2003). A “Contested case” is defined by the UAPA as “a proceeding . . . in which the legal rights,

duties or privileges of a party are required by any statute or constitutional provision to be determined

6

“Review under a statutory writ is by trial de novo.” McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W .2d 633, 638

(Tenn. 1990) (citing Roberts v. Brown, 310 S.W .2d 197, 206–08 (Tenn. 1957)). Review under a statutory writ of

certiorari is appropriate where a statute provides “the scope and method of review of an action of an administrative

body.” Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 746 S.W .2d 176, 178 (Tenn. 1987). Although the Employees sought,

in the alternative, review under the statutory writ of certiorari, the chancery court properly recognized that it could not

undertake a review of the decision of the OJI Appeals Panel in these cases under the statutory writ. The Employees

apparently realized the error of seeking review under a statutory writ of certiorari when their proposed Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law omitted as an option review of the OJI Appeals Panel decisions under a statutory writ of

certiorari. Regardless of the resolution of the dispositive issues in this case, it is clear that the statutory writ of certiorari

was an improper vehicle to use when seeking review of the OJI Appeals Panel decisions. See Davis v. Hamilton County

Bd. of Educ., No. 03A01-9504-CH-00135, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1995);

Cunningham v. Bd. of Educ for Grundy County, No. 85-302-II, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3331, at *4–5 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Oct. 1, 1986).

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by an agency after an opportunity for a hearing.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-102(3) (2003). A person

can request judicial review “by filing a petition in the chancery court of Davidson County, unless

another court is specified by statute[,] . . . within sixty (60) days after the entry of the agency’s final

order thereon.” TENN . CODE ANN . § 4-5-322(b)(1) (2003). When reviewing an agency’s decision,

the chancery court is bound by the following standard of review:

(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the

case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the

decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because

the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory

provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion; or

(5) Unsupported by the evidence which is both

substantial and material in light of the entire record.

In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into

account whatever the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the

court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the

weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

TENN . CODE ANN . § 4-5-322(h) (2003).

At issue in this case is the present statutory language found in section 27-9-114 of the

Tennessee Code. Prior to 1989, however, section 27-9-114 provided that:

No court of record of this state shall entertain any proceeding

involving the civil service status of a county or a municipal employee

when such proceeding in the nature of an appeal from a ruling of city

or county official or board which affects the employment status of a

county or city employee, except such proceeding be one of common

law certiorari. Any such proceeding shall be heard by a judge or

chancellor without the intervention of a jury. This section shall

supersede any displaced provisions of city charters to the contrary.

TENN . CODE ANN . § 27-914 (1984) (emphasis added). Our supreme court held that section 27-9-

114, “dealing exclusively with the employment status of city and county employees, is the exclusive

remedy for judicial review of administrative determinations respecting the employment status of

such employees.” Huddleston v. City of Murfreesboro, 635 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tenn. 1982); see also

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Gaston v. Civil Serv. Merit Bd. of Shelby County, 1986 WL 9964, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15,

1986).

Accordingly, this Court applied the pre-1989 language of section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee

Code and held that decisions of a municipality’s civil service commission were to be judicially

reviewed under a common law writ of certiorari. See City of Memphis Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Eulls,

1988 WL 119291, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1988); Moore v. Civil Serv. Comm’n for the City

of Memphis, No. 41, 1988 WL 1730, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1988); Smith v. City of Memphis,

1986 WL 9698, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1986). During the same period, the courts of this

state, also relying on the language in section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, reviewed the decisions

originating from other entities under a common law writ of certiorari as well. See Huddleston v. City

of Murfreesboro, 635 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that judicial review of the decision

of a city council regarding an employee’s discharge under section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code

was by common law certiorari); Love v. Ret. Sys. of the City of Memphis, No. 27, 1987 WL 17246,

at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1987) (reviewing the city’s denial of pension benefits to an employee

under a common law writ of certiorari); State v. City of Linden, No. 86-303-II, 1986 WL 13641, at

*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1986) (addressing a petition to rehear and stating that review of a

decision of the board of mayor and alderman was by common law writ of certiorari); Cunningham

v. Bd. of Educ. for Grundy County, No. 85-302-II, 1986 WL 10692, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 1,

1986) (stating that the applicable standard of review of a decision by the board of education

terminating a school employee was by common law writ of certiorari); Whitten v. Tucker, 1986 WL

4599, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1986) (“We hold that a review of the City of Knoxville Board

of Education’s decision to fire, or not to fire, a teacher tenured under that system is governed by the

provisions of T.C.A. Sec. 27-9-114.”); Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 386

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (reviewing the decision of a health board to terminate an employee under a

common law writ of certiorari).

In 1988, the legislature amended section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code to provide, in

relevant part, as follows:

Proceedings involving certain public employees.

(a)(1) Contested case hearings by civil service boards of a county or

municipality which affect the employment status of a civil service

employee shall be conducted in conformity with contested case

procedures under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act,

compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3.

(2) The provisions of this subsection pertaining to hearings by civil

service boards shall not apply to municipal utilities boards or civil

service boards of counties organized under a home rule charter form

of government.

(b)(1) Judicial review of decisions by civil service boards of a county

or municipality which affects the employment status of a county or

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city civil service employee shall be in conformity with the judicial

review standards under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act,

§ 4-5-322.

(2) Petitions for judicial review of decisions by a city or county civil

service board affecting the employment status of a civil service

employee shall be filed in the chancery court of the county wherein

the local civil service board is located.

TENN . CODE ANN . § 27-9-114 (2003) (emphasis added); see also 1988 TENN . PUB. ACTS Ch. 1001;

City of Knoxville v. Popejoy, No. 03A01-9104-CH-00148, 1991 WL 276796, at *2 n.1 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Dec. 31, 1991).

Subsequent to the statutory amendment of section 27-9-114, this Court continued to apply

the language of section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code to the decisions of civil service boards, but

we reviewed those decisions under the standard of review found in section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee

Code. See Hughey v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. M2002-02240-COA-R3-

CV, 2003 WL 21849628, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2003); Lien v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &

Davidson County, 117 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Howell v. City of Columbia, No.

M2001-00620-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31322529, at *2 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002); Robbins

v. City of Johnson City, No. E2000-02952-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 767020, at *4–5 (Tenn. Ct. App.

July 3, 2001); Mack v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the City of Memphis, No. 02A01-9807-CH-00215,

1999 WL 250180, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Knoxville Utilities Bd. v. Knoxville Civil Serv. Merit

Bd., No. 03A01-9301-CH-00008, 1993 WL 229505, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1993); City of

Memphis v. Owens, No. 02A01-9109CH00202, 1992 WL 227561, at *6 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.

18, 1992); City of Knoxville v. Popejoy, No. 03A01-9104-CH-00148, 1991 WL 276796, at *2 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1991); Lockridge v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. 01-A-

019103CH00097, 1991 WL 153316, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1991); Lewis v. Metro. Gov’t

of Nashville & Davidson County, No. 01-A-01-9006CH00220, 1990 WL 205223, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Dec. 18, 1990); State v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson

County, No. 01-A-01-9002-CH00061, 1990 WL 165073, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1990).

Conversely, many decisions rendered by this Court subsequent to the statutory amendment

of section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code referenced the statute when discussing the judicial review

of decisions rendered by other municipal entities not specifically designated a civil service board.

See Yates v. City of Chattanooga, No. E2000-02064-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 533351, at *2 (Tenn.

Ct. App. May 21, 2001) (applying the amended statutory language to the review of a decision by a

city council to terminate an employee); Bullard v. City of Chattanooga Firemen’s and Policemen’s

Ins. & Pension Fund, No. 03A01-9705-CH-00193, 1998 WL 90834, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3,

1998) (stating that the amended language in section 27-9-114 applies to the denial of pension

benefits to civil service employees); Stephenson v. Town of White Pine, No. 03A01-9705-CH-00185,

1997 WL 718974, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1997) (reviewing a decision by the town council

to terminate a city employee under section 27-9-114); Paris v. City of Lebanon Pers. Review Bd.,

No. 01A01-9702-CH-00054, 1997 WL 607519, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 1997) (applying the

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amended language to the review of the decision of a city personnel board); Holder v. City of

Chattanooga, 878 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the argument of the appellant

that a city council did not qualify as a “civil service board” under the language in section 27-9-114);

Kendrick v. City of Chattanooga Firemen’s & Policemen’s Ins. & Pension Fund, 799 S.W.2d 668,

669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (referencing our decision in Love when discussing review of a pension

benefit board’s denial of pension benefits to an employee); Jones v. Pers. Merit Bd. of the City of

Dyersburg, No. 5, 1998 WL 104697, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1988) (reviewing the city’s

termination of a fireman following an on-the-job injury under section 27-9-114).

Our research has also identified decisions by this Court, subsequent to the 1988 amendment

to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, holding that the proper standard of review of the

decisions by agencies not expressly identified as a civil service boards is by common law certiorari.

See Pardue v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. 01A01-9707-CH-00312, 1998 WL

173208, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1998) (stating that the Metropolitan Benefit Board “is an

agency of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Administrative

Procedures Act does not cover ‘county and municipal boards, commissions, committees,

departments or offices.’”); Davis v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., No. 03A01-9504-CH-00135,

1995 WL 507796, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1995) (reviewing a decision by the board of

education to terminate a bus driver, and alluding to the proper standard of review being by common

law writ of certiorari).

In several instances, this Court stated that review of decisions falling under section 27-9-114

of the Tennessee Code are no longer by common law writ of certiorari, but the proper method of

appeal is by filing a petition for judicial review pursuant to section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code.

See Maasikas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. M2002-02652-COA-R3-CV,

2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 889, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2003); Woods v. Metro. Gov’t of

Nashville & Davidson County, No. M2001-03143-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 858, at

*4–5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003); Stephenson v. Town of White Pine, No. 03A01-9705-CH-

00185, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 787, at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1997); Knoxville Util. Bd.

v. Knoxville Civil Serv. Merit Bd., No. 03A01-9301-CH-00008, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 438, at *24

(Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1993); City of Memphis v. Owens, No. 02A01-9109-CH-00202, 1992 Tenn.

App. LEXIS 784, at *1 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 1992); City of Knoxville v. Popejoy, No.

03A01-9104-CH-00148, 1991 WL 276796, at *2 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1991).

Whether section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code applies to the OJI Appeals Panel

Having set forth the legal landscape which led to the current dispute, we now turn our

attention to the issues presented on appeal. We begin by noting that we agree with the chancery

court in that, by amending section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, the legislature made proceedings

before a “civil service board,” and judicial review of those decisions, subject to the provisions of the

UAPA. Therefore, review of the decisions of a civil service board is no longer by common law writ

of certiorari, but by filing a petition for review under section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code. See

Stephenson v. Town of White Pine, No. 03A01-9705-CH-00185, 1997 WL 718974, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.

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App. Nov. 13, 1997); Paris v. City of Lebanon Pers. Review Bd., No. 01A01-9702-CH-00054, 1997

WL 607519, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 1997); City of Memphis v. Owens, No. 02A01-

9109CH00202, 1992 WL 227561, at *6 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 1992).

In those instances where section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code is applicable, our supreme

court has provided that this statute “is the exclusive remedy for judicial review of administrative

determinations respecting the employment status of such employees.” Huddleston v. City of

Murfreesboro, 635 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tenn. 1982). As a threshold matter, we are asked to determine

whether the chancery court erred in applying the applicable statute to the OJI Appeals Panel. The

City argues that the OJI Appeals Panel does not constitute a “civil service board” as that term is used

in section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, therefore, section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code is

inapplicable to the OJI Appeals Panel. Accordingly, the City asserts that the proper method of

judicial review is to review decisions by the OJI Appeals Panel under the common law writ of

certiorari.

“The primary rule of statutory construction is that the intention of the legislature must

prevail.” Lucchesi v. Alcohol & Licensing Comm’n of the City of Memphis, 70 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2001). When presented with issues of statutory construction, we begin in the first instance

by examining the language employed by the legislature as follows:

Courts are restricted to natural and ordinary meaning of the language

used by the legislature in the statute, unless an ambiguity requires

resort elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent.” Austin v. Memphis

Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. 1983). A statute is ambiguous

if it is capable of conveying more than one meaning. In re

Conservatorship of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn. App. 1995).

We must consider the language employed in context of the entire

statute without any forced or subtle construction which would extend

or limit its meaning. Wilson v. Johnson County, 879 S.W.2d 807, 809

(Tenn. 1994). Furthermore, we are to assume that the legislature used

each word in the statute purposely, and that the use of these words

conveys some intent and has a meaning and purpose. Locust, 912

S.W.2d at 718. Where words of the statute are clear and plain and

fully express the legislature’s intent, there is no room to resort to

auxiliary rules of construction, Roberson v. University of Tennessee,

912 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Tenn. App. 1995), and we need only enforce

the statute as written, Clayton, 914 S.W.2d at 90.

Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998). This Court is not authorized to amend a

statute, Limbaugh v. Coffee Medical Center, 59 S.W.3d 73, 83 (Tenn. 2001), nor is it our province

to impose our own judgment over that of the legislature, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v.

Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

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The City correctly identifies the absence of a definition of “civil service board” in section 27-

9-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code. Holder v. City of Chattanooga, 878 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1994). The City urges this Court to apply the meaning of that term as described in section

6-54-114, which provides:

M u n i c i p a l c i v i l s e r v ice b o a r d –

Members–Qualifications–Appointment.

....

(b) Notwithstanding any provision of any municipal charter or

ordinance to the contrary, all members of any municipal civil service

board in any county with a population greater than three hundred

thousand (300,000), created by ordinance or charter, shall be

appointed by the mayor of the municipality which the board serves.

Such appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the municipal

legislative body. At least one (1) member shall be a woman and one

(1) member shall be a minority citizen. The provisions of this section

shall not apply to municipalities with a mayor-alderman form of

government.

TENN . CODE ANN . §6-54-114(b) (2003). When the legislature amended section 27-9-114 of the

Tennessee Code, it chose to remove the broad language “city or county official or board” and

replace it with the specific phrase “civil service board.” See 1988 TENN . PUB. ACTS Ch. 1001.

“When approaching statutory text, courts must . . . presume that the legislature says in a statute

what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Greer,

972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted).

Both parties agree that the OJI Appeals Panel does not comply with section 6-54-114 of the

Tennessee Code. The OJI Appeals Panel was not created by city charter, and its members are not

appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city council. When construing statutory language, we

must seek to avoid a construction which would be repugnant to another section of the Tennessee

Code and thereby create a conflict. See Williams v. Thomas Jefferson Ins. Co., 385 S.W.2d 908,

910–11 (Tenn. 1965) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we find that the OJI Appeals Panel is not a

“civil service board,” as that term was intended to be used by the legislature, under section 27-9-114

of the Tennessee Code.

The Employees, in arguing that decisions of the OJI Appeals Panel are subject to section 27-

9-114 of the Tennessee Code and, in turn, the UAPA, point to our decision in Love v. Retirement

System of the City of Memphis, No. 27, 1987 WL 17246, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1987), and

its progeny. In Love, the city’s Board of Retirement denied pension benefits to a city judge, and the

judge filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the chancery court. Love, 1987 WL 17246, at *1.

The chancery court conducted a de novo review of the proceedings before the Board of Retirement

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finding that the petitioner’s application for benefits should have been granted by the board. Id. The

city appealed, asking this Court to address whether the chancery court erred by not applying the more

restrictive common law writ of certiorari standard of review. Id. In reversing the decision of the

chancery court, we held that the proper standard of review, pursuant to the pre-1989 language in

section 27-9-114, was by common law certiorari. Id. The Employees also point to our decisions in

Kendrick v. City of Chattanooga Firemen’s and Policemen’s Insurance and Pension Fund, 799

S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), and Bullard v. City of Chattanooga Firemen’s and Policemen’s

Insurance and Pension Fund, No. 03A01-9705-CH-00193, 1998 WL 90834 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.

3, 1998), as instances where this Court has applied the current language in section 27-9-114 of the

Tennessee Code to municipal boards similar to the OJI Appeals Panel at issue in this case.7

After examining the statutory language of section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code and

reviewing the applicable case law, we conclude that the Employee’s argument is misguided. We

begin by noting that our decision in Love was premised upon the pre-amendment language in section

27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, which the legislature made applicable to “an appeal from a ruling

of a city or county official or board which affects the employment status of a county or city

employee.” See Love, 1987 WL 17246, at *1 (emphasis added). As stated previously, when the

legislature amended section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code in 1988, the legislature removed this

broad terminology and inserted the more specific language “civil service boards of a county or

municipality.” See TENN . CODE ANN . § 27-9-114 (2003). Therefore, our decision in Love, applying

section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code to a retirement board, was consistent with the statutory

language present at the time.

In Kendrick, the chancery court, reviewing the case under a statutory writ of certiorari and

employing a de novo standard of review, reversed the city’s decision denying an employee pension

benefits. Kendrick, 799 S.W.2d at 668. In reversing the chancery court, this Court held that “[t]he

action of the Board was subject to review by common law writ of certiorari since the agency was

acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” Id. (citing Davison v. Carr, 659 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn.

1983); TENN . CODE ANN . § 27-8-101). The Employees correctly point out that in Kendrick we cited

to our decision in Love as an example where this Court applied section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee

Code to a municipal body’s denial of pension benefits. Id. at 669. Our citation to Love, however,

constitutes obiter dictum not binding upon the Court in the present case. See Shepherd Fleets, Inc.

v. Opryland USA, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). We reach this conclusion by

noting that, in Kendrick, when stating the proper manner of review was by common law certiorari,

we cited to section 27-8-101 of the Tennessee Code governing the common law writ of certiorari as

authority for that conclusion. See Kendrick, 799 S.W.2d at 668. Our decision to review the case

7

During oral argument, the Employees also cited to our decision in Lockridge v. Metropolitan Government of

Nashville, No. 01-A-019103CH00097, 1991 W L 153316 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1991), where we held that section

4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code applied to the decision of the city’s civil service board in failing to promote minority

employees, as additional support for their position. W e find our holding in Lockridge, as it relates to the issue of whether

the OJI Appeals Panel qualifies as a civil service board, inapplicable to the present case because we were dealing

specifically with a civil service board in that case. See Lockridge, 1991 W L 153316, at *1.

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under the standards applicable to a common law writ of certiorari was warranted given the recent

amendment to the statute.

The Employees also assert that our decision in Bullard is factually similar to the undisputed

facts set forth in the present case. In Bullard, the city’s pension fund board denied an employee

disability benefits after he suffered a heart attack he attributed to his duties as a fireman. Bullard,

1998 WL 90834, at *1. Citing to Kendrick, we stated that the proper method of reviewing the

board’s decision, pursuant to section 27-9-114, was in accordance with section 4-5-322(h) of the

Tennessee Code. Id. The Employee’s reliance on our decision in Bullard is flawed. It was incorrect

for the Court in Bullard to say that we applied the language in section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee

Code in Kendrick to the denial of pensions to civil servants.8 See id. As we expressly stated in

Kendrick, “[t]he action of the Board was subject to review by a common law writ of certiorari since

the agency was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” Kendrick, 799 S.W.2d at 668 (citing

TENN . CODE ANN . § 27-8-101) (emphasis added).

Finally, the City asserts that, even if we determine that the OJI Appeals Panel is not a civil

service board, our inquiry does not end there. The City directs our attention to this Court’s decision

in Holder v. City of Chattanooga, 878 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), where we were asked

to determine the appropriate standard of review when reviewing the decision of a city council in

discharging a police officer. In applying the provisions of section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code

to the city council’s decision, we stated:

Appellant insists that the application of the statute is restricted to

decisions of “civil service boards” and points out that the [term]

“civil service boards” is not defined in the statute. We are of the

opinion, however, that there is no merit in this insistence. It is clear

that the City Council of Chattanooga was sitting as a civil service

board rather than as a legislative body insofar as the proceedings

involved here are concerned.

Id. at 952. The City contends that it is necessary for this Court to decide whether the OJI Appeals

Panel “was sitting as a civil service board” by rendering a decision which “affect[ed] the

employment status of a civil service employee.” See State v. Odom, 137 S.W.3d 572, 581 (Tenn.

2004); City of Memphis v. Overton, 392 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tenn. 1965) (“[I]t is axiomatic that this

State has long approved the doctrine of stare decisis.”).

The Employees once again rely on our decisions in Love, Kendrick, and Bullard to argue that

this Court has expressly held that “employment status” includes benefits associated with

employment. As stated above, the Employees’ reliance on Kendrick and Bullard is misplaced. The

8

In a recent decision, this Court correctly identified and applied the holding in Kendrick by reviewing the

decision of a pension board under the common law writ of certiorari. Pardue v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson

County, No. 01A01-9707-CH-00312, 1998 W L 173208, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1998).

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Employees’ argument that, in Kendrick, this Court held section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code

applied to the decision of a municipal pension board is incorrect. To the contrary, we reiterate that

in Kendrick we held that “[t]he action of the Board was subject to review by a common law writ of

certiorari since the agency was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” Kendrick v. City of

Chattanooga Firemen’s & Policemen’s Ins. & Pension Fund, 799 S.W.2d 668, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1990) (citing TENN . CODE ANN . § 27-8-101). Likewise, for reasons already discussed, the

Employee’s reliance on our decision in Bullard is misplaced as well. See Bullard v. City of

Chattanooga Firemen’s & Policemen’s Ins. & Pension Fund, No. 03A01-9705-CH-00193, 1998 WL

90834, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1998) (citing Kendrick, 799 S.W.2d at 668).

The overriding contention between the parties, however, is this Court’s statement in Love to

the effect that:

Although most of the cases arising under T.C.A. § 27-9-114 have to

do with employee discharges and suspensions, see, e.g., Wheeler v.

City of Memphis, 685 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. App. 1984), and Burns v.

Johnson, 636 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. App. 1982), we are of the opinion

that the statute is not limited to those situations. The term

“employment status” encompasses the entire legal relation of the

employee to the employer. An employee’s eligibility for the

retirement benefits is an important aspect of that relation. We

therefore hold that the trial court erred in not restricting its scope of

review to that applicable to a common law writ of certiorari.

Love v. Ret. Sys. of the City of Memphis, No. 27, 1987 WL 17246, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21,

1987), perm. to appeal denied (Dec. 28, 1987). Given the fact that Love was decided under the pre-

amendment language of section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code and the subsequent decisions by

this Court applying the amended language have typically limited the statutes application to

discharges, demotions, and the like,9 our decision in Love has become less significant in recent years.

See Holder, 878 S.W.2d at 951 (addressing a city employee’s discharge); see also Pardue v. Metro.

Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. 01A01-9707-CH-00312, 1998 WL 173208, at *1 (Tenn.

9

See Hughey v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. M2002-02240-COA-R3-CV, 2003 W L

21849628, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2003); Lien v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 117 S.W .3d 753,

757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Howell v. City of Columbia, No. M2001-00620-COA-R3-CV, 2002 W L 31322529, at *2

n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002); Robbins v. City of Johnson City, No. E2000-02952-COA-R3-CV, 2001 W L 767020,

at *4–5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2001); Mack v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the City of Memphis, No. 02A01-9807-CH-00215,

1999 W L 250180, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Knoxville Utilis. Bd. v. Knoxville Civil Serv. Merit Bd., No. 03A01-9301-

CH-00008, 1993 W L 229505, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1993); City of Memphis v. Owens, No. 02A01-

9109CH00202, 1992 W L 227561, at *6 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 1992); City of Knoxville v. Popejoy, No. 03A01-

9104-CH-00148, 1991 W L 276796, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1991); Lockridge v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &

Davidson County, No. 01-A-019103CH00097, 1991 W L 153316, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1991); Lewis v. Metro.

Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. 01-A-01-9006CH00220, 1990 W L 205223, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18,

1990); State v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, No. 01-A-01-9002-CH00061,

1990 W L 165073, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1990).

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Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1998) (holding that review of benefit board’s decision denying an employee

pension benefits is by common law certiorari and not under the UAPA). In addition, when the

legislature amended the statute by limiting its application to “civil service boards,” it also impliedly

limited the nature of the decisions falling under the statute.10 Therefore, the decisions of the OJI

Appeals Panel did not affect the “employment status” of the Employees as we have interpreted that

term subsequent to the statutory amendment of section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code.

Given the legislature’s decision to amend section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code by

removing the broad language “city or county official or board” and substituting the specific language

“civil service boards of a county or municipality,” we find that the OJI Appeals Panel does not

qualify as a civil service board. In addition, we find that the decision by the OJI Appeals Panel to

deny disability benefits to the Employees did not affect their “employment status” as that term is

used in the statute and defined by our case law. Accordingly, the chancery court erred by applying

section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code to the OJI Appeals Panel, thereby making the procedural

and judicial review provisions of the UAPA applicable to the OJI Appeals Panel. In this instance,

proper judicial review of the decision by the OJI Appeals Panel is by common law writ of certiorari.

See Kendrick v. City of Chattanooga Firemen’s & Policemen’s Ins. & Pension Fund Bd., 799

S.W.2d 668, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Since we have determined that section 27-9-114 of the

Tennessee Code does not apply to the OJI Appeals Panel, it is not necessary for this Court to reach

the remaining issue.

Conclusion

For the reasons contained herein, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and find that

the City’s OJI Appeals Panel is not subject to the provisions of section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee

Code. Accordingly, it was error for the chancery court to grant benefits to the Employees based upon

the OJI Appeals Panel’s perceived failure to comply with the provisions of the UAPA and

necessitates our reinstating the decision of the OJI Appeals Panel. Costs of this appeal are taxed

against the Appellees, for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

10

W e note, and our case law has established, that the decisions presented for review under the broader language

“city or county official or board” will necessarily produce a more divergent array of factual circumstances than the more

narrow language “civil service board.” By limiting review under section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code to decisions

of a “civil service board,” the legislature, in effect, narrowed the meaning of “employment status.”

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