Yvonne N. Robertson v. Tennessee Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 4, 2005 Session

YVONNE N. ROBERTSON v. TENNESSEE BOARD OF SOCIAL

WORKER CERTIFICATION AND LICENSURE, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 02-2869-II Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor

No. M2004-00647-COA-R3-CV - Filed November 15, 2005

The Tennessee Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure appeals from the decision of the

Chancery Court to set aside its disciplinary ruling revoking a licensed clinical social worker’s license

for two years for engaging in a dual relationship with a client. The Chancellor set aside the Board’s

ruling on the grounds the sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion and were arbitrary and

capricious. We reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and reinstate the Board’s order of

revocation.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed

FRANK G. CLEMENT , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM B. CAIN , J., joined.

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; and Sara E. Sedgwick, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellant, Tennessee Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure and

Tennessee Department of Health.

Michael E. Terry, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Yvonne N. Robertson.

OPINION

Prior to seeking licensure as a licensed clinical social worker, Yvonne Robertson worked in

the health care field as a certified master social worker. She had been certified as such by the

Tennessee Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure since October of 1994. In 1996,

Robertson sought to advance her career and economic status in the health care industry by making

application to become a licensed clinical social worker, independent practitioner of social work, by

examination. Robertson’s application, however, and the right to take the requisite examination for

licensure, were denied because of a 1982 felony conviction for three counts of forgery.1 Robertson

appealed the denial of her application. A contested evidentiary hearing was conducted after which

1

Robertson was convicted on three counts of forging payroll checks.

the Board reversed the prior decision and approved Robertson’s application “to sit for the licensure

examination.” Pursuant to the Board’s order, entered February 26, 1997, Robertson took the

examination, which she passed. As a result, Robertson was granted a Clinical Social Worker license

in 1997.

In September of 1997, Robertson was employed to work in the Great Starts program at Child

and Family, Inc., a nonprofit community agency providing in-patient and out-patient services for

persons in need. Great Starts had three shelters and provided advocates for women in need of

protection from abusive relationships. It also operated a residential treatment facility for persons

with addictions and offered classes, group therapy, and transportation to Alcoholics Anonymous and

Narcotics Anonymous.

In early 1998, a client, D.W.,2 came to the Great Starts program. She was enrolled in the

program, and Robertson was assigned as her individual, primary therapist. The client left the

program shortly thereafter but returned in December 1998. When the client returned, a different

social worker was assigned to be her individual, primary therapist, and Robertson was assigned to

be her group therapist.

During the client’s time at Great Starts, Robertson developed a personal relationship with the

client, one of companionship and friendship that went beyond permissible professional boundaries.

Dual relationships, as they are called, are expressly and strictly prohibited. Neither the social worker

nor the client may become involved in the other’s personal life. The duty is on the social worker to

maintain a professional boundary to avoid possible adverse consequences to the client. Due to the

likely adverse effect on the client, dual relationships are expressly proscribed as unethical conduct

by a social worker in Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 1365-1-.13. Moreover, a clinical social worker’s

license may be revoked for such unethical conduct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-23-106(a).

The prohibition against dual relationships notwithstanding, Robertson developed a significant

personal relationship with the client between July and October of 1999. They spent a great deal of

time together on numerous occasions away from work over the four-month period. The meetings

and activities that violated the dual relationship prohibition included the two of them attending

sporting events in which Robertson’s son participated, the client spending Christmas with Robertson

and her family, and the client staying the night at Robertson’s house on at least two occasions. Other

prohibited activities that took place away from work included Robertson and the client going on

walks together and attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings together.

Robertson explained that she engaged in the extracurricular personal relationship with the

client in an effort to help the client stay sober. Though perhaps well intended, the proscribed dual

relationship constituted unethical conduct.

2

The identity of D.W . is irrelevant to the issues; therefore, we shall refer to D.W . hereafter as the client.

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Not unexpectedly, the personal relationship between Robertson and the client came to a

tumultuous and tragic ending. The beginning of the end occurred when Robertson’s supervisor

observed Robertson with the client away from work.3 Sometime thereafter, the supervisor discussed

the matter with Robertson. Robertson had meetings with her supervisor and senior staff at Great

Starts during which she admitted the relationship with the client, though she did not disclose the

extent of the relationship. It was not until later, when the client more fully disclosed the relationship

to the staff at Great Starts, that Robertson was forthcoming about the extent of the relationship.

Shortly after the supervisor discussed the matter with Robertson, Robertson informed the

client their relationship was inappropriate and could not continue. The client took the news badly.

Not only did the client become emotionally traumatized, she acted out by making threats against

other staff members at Great Starts, including a threat to kill a staff member whom she believed

reported the relationship. The termination of the dual relationship also produced a significant

depression, one the client suffered for several months.

Robertson’s dual relationship with the client was reported to the Tennessee Department of

Health, Division of Health Related Boards, which investigated the matter. In November of 2001,

the Department of Health initiated the proceedings at issue by serving a Notice of Charges on

Robertson, informing her it was seeking suspension or revocation of her license. The Notice of

Charges contained “Allegations of Fact” and “Allegations of Law.” The Allegations of Fact

included the specifics of the dual relationship and that Robertson’s application for licensure was

originally denied because of a 1982 criminal conviction and granted thereafter following a contested

hearing; the 1982 criminal conviction, however, was not mentioned in the Allegations of Law.

A contested administrative hearing before the Tennessee Board of Social Worker

Certification and Licensure was held on May 6, 2002. The Department of Health contended that

Robertson violated patient-therapist boundaries and sought revocation of Robertson’s license.

Robertson admitted she violated the boundaries between patient and therapist. She also admitted

her behavior caused harm to the client. She attributed this mistake to becoming too involved with

the patient and losing sight of what was therapeutic. Robertson contended this was an isolated

incident, that she had not violated the boundaries between patient and therapist on any other

occasion, and having learned from this mistake she was now “hyper-vigilant” about boundaries.

Robertson did not contest the violation, and she recognized that the Board would have to take some

sort of disciplinary action.

Following closing arguments, the Board engaged in an open discussion of the case. Members

of the Board expressed various opinions and made suggestions regarding the appropriate sanction.

During this discussion, some Board members made reference to the initial denial of Robertson’s

application in 1996 and to the 1997 hearing. The Chair commented that Robertson had been before

3

Robertson was having domestic problems and had to appear in court in Knox County, Tennessee. She had

informed the client of her difficulties and the scheduled court hearing. The client, on her own initiative, appeared at the

hearing to support her friend, Robertson. Robertson’s supervisor was also in attendance.

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the Board in the past. Another member addressed Robertson’s felony conviction but expressed the

opinion that the situation regarding the dual relationship should be viewed on its own merits.

Another Board member expressed concern about this being her second time before the Board. The

Chair also referenced the portion of the Board’s 1997 order where the Board credited Robertson for

being committed to upholding the professional standards in the practice of social work, though

noting, “again, today she has admitted that she has violated ethical and professional standards.”

Following the open discussion, the Board held that the dual relationship between Robertson

and the client existed, the relationship was inappropriate, and the relationship harmed the client.

Based upon these findings, the Board revoked Robertson’s license as a clinical social worker for a

period of two years, at the end of which Robertson could appear before the Board for consideration

of reinstatement of her license. The Board also required that Robertson comply with continuing

education requirements and complete twelve hours of ethics training.

Robertson sought relief from the Board’s decision by filing a petition for judicial review of

the Board’s order.4 Robertson complained that the Board’s decision was erroneously based upon her

1982 felony conviction and that the sanction was so severe as to be arbitrary or capricious, an

unwarranted exercise of the Board’s discretion, and not supported by substantial and material

evidence.

Following a hearing, the Chancellor set aside the decision of the Board, ruling that it could

not uphold the Board’s decision because the Board relied upon evidence that was “both immaterial

and prejudicial” – referring to the Board’s prior order granting Robertson permission to take the

exam and Robertson’s 1982 pre-licensure conviction for forgery – and the Board treated the 1982

conviction as “an additional charge/ethical violation” against Robertson. The Chancellor reasoned

that an objective and reasonable fact finder could not concur with the Board’s decision “to invoke

the severest sanction possible – revoking Ms. Robertson’s license – for the charged ethical violation,

without basing the decision upon the pre-licensure conviction.”5

The State appeals the decision to set aside the Board’s order. It contends the Board was

authorized to consider its records and the information contained therein; the Board did not treat the

1982 conviction as an additional charge; and the Chancellor applied an erroneous standard of review

by substituting its judgment for that of the Board.

4

Robertson additionally sought a stay of the Board’s order pending judicial review. The Chancellor granted

that stay. No appeal was taken from that decision.

5

The Chancellor set aside the Board’s decision and remanded the matter to the Board for a new hearing before

a different panel and Administrative Law Judge. T he Chancellor further ordered that all references to the 1982

conviction be redacted from all documents considered by the panel.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies, when those agencies are acting within

their area of specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise, is governed by the narrow standard

contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) rather than the broad standard of review used in other

civil appeals. Willamette Indus., Inc. v. Tennessee Assessment Appeals Comm’n, 11 S.W.3d 142,

146 (Tenn. Ct. App.1999); Wayne County v. Tenn. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d

274, 279-280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); CF Indus. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 599 S.W.2d 536,

540 (Tenn. 1980)); Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tenn. 1977).

The trial court may reverse or modify the decision of the agency if the petitioner’s rights have

been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly

unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light

of the entire record.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(1)-(5). The trial court, however, may not substitute its judgment

concerning the weight of the evidence for that of the Board. Jones v. Bureau of TennCare, 94

S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Gluck v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 15 S.W.3d 486, 490).

The same limitations apply to the appellate court. See Humana of Tennessee v. Tennessee Health

Facilities Comm'n, 551 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tenn. 1977) (holding the trial court, and this court, must

review these matters pursuant to the narrower statutory criteria). Thus, when reviewing a trial court's

review of an administrative agency's decision, this court is to determine "whether or not the trial

court properly applied the . . . standard of review" found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). Jones,

94 S.W.3d at 501 (quoting Papachristou v. Univ. of Tennessee, 29 S.W.3d 487, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2000)).

ROBERTSON ’S CONVICTION AND THE BOARD ’S 1997 ORDER

The Chancellor ruled that it could not uphold the Board’s decision because the Board relied

upon its prior order and treated the 1982 conviction for forgery as “an additional charge/ethical

violation” against Robertson. The prior order at issue is the Board’s order from the 1997 contested

hearing whereby the Board first denied and then granted Robertson permission to take the licensure

examination. The State contends the Board did not treat the forgery conviction as an additional

charge, and the Board was authorized to consider information contained in its records. Although we

agree with the Chancellor that the 1982 conviction and 1997 order were of little if any relevance, it

was not error for the Board to examine its previous order, and the record does not sustain the finding

that the Board treated the conviction as an additional charge or ethical violation.

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An administrative agency’s review of its previous orders is not prohibited. To the contrary,

Tennessee law permits an agency to take notice of “[t]he record of other proceedings.” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 4-5-313(6)(A)(ii). Moreover, Tennessee’s Uniform Administrative Procedures Act expressly

authorizes a more liberal protocol for the admission of evidence in a contested hearing than the

Tennessee Rules of Evidence permit in a court proceeding. The Act provides that an administrative

agency

shall admit and give probative effect to evidence admissible in a court, and when

necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible to proof under the rules of

court, evidence not admissible thereunder may be admitted if it is of a type

commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The

agency shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law and to agency

statutes protecting the confidentiality of certain records, and shall exclude evidence

which in its judgment is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious.

Tenn. Code Ann. §4-5-313(1).

We also find it significant that Robertson was on notice that the 1997 order and the 1982

conviction would be addressed at the contested hearing;6 however, Robertson never challenged the

relevance or admissibility of the order or the conviction. She did not move to strike the 1997 order

from the Notice and did not seek a motion in limine prior to the contested hearing. Moreover, during

the contested hearing, she failed to object to the State’s reference to the 1997 order or the 1982

convictions at the contested hearing. Instead of seeking to exclude the 1997 order and the 1982

convictions, Robertson’s counsel discussed both matters in his opening statement to the Board and

questioned Robertson about them upon direct examination.

It also appears the Chancellor misunderstood the Board’s use of the information contained

in the 1997 order, specifically the 1982 conviction. The Memorandum Opinion stated that “a

witness may not be impeached by a prior conviction when more than 10 years have elapsed from the

date of the witness’s release from confinement.” The Chancellor’s interpretation of the rule of

evidence is correct;7 however, the record does not support the conclusion that followed, that the

Board treated the felony as impeachment evidence. Instead, we find the Board merely considered

the order, which referenced the felony, along with all other information in Robertson’s file for

purposes of determining the sanctions to be imposed for violating the prohibition against a social

worker having a dual relationship with a client.

The Chancellor also found that the Board treated the information in the 1997 order,

particularly the information pertaining to the 1982 conviction as “an additional charge/ethical

6

The most obvious indication was the fact the 1997 order was attached to the Notice of Charges served on

Robertson at the commencement of these proceedings.

7

See Tenn. R. Evid. 609.

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violation” against Robertson.8 We respectfully disagree with this finding. Although the statutory

provision governing social workers authorizes the Board to revoke a license for “conviction of a

felony,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-23-106(a)(12), Robertson’s license was not revoked for the

conviction of a felony. Although some Board members discussed the prior conviction in their

deliberations, the Board did not conclude that Robertson’s license should be revoked because she

had a previous felony. While the 2002 order included a recitation of Robertson’s history, including

the initial denial of her licensure application because of “a criminal conviction in 1982,"9 there was

no mention of the 1997 order or the felony in the “Conclusions of Law” or “Reasons for the

Decision.”

The Board was authorized by statute to review its previous orders. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-

313(6)(A)(ii). Thus, the review of the Board’s 1997 order and the information contained therein was

not impermissible. Moreover, the discussion by some members of the Board of the 1997 order and

the 1982 conviction does not lead us to the conclusion the Board made its decision based upon the

matters discussed by some of its members. To the contrary, we must look to the order filed by the

Board to ascertain the findings and conclusions of law that led to the decision. Sierra Club v.

Tennessee Dep’t of Health & Env’t, No. 01-A-01-9203CH00131, 1992 WL 288870, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.

App. October 16, 1992) (holding that statements made by individual board members during

deliberations do not show as a matter of law that their decision was arbitrary and capricious, and that

the board’s order, not the discussion, is of greatest importance). Accordingly, individual views

expressed by some Board members do not constitute the findings and conclusions of law by the

Board. For these reasons, we are unable to conclude the Board treated the1982 conviction as an

additional charge or an additional ethical violation.

Therefore, the Board did not abuse its discretion by reviewing its records concerning

Robertson, including the 1997 order and Robertson’s 1982 conviction contained therein.

THE SANCTION

The Notice of Charges filed by the State against Robertson contended that she engaged in

unethical conduct by engaging in a dual relationship with the client and that her license should be

revoked or suspended for such violation. Robertson did not contest the allegations. In fact, she

admitted engaging in a four-month relationship with the client. She also admitted her conduct

violated applicable rules and regulations and constituted unethical conduct. Because the underlying

facts were not in dispute and Robertson admitted her conduct constituted unethical conduct, the only

8

Tenn. Code Ann § 63-23-106, the statutory provision governing social workers, lists as a ground for revoking

one’s license “[c]onviction of a felony in the courts of this state or any other state, territory or country that, if committed

in this state, would be a felony. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-23-106(a)(12).

9

The 2002 order stated, “Respondent’s initial license was denied by the Board in 1996 on the basis of a criminal

conviction in 1982. Respondent was notified of this decision by letter of July 30, 1996, and requested a contested case

hearing. The Board heard a contested case on the matter on February 10, 1997, and granted Respondent a license.”

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issue for the Board was the appropriate sanctions to impose upon Robertson for her admitted

unethical behavior.

The Chancellor found “if the Board did not consider the 1982 conviction in arriving at its

decision, then its decision is arbitrary and capricious. . . .” The standard of arbitrary and capricious

requires the reviewing court “to determine whether the administrative agency has made a clear error

in judgment.” Jackson Mobilphone Co., Inc. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 S.W.2d 106,

110,111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,

461 U.S. 402, 413, 103 S.Ct. 1921, 1928, 76 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc.

v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823-24, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)). Under the arbitrary and

capricious standard, the Board’s decision need only be supported by substantial and material

evidence.10 The only issue in the case at bar, however, is the severity of the sanctions imposed by

the Board. Although we use the substantial and material evidence standard to review most

administrative decisions, see Estate of Street v. State Bd. of Equalization, 812 S.W.2d 583, 585

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), a more restrictive standard of review applies when the issue is the propriety

of the sanctions imposed by the administrative tribunal. Mosley v. Tennessee Dep’t of Commerce

and Ins., 167 S.W.3d 308, 319 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has stated the appropriate remedy is peculiarly within the

discretion of the agency. McClellan v. Bd. of Regents, 921 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tenn. 1996).

Moreover, if grounds exist to affirm the procedures employed, the facts found, and the conclusions

reached, the court should not interfere with the sanctions imposed by the board of an agency. Id.

Determination of a sanction to be applied by an administrative agency, if within

bounds of its lawful authority, is subject to very limited judicial review. Kulkin v.

Bergland, 626 F.2d 181, 184 (1st Cir.1980). "The relations of remedy to policy is

peculiarly a matter of administrative competence." Butz v. Glover Livestock

Commission Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 1458, 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973)

(quoting American Power Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 112, 67 S.Ct. 133, 146, 91

L.Ed. 103 (1946)). The reviewing court's function is only to "determine the validity

of the questioned administrative action," not to review the sanctions. Martin v.

United States, 459 F.2d at 302; G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286,

296 (7th Cir.1958) (en banc ) cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907, 79 S.Ct. 582, 3 L.Ed.2d 572

(1959).

...

Once the trial court confirmed that there were repeated violations of the law and

regulations as determined by appellant, "the court's only reasoning task is to examine

10

Substantial and material evidence merely requires that the evidence be such that a reasonable mind might

accept it to support a rational conclusion. Clay County Manor, Inc. v. State of Tennessee Dep’t of Health and Env’t,

849 S.W .2d 755, 759 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 682 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tenn.

1984). The decision of the Board “need not be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” 876 S.W .2d at 111

(citing Street v. State Bd. of Equalization, 812 S.W .2d 583, 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)).

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the sanction imposed in light of the administrative record to judge whether the

agency properly applied the regulations, i.e., whether the sanction is 'unwarranted in

law ... or without justification in fact. . . .' " See Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission

Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-189, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 1457-1459, 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973) (other

citations omitted).

Woodard v. U.S., 725 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6th Cir. 1984).

The leading case addressing the restrictive standard of review of sanctions imposed by an

administrative agency is Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., 411 U.S. 182, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 36

L.Ed.2d 142 (1973), wherein the court reasoned:

[ W]here Congress has entrusted an administrative agency with the responsibility of

selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy “the relation of remedy to policy

is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.” American Power Co. v. SEC,

329 U.S. 90, 112, 67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103 (1946). Thus, the Secretary's choice

of sanction was not to be overturned unless the Court of Appeals might find it

"unwarranted in law or . . . without justification in fact. . . ." Id., at 112-113, 67 S. Ct.

133 (other citations omitted).

Butz, 411 U.S. at 411.

This court has previously recognized the wisdom of Butz and applied the restrictive standard

of review to affirm what may have appeared to some to be a relatively harsh sanction imposed by

the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance on a licensed insurance agent. See Mosley,

167 S.W.3d 308 (holding the trial court erred in modifying the sanctions imposed by the

administrative tribunal). In Mosley we concluded that neither this court nor the Chancery Court is

“permitted to weigh factual evidence and substitute our own judgment for that of the agency, even

if the evidence could support a different determination than the agency reached.” Id. at 318 (citing

Ware v. Green, 984 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). To the contrary, the role of the

Chancery Court and this court when reviewing the sanction imposed by an agency is to examine the

sanction “in light of the administrative record to judge whether the agency properly applied the

regulations, i.e., whether the sanction is ‘unwarranted in law . . . or without justification in fact. . .

.’” Id. at 319 (citing Butz, 411 U.S. at 185-186, 93 S.Ct. at 1458).11

“Every action taken by an agency must be grounded in an express statutory grant of authority

or must arise by necessary implication from an express statutory grant of authority.” Sanifill of

Tennessee, Inc. v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 907 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1995)

11

In Mosley, this court reviewed a trial court’s decision to alter the sanction imposed by the administrative

agency and reasoned, “[s]ince the chancellor found, and indeed M r. M osley conceded, that the facts as found by the ALJ

were essentially true, the case narrows down to the propriety of the sanctions imposed on Mr. Mosley by the

administrative tribunal.” 167 S.W .3d at 317.

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(citing Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. R.R. Co., 554 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tenn. 1977); Wayne

County v. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)). The

Board was authorized to suspend or revoke any license, or to otherwise discipline a holder of a

license who is found guilty of “[u]nprofessional or unethical conduct, or engaging in practices in

connection with the practice of social work that are in violation of the standards of professional

conduct, as defined in this section or prescribed by the rules of the board . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 63-23-106(a)(7). Rules of the Tennessee State Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure

define unethical conduct, in pertinent part, as the failure to make every effort to “avoid dual

relationships with clients and/or relationships which might impair independent professional

judgment or increase the risk of client exploitation.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1365-1-.13(3)(j)

(1986). Robertson admitted she engaged in a four-month dual relationship with the client. The

Board found Robertson’s relationship with the client constituted unethical conduct. Therefore, the

Board’s revocation of Robertson’s license was not unwarranted in law because revocation for

unethical conduct was within its statutory authority.

Having determined the sanction was warranted in law, we now turn to the question of

whether the Board’s decision was justified in fact. The Board made several significant findings of

fact. The findings include: during the course of treatment of the client at Great Starts, Robertson

violated patient/therapist boundaries and formed a dual relationship with the client; she invited the

client to her home on numerous occasions; and the client went on camp-outs and attended ballgames

and other functions with Robertson. The most significant finding of fact the Board made was that

the client’s progress in the program at Great Starts was delayed, and her mental health suffered as

a result of Robertson’s relationship with her.

The undisputed facts of this case establish that Robertson not only repeatedly violated the

boundaries required of her as a licensed clinical social worker, she knew she was violating the

boundaries, and the tragic consequences to the client that resulted from Robertson’s violations were

foreseeable. Although the sanction imposed by the Board was significant, the facts of the case are

sufficient to lead a reasonable person to reach the same conclusions and sanction imposed by the

Board.

Having examined the administrative record, we have concluded the sanction imposed was

warranted in law and justified in fact. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and

this matter is remanded for the entry of an order reinstating the decision of the Board of Social

Worker Certification and Licensure and for such other proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of

appeal are assessed against Appellee, Yvonne N. Robertson.

___________________________________

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE

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