Rodney M. Butler v. Quentin White, Commissioner

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

ASSIGNED ON BRIEFS DECEMBER 13, 2005

RODNEY M. BUTLER v. QUENTIN WHITE, COMMISSIONER, ET AL.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Lauderdale County

No. 13, 098 Martha B. Brasfield, Chancellor

No. W2005-01382-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 12, 2006

The prison disciplinary board found the prisoner guilty on numerous occasions of refusing to submit

to a drug screen. After exhausting his administrative appeals, the prisoner filed a pro se petition for

a writ of certiorari in the chancery court to contest the convictions. The trial court dismissed the

prisoner’s petition citing his failure to file it within the applicable statute of limitations. The prisoner

appealed to this Court. Because the prisoner was released from prison during the pendency of the

case in the trial court, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this case for the entry of an order

dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated and

Remanded

ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID R. FARMER , J., and HOLLY

M. KIRBY , J., joined.

Rodney M. Butler, pro se, Jackson, TN

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Bradley W.

Flippin, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

When this lawsuit was originally filed in the trial court, Rodney M. Butler (“Butler” or

“Appellant”) was an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”)

being housed at West Tennessee State Penitentiary in Henning, Tennessee. Between July 24, 2001

and October 7, 2003, the prison’s disciplinary board found Butler guilty of eleven separate

incidences of refusing to submit to a drug screen. Butler appealed all of the these convictions to the

prison’s warden who upheld the convictions. Butler’s most recent conviction was affirmed by the

warden on December 4, 2003.

On September 28, 2004, Butler filed a pro se “Petition for Writ of Certiorari” against Quentin

White, TDOC Commissioner (“Commissioner” or “Appellee”), in the Chancery Court of Lauderdale

County seeking to challenge the propriety of his disciplinary convictions. Thereafter, the

Commissioner filed a motion seeking to have Butler’s petition dismissed for, among other things,

his failure to file the petition within the sixty (60) day statute of limitations set forth in section 27-9-

102 of the Tennessee Code. On May 3, 2005, the chancery court entered an order dismissing

Butler’s petition citing his failure to file it within the applicable statute of limitations. Butler

subsequently filed a pro se appeal to this Court presenting numerous issues for our review.

During the pendency of the present appeal, the Commissioner filed a motion asking this

Court to dismiss Butler’s appeal. Therein, the Commissioner alleged that Butler’s appeal is presently

moot due to his release from prison on March 2, 2005.2 On October 12, 2005, this Court entered an

Order denying the Commissioner’s motion, but we did not preclude the Commissioner from raising

the mootness issue in his brief. Upon further review, we hold that the present appeal is not

justiciable under the doctrine of mootness.

1

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides as follows:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm,

reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a

formal opinion would have no precedential value. W hen a case is decided by

memorandum opinion it shall be designated “M EMORANDUM OPINION”, shall

not be published, and shall not be cited to or relied on for any reason in any

unrelated case.

2

The Commissioner’s motion was accompanied by the affidavit of Jeannetta Kimbro, Sentence Manager for

the TDOC, who attested that Butler was released from prison on the aforementioned date after completing his sentence.

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II.

ANALYSIS

We have previously explained the doctrine of mootness in the context of an appeal involving

a prisoner, stating:

The doctrine of justiciability prompts courts to stay their hand

in cases that do not involve a genuine and existing controversy

requiring the present adjudication of present rights. State ex rel.

Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. 534, 537, 347 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1961);

Dockery v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

Thus, our courts will not render advisory opinions, Super Flea Mkt.

of Chattanooga v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. 1984); Parks

v. Alexander, 608 S.W.2d 881, 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), or decide

abstract legal questions. State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. at

538, 347 S.W.2d at 49.

Cases must be justiciable not only when they are first filed but

must also remain justiciable throughout the entire course of the

litigation, including the appeal. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,

494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S. Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1990);

Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 128-29, 97 S. Ct. 1709, 1715, 52

L. Ed. 2d 184 (1977); 13A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice

and Procedure §§ 3533, 3533.10 (2d ed. 1984) (“Federal Practice and

Procedure”). The concept of mootness deals with the circumstances

that render a case no longer justiciable. Davis v. McClaran, App.,

1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 760, No. 01-A-01-9304-CH-00164, slip op.

at 2, 19 T.A.M. 1-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1993), perm. app.

granted (Tenn. Mar. 28, 1994) (“mootness is a doctrine of

justiciability”); Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 211.

A moot case is one that has lost its character as a present, live

controversy. McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631, 637, 188 S.W.2d

745, 747 (1945); Krug v. Krug, 838 S.W.2d 197, 204 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1992); LaRouche v. Crowell, 709 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1985). The central question in a mootness inquiry is whether changes

in the circumstances existing at the beginning of the litigation have

forestalled the need for meaningful relief. Federal Practice and

Procedure § 3533.3, at 261. A case will generally be considered moot

if it no longer serves as a means to provide relief to the prevailing

party. Church of Scientology v. United States, [506 U.S. 9, 12], 113

S. Ct. 447, 449 (1992); Knott v. Stewart County, 185 Tenn. 623, 626,

207 S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1948); Massengill v. Massengill, 36 Tenn.

App. 385, 388-89, 255 S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (1952).

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McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added). Thus, an

appeal filed by a prisoner may become moot by virtue of the prisoner’s release from prison during

the pendency of the litigation. See id.

This Court previously addressed the justiciability of an appeal filed by a prisoner in a case

factually similar to the one presently before the Court. In Easley v. Britt, No. M1998-00971-COA-

R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 771, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2001), the prisoner was

convicted of robbery and sentenced to twenty years in prison. While participating in the prison’s

work release program, the prisoner failed to return to the prison at the designated time. Id. The

TDOC charged the prisoner with the disciplinary offense of escape, and the prison disciplinary board

ultimately found him guilty of the offense. Id. As a result, the TDOC removed the prisoner from

the work release program and reclassified him as an medium security inmate. Id. at *2–3. After

exhausting his administrative appeals, the prisoner filed a pro se writ for common law certiorari

alleging that the prison’s disciplinary board erred in finding him guilty of escape. Id. at *3. The trial

court affirmed the board’s decision and dismissed the prisoner’s appeal. Id. The prisoner

subsequently filed an appeal to this Court. Id.

During the pendency of the appeal, we learned that the prisoner had been released from

prison. Id. Taking notice of this post-judgment fact pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tennessee Rules of

Appellate Procedure, we noted the following:

When Mr. Easley filed this appeal, his purpose was to

convince this court that we should vacate the trial court’s dismissal

of his petition for common-law writ of certiorari and that we should

send the case back to the trial court to determine whether the

disciplinary board had acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The

ultimate relief he sought was to clear his disciplinary record so that

he could return to his minimum security classification and could be

placed back in the work release program at the NCSC for the

remainder of his sentence. Mr. Easley’s release calls the justiciability

of this case into question.

The courts, being careful stewards of their power, have

developed various justiciability principles to serve as guidelines for

determining whether providing judicial relief in a particular case is

warranted. To be justiciable, a case must involve presently existing

rights, live issues that are within a court’s power to resolve, and

parties who have a legally cognizable interest in the resolution of

these issues. A case is not justiciable if it does not involve a genuine,

existing controversy requiring the adjudication of presently existing

rights. State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 18 S.W.3d 186,

193 (Tenn. 2000); State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. 534, 537,

347 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1961); Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay, 984

S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

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The requirements for litigation to continue are essentially the

same as the requirements for litigation to begin. Charter Lakeside

Behavioral Health Sys. v. Tennessee Health Facilities Comm’n, 2001

Tenn. App. LEXIS 58, M1998-00985-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 72342,

at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11

application filed). Thus, cases must remain justiciable throughout the

entire course of the litigation, including the appeal. State v. Ely, 48

S.W.3d 710, 716 n.3 (Tenn. 2001); Cashion v. Robertson, 955

S.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). A moot case is one that has

lost its justiciability because it no longer presents a present, live

controversy. McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631, 637, 188 S.W.2d

745, 747 (1945); County of Shelby v. McWherter, 936 S.W.2d 923,

931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134,

137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). Thus, a case will be considered moot if

it no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of judicial relief

to the prevailing party. Knott v. Stewart County, 185 Tenn. 623, 626,

207 S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1948); Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay,

984 S.W.2d at 616; Massengill v. Massengill, 36 Tenn. App. 385,

388-89, 255 S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (1952).

Determining whether a case or an issue has become moot is

a question of law. Charter Lakeside Behavioral Health Sys. v.

Tennessee Health Facilities Comm’n, 2001 WL 72342, at *5;

Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging Co., 1999 Tenn. App.

LEXIS 762, No. M1999-00943-COA-R3-CV, 1999 WL 1040544, at

*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1999) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11

application filed). Thus, unless the case fits within one of the

recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine,3 the courts will

ordinarily vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court

with directions that it be dismissed. Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay,

984 S.W.2d at 617; McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d at 138.

Id. at *4–7 (footnote omitted). Due to his release from prison during the pendency of the appeal, we

held that this Court could no longer grant the prisoner the relief he requested in his petition. Id. at

*8. Accordingly, we determined that the prisoner’s appeal was moot. Id.

Turning to the present appeal, in his petition, Butler requested that the trial court find the

prison disciplinary board’s actions to be “arbitrary and illegal,” dismiss the disciplinary convictions,

and remove the convictions from his disciplinary record. Relying on our reasoning in Easley, we

hold that the present appeal has become moot due to Butler’s release from prison prior to the entry

of the trial court’s order in this case.

3

The courts of this state have recognized several exceptions to the doctrine of mootness, McIntyre, 884 S.W .2d

at 137, none of which apply to the present case.

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III.

CONCLUSION

“The ordinary practice in disposing of a case that has become moot on appeal is to vacate the

judgment and remand the case with directions that it be dismissed.” McIntyre, 884 S.W.2d at 138;

see also Easley, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 771, at *8. In accordance with this practice, we vacate the

trial court’s order and remand this case to the trial court with directions that Butler’s petition be

dismissed on the ground of mootness. Costs of this appeal are to be taxed to the Appellant, Rodney

M. Butler, for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

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