Kenyale Pirtle v. State of Tennessee

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 6, 2009

KENYALE PIRTLE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Haywood County

Nos. 4940, 4995, 4996 Clayburn Peeples, Judge

No. W2008-01934-CCA-R3-HC - Filed June 25, 2009

The petitioner, Kenyale Pirtle (“Pirtle”), appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of

habeas corpus. In this appeal, Pirtle raises a single issue for our review. He argues that the trial

court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because the Attorney General and Reporter, acting

through one of his assistants, had no authority to file a motion to dismiss in the habeas court. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. GLENN and J. C.

MCLIN , JJ., joined.

Bob C. Hooper, Brownsville, Tennessee (on appeal); Tom W. Crider, District Public Defender; J.

Diane Blount, Assistant Public Defender, Trenton, Tennessee (at trial); for the petitioner-appellant,

Kenyale Pirtle.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Rachel E. Willis, Assistant Attorney General;

Garry G. Brown, District Attorney General; Larry Hardister and Matt Hooper, Assistant District

Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 25, 2003, the petitioner, Kenyale Pirtle, negotiated plea agreements in cases 4940,

4995, and 4996 in Haywood County Circuit Court. In case 4940, Pirtle pled guilty to felony evading

arrest and driving on a revoked licensed. He received a concurrent sentence of two years for the

felony evading arrest conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked

license conviction. In case 4995, Pirtle pled guilty to three counts of theft of property over $1000

but less than $10,000, two counts of auto burglary, burglary, and vandalism over $1,000 but less than

$10,000. He received a concurrent sentence of four years for each theft conviction, two years for

each auto burglary conviction, four years for the burglary conviction, and four years for the

vandalism conviction. In case 4996, Pirtle pled guilty to felony evading arrest and driving on a

revoked license. He received a concurrent sentence of two years for the felony evading arrest

conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction. In

addition, the sentences received in cases 4940 and 4996 were to be served concurrently but

consecutively to the sentence received in case 4995 and a Lauderdale County sentence,1 for an

effective sentence of at least six years to be served in community corrections.2

On June 26, 2003, Corrections Management Corporation, a community corrections program,

filed a petition with the trial court alleging that Pirtle had violated the terms and conditions of his

“Behavioral Contract Agreement.” On June 3, 2004, Pirtle entered a guilty plea to the community

corrections violations and was ordered to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of

Correction. In addition, Pirtle’s sentence in case number 4940 was increased by one year, for a total

effective sentence of seven years.3

On November 12, 2004, Pirtle filed a petition entitled “Writ of Habeas Corpus” in Haywood

County Circuit Court asserting that: (1) he was not granted a community corrections revocation

hearing; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in

imposing concurrent and consecutive sentences; (4) he did not meet any of the criteria prescribed

by statute for the imposition of a consecutive sentence; and (5) he is entitled to pretrial jail credits.

On December 14, 2007, Pirtle filed a second petition entitled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus”

in Haywood County Circuit Court asserting substantially the same claims that were in his first

petition.

On June 23, 2008, an Assistant District Attorney General filed a motion entitled “Motion to

Dismiss Writ of Habeas Corpus and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or in the alternative for

Continuance to Allow the Defendant to File an Amended Petition.” On June 30, 2008, Pirtle

amended his petition, asserting the following:

This court has jurisdiction to hear this case since it was the original

sentencing court. Relevant documents regarding the issues raised regarding his

sentence are on file in the Circuit Court of Haywood County. Further, at the time

of filing this petition he was [sic] West Tennessee State Prison in Henning,

Tennessee. He is now housed in Mountain City, Tennessee.

1

The Lauderdale County judgment was not included in the record; however, Pirtle admitted at the guilty plea

hearing that he was sentenced to three years to be served in community corrections for the Lauderdale County

conviction.

2

The trial court’s order filed on June 26, 2003, states that Pirtle was sentenced to an effective sentence of eight

years for indictment numbers 4940, 4995, and 4996; however, the judgments reflect and both parties agree that Pirtle’s

effective sentence for indictment numbers 4940, 4995, and 4996 is six years.

3

The trial court’s revocation order did not mention the increase in Pirtle’s sentence.

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On July 30, 2008, an Assistant State Attorney General filed a “Motion to Dismiss Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” referencing both of Pirtle’s filed petitions. By order entered August 4,

2008, the trial court granted the motion, stating that “[t]he petitioner has filed his petitions in the

wrong venue, has failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-107,

has failed to allege a colorable claim for relief, and has failed to properly support his factual

allegations.” On August 6, 2008, Pirtle amended his petition for writ of habeas corpus to attach the

judgments of the convictions from which he complains. On August 25, 2008, Pirtle filed this timely

appeal.

ANALYSIS

Pirtle contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because the

Attorney General and Reporter, acting through one of his assistants, had no authority to file a motion

to dismiss in the habeas court. The State counters that the trial court properly dismissed the petition

because the Attorney General and Reporter “has a statutory duty to represent the respondent in a

habeas corpus case.” We agree with the State.

The Tennessee Constitution, Art. 6, section 5 establishes the offices of the State Attorney

General and Reporter as well as the offices of District Attorneys General. Tennessee Code

Annotated section 8-6-109, sets forth the duties of the State Attorney General and Reporter and

provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The attorney general and reporter has and shall exercise all duties vested in the

office by the Constitution of Tennessee and all duties and authority pertaining to the

office of the attorney general and reporter under the statutory law. The attorney

general and reporter is authorized to utilize and refer to the common law in cases in

which the state of Tennessee is a party.

(b) In addition to the duties described in subsection (a), the attorney general and

reporter, or assistants acting at the attorney general and reporter’s discretion, has the

following duties:

(1) The trial and direction of all civil litigated matters and

administrative proceedings in which the state of Tennessee or any

officer, department, agency, board, commission or instrumentality of

the state may be interested[.]

T.C.A. § 8-6-109(b)(1).

A prisoner is guaranteed the right to habeas corpus relief under Article I, section 15 of the

Tennessee Constitution and procedures for obtaining such relief are governed by Tennessee Code

Annotated section 29-21-101, et seq. In State ex rel. Folds v. Hunt, the Tennessee Supreme Court

recognized that “[t]he writ of [h]abeas corpus is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution

but an independent civil suit [] in which the record of the trial court is not open to collateral attack

but imports absolute verity.” 391 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tenn. 1965) (quoting Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S.

333, 43 S. Ct. 555 (1923)); see also Davis v. State, 261 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008).

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Although there are differences between general civil litigation and habeas corpus actions, “habeas

corpus proceedings are essentially civil in nature.” Joseph Miles v. State, No. M2006-02088-CCA-

R3-HC, 2007 WL 1828879, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 26, 2007), perm. app.

denied, (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

In support of his position, Pirtle cites Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-6-109,

enumerating the powers and duties of the Attorney General and Reporter, and argues that it does not

“list as a duty to prosecute violations of the state criminal statutes in the Circuit Courts of

Tennessee.” He further relies upon State v. Simmons, 610 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1980), a criminal matter, wherein the State Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss its direct

appeal as to the appellees. The District Attorney General filed a motion objecting to the dismissal,

and argued that he had the right to pursue the State’s appeal notwithstanding the position of the State

Attorney General. Considering Tennessee Code Annotated sections 8-7-103 and 8-6-109 combined,

this court held that “the legislature has given the District Attorney General the power to prosecute

criminal cases at the trial level, and that the State Attorney General has been given the full right,

power and exclusive authority to prosecute criminal cases and/or pursue other remedies that may be

attendant to such cases in the appellate courts.” Id. (emphasis added).

We agree with Pirtle that the Attorney General and Reporter has no authority to prosecute

violations of state criminal statutes in the Circuit Courts of Tennessee. However, as set out above,

a petition for habeas corpus is not a criminal proceeding. Simmons is distinguishable from the

instant case because it was a direct appeal of a criminal matter. In other words, even though Pirtle’s

underlying prosecution and conviction were criminal proceedings in the exclusive power and

authority of the District Attorney General, the writ of habeas corpus is a separate and distinct civil

action. As a civil proceeding, the Assistant Attorney General had a duty to respond to the petition

as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-6-109(b)(1). See, e.g., Simerly v. Norris, No.

1071, 1987 WL 8315 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 26, 1987). Accordingly, the trial court

did not err in granting the motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition, and Pirtle is not entitled to

relief on this issue.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the petition for habeas corpus relief was properly dismissed by the trial

court because the State Attorney General had a statutory duty to respond to the petitioner’s habeas

corpus petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

_____________________________

CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE

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