The opinion
Filed 7/24/24; certified for publication 8/13/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
HOLGUIN FAMILY 2d Civ. No. B328569
VENTURES, LLC, et al., (Super. Ct. No. 56-2021-
00561036-CU-WM-VTA)
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Ventura County)
v.
COUNTY OF VENTURA,
Defendant and Respondent.
This case involves the Old Creek Ranch Winery, which “is
located north of the City of [Ventura] at the end of Old Creek
Road.” The winery is owned by appellant Holguin Family
Ventures, LLC (Holguin). Appellant OCRW, Inc., is the lessee of
the winery.
Appellants appeal the trial court’s judgment upholding a
decision by the Ventura County Board of Supervisors (Board).
The Board found that appellants had committed various
violations of the Ventura County Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance
(NCZO).1 The primary violations are that, without obtaining a
conditional use permit (CUP), appellants (1) expanded the winery
and wine-tasting area beyond the historical use area, and (2)
changed the principal use of the ranch from crop production to a
“wine tasting/associated event venue.” The Board also denied
appellants’ request for zoning clearance of their unpermitted
installation of a paved parking lot with 40 to 50 parking spaces
and charging stations for electric vehicles.
Appellants contend that, in upholding the Board’s decision,
the trial court applied the wrong standard of review – the
substantial evidence standard. Appellants argue that the court
should have independently reviewed the 4,813-page
administrative record. We conclude the substantial evidence
standard of review is the correct standard. We further conclude
that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision.
We reject appellants’ claim that the trial court (1) abused
its discretion in denying permission to amend their complaint to
add a new cause of action for declaratory relief, and (2)
erroneously denied their third cause of action for declaratory
relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Old Creek Ranch encompasses approximately 800
acres. Holguin owns approximately 329 acres. The winery is
located on Holguin’s property. The winery “currently
encompasses approximately 7 acres and that . . . include[s] the
parking areas and roads around it.” The ranch is zoned
“agriculture exclusive.”
1 The NCZO is Chapter 1 of Division 8 of the Ventura
County Ordinance Code.
2
In December 1981 the County issued a Zoning Clearance
permitting a “Temporary/Portable Produce Stand” inside an
“Existing Winery” on a lot area of 328.74 acres. (Zoning
Clearance no. 37254, attached hereto as Appendix A.) The
Zoning Clearance shows the dimensions of the existing winery
were 30 feet x 20 feet, i.e., 600 square feet. The dimensions of the
proposed produce stand were 15 feet x 5 feet, i.e., 75 square feet.
A Zoning Clearance issued in 1990 (Zoning Clearance No. 67780)
authorized a 676 square-foot addition to the winery. Thus, as of
1990, the total floor area permitted for the winery and “produce
stand” was approximately 1,276 square feet.
In a December 2007 letter to the County, counsel for
Carmel Whitman, who at that time was the owner of the
property, wrote that the “Produce Stand” was intended to be “a
wine tasting area within the permitted winery.” Counsel
asserted: “In reliance on [the 1981] zoning clearance, the property
owners have operated a wine tasting area within the winery
continuously since December 1981.”
Counsel continued: “[A]lthough the winery itself has
expanded over the years, it has done so on a fully permitted
basis. More important, the wine tasting area within it has
remained the same size [i.e., 75 square feet,] and has operated in
the same way since it was permitted in December 1981.” (Italics
added.) “In 1981, as they are today, wineries and wine tasting
were activities incidental to the operation of grape production
and vineyards.” The winery “was permitted . . . to conduct wine
tastings of its own production on the winery premises incidental
to its normal operations.”
Counsel’s December 2007 letter was triggered by the
County’s issuance of a notice of violation (NOV) claiming that
3
Whitman was “[o]perating a wine tasting room without a
conditional use permit.” In response to counsel’s letter, in
January 2008 the Planning Director wrote to Whitman: “[O]ur
review of the permit files and the Zoning Ordinance in effect in
the early 1980’s has led me to determine that simple wine
tasting, conducted in accordance with Business and Profession[s]
Code section 23356.1(a), is allowed in the manner that it has
been conducted on the site since the early 1980’s.
[¶] [Therefore], the basis for the Notice of Violation is no longer
valid. The NOV is hereby rescinded and the case closed.”
A 2019 Planning Commission Staff Report (Staff Report)
explained why the NOV was issued and later rescinded: “[I]n
1981, the Planning Division permitted the winery and public
tasting room with a ministerial Zoning Clearance. In 1985,
however, the County amended the Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance
(NCZO) to require a discretionary Conditional Use Permit . . . to
authorize a winery with public tours or tasting room, and to
authorize any winery with over 2,000 square feet of structures.
Because Old Creek Ranch Winery was permitted with a Zoning
Clearance before this more stringent CUP requirement took
effect, the winery is a legal nonconforming use under the
NCZO . . . .” (See Ideal Boat & Camper Storage v. County of
Alameda (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 301, 313 [“The classic definition
of a legal nonconforming use is ‘one that existed lawfully before a
zoning restriction became effective and that is not in conformity
with the ordinance when it continues thereafter’”].)
The Staff Report continued: “In 2008, the Planning Division
worked with the winery’s then-owner [Whitman] to document the
‘baseline’ size and operations of the then-existing winery with
public tasting room to establish the parameters of the winery’s
4
nonconforming use which was authorized to continue without a
CUP. These baseline conditions are set forth in a letter from the
Planning Director to [Whitman] dated March 5, 2008 . . . .” One
of the conditions was that “[a]ll activities at the Old Creek Ranch
Winery must be clearly incidental, accessory, and subordinate to
the primary operations of the associated winery as a production
facility.” The letter said that Monday through Friday, 50 to 75
winery “patrons per day . . . appears to be reasonable based upon
the existing facility use.” On Saturday, “between 50 and 150
[patrons] is an acceptable number. The wine tasting and tours by
daily patrons would be considered typical business operations for
a winery.” The letter continued, “[T]he only ‘events’ that should
be held are in conjunction with marketing or wine production
educational activities, and which are . . . limited to either 15 or 25
[visitors] maximum based on the day of the week.” Other events,
“such as birthday and anniversary parties, family reunions,
retirement parties, weddings, receptions and the like,” would
require a CUP.
The Board found: “It was understood between Whitman
and the Planning Division that any winery activities and/or uses
exceeding the established baseline set forth in the County’s
March 5, 2008, letter would constitute an expansion of the
nonconforming use triggering the NCZO requirement for a CUP.”
“Whitman did not administratively appeal the Planning
Director’s determination thereby waiving her right, and the right
of all subsequent owners of the property, to challenge the scope of
the nonconforming winery use of the property that could continue
without the need for obtaining a CUP.”
Holguin purchased the approximately 329-acre property,
including the winery, in June 2015. It closed the winery for “a
5
three-year period to start construction and some renovations of
the property.” In September 2015 the County issued to Andrew
Holguin an “Inauguration of Use” “Zoning Clearance for a
certificate of occupancy for an existing winery of up to 2,000 sq.
ft. (bottling, processing, and storage) which includes a change of
ownership.”2 The Zoning Clearance (ZC15-0948) is attached
hereto as Appendix B. It noted, “There is a permitted produce
stand with a non-conforming wine tasting room (Zoning
Clearance #37254 [the 1981 Zoning Clearance attached as
Appendix A]).” ZC15-0948 stated that the earliest opening time
of the “tasting room” will be 11:00 a.m. and the latest closing time
will be 5:00 p.m. “No special events will be permitted on the site
until an approved Conditional Use Permit is issued.” The Zoning
Clearance further stated, “See previous correspondence between
Planning Management and previous owner [Whitman] for
clarification.” The “previous correspondence” includes the
Planning Director’s March 5, 2008 letter to Whitman which,
according to the Board, “established the baseline parameter[] for
the allowable nonconforming use of the winery to continue
without the need for a CUP.”
Despite ZC15-0948’s prohibition of “special events . . . on
the site until an approved Conditional Use Permit is issued,”
Holguin’s website “advertise[d] the property as a third party
venue for ‘weddings, birthday, retirement, bridal shower, baby
shower, gender reveal, celebration of life, rehearsal dinner’ and
2 Andrew Holguin stated that he “and [his] family own the
Old Creek Ranch Wineries.” In a letter to the Planning Director
dated November 1, 2017, Andrew Holguin said he is the
president of appellant OCRW, Inc., the lessee of the winery.
6
includes the statement, ‘What better venue than Old Creek
Ranch Winery.’”
At Holguin’s request, the County issued several permits
for improvements on the property. The permits included
construction of a “2,000 sq. ft. agricultural barn,” a 3,655 sq. ft.
“agricultural storage building,” and “a 900 sq. ft. agricultural
storage building.” A Construction/Demolition Zoning Clearance
issued in October 2015 noted that the “[p]arcel contains existing
2,000 sq.ft. winery office.”
The Staff Report states: “On November 1, 2017, [Holguin]
submitted a request for a Zoning Clearance to authorize the
relocation of the existing wine tasting room to the newly
constructed agricultural building [the 2,000 sq. ft. agricultural
barn] on the ranch . . . . On May 8, 2018, the Planning Division
responded to the . . . request and indicated the need for a site
visit and ‘additional information to confirm that the cumulative
square footage dedicated to the winery use is under the
maximum 2,000 sq. ft. that can be approved through a
ministerial permit’ and to clarify that public use of the property
continues to be accessory to crop production and does not become
a principal use of the property that would require a conditional
use permit on its own . . . . [Holguin] denied the County a site
visit . . . .”
“Starting in March 2018, public complaints were submitted
to the Code Compliance Division in regard to the use of the
property for unpermitted outdoor winery-related events and
associated activities without the required permits and the
increase of traffic and noise.” “After confirming violations
described in multiple complaints . . . , the Code Compliance
Division issued a Notice of Violation . . . (Violation Case No.
7
CV18-0095) to [Holguin] on May 4, 2018.” Holguin appealed the
NOV.
In July 2018 “[a] County Building and Safety inspector
issued a Stop Work Order to [Holguin] . . . for the installation of
unpermitted electrical infrastructure and electric vehicle
charging stations for a newly paved parking lot with
approximately 40 parking spaces.” The Planning Division denied
Holguin’s request for a Zoning Clearance authorizing the
improvements. It said “that ‘the car chargers and parking lot
should be incorporated into a conditional use permit rather than
be approved through a zoning clearance’ since the construction
and new parking lot is considered an expansion of the
winery . . . .” Holguin appealed the denial of the Zoning
Clearance.
In January 2019 “County staff inspected the winery
grounds and all of the existing buildings, except for one, which
[Holguin] denied access . . . . The site inspection revealed that
the winery had, in fact, expanded significantly from its original
footprint and scope as established in the 1980s.” Another NOV
was issued to Holguin (Violation No. CV19-0012). The County
claimed that Holguin had expanded “the nonconforming winery
without a CUP” and had changed the principal use of the
property from “crop production” to a “wine tasting/associated
event venue.” Holguin filed a timely appeal.
In March 2019 a hearing before the Planning Commission
was conducted on Holguin’s appeals. The Planning Commission
unanimously denied the appeals. Holguin appealed to the Board.
After conducting a public hearing in September 2019, the Board
unanimously upheld the Planning Commission’s decision.
8
Several persons who resided on Old Creek Road spoke at
the hearing before the Board. The winery is located at the end of
the road. Angela Ross said she had visited the “old winery over
ten years ago.” “[I]t was a very small, intimate type area.”
“[T]here was only enough [space] for eight to ten customers to sit
at the little bar to do the wine tasting.” Since the reopening of
the winery after its sale to Holguin, Old Creek Road “is now like
a freeway.” “[W]e don’t get to go out and ride our bikes. We don’t
get to go out walking because there is too many cars and it is very
unsafe.” Steven Johnson complained, “There’s hundreds of cars
on the weekends.” Chris Moore said, “[T]here have been many
events over the past year that have been held without any
permits. These events have created weekend traffic that has
become untenable from the sheer number of cars, trucks, buses,
Jeep caravans, motorcycles, and 18-wheelers.”
Terri Wolfe submitted a written statement signed by 13
persons who resided on Old Creek Road. Wolfe said: “From
weddings that are advertised to have a 200-person capacity, to an
international corporate meeting for Volvo where hundreds of
people drove test cars originating at the winery, to tour bus
operators passing in full-sized tour buses, the venue has
advertised and (presumably) held 57 music events and 33 food
truck events in their first twelve months. . . . It has created a
nightmare for our road.”
Holguin filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging
the Board’s decision. The trial court vacated the decision because
the Board had failed to make adequate written findings. The
court ordered the Board to conduct a new noticed public hearing.
Before the new hearing was conducted, the Board rescinded
the NOV for unpermitted winery events (NOV CV18-0095). The
9
remaining NOV (CV19-0012) was primarily for the unpermitted
expansion of the winery and change of principal use of the
property. The other matter before the Board was Holguin’s
appeal from the denial of its “request for a zoning clearance to
authorize . . . electric vehicle charging stations and electrical
infrastructure installed in a 40-plus vehicle parking lot that was
constructed by [Holguin] . . . without County approval.”
Terri Wolfe spoke at the new hearing in November 2021.
She said: “Old Creek Road is a very narrow County road. It’s
basically a one-lane road, and ends at a dead end. Most houses
are built within a few yards of the road. For over 20 years, I and
others rode our horses, walked dogs, we taught our children to
ride bikes, we exercised, and visited neighbors. It was a quiet,
rarely traveled road. There was a winery at the end of the road
with an estimated 20 to 30 cars visiting on a weekend day. [¶]
For the past several years, we no longer go out on the road on the
weekends. We do not exercise there, ride horses, walk dogs, or
visit with neighbors, because it’s too dangerous. Now, hundreds
of cars speed by to the event venue. They drink alcohol before
getting back in cars for the return trip. Tour vans, and wine tour
jeeps pass by continuously. . . . This past weekend, a friend
visiting the winery at our request, counted roughly 200 people
wine tasting at one time. [¶] Old Creek Road was improved for
the use of 12 single family residences. It was not constructed for
the use by a major event venue.” “We and others have
experienced the vast expansion of the winery. Storage sheds are
not used for storage sheds, and the expansion is very extensive.”
A representative from the County Fire Prevention Division
said the property is in “a high and moderate fire severity zone.”
“The proposed uses” of the property would “require a minimum
10
20-foot wide road” to the winery, but the existing road does not
meet this requirement. “[A] secondary access” to the property
would also be required, but it does not exist. The secondary
access would have to meet the same requirements as the primary
access.3
At the conclusion of the new hearing, the Board
unanimously voted to deny Holguin’s appeals. In support of its
decision, the Board made 155 findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
In December 2021 appellants filed in the trial court a 52-
page complaint against the County. Appellants sought to
overturn the Board’s denial of Holguin’s appeals. The complaint
alleged five causes of action. The first cause of action was a
petition for a writ of administrative mandate. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.5.) The second was a petition for a traditional writ of
mandate. (Id., § 1085.) The third and fourth causes of action
were for declaratory relief, and the fifth cause of action was for
inverse condemnation.
The trial court determined that the Board’s decision should
be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. The court
concluded: “Based on the evidence, the County has made a
compelling argument that [appellants] converted the property’s
principal use from crop and wine production into a relatively
3 The County Fire Marshall, Massoud Araghi, spoke at the
original September 2019 hearing but not at the new hearing
before the Board. At the original hearing Araghi said that, “[i]f
[the project] was coming today for conditioning, most likely [a
secondary access road] would be one of the conditions.” Araghi
was concerned about “having the number of people in a location
where it would be difficult to evacuate in a fire or any emergency
situation.”
11
elaborate commercial wine bar and event space.” “‘[T]he County
seeks for [appellants] to either abide by the scope of the winery’s
legal nonconforming use by scaling back to its historic size and
operations, or seek the necessary conditional use permit for the
expanded and modified winery. Substantial evidence supports
the Board’s decision to uphold the violations and deny
[appellants’] appeals . . . .’”
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the County on
appellants’ writ petitions and causes of action for declaratory
relief. Appellants dismissed without prejudice the remaining
cause of action for inverse condemnation.
Standard of Review
“The exclusive remedy for judicial review of administrative
action affecting land use is a proceeding under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5. [Citations.] A trial court’s review of an
administrative decision is subject to two possible standards
depending on the nature of the right involved. [Citation.] [¶] If
the administrative decision involved or substantially affected a
‘fundamental vested right,’ the [trial] court exercises its
independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited
trial de novo in which the court must examine the administrative
record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment
upon the evidence. [Citations.] [¶] Where no fundamental
vested right is involved, the trial court's review is limited to
examining the administrative record to determine whether the
agency’s decision and its findings are supported by substantial
evidence in light of the whole record. [Citation.]” (SP Star
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
459, 468-469 (SP Star Enterprises).)
12
“Regardless of the nature of the right involved or the
standard of judicial review applied in the trial court, an appellate
court reviewing a trial court’s ruling on administrative
mandamus applies a substantial evidence standard. [Citations.]
‘If a fundamental vested right was involved and the trial court
therefore exercised independent judgment, it is the trial court’s
judgment that is the subject of appellate court review.
[Citations.] On the other hand, if the [trial] court properly
applied substantial evidence review because no fundamental
vested right was involved, then the appellate court’s function is
identical to that of the trial court. It reviews the administrative
record to determine whether the agency’s findings were
supported by substantial evidence . . . .’’ ” (SP Star Enterprises,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.)
“Under the substantial evidence test, the agency’s findings
are presumed to be supported by the administrative record and
the appellant challenging them has the burden to show they are
not.” (SP Star Enterprises, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.)
“[T]he reviewing court [must] consider all relevant evidence in
the administrative record and view that evidence in the light
most favorable to the agency’s findings, drawing all inferences in
support of those findings. [Citation.] The reviewing court does
not substitute its own findings and inferences for that of the
agency. [Citation.] ‘Only if no reasonable person could reach the
conclusion reached by the administrative agency, based on the
entire record before it, will a court conclude that the agency’s
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.’” (Akella v.
Regents of University of California (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 801,
814 (Akella).)
13
“‘[T]he burden is on appellant to show there is no
substantial evidence whatsoever to support the findings of the
Board.’ [Citation.] [¶] . . . It is for the [Board] to weigh the
preponderance of conflicting evidence . . . .” (Young v. City of
Coronado (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 408, 419 (Young).) “‘‘Substantial
evidence has been defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate support for a conclusion. . . .”’”
(Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo County Bd. of
Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 13.)
The Trial Court Correctly Applied the
Substantial Evidence Standard of Review
Appellants contend the judgment must be reversed because
the trial court erroneously applied the substantial evidence
standard of review. Appellants argue, “[B]ecause Holguin’s
fundamental vested rights to the historical use of the Winery are
at stake, the law requires that the evidence be subject to the
court’s independent judgment.”
“A right may be deemed fundamental ‘“on either or both of
two bases: (1) the character and quality of its economic aspect;
[or] (2) the character and quality of its human aspect.” [Citation.]
“The ultimate question in each case is whether the affected right
is deemed to be of sufficient significance to preclude its extinction
or abridgement by a body lacking judicial power. [Citation.]”
[Citation.] “In determining whether the right is fundamental the
courts do not alone weigh the economic aspect of it, but the effect
of it in human terms and the importance of it to the individual in
the life situation.”’ [Citation.] Further, a fundamental right is
vested if it is ‘already possessed by the individual’ . . . .”
(Saraswati v. County of San Diego (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 917,
926-927.)
14
“The courts have rarely upheld the application of the
independent judgment test to land use decisions. Those cases [in
which the courts have applied the test] have typically involved
classic vested rights.” (Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1527 (Goat Hill Tavern).)
Appellants assert: “Where a petitioner has a vested right to
a nonconforming use and seeks approval to expand it, courts will
employ substantial evidence review. [Citation.] But when a
petitioner’s action seeks to protect its existing nonconforming use
from government action which threatens to extinguish the
existing and vested right, such as here, the trial court must
independently review the evidence.” “Holguin does not argue
that it has a vested right to expand the nonconforming use. Nor
has Holguin applied for an expansion of the nonconforming use.”
“Holguin contends that its vested rights are governed by the
scope of the business in 1985,” when the NCZO was amended to
require a conditional use permit for a winery with a wine-tasting
room or with over 2,000 square feet of structures. “Holguin
argues . . . that (1) it has the right to maintain an unexpanded
nonconforming use as it existed in 1985, and (2) the County’s
actions have infringed on that right.”
If Holguin has a fundamental vested right to maintain an
unexpanded, nonconforming use of the winery as it existed in
1985, the County has not taken any action to narrow the scope of
that use. In 1985 the winery was limited to 600 square feet, and
the wine-tasting room was limited to 75 square feet within the
confines of the winery. (See the December 1981 Zoning
Clearance attached hereto as Appendix A.) Accordingly, the trial
court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard of
15
review because the Board’s decision did not affect a fundamental
vested right.
Goat Hill Tavern, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1519, is
distinguishable. There, the court held that a city’s refusal to
renew a tavern owner’s conditional use permit implicated a
fundamental vested right – “the right to continue operating an
established business in which he has made a substantial
investment.” (Id., at p. 1529.) “By simply denying renewal of its
conditional use permit, the city destroyed a business which has
operated legally for 35 years.” (Id., at p. 1531.)
The County did not destroy Holguin’s business. Unlike the
tavern owner, Holguin was allowed to continue to operate the
winery and wine-tasting room as they had been operated by
previous owners within the parameters of the 1985 legal
nonconforming use.
Substantial Evidence Supports
Violations 1, 3, 4, and 8 of NOV CV19-0012
Appellants contest the Board’s upholding of violations 1, 3,
4, and 8 of NOV CV19-0012.
Violation 1
As described in NOV CV19-0012, Violation 1 is as follows:
“Expansion of the non-conforming winery without a CUP
(structures/uses beyond the 2,000-sq. ft. ministerial limit) – wine
tasting/associated event venue has become the principal use of
the property and not secondary to wine production (crop
production) and includes several additional structures used for
the wine tasting/event venue and grounds improvements . . . .”
At the new hearing before the Board in September 2021,
Franca Rosengren, the case planner for the project, stated: “The
principal use of the property was historically agricultural, and
16
now it is no longer producing crops on site for the production of
wine, but rather it’s run as a de facto bar, where they’ve set up
several bars throughout the facility, or the property, where
they’re . . . serving and selling wine grown and produced off site.
They’ve increased the area occupied by the public wine tasting,
and also the occupancy capacity of the buildings, and the parking
lots.” “So the winery footprint has tripled in size, buildings have
been converted to winery related uses, which exceed the 2,000
square foot ministerial Zoning Clearance limit, and crop
production has become secondary to the winery use.”
Jacklyn Smith, Assistant County Counsel, stated, “[W]hat
we know is that under the Whitmans, their wine tasting
operation was limited to wine tasting inside of the original, 1981
winery building. What we also know is that under [Holguin’s]
ownership, wine tasting occurs pretty much throughout the
property. It was no longer just limited to the inside of that
original winery building.”
A newspaper article published in the Ventura County Star
on April 1, 2018, said that in late February 2018 a private wine-
tasting event had occurred at the winery. “Available by the taste,
glass and bottle, the wines were poured at outdoor counters by”
members of the Holguin family. “The outdoor counters will be in
use again come April 7,” when the winery will celebrate its
official reopening.
The Board found: “Permittee testified that the grapes used
to make wine now being served at the [winery] are grown offsite
in Paso Robles and Northern Santa Barbara County.[4] . . . [T]he
4 The Board said that “Permittee” refers collectively to
appellants Holguin, i.e., Holguin Family Ventures, LLC, and
17
grapes are then shipped to a winery in Paso Robles where they
are crushed, fermented and bottled. [Record citation.] In
contrast, Permittee acknowledged that the prior owner . . . had
conducted winemaking onsite. [Record citation.] [¶] [] Permittee
has converted the principal use of the property from agricultural
use to instead using the property for the principal purposes of
serving and selling wine produced offsite and associated
assembly uses. [Record citation.] Permittee has increased the
amount of wine that can be and presumably is being sold, as well
as [the] number of patrons and overall intensity of the winery
land use, as compared to the property’s historic nonconforming
winery use.” “Based upon Permittee’s unpermitted expansion
and changed use of the winery such that the principal use is no
longer agricultural production, the County issued NOV CV19-
0012 to Permittee . . . .” Section 8102-0 of the NCZO defines
“expansion” as “[i]ncreasing the area or volume occupied by or
devoted to a use . . . .” It defines “Change of Use” as occurring
“[w]here a new use of land or structures is initiated in place of, or
in addition to, a previous use.”
In support of its decision to uphold violation 1, the Board
made 15 findings. One of the findings was that “[a]n ABC license
premises diagram dated March 29, 2018, which was submitted by
Permittee to obtain a revised ABC license, increased the area
designated for public wine consumption at the winery to 130,000
sq. ft. and encompassed multiple buildings and structures never
before authorized for public wine and consumption in prior
winery ABC licenses.” The diagram is attached hereto as
Appendix C.
OCRW, Inc., as well as Andrew Holguin, who is not named as an
appellant.
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Appellants contend that “what Holguin is accused of [i.e.,
the change of principal use of the property without a CUP,] isn’t
even a violation.” We disagree. The Board explained: “Because
the principal use of the property was historically agricultural,
and because Permittee has ‘change[d] the use’ of the property to
now be used principally for the purpose of serving and selling
wine grown and produced offsite, at a volume and intensity that
far exceeds any prior wine tasting operation, the [Permittee]
must ‘conform to the provisions of [the NCZO], including the
requirements for type of permit.’ Under the current provisions of
the NCZO, a CUP is required to operate the winery because it is
a winery in the A-E zone ‘with public tours or tasting rooms.’[5]
(NCZO, § 8105-4 [permitted use matrix for wineries].) Wineries
are categorized as a ‘Crop and Orchard Production’ land use,
meaning that wineries must principally consist of the growing of
grapes and production of wine onsite. (Ibid.) Thus, because [the
NCZO, § 8105-4] Permittee has ‘change[d] the use’ of the property
as compared to its historic nonconforming use, Permittee’s
current operation requires a CUP and exists in violation of
sections 8101-3.1, 8105-4 and 8113-10.3(b).” NCZO section 8113-
10.3(b) provides: “Except as provided in this Section, any
modification or expansion of the use or structure, change of use,
or additional use shall conform to the provisions of this Chapter,
including the requirements for type of permit. . . . .”
5 NCZO section 8104-1.2 provides: “The purpose of [the
Agricultural Exclusive (AE) Zone] is to preserve and protect
commercial agricultural lands as a limited and irreplaceable
resource, to preserve and maintain agriculture as a major
industry in Ventura County and to protect these areas from the
encroachment of nonrelated uses which, by their nature, would
have detrimental effects upon the agricultural industry.”
19
Appellants next claim that the “Board’s findings do not
support” the change-of-principal-use violation. “[T]he findings
‘must expose the board's mode of analysis to an extent sufficient
to serve the purposes’ of the need for findings.” (Young, supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at p. 421.) “[T]he findings should ‘enable the parties
to the agency proceeding to determine whether and on what basis
they should seek review.’” (Ibid.) “[C]ourts have stated that
‘[a]dministrative agency findings are generally permitted
considerable latitude with regard to their precision, formality,
and matters reasonably implied therein.’ [Citation.] An agency’s
findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 ‘do not need
to be extensive or detailed.’ [Citation.] ‘In addition, findings are
to be liberally construed to support rather than defeat the
decision under review.’” (Ibid.) We agree with the County that
the Board’s detailed “findings provide more than enough
information to bridge the analytic gap between the evidence and
the decision.”
Finally, appellants maintain that “the Board’s findings on
the principal use claim are not supported by the evidence.” (Bold
and capitalization omitted.) Appellants assert that there “is not
sufficient evidence to conclude that the principal use of the Ranch
was ever agriculture in comparison to the Winery.”
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that in
the 1980s the “principal use of the property was agricultural.”
According to “A Historical Geography” of the property prepared
by Barbara Ann Snyder in 1985, at that time the property
contained “a large orchard and there are on-going experimental
plantings. A survey is now in progress and a new map of the
plantings soon to be completed will include: 11 varieties of apples,
7 of plums, 6 of apricots, 5 of almonds and pears, 4 of cherries,
20
peaches and figs, just to name a few. In addition to the tree
crops, an acre of boysenberries and 7 varieties of seedless grapes
have been planted.” In 1981 “[t]wenty-two hundred wine grapes
[sic, should read ‘grape vines’] were planted on 4 ½ acres. . . . A
projected goal of 15 acres is anticipated for the future.” “[T]he
open hillsides . . . are today used for agriculture: oat[,] hay,
deciduous fruits, berries, etc. ‘The ranch has some 120
agriculture acres and the remainder [207] [acres] is
wildlands . . . .” (Brackets for “207” in orignal.) An earlier owner
of the property, Antonio Riva, “planted apple, pear and plum
trees and various vegetables and sold produce to city dwellers in
Ventura.” He also “planted approximately 14 acres of grapes.”
Violation 3
Violation 3 of NOV CV19-0012 alleges that Holguin made a
“[n]on-permitted conversion” of a “2,000-sq.ft. agricultural
storage building” to a building “for ‘amusement and recreational
activities’, such as . . . yoga instruction[,] . . . contributing to the
expansion of the non-conforming winery use . . . .” Substantial
evidence supports Violation 3.
The Board found that the 2,000 square-foot agricultural
storage building had been used for winery-related events because
“[o]n January 1, 2019, Permittee hosted a yoga and wine-tasting
event inside the [building], which according to Permittee,
featured a ‘2 hour yoga class followed by wine tasting including
six varietals.’” The quoted language attributable to Permittee is
taken from an advertisement for the event. The advertisement
stated, “Only a few remaining spots for tomorrow’s Yoga & Wine
Tasting!”
The Board also found that “[a] social media post by
Permittee shows the 2,000 sq. ft. . . . building being used for
21
‘pourer training and wine tasting.’ Permittee refers to the 2,000
sq.ft. . . . building as ‘the new tasting room.’” “Photos of the 2,000
sq. ft. . . . building show a built-in wooden bar, multiple wine
barrel tables with chairs . . . .” “Photos show groups of people
drinking wine at the 2,000 sq. ft. agricultural building.”
The Board concluded: “The use of such building for a yoga
and wine tasting event on January 1, 2019, for pourer training
and wine tasting, and in light of the permanent fixtures installed
to facilitate wine tasting such as a permanent wooden bar, . . .
and wine barrel tables and chairs demonstrate that the structure
was constructed and is used for the winery use and therefore
‘expands’ upon the historic, nonconforming winery use. A
CUP was therefore required to authorize the construction and
use of this winery building.” “Moreover, by constructing and
using an additional 2,000 sq. ft. building for winery-related uses,
in addition to the 2,000 sq. ft. winery building authorized by
ZC15-0948 [Appendix B, p. 1], Permittee violated [the NCZO]
because Permittee is operating a winery with a tasting room, and
with greater than 2,000 sq. ft. of structures, without the requisite
CUP.” We agree with the Board.
Appellants argue, “[T]he Board incorrectly assumed that
Holguin is limited to 2,000 [square feet] of winery-related
structures.” Contrary to appellants’ argument, ZC15-0948
(Appendix B, p. 1) granted to Holguin “Zoning Clearance for a
certificate of occupancy for an existing winery of up to 2,000 sq.ft.
(bottling, processing, and storage).” ZC15-0948 refers to Zoning
Clearance no. 37254 (Appendix A), which shows that the 75
square-foot wine-tasting area is located within the winery.
Appellants acknowledge that ZC15-0948 “references and
maintains the existing . . . produce stand,” i.e., the wine-tasting
22
area. In Whitman’s counsel’s December 2007 letter to the
County, counsel said, “[T]he wine tasting area within [the
winery] has remained the same size and has operated in the
same way since it was permitted in December 1981.”
Because appellants did not appeal ZC15-0948 when it was
issued in 2015, they are bound by it. “A landowner cannot
challenge a condition imposed upon the granting of a permit after
acquiescence in the condition by either specifically agreeing to
the condition or failing to challenge its validity, and accepting the
benefits afforded by the permit.” (Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of
California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642, 654 (Rossco Holdings
Inc.).) Section 8111-7.1 of the NCZO provides for the filing of
“[a]n application for an appeal concerning any order,
requirement, permit or decision made in the administration of
[the NCZO].”
In their opening brief appellants contend “the County
issued entitlements for winery-related structures far exceeding
the NCZO’s current 2,000-[square-foot] ministerial cap.” They
list four zoning clearances issued between 1981 and 1990 that
allegedly expanded the floor space of the winery beyond the 2,000
square-foot limit. If such an expansion occurred, appellants
should have challenged the 2,000 square-foot limit of ZC15-0948
when it was issued to them in 2015. Instead, Andrew Holguin
signed the following certification on ZC15-0948, “I have reviewed,
read and understand the terms, notes and conditions of this
permit . . . and agree to abide by them . . . .” (Italics added; see
Appendix B, p. 2.) In a letter to the Planning Division dated
November 1, 2017, Andrew Holguin wrote, “Under current zoning
restrictions OCRW [Old Creek Ranch Winery] is limited to 2,000
sf of Winery.”
23
In any event, three of the four zoning clearances cited by
appellants made no mention of expanding the winery. Zoning
Clearance No. 36533, issued on March 13, 1981, authorized the
construction of a 30 x 30-foot “out-structure office/tack rm.”
Zoning Clearance No. 36763, issued on May 28, 1981, authorized
the construction of a 20 x 30-foot “storage structure on ag.
preserve.” Zoning Clearance No. 43844, issued on August 8,
1986, authorized a “storage addition” without specifying the
dimensions of the addition. The fourth Zoning Clearance, No.
67780 issued on January 23, 1990, authorized a 676 square-foot
expansion of the winery. As we noted at p. 3, ante, this expansion
increased the size of the winery from 600 to approximately 1,276
square feet, well within the 2,000 square-foot limit specified in
ZC15-0948.
Violation 4
Violation 4 of NOV CV19-0012 is for a “[n]on-permitted
conversion of [a] 900 sq. ft. agricultural shed to a large
agricultural sales facility that includes the display of items for
sale, such as books, china, wine baskets, shirts, and olive oil . . . .”
Substantial evidence supports Violation 4.
The Board found: “Permittee applied for and, on November
30, 2016, was issued a zoning clearance to construct a 900 sq. ft.
general agricultural storage building with utility sink and
covered deck on Permittee’s property . . . .” “At site inspection
conducted by Planning staff on January 9, 2019, the . . .
[building] did not contain any agricultural-related equipment or
materials but rather included the display of items for winery-
related retail sale such as books, china, wine baskets, shirts and
olive oil.” “The addition of a 900 sq.ft. building used by Permittee
to display winery-related merchandise for sale to patrons of the
24
winery is an ‘expansion of the [nonconforming] . . . use or
structure’ of the winery. . . . [It] add[s] uses or structures
accessory to the 2,000 sq. ft. winery building authorized by ZC15-
0948. . . . [B]ecause the 900 sq. ft. general agricultural barn . . .
expands upon the nonconforming winery, the current permit
requirement of the NCZO apply and under those provisions a
CUP is required to operate the winery.”
The administrative record includes a posting on social
media that shows a photograph of the purported agricultural
storage building. Next to the photograph, Holguin stated, “Our
‘Fruit Stand’ is coming along! Can’t wait for it to open so you can
see what we will have in-store!” A member of the public
responded, “A fruit stand. What a great addition. This will be a
full service Winery for sure.” The response shows that the public
perceived the sales facility to be an integral part of the winery.
Another photograph shows a sign with the word “WINERY”
in bold letters. An arrow points in the direction of the winery.
Below this sign is another sign in bold letters advertising
“Holiday Gifts.” The sign shows that appellants intended the
sales facility to be an integral part of the winery. It was the
winery’s “gift shop.”
Violation 8
Violation 8 of NOV CV19-0012 alleges that Holguin made a
“[n]on-permitted expansion of the non-conforming winery use, by
using the approximately 3,000 sq. ft. agricultural storage
building for the storage/warehousing of boxes of bottled wine,
which should be located within the existing 2,000-sq. ft. wine
tasting, wine storage building, without a CUP . . . .”
Appellants argue: “[The] Building [] is approved for
agricultural and storage uses. [Record citation.] Wine in bottles
25
and barrels is the product of the agricultural operation of
processing grapes into wine and can be stored in Holguin’s
agricultural buildings like any other agricultural product or
equipment. . . . Holguin is just storing agricultural end-products
in a building permitted for agricultural storage.”
We disagree. ZC15-0948 (Appendix B, p. 1) provides
“Zoning Clearance for a certificate of occupancy for an existing
winery of up to 2,000 sq. ft. (bottling, processing, and storage)
. . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, bottles of wine are to be stored
within the winery. Moreover, the Board noted that “[t]he storage
of wine bottles or finished wine in barrels is specifically identified
[by the NCZO] as counting toward the square footage of a winery
use. (NCZO, § 8105-4 (‘Wineries’).)” NCZO section 8105-4
provides, “Wineries (including Processing, Bottling & Storage)”
require a CUP if the square footage of the “structure” is “[o]ver
2,000 . . . sq. ft.” (Italics added.)
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding that, “[b]ecause Permittee used the agricultural
building . . . to store bottles of wine, this square footage is
counted toward the winery use. And because such square footage
exceeds 2,000 sq. ft., a CUP is required.”
Substantial Evidence Supports the Board’s Denial of a
Zoning Clearance for the Parking Lot and Charging Stations
The Board found: “Permittee’s zoning clearance application
. . . seeks to . . . legalize, after-the-fact, EV charging stations and
associated electrical infrastructure located in a new paved
parking lot constructed by Permittee. [Record citation.]
Permittee removed and paved over what was previously an
agricultural field designated as having soils of statewide
importance, measuring approximately 16,000 sq. ft., to construct
26
the parking lot where the EV charging stations are located.
[Record citation.] The . . . parking lot contains approximately 40-
50 parking spaces. [Record ciation.] [¶] [] The parking lot, EV
charging stations and related electrical infrastructure are used
by patrons of the winery when they visit the winery for wine
tasting and/or other winery-related activities.”
The Board further found that, by installing the new
parking lot and EV charging stations, “Permittee ‘increase[d] the
area . . . [of the property] occupied by or devoted to’ the use of the
winery. Moreover, the installation of EV charging stations . . .
[was] for the purpose of attracting more patrons and increasing
the intensity of the use beyond that of the historic wine tasting
operation.” “[B]ecause the parking lot, EV charging stations and
related electrical infrastructure modifies and expands upon the
winery use, a CUP is required to approve such modifications and
expansions.”
Appellants contend: “[T]he parking area of the Ranch is not
part of the Winery. Nor is the parking area a use or structure
that is accessory to the Winery.” “[T]he parking lot did not
increase the area or volume occupied by or devoted to the winery.
Parking on the Ranch is not new; the Ranch has historically been
open to the public, including public visitors to the Winery.
[Record citation.] Parking has historically occurred throughout
the Ranch in unpaved areas . . . .” “Thus, Holguin did not
‘expand’ the Winery merely by upgrading the Ranch’s preexisting
parking areas, paving the lot and including eco-friendly charging
stations. There is no basis for requiring Holguin to seek a
discretionary CUP just to provide a paved parking surface.”
Viewing the “evidence in the light most favorable to the
[Board’s] findings, [and] drawing all [reasonable] inferences in
27
support of those findings,” we conclude a reasonable person could
find that appellants’ installation of the parking lot and charging
stations was an integral component of the expansion of the
winery beyond its legal non-conforming use. (Akella, supra, 61
Cal.App.5th at p. 814.) The winery previously had been a small
operation. Angela Ross, who spoke at the original hearing before
the Board, said that when she had visited the “old winery over
ten years ago . . . it was a very small, intimate type area.”
“[T]here was only enough [space] for eight to ten customers to sit
at the little bar to do the wine tasting.”
The paved parking lot with 40 to 50 parking spaces and EV
charging stations was much larger than necessary to
accommodate visitors to the winery before its expansion by
appellants. The purpose of these improvements was to attract
many more visitors than the unexpanded winery could
accommodate, thereby promoting and facilitating its expansion.
We agree with the case planner’s statement at the original Board
hearing that the expansion of the winery and the installation of
the paved parking lot and charging stations must be considered
together as comprising a single project. The case planner said,
“We look at . . . the whole of the action. [The parking lot and
charging stations] are part of the winery itself and part of the []
now . . . non-conforming winery.”
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Appellants’ Motion to Amend Their Complaint
After the trial court had ruled in favor of the County, but
before judgment was entered, appellants filed a motion to amend
their complaint to add a new cause of action for declaratory relief.
The proposed new cause of action stated: “On November 28, 2022,
this Court denied [appellants’] petitions for writ of mandate,
28
ruling that [they] must ‘either abide by the scope of the winery’s
legal nonconforming use by scaling back to its historic size and
operations, or seek the necessary conditional use permit for the
expanded and modified winery.’ However, the Court’s ruling did
not establish the ‘historic size and operations’ of the Winery—an
open question that must be answered in order to inform
[appellants] as to the NOV abatement that is supposedly
required.” “[Appellants] thus seek a judicial declaration: (1) that
the [March 5,] 2008 Letter [from the Planning Director to
Whitman, the winery’s previous owner,] does not establish the
‘historic size and operations’ of the Winery; and (2) determining
the ‘historic size and operations’ of the Winery.”
The trial court denied appellants’ motion to amend. It
stated three grounds for the denial. The first was that “[t]he
proposed cause of action is essentially the same as the
declaratory relief causes of action which were already decided
and denied.” The court explained: “The Court previously upheld
the Board's decisions regarding the notice of violations as
outlined in [the] 2008 letter and the 2015 [zoning] clearance
[Appendix B], which described and outlined the historic use of the
winery. While the Court’s Order may not have explicitly
described the applicable operating hours, customer counts and
limits, types and frequency of events, etc., the underlying letter
and [zoning] clearance did. The Court upheld the NOV decisions
in their entirety which were based upon those documents. There
is no ambiguity in need of clarification.”
The court’s second ground for denying the motion was that
“the delay in moving to amend [is not] justified because
[appellants have] not adequately explained the failure to raise
the claim earlier.” The third ground was that appellants have
29
“not alleged an actual controversy that is proper for resolution by
the Court in the first instance because the Court will not issue an
advisory opinion.”
“‘[T]he trial court has wide discretion in allowing the
amendment of any pleading [citations], [and] as a matter of policy
the ruling of the trial court in such matters will be upheld unless
a manifest or gross abuse of discretion is shown. . . .’” (Record v.
Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486 (Record).) “A court abuses
its discretion if its ruling is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it. [Citation.] An abuse of
discretion occurs if, in light of the applicable law and the relevant
circumstances, the court's decision exceeds the bounds of reason,
resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” (Olive v. General Nutrition
Centers, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 804, 827-828.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave
to amend the complaint to add the new cause of action.
Appellants’ justification for adding the cause of action was
unfounded. They alleged that the court had ruled that appellants
“must ‘either abide by the scope of the winery’s legal
nonconforming use by scaling back to its historic size and
operations, or seek the necessary conditional use permit for the
expanded and modified winery.’” But the court did not so rule.
Instead, it said, “‘[T]he County seeks for [appellants] to either
abide by the scope of the winery’s legal nonconforming use by
scaling back to its historic size and operations, or seek the
necessary conditional use permit . . . .’” (Italics added.) The
court’s ruling was that “‘[s]ubstantial evidence supports the
Board’s decision to uphold the violations and deny [appellants’]
appeals . . . .’”
30
Furthermore, the trial court reasonably concluded that
clarification was unnecessary because the Board’s detailed
findings make clear that, if appellants do not obtain a CUP, they
must limit the winery and wine-tasting area to the 2,000 square-
foot winery building that existed in 2015 when the County issued
Holguin the Inauguration of Use ZC 15-0948. ZC 15-0948
specifies the permissible “hours of operations for the tasting
room” and provides that “[n]o special events will be permitted on
the site until an approved Conditional Use Permit is issued.”
(Appendix B, p. 1.)
In addition, the Board’s findings make clear that appellants
are bound by the March 5, 2008 letter from the Planning Director
to Whitman. ZC 15-0948 states, “See previous correspondence
between Planning Management and previous owner [Whitman]
for clarification.” When ZC 15-0948 was issued on September 21,
2015, appellants knew that this correspondence includes the
March 5, 2008 letter. The Board found: “On August 10, 2015,
[before ZC 15-0948 was issued,] Permittee sent the Planning
Division a letter acknowledging the aforementioned March 5,
2008, letter establishing the scope of the legal nonconforming
winery use. [The letter was from Andrew Holguin in his capacity
as President of OCRW, Inc.] The letter then requested
permission for [the winery] to have ‘slightly’ longer operating
hours [than permitted in the March 5, 2008 letter]. [Record
citation.] In a response to Permittee’s architect dated August 19,
2015, [also before ZC 15-0948 was issued,] the Planning Division
informed [the architect] that a CUP would be required to exceed
the operating parameters of the March 5, 2008, letter, and stated
that . . . ‘[the winery] will be only allowed to operate under the
standards set forth in the March 5, 2008 letter’ [record citation].
31
Consequently Permittee, by its own admission, was informed and
understood the limitations of the legal nonconforming winery use
that could continue without the need for a CUP . . . .”
The Board found that, by not administratively appealing
“the Planning Director’s determination as to the scope of the
nonconforming winery” as set forth in the March 5, 2008 letter,
Whitman had “waive[d] her right, and the right of all subsequent
owners of the property, to challenge [that determination].” (Italics
added.) Irrespective of Whitman’s waiver, appellants are bound
by the March 5, 2008 letter because they did not appeal ZC 15-
0948, which incorporated the letter. (Rossco Holdings Inc.,
supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 654.)
In their reply brief appellants assert: “Holguin was a new
owner and would not have even known that the [March 5,] 2008
Letter existed. That Holguin would have been expected to
surmise that the 2015 Zoning Clearance incorporated some letter
it was not even aware of is absurd.” The previously referred to
August 10, 2015 letter from Andrew Holguin shows that
appellants’ assertion is false. In that letter Andrew Holguin
expressly mentioned the March 5, 2008 letter: “In another letter
from Ventura Country [sic] . . . dated March 5, 2008 (see
attached) the country [sic] authorized the following hours and
conditions of operation of the Wine Tasting Room and associated
facilities . . . .” Andrew Holguin said that “OCRW, Inc. is asking
for a slight increase in [the hours of] operation from the previous
owner [Whitman] of Old Creek Ranch . . . .”
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because
it reasonably concluded that appellants had unreasonably
delayed their motion to amend the complaint. “‘[E]ven if a good
amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in
32
presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial.’”
(Record, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 486.)
Appellants’ Third Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief
Appellants’ third cause of action for declaratory relief
alleged, inter alia, that they “may host an unlimited number of
outdoor events with up to 100 attendees at the Ranch pursuant to
NCZO § 8107-46.1,” and that they “may host up to 10 outdoor
events with between 101 and 350 attendees at the Ranch
pursuant to NCZO § 8107- 46.3(a)(3).” The trial court ruled, “The
claim for declaratory relief is denied because the County
rescinded the NOV [NOV CV18-0095] citing [appellants] for
hosting large-scale winery events. . . . The issue is moot.”
Appellants argue that the issue is not moot because “the
County threatened Holguin with further violations and penalties
in the case of additional outdoor events.” Appellants contend:
“The County . . . has no basis to prohibit Holguin from hosting
outdoor events consistent” with an ordinance that was enacted in
2018, NCZO section 8107-46 (the Outdoor Events Ordinance).
“By its terms, the . . . ordinance allows Holguin to host outdoor
events consistent with its parameters.” “True, the 2015 Zoning
Clearance [ZC15-0948 (Appendix B)] does say that no special
events will be permitted until an approved conditional use permit
is issued [record citation], but that was before the law changed in
2018 . . . . [The law] has now changed with the [enactment of the
Outdoor Events] Ordinance, which governs.” Therefore, this
court should “direct[] the trial court to enter a judgment declaring
that Holguin is entitled to the benefits and regulations of the
[Outdoor Events] Ordinance.”
The Outdoor Events Ordinance is inapplicable to
appellants. “The purpose of [section] 8107-46 is to regulate
33
outdoor events to ensure they are compatible with surrounding
land uses and are not detrimental to public health and safety of
the environment.” (NCZO § 8107-46.1.) The NCZO defines
“Outdoor Events” as excluding events “addressed by a permit or
entitlement issued under this Chapter.” (NCZO § 8102-0.)
Therefore, the Outdoor Events Ordinance does not override
ZC15-0948’s requirement that “[n]o special events will be
permitted on the site until an approved Conditional Use Permit
is issued.” Nor does it override the restrictions set forth in the
March 5, 2008 letter.
In a letter to Holguin dated August 27, 2021, the County’s
Code Compliance Director gave additional reasons why the
Outdoor Events Ordinance does not apply to appellants’ winery:
“By its own terms, the Outdoor Events Ordinance does not apply
to events which are ‘separately regulated [under this Chapter]’
. . . . (NCZO, § 8102 . . . .) Wineries in the Agricultural-Exclusive
zone, including wineries with a tasting room (such as [appellants’
winery]) are ‘separately regulated’ under the NCZO (see NCZO,
§ 8105-4 . . . .); thus, events held at [appellants’] winery fall
outside the purview of the Outdoor Events Ordinance. Winery
events on [appellants’] property are further regulated by the
nonconforming use provisions of the NCZO and for that
additional reason such events are not subject to the Outdoor
Events Ordinance. (See Articles 2 and 13.)”
“In interpreting municipal [or county] ordinances, we
exercise our independent judgment as we would when construing
a statute. [Citation.] Nonetheless, a city’s [or county’s]
interpretation of its own ordinance ‘“is entitled to great weight
unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.”’ [Citation.] . . .
Greater deference is accorded an agency’s interpretation where
34
‘“the agency has expertise and technical knowledge . . . since the
agency is likely to be intimately familiar with regulations it
authored and sensitive to the practical implications of one
interpretation over another.”’” (Berkeley Hills Watershed
Coalition v. City of Berkeley (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 880, 896.)
Accordingly, regardless of whether the applicability of the
Outdoor Events Ordinance is moot, the trial court did not err in
denying the third cause of action’s claim for declaratory relief.
“‘No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by
authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and
propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will
not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong
reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case,
it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may
have moved the trial court to its conclusion.’” (D'Amico v. Board
of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. The County shall recover its
costs on appeal.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
35
37
Benjamin F. Coats, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell and Matthew D. Hinks,
Lara L. Leitner, for Plaintiffs and Appellant.
Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, Jeffrey E. Barnes, Chief
Assistant County Counsel, David Edsall, Jr., Assistant County
Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
40
Filed 8/13/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
HOLGUIN FAMILY 2d Civ. No. B328569
VENTURES, LLC, et al., (Super. Ct. No. 56-2021-
00561036-CU-WM-VTA)
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Ventura County)
v. ORDER CERTIFYING
OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
COUNTY OF VENTURA, [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on July 24,
2024, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For
good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published
in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
GILBERT, P. J. YEGAN, J. BALTODANO, J.