Opinion

Com. v. Kasey, J.

Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Aug 15, 2024
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Lazarus, P.J.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.5%

“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”

How later courts described this case

  • “When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”
  • “[I]n criminal cases[,] appeals lie from judgment of sentence rather than from the verdict of guilt[.]”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

J-S07003-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

JEROME KASEY :

:

Appellant : No. 907 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 31, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002108-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2024

Jerome Kasey appeals from the judgment of sentence,1 entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, following his convictions of one

count each of first-degree murder,2 person not to possess firearms,3 and

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 On June 26, 2023, Kasey filed a counseled notice of appeal stating the appeal

was “from the conviction of May 25, 2023, and judg[]ment of sentence[]

entered on May 31, 2023, by the Honorable Scott Arthur Evans.” Notice of

Appeal, 6/26/23. We note that this appeal properly lies only from Kasey’s

judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. O’Neill, 578 A.2d 1334,

1335 (Pa. Super. 1990) (“[I]n criminal cases[,] appeals lie from judgment of

sentence rather than from the verdict of guilt[.]”). We have amended the

caption accordingly.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).

3 Id. at § 6105(a)(1).

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firearms carried without a license.4 Additionally, Kasey’s counsel, Kristen L.

Weisenberger, Esquire, has filed an application to withdraw as counsel, and

an accompanying Anders5 brief. Upon review, we grant Attorney

Weisenberger’s application to withdraw, and we affirm Kasey’s judgment of

sentence on the basis of the thorough and well-written decision authored by

the Honorable Scott Arthur Evans.

The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:

On November 16, 2021, James Williams was living in Harrisburg

and making his living as a drug dealer. He had met [Kasey] two

[] to three [] months earlier when they lived in the same building

and became friends. . . . Several weeks before November 16th,

[2021,] Williams moved [out of his apartment and] into the

apartment [Kasey] shared with his wife, Rhaquan Brown, at 253

Hummel Street, Apartment 2, in the City of Harrisburg.

At some point on November 16th[, 2021, Kasey, while in

Baltimore,] . . . told Williams they needed to pick up his cousin,

Jeramiah Beamon, to bring him back to Harrisburg. Beamon

carried a black case[,] which Williams later learned contained a

gun.

* * *

At some point [back in Harrisburg], Williams saw [Kasey] place

the gun Beamon had brought from Baltimore in[] his bedroom

closet.

[Kasey] seemed concerned with Beamon’s behavior and told

Williams he wanted to bring him back to Baltimore. Specifically,

[Kasey] said he did not trust Beamon because he was unlocking

____________________________________________

4 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).

5 Anders v. California, 368 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.

McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).

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the doors and windows of his apartment and asking for the

address. During the evening, Beamon also expressed his need to

make some money.

By approximately 10:30 p.m., Williams, [Kasey], and Beamon[]

were outside near the corner of Kittatinny [] and Hummel

Streets[,] in the Allison Hill section of Harrisburg[,] attempting to

sell drugs, although it was mostly Williams doing the selling.

Williams was extremely familiar with the neighborhood, including

the locations of most of the cameras in the area. In fact, video

footage later obtained by the police and displayed for the jury

showed Williams ducking behind a truck to make a drug

transaction out of the view of any cameras.

The three [] men walked down Hummel Street[,] where Williams

looked for more possible sales. They turned onto Swatara Street,

and then Williams described for the jury what transpired:

We was walking down the street, was—we turned on

Swatara and Hummel, got to I want to say in the middle of

the block of Swatara [], between Swatara and Hummel and

Swatara and Evergreen[,] and I heard—[Kasey] moved me

from the middle to the left, and when I heard the first shot,

I took off running. But I can’t sit here and say that I [saw]

[Kasey] shoot him.

[N.T. Jury Trial, 5/22/24-5/24/24, at 420].

Although Williams could not see [Kasey] fire the gun, he saw the

gun out of the corner of his eye, and he saw Beamon drop to the

ground. [Kasey] also ran from the scene, following behind

Williams, and both men returned to [Kasey]’s apartment. There

had been no arguments or advance[] warning that [Kasey]

intended to shoot Beamon. Therefore, Williams was surprised and

asked [Kasey] why he didn’t inform him of his plans. [Kasey]

replied that he had told him. Williams told [Kasey] it was a dumb

place to shoot someone because of all the cameras in the area.

Beamon suffered at least three [] gunshot wounds to his head,

one [] to his left arm, and one [] to his back. The shots to his arm

and back occurred first, but the shots to his head happened before

he died and were [] fatal. The autopsy uncovered no signs of a

physical altercation, seeming to confirm various witnesses who

testified they did not hear any argument or indications of a

physical struggle prior to the gunshots.

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Needing more marijuana, and because [Kasey] needed to “clear

his head,” the men decided to again return to Baltimore. They

changed clothes, placed the clothes they had been wearing in a

garbage bag, and discarded the bag along Route 83 on the way to

Baltimore. While in Baltimore, [Kasey] took the gun into a house

with which Williams was not familiar. When he returned from the

house, [Kasey] no longer had the gun. [Kasey] also directed them

to a house where he could get money for him and Williams to

leave Pennsylvania.

Williams suggested that he and [Kasey] go their separate ways,

but [Kasey] refused. [Kasey] wanted Williams to flee with him,

and Williams believed he had no choice because [Kasey] was firm

in his position and had just killed his own cousin.

Without the gun, and presumably with money to finance their

escape, the men returned to Harrisburg in the early morning of

November 17th. Later [] th[at] afternoon, [Kasey] and Williams

picked Brown up from work, but Williams insisted on being

dropped off at a bar rather than returning to [Kasey]’s apartment

due to the likelihood of police activity in the area of the murder.

[Brown proceeded to the apartment while Williams and Kasey

went to a bar.]

While at the bar, Williams overheard [Kasey]’s side of a telephone

conversation with Brown in which she apparently advised [Kasey]

that the police were in their apartment searching at that moment.

Detective Jason Brinker testified that Brown initiated a telephone

call in his presence during the search of the apartment. [Brown]

told him she was calling her father and [Detective Brinker] heard

[Brown] explaining that the police were searching the apartment,

she did not know why, and that she was scared. Since the police

had explained the reason for their interest to Brown, and obtained

her written consent to search the apartment, [Detective] Brinker

offered to speak to her father to explain. Brown put the phone on

speaker, handed it to [Detective] Brinker[,] and he explained the

purpose of the police’s presence. However, the police never

checked the phone number Brown called or otherwise verified who

she had called. [Detective] Brinker simply took [Brown] at her

word [as to] who[m] she was [spea]king [with] and who he ended

up talking to.

After that phone call, [Kasey] decided that he and Williams needed

to leave town. Accompanied by Brown, they were driven to

Brown’s mother’s house near the Maryland/Delaware border by

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Brown’s sister. Several days later, Brown’s mother and stepfather

drove them to Lubbock, Texas, where they stayed with one of

Brown’s relatives. [Kasey] and Williams obtained jobs and

planned to remain in Texas indefinitely. They were both arrested

in Texas approximately two [to three] months later. Williams’

description of his and [Kasey]’s whereabouts and the timeline of

events was substantially corroborated by an investigation of the

locations of [Williams’] cell phone at relevant times. Based in part

on this corroboration of Williams’ credibility, and observations of

the videos of the incident, the police eliminated Williams as a

suspect in the shooting.

* * *

Eight [] shell casings were discovered at the scene of the

homicide. All the casings were for a 9-millimeter semi-automatic

handgun, and all were manufactured by Federal Ammunition. The

consent search of [Kasey]’s apartment revealed a box of 9-

millimeter Federal [A]mmunition [bullets] and a 9-millimeter

magazine in a closet. Brown claimed that the ammunition and

magazine were left by the previous tenants.

Brown was present during the search of the apartment. Officers

noticed that she was intently focused on a jacket sitting on top of

a plastic tote. Before being asked to move to another location in

the apartment, her body was shielding the jacket from the police’s

view. The jacket was identified as the same one [Kasey] was seen

wearing in photographs reviewed on [social media accounts], but

without the fur collar observed in those photographs. The

attachable fur collar was found in the bedroom closet. The jacket

was collected as evidence and later tested positive for the

presence of gunshot residue.

* * *

A camera operated by Dauphin County, located at Hummel and

Kittatinny Streets, captured three [] individuals walking towards

the location of the shooting. One of those individuals was wearing

clothes matching those worn by Beamon when he was discovered

dead. Several moments later, two [] of those individuals could be

viewed leaving the scene of the crime. Additional surveillance

video footage was admitted for the jury to view depicting the

actual shooting, including a zoomed[-]in video depicting the

shooter and muzzle fire coming from the firearm. While the jury

was able to view the videos and make their own determinations,

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Williams identified [Kasey] as the person firing the gun at

Beamon.

Finally, [the parties] stipulate[ed] that [Kasey] was previously

convicted of a felony drug offense and [a]ggravated [a]ssault.8

[Kasey] was also not licensed to carry a concealed firearm.

8 The trial was bi[]furcated to avoid prejudice to [Kasey]

from the introduction of this evidence. Accordingly, the

evidence of [Kasey]’s prior convictions was not presented to

the jury until after [it] returned verdicts on the counts of

[first-d]egree [m]urder and [f]irearms not to be [c]arried

[w]ithout a [l]icense, and answered in the affirmative that

the[ jury] believed beyond a reasonable doubt that [Kasey]

possessed a firearm.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/16/23, at 2-8 (citations, quotation marks, brackets,

and some footnotes omitted).

On May 25, 2023, following trial, a jury rendered a guilty verdict on the

above-mentioned offenses. On May 31, 2023, the court sentenced Kasey to

an aggregate term of incarceration for life. That same day, Kasey filed a

counseled post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence, which

the court granted, in part, and denied, in part, on June 1, 2023.6

Kasey filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Attorney

Weisenberger subsequently filed with this Court an application to withdraw as

counsel and a brief pursuant to Anders and its progeny. Kasey did not file a

____________________________________________

6 The court granted defense counsel Gerard Mangieri, Esquire, permission to

withdraw, and appointed Attorney Weisenberger in his stead, and denied the

request for a new trial and the request for additional time to file an additional

post-sentence motion. See Order, 6/1/23.

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pro se brief or otherwise respond, and did not retain alternate counsel for this

appeal.

Before addressing Kasey’s issues on appeal, we must determine whether

Attorney Weisenberger has complied with the dictates of Anders in petitioning

to withdraw from representation. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d

590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court

may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on

the request to withdraw.”). To procedurally withdraw, counsel must:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and (3) advise the

[appellant] that [the appellant] has the right to retain private

counsel or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems

worthy of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc).

With respect to the third prong, this Court has held that counsel must

“attach to [the] petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to [the] client

advising [the client] of their rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d

748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). In addition, an Anders brief must comply with

the following requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous [and]

articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or

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statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal

is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). After

determining that counsel has satisfied the technical requirements of Anders

and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of the record to

ascertain if there appear[,] on its face[,] to be arguably meritorious issues

that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v.

Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

Instantly, our review of Attorney Weisenberger’s Anders brief and

application to withdraw reveals that counsel has complied with each of the

technical requirements of Anders and Santiago. The record further reflects

that Attorney Weisenberger has furnished a copy of the Anders brief to Kasey

and advised him of his right to retain new counsel or raise himself any

additional points that he deems worthy of this Court’s attention. Accordingly,

since Attorney Weisenberger has complied with all requirements for

withdrawing from representation, we will examine the record and make an

independent determination of whether Kasey’s appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.

On appeal, Kasey raises two issues for our review:

[1.] Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict

where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence

[Kasey] shot [Beamon].

[2.] Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict

which went against the weight of the evidence [that] established

[Williams] shot [Beamon].

Anders Brief, at 4. Kasey is entitled to no relief.

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When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court

must review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and

we must determine if the evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to

enable the fact-finder to find every element of the offense beyond

a reasonable doubt. The fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or

none of the evidence presented. This Court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the fact-finder, and if the record contains

support for the verdict, we may not disturb the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Goins, 867 A.2d 526, 527-28 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(citations omitted).

“The elements of first[-]degree murder exist where the Commonwealth

shows that the defendant acted with the specific intent to kill, that a human

being was unlawfully killed, that the person accused did the killing, and that

the killing was done with premeditation or deliberation.” Commonwealth v.

Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

To “convict a defendant for possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant was previously

convicted of a specific offense enumerated in [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 6105.”

Commonwealth v. Hewlett, 189 A.3d 1004, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2018).

“In order to convict a defendant for carrying a firearm without a license,

the Commonwealth must prove: that the weapon was a firearm; that the

firearm was unlicensed; and that[,] where the firearm was concealed on or

about the person, it was outside his home or place of business.” Id.

When examining a challenge to the weight of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

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The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of

fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An

appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the

finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the . . . verdict if

it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of

justice.

Commonwealth v. Small, [] 741 A.2d 666, 672-73 (Pa. 1999).

Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim

below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial

court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Champney, 832 A.2d at 408 (some citations omitted). A “trial court’s denial

of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least

assailable of its rulings.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225

(Pa. 2009).

With respect to both challenges, after a thorough review of the record,

counsel’s Anders brief, the applicable law, and Judge Evans’ well-reasoned

opinion, we conclude Kasey’s claims merit no relief. The trial court’s opinion

properly addresses and disposes of Kasey’s issues on appeal. See Trial Court

Opinion, 10/16/23, at 8-11. Finally, our independent review of the record

reveals no meritorious issues that counsel missed or misstated. See

Dempster, supra. Therefore, we rely on Judge Evans’ opinion to affirm

Kasey’s judgment of sentence. We direct the parties to attach a copy of that

opinion in the event of further proceedings.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/15/2024

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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