rejecting Attorney General’s argument that a court order denying intervention was unlawful
How later courts described this case
- rejecting Attorney General’s argument that a court order denying intervention was unlawful
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-1327
_____________________________
HALIFAX HOSPITAL MEDICAL
CENTER, d/b/a Halifax Health,
Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF
FLORIDA, et al.,
Appellees.
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-1394
_____________________________
NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL
DISTRICT, d/b/a Broward Health,
Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF
FLORIDA, et al.
Appellees.
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-1481
_____________________________
SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL
DISTRICT, d/b/a Memorial
Healthcare System,
Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF
FLORIDA, et al.,
Appellees.
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-1484
_____________________________
SCHOOL BOARD OF MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY and PUTNAM COUNTY
SCHOOL BOARD,
Appellants,
v.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF
FLORIDA, et al.,
Appellees.
2
____________________________
No. 1D2023-1500
_____________________________
SARASOTA COUNTY PUBLIC
HOSPITAL DISTRICT, d/b/a
Sarasota Memorial Healthcare
System, Inc.,
Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF
FLORIDA, et al.,
Appellees.
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-1529
_____________________________
PUTNAM COUNTY SCHOOL
BOARD,
Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF
FLORIDA, et al.,
Appellees.
3
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-1570
_____________________________
LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM,
d/b/a Lee Health,
Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF
FLORIDA, et al.,
Appellees.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
John C. Cooper, Judge.
August 14, 2024
B.L. THOMAS, J.
The Attorney General filed suit on behalf of the State of
Florida against certain opioid manufacturers, distributors, or
prescribers (the “Opioid Defendants”) to combat the opioid-
addiction epidemic. After the State filed suit, Appellants—school
boards, legislatively created hospital districts, and Lee Hospital
System, all “subdivisions” of the state under organic and general
law—filed separate lawsuits against the Opioid Defendants,
alleging similar claims but asserting unique and individualized
damages.
4
The Attorney General ultimately settled the State’s suits
against the Opioid Defendants, providing for compensation to
many political subdivisions, but no compensation for Appellants,
which the Attorney General disavowed representing in the suit.
The releases in the settlement agreements required, however, that
the Attorney General would seek to dismiss Appellants’ claims by
intervening in their cases and filing a motion to dismiss, by
commencing a declaratory judgment action, or by seeking
legislation barring the subdivisions from prosecuting their claims.
The settlement agreements also provided that no entity could
ultimately receive any portion of the settlements’ remediation
payment or litigation costs payment unless that entity accepted
the terms of the settlement agreements. In other words, unless
Appellants waived all their claims for damages inflicted by the
Opioid Defendants and dismissed their suits for their individual
damages claims, the Attorney General would take action against
Appellants and seek to extinguish their damage claims. As
Appellant North Broward Hospital District notes, however, “no
public hospital has signed off on the Attorney General’s
settlements, and for good reason: no portion of the settlement
proceeds were allocated to public hospitals.”
In fact, the Attorney General denied any intention of
quantifying or recovering these damages. Instead, as required by
the settlement, the Attorney General filed suit against Appellants
in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment finding that despite
this fact, she had the authority under common and general law to
release the Appellants’ claims against the Opioid Defendants and
that the settlement agreements accomplished that release.
The circuit court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of
the Attorney General. That court ruled that the Legislature had
granted the Attorney General the authority to enforce consumer
protection laws, including the authority to bring an action on
behalf of consumers or governmental entities. The court concluded
that the Attorney General had the power to release claims,
including the Appellants’ legal claims for actual and individual
damages different than those generally inflicted on the state as a
whole. The court further concluded that it was legally irrelevant
that the Attorney General never notified the Appellants of her
actions to reach a “Global Settlement” that purportedly eliminated
5
the Appellants’ legal claims. The circuit court ruled that the
Attorney General acted as the state sovereign who controlled all
legal rights and remedies of independent state bodies created by
the constitution and general law. Thus, the Attorney General could
waive and eliminate Appellants’ legitimate damage claims against
the Opioid Defendants.
We reverse.
I.
The opioid-addiction epidemic in the United States has
directly or indirectly killed approximately 645,000 Americans by
overdose. This drug epidemic killed more Americans than those
lost in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, combined.
In May 2017, Governor Rick Scott declared opioid overdoses a
public health emergency in Florida.
One year later, the Attorney General filed a complaint in the
Sixth Judicial Circuit, against some opioid manufacturers and
distributors who operated in Florida. The complaint alleged
violations of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
(FDUTPA), Florida’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act, public nuisance, and negligence. The
Attorney General amended the complaint to add claims against
two pharmacy chains that dispensed opioids in Florida.
Beginning in 2019, Appellants filed suits against the Opioid
Defendants. They alleged that they had “incurred massive costs by
providing uncompensated care as a result of opioid-related
conditions.” Their claims included violations of Florida’s RICO Act,
violation of FDUTPA, false and misleading advertising,
negligence, nuisance, and unjust enrichment. The Attorney
General neither sought to intervene in any of these suits nor
notified Appellants of any assertion that she could unilaterally
extinguish their legitimate legal claims.
The Attorney General, along with other states’ attorneys
general and others negotiated with multiple Opioid Defendants.
6
The Attorney General finalized settlement agreements with seven
groups of Opioid Defendants, and consent judgments were entered.
Each of the opioid settlements included the requirement that the
Attorney General seek to dismiss or otherwise extinguish
Appellants’ claims:
[I]f any [legal] Action remains pending against one
or more Releasees after the Effective Date of the
Agreement or is filed by a Subdivision against any
Releasee on or after the Execution Date, Plaintiff will
seek to obtain dismissal of such Action as to such
Releasees as soon as reasonably possible. Depending on
facts and circumstances, Plaintiff may seek dismissal,
among other ways, by intervening in such Action to move
to dismiss or otherwise terminate the Subdivision’s
Claims in the Action or by commencing a declaratory
judgment or other action that establishes a Bar to the
Subdivision’s Claims and Action. For avoidance of doubt,
Plaintiff will seek dismissal of an Action under this
paragraph regardless [of] whether the Subdivision in
such Action is a Participating Subdivision.
In the event that the actions required of Plaintiff . . .
fail to secure the prompt dismissal or termination of any
Action by any Subdivision against any Releasee, Plaintiff
shall seek enactment of a legislative Bar as defined in
Section A(d)(1) and will endeavor to achieve enactment
as soon as is practicable. Participating Subdivisions
agree not to oppose any effort by Plaintiff to achieve
enactment of a legislative Bar.
The agreements defined the legislative bar as follows:
“Bar” means either: (1) a law barring all
Subdivisions in the State of Florida from maintaining
Released Claims against Releasees (either through a
direct bar or through a grant of authority to release
Claims and the exercise of such authority in full) or (2) a
ruling by the Florida Supreme Court (or a District Court
of Appeal if a decision is not subject to further review by
the Florida Supreme Court) setting forth the general
principle that Subdivisions in the State of Florida may
7
not maintain any Released Claims against Releasees,
whether on the ground of this Agreement (or the release
in it) or otherwise. For the avoidance of doubt, a law or
ruling that is conditioned or predicated upon payment by
a Releasee . . . shall not constitute a Bar.
The agreements also provided that a political subdivision could not
receive any portion of the remediation payment or litigation costs
payment unless the subdivision accepted the terms of the
settlement agreements.
Before filing the declaratory action below, the Attorney
General advocated for legislation recognizing that “[it] is in the
interest of the state that a single official represent governmental
entities in civil proceedings in matters of great governmental
concern to maximize recoveries and minimize costs” and declaring
that “[t]he Attorney General is the state’s chief legal officer and is
the official that should be responsible for the prosecution,
management, and coordination of any civil proceedings brought by
governmental entities in matters of great governmental concern.”
Fla. SB 102, § 1 (2021). The proposed legislation would have
established procedures for the Attorney General to: 1) “institute or
intervene in any civil proceeding in state or federal court . . . on
behalf of a governmental entity to seek any relief afforded at law
or in equity . . . pertaining to a matter of great governmental
concern”; 2) “consolidate, dismiss, release, settle, or take action
that he or she believes to be in the public interest in any civil
proceeding in state or federal court pertaining to a matter of great
governmental concern”; and 3) declare a matter of “great
governmental concern,” thereby staying any civil proceeding
pertaining to the matter unless the Attorney General takes action
in the proceeding. Id. The legislation also would have made any
settlement undertaken in a civil proceeding by a government
entity after the declaration that the case involved a “matter of
great governmental concern” void if the Attorney General did not
consent to the settlement. Id. This proposed legislation was not
approved by the 2021 Legislature.
In 2022, the Legislature did approve legislation creating the
Opioid Settlement Clearing Trust Fund within the Department of
Financial Services, to hold monies from the opioid settlements.
8
§ 17.42(1), Fla. Stat. The legislation also created a task force to
operate with local subdivisions to collect information related to
substance-abuse disorders. § 17.42(4)(b), Fla. Stat. The legislation
allows funds to be disbursed to the opioid settlement trust funds of
the various agencies as provided in the General Appropriations
Act, for use to abate the opioid epidemic. See § 17.42(5), (6), Fla.
Stat. This fund does not compensate Appellants for losses and
damages caused by the Opioid Defendants.
After the State’s opioid settlements had been finalized in June
2022, the Attorney General filed a complaint, later amended, for
declaratory relief against Appellants. This complaint alleged that
the Attorney General had the power to release Appellants’ claims
because the Attorney General exercised Florida’s sovereign
authority under common law and the Florida Constitution. She
asserted that Appellants, as administrative “creatures of the
state,” have jurisdiction to bring certain legal claims, but their
authority flows only from the State. Thus, where overlapping
jurisdiction exists, the Attorney General’s asserted claims are
superior, according to this theory.
The amended complaint alleged that Appellants’ inferior
claims placed the Attorney General’s settlements in jeopardy. The
Attorney General sought the declaratory judgment pursuant to
sections 86.011, 86.021, and 86.101, Florida Statutes. The
Attorney General argues that she had the power to release, and
did release, Appellants’ subordinate claims through the execution
of settlement agreements and release provisions with the Opioid
Defendants. She asserts here that the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment ruling that Appellants could not assert their
legal claims, despite statutory authority to the contrary granting
Appellants the right to sue and be sued.
II.
The Attorney General cannot disavow the substantive vested
rights of Appellants, including the two school boards created under
the constitution, all of which have the power to sue to protect those
vested rights and the hospital districts. See Fla. Const. art. IX, §
4(b) (“The school board shall operate, control and supervise all free
public schools within the school district . . . .”); § 1001.32(2), Fla.
9
Stat. (“district school boards shall operate, control, and supervise
all free public schools in their respective districts and may exercise
any power except as expressly prohibited by the State Constitution
or general law.”)’; § 1001.41(4), Fla. Stat. (granting district school
boards the power to sue and be sued); Ch. 2007-299, § 4, Laws of
Fla. (establishing North Broward Hospital District’s power to sue
and be sued); Ch. 2004-397, § 4(1)(f), Laws of Fla. (establishing
South Broward Hospital District’s power to sue and be sued); Ch.
2003-374, § 4, Laws of Fla. (establishing Halifax Hospital Medical
Center’s power to sue and be sued); Ch. 2000-439, § 4, Laws of Fla.
(establishing Lee Memorial Health System’s power to sue and be
sued).
And even to the extent that the Attorney General correctly
asserts the common-law authority to do so, the Legislature
removed that authority when it created Appellants and assigned
the rights of legal representation of claims to Appellants
themselves, not the Attorney General. Cf. Fried v. State, 355 So. 3d
899, 909 (Fla. 2023) (finding that, by creating statutes imposing
civil penalties against government entities and individual officers
for violating a statute preempting firearm and ammunition
regulation, the Legislature abrogated common-law immunity of
local-government officials “in the context addressed in the
Preemption Statute”). If the Legislature can abrogate the long-
established common-law immunity of elected officials, it certainly
can abrogate any asserted common-law authority of the Attorney
General to dispose of local entities’ legal claims. Of course,
Appellants cannot assert any purported legal rights that are
contrary to superior general law. See id.
In essence, the Attorney General asserts the unilateral
substantive authority to dispose of Appellants’ claims on behalf of
the people of Florida, notwithstanding the enactment of law
assigning that authority to Appellants. But the Attorney General
is the “chief state legal officer” of the state, not the client. Fla.
Const. art. IV, § 4(b), Fla. Const. As the state’s chief legal officer,
the Attorney General has limited common-law authority as parens
patriae to litigate claims common to the state at large—and, of
course, claims authorized by general law, and limited by that
law—but not to control claims of Appellants who assert unique and
individual actual damages. The Attorney General has no more
10
authority to litigate such claims than the claims of a private
hospital asserting its own individual damages.
To hold otherwise would make the Attorney General equal to
the Governor and the Legislature. But the Attorney General is not
the supreme executive of Florida, who may assert policy
prerogatives on behalf of the Governor and the Legislature. The
Governor exercises the supreme executive power:
The supreme executive power shall be vested in a
governor, who shall be commander-in-chief of all military
forces of the state not in active service of the United
States. The governor shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, commission all officers of the state
and counties, and transact all necessary business with
the officers of government.
Fla. Const. art. IV, § 1(a) (emphasis added). The Governor’s
supreme executive power authorizes him or her to compel other
executive officers, including the Attorney General, to perform their
duty:
The governor may initiate judicial proceedings in the
name of the state against any executive or administrative
state, county or municipal officer to enforce compliance
with any duty or restrain any unauthorized act.
Fla. Const. art. IV, § 1(b).
The Legislature exercises the legislative power of the state:
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a
legislature of the State of Florida . . . .
Fla. Const. art. III, § 1. The Legislature may exercise this power to
limit the authority of the Attorney General to assert his or her
authority to exercise the parens patriae power to sue or prohibit
other governmental entities to sue for damages. As noted by
Justice Ervin:
Neither the Legislature nor the courts has ever
undertaken to delineate or set the outer limits of the
11
Attorney General’s litigation power, although in a few
specific instances the Legislature has curtailed his role.
State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So. 2d 891, 896 (Fla. 1972)
(Ervin, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added). Here, the
Legislature did just that by creating Appellants and granting them
the authority to protect their property interests and to assert legal
claims in court.
In addition, by failing to intervene in the Appellants’ suits, the
Attorney General cannot now circumvent this legislative decision
by seeking a declaratory judgment to allow her to extinguish
Appellants’ asserted damage claims:
If the Legislature had intended to provide that the
Attorney General would be permitted to intervene as a
party, with the privilege of filing such pleadings as he
might see fit, it is reasonable to suppose that the statute
would have so provided. It did not. The statute provides
that he should be ‘heard,’ which means that he should be
heard according to the merits of what he presented at the
hearing and that he should be amenable to the Court’s
rulings, as are other petitioners.
Watson v. Claughton, 34 So. 2d 243, 246 (1948) (rejecting Attorney
General’s argument that a court order denying intervention was
unlawful). This Court has also held that the Attorney General has
no standing to appeal, where the Attorney General did not
intervene below as a party but only represented a party in the
circuit court. Bondi v. Tucker, 93 So. 3d 1106, 1111–12 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2012). Here, the Attorney General never intervened in
Appellants’ suits.
The Attorney General argues unpersuasively that as the
state’s chief legal officer, she may bar Appellants from
representing themselves, while simultaneously denying any
interest in representing Appellants. The Attorney General argues
that it is her prerogative to eliminate the value of Appellant’s
individual claims for harms caused by the Opioid Defendants, as a
“bargaining chip” to obtain this global financial settlement. Thus,
the Attorney General asserts that she may disavow these school
12
boards’ and hospital districts’ actual damages for her own
negotiating prerogatives.
We note that the question presented is not whether the
Department of Legal Affairs, acting by and through the elected
Attorney General, has the authority as authorized by law and has
limited parens patriae authority to represent the state in certain
matters belonging to the public at large. Fla. Const. art. IV, § 4(b)
(“The attorney general shall be the chief state legal officer.”).
Section 16.01(2), Florida Statutes (2020), specifies the authority
and the duties of the Attorney General as “prescribed by the
Constitution of this state and . . . appropriate to his or her office as
. . . required of the Attorney General by law or by resolution of the
Legislature.” These duties may include providing opinions when
requested by the Governor, and other elected state and local
officers, including local subdivisions, “relating to the official duties
of the requesting officer.” § 16.01(3), Fla. Stat. She “shall appear
in and attend to, in behalf of the state, all suits or prosecutions,
civil or criminal or in equity, in which the state may be a party, or
in anywise interested, in the Supreme Court and district courts of
appeal of this state” as well as in federal court. § 16.01(4), (5), Fla.
Stat. (emphasis added). The Attorney General shall “have and
perform all powers and duties incident or usual to such office.”
§ 16.01(7), Fla. Stat. Under section 16.015, Florida Statutes, the
“Department of Legal Affairs shall be responsible for providing all
legal services required by any department, unless otherwise
provided by law.” (Emphasis added).
The Attorney General is commanded to study federal
legislation and its potential impacts on the “constitutional
integrity of state governments,” and to inform representatives in
Congress from the state. § 16.52(1), Fla. Stat. In addition, under
section 922.14, Florida Statutes, the Attorney General is
authorized to apply to the Florida Supreme Court to issue a death
warrant in a capital case under certain circumstances. Thus, the
authority and duties of the Attorney General are broad and
encompass a varied field of operation in the courts and in civil and
criminal law enforcement.
The Legislature has created Trust Funds to provide resources
to the Attorney General to investigate and prosecute Florida’s
13
RICO Act, the FDUTPA, the Florida False Claims Act, “or state or
federal antitrust laws.” § 16.53(1), Fla. Stat.; see generally Barati
v. State, 198 So. 3d 69, 84–85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (holding that the
Attorney General has the authority to dismiss a qui tam false
claims action over relator’s objection despite Attorney General’s
lack of prior intervention, as such claims are “brought in the name
of the state” under section 68.083, Florida Statutes, and the
Attorney General is the real party in interest).
But there are limits to the authority of the Attorney General.
See Holland v. Watson, 14 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1943); Watson v.
Caldwell, 27 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1946). In Holland, the supreme court
unequivocally rejected the proposition that the Attorney General
had authority under the common law to represent non-Executive
Branch entities, without their approval:
[T]he Attorney General filed a bill of complaint in the
circuit court seeking to restrain the State Board of
Administration from retaining counsel other than the
Attorney General. He alleges that under the common law,
the statutes, and the Constitution of Florida, it is his
exclusive prerogative to represent the said Board. A
motion to dismiss the bill was overruled and that
judgment is here for review under Rule 34 of the Rules of
this Court.
The question presented is whether or not the
Attorney General is under the law the duly authorized
legal representative of the State Board of Administration
or may the said Board in its discretion retain other
counsel to represent it.
...
In our view, the very terms of Section 16 of Article
IX of the Constitution, the magnitude of the power
granted, the scope and character of the labor required in
its execution, and its importance to the fiscal policy of the
counties and special taxing districts force the conclusion
that the State Board of Administration is authorized to
employ counsel to assist it. The very fact that it creates the
Board a body corporate with power to sue and be sued and
14
provides the means for it to liquidate a bonded
indebtedness for the counties and special road and bridge
districts running into hundreds of millions of dollars and
extending over a period of fifty years with power to issue
refunding bonds and gasoline anticipation certificates
would seem to foreclose the question. Since we find no
intent on the part of the legislature to extend the duties
of the Attorney General to that of representing the Board,
we are of the opinion that it may employ other counsel to
represent it.
14 So. 2d at 200–03 (emphasis added).
In Watson, the Supreme Court stated that the Board of
Trustees had the authority to retain legal counsel, and the
Attorney General did not have the authority to represent the
Trustees over that choice. 27 So. 2d at 529. In part, the Court relied
on the implied authority of the Trustees to sue and be sued, and
further noted that in eighty years the organic law had not
delegated this exclusive authority of legal representation to the
Attorney General:
The Governor and other administrative officers of
the Executive Department of the State named in the act
were constituted Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund by Chapter 610 Acts of 1855. Section 2 of that Act
contemplated the conduct of law suits and legal actions,
and, therefore, the act necessarily implied that the
Trustees should have power and authority to employ
counsel to represent them in connection with the
performance of the duties with which they were and are
charged. Every Act of the Legislature from that time
down to the present has recognized the power and
authority of the Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund to prosecute and to defend law suits and to engage
in transactions which would require the services of an
attorney. . . .
...
This provision of the statute clearly indicates that
the Attorney General is expected to be drawn into
15
litigation as attorney in cases affecting the powers and
duties of the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund
only when and if the State of Florida joins with the
Trustees in any action or suit where such intervention is
deemed necessary and that in those cases he should come
in representing the State of Florida as differentiated from
representing the Trustees.
So, our conclusion is that the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund are authorized to employ counsel to
represent and advise the Trustees in any matter or
matters which may be incident to their duties as such
Trustees.
27 So. 2d at 528–29. And here, the Attorney General asserts far
more legal authority than did the Attorney General in 1943 and
1946. Unlike in Holland and Watson, here, the Attorney General
does not even purport to have represented the Appellants, whereas
in those cases, the Attorney General asserted the authority, and
the interest, in representing the Board of Trustees and the State
Board of Administration.
The Attorney General thus could not seek to disavow actual
and individual damages for Appellants as subsumed by her own
suit against the Opioid Defendants. Appellants are not Executive-
Branch entities somehow subordinate to the Attorney General’s
legal control.
III.
As noted, the Florida Constitution creates the office of the
Attorney General but limits that office’s authority to powers
conferred by the constitution or assigned in general law or by
resolution of the Legislature. The specific authority assigned in
organic law relates to matters such as the responsibility to seek
advisory opinions from the Florida Supreme Court regarding the
validity of constitutional initiatives proposed pursuant to Article
IX, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. See Fla. Const. art. IV,
§ 10. But even this responsibility is limited as “directed by general
law.” Id. Nowhere does the organic law authorize the Attorney
General to represent without consent, or decline to represent and
then attempt to disavow the damages of Appellants.
16
As Appellant North Broward Hospital District correctly
summarizes the question presented here, the Attorney General
can only represent interests common to the public under her
parens patriae common-law authority, not specific damages unique
to the district, authorized and created by the Legislature with the
power to sue to protect those unique interests not common to the
public. Nor can the Attorney General rely on consumer-protection
statutes—which have specific requirements for making victims
whole, including Appellants—to obtain funds from a settlement
without their consent, and without compensating them for their
suffered harms, for the general purposes of “opioid abatement,”
without providing any remedies to Appellants for their unique
damages inflicted by the Opioid Defendants. See § 501.2101(2),
Fla. Stat. (stating that monies received by an FDUTPA enforcing
authority that are not for attorney fees or litigation and
investigation costs “shall accrue to the state and be deposited” in
the General Revenue Fund); § 895.09(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (providing
that, for distribution of monies obtained from a judgment of
forfeiture in an action under Florida’s RICO Act, claims for
restitution by victims of the racketeering activity are given priority
over distributions to a Department of Legal Affairs trust fund).
The Attorney General does not have the legal authority to
unilaterally dismiss, for example, actual and individual damages
incurred by the two school boards for increased harms and
expenditures for compliance with federal law for special
educational needs for disabled students—disabled allegedly by the
actions of the Opioid Defendants that caused the students or their
parents to become addicted to prescription opioids. And this is but
one example. The Special Hospital Districts also assert individual
and actual damages separate from the general public for harms
allegedly inflicted by the Opioid Defendants that caused these
hospitals to have to provide specialized medical care for opioid-
addicted and harmed patients.
It is not within the Attorney General’s power to make such
decisions. While it may be in the interest of the Opioid Defendants
to see Appellants’ claims extinguished, it is not in the public
interest of the children and parents of a certain district: “Through
a settlement term, the Attorney General has allowed the Opioid
Defendants to usurp her authority, which is designed as a shield
17
for the citizens of Florida, and use it as a sword to defeat certain
local entities’ claims.” Miami-Dade School Board Init. Br. 10.
In conclusion, we do agree with the Attorney General that res
judicata and preemption doctrines are not relevant here. (“The
issue here is whether the Attorney General has the power to
release the claims of Florida’s political subdivisions. If she does not
have that power, then her release was without effect and cannot
bind the subdivisions—through res judicata or otherwise.”).
Because we reject the assertion that the Attorney General has the
authority to somehow prohibit Appellants from exercising their
constitutional and statutory authority to sue to recover damages
from the Opioid Defendants, we need not address arguments based
on res judicata or preemption. And, of course, the Legislature has
not preempted Appellants claims.
No doubt the global settlement achieves many laudable goals.
But it cannot deprive Appellants of their legal rights to be made
whole for their unique losses. The circuit court erred as a matter
of law in granting summary judgment for the Attorney General in
the declaratory judgment action. We reverse with direction to
enter judgment for all Appellants.
REVERSED.
BILBREY and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Barry Richard, Tallahassee, for Appellant Halifax Hospital
Medical Center.
George T. Levesque, Jason L. Unger, Stephen K. Varnell,
GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant North Broward
Hospital District.
18
Frank P. Rainer, Office of General Counsel, Memorial Healthcare
System, Hollywood, for Appellant South Broward Hospital District.
Joseph W. Jacquot, Derek K. Mountford, Gunster, Yoakley &
Stewart, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant School Board of Miami-
Dade County.
Steven W. Teppler, Mandelbaum Barrett PC, Roseland, New
Jersey; Timothy M. Hartley, Hartley Law Offices, PLC, Fort
Lauderdale; David A. Wallace, Morgan R. Bentley, Corinna S.
Coser, Bentley Goodrich Kison P.A., Sarasota, for Appellants
Sarasota County Public Hospital District and Lee Memorial
Health System.
John Wayne Hogan, Terrell Hogan Yegelwel, P.A., Jacksonville,
for Appellant Putnam County School Board.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, John Guard, Chief Deputy
Attorney General, Gregory S. Slemp, Special Counsel, Office of the
Attorney General, Tallahassee; Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor
General, Daniel W. Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, David M.
Costello, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General,
Tallahassee, for Appellee Office of the Attorney General.
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