Randolph Cooper v. Shawn Lister

USCA11 Case: 23-11261 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 08/09/2024 Page: 1 of 17

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11261

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

RANDOLPH CLAY COOPER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHAWN LUCAS LISTER,

AARON GLASS,

ZACH KUIKEN,

TOWN OF LOXLEY, ALABAMA,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11261

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00324-C

____________________

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Randolph Clay Cooper sued Officer Shawn Lister, Sergeant

Aaron Glass, and Lieutenant Zach Kuiken for violating his consti-

tutional rights following an alleged false arrest, as well as the Town

of Loxley for its alleged deliberate indifference to deficiencies in of-

ficer training. Mr. Cooper now appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment as to all claims in favor of the officers and the

Town of Loxley. After careful review, we affirm.

I

This case stems from a contentious dispute among siblings

over a family farm in Baldwin County, Alabama. In 2011, Carol

Cooper, Mr. Cooper’s mother, conveyed a 10.1-acre parcel to her

daughter and son-in-law, Rebecca and David Bonner, through a

quitclaim deed. Following his mother’s death in April of 2012, Mr.

Cooper persistently filed lawsuits against his siblings claiming a

property interest in the farm based on alleged improper transfers

from their father’s estate. As the Alabama Supreme Court ex-

plained, Mr. Cooper failed to assert ownership in successive law-

suits brought in 2012 and 2015. See Cooper v. Cooper, 279 So. 3d 561

(Ala. 2018), reh’g denied (Ala. Jan. 4, 2019).

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On August 23, 2019, Mr. Cooper’s brother, Terry Cooper,

filed a complaint with the Loxley Police Department alleging that

Mr. Cooper had stolen hay bales from the farm. Lt. Kuiken initiated

an investigation to ascertain ownership of the property. In an inter-

view, the Bonners claimed ownership and presented a copy of their

2011 quitclaim deed. Ms. Bonner also emailed Lt. Kuiken a copy of

the 2018 Alabama Supreme Court decision in Cooper. Lt. Kuiken

interpreted the Court’s affirmance of summary judgment in favor

of the Bonners as validating their ownership of the property.

On September 13, 2019, Mr. Cooper executed and recorded

a deed to transfer the farm to himself and his siblings. In October

of 2019, the siblings filed a quiet title/slander of title action against

Mr. Cooper regarding this deed. In April of 2020, the siblings’ at-

torney sent a letter to the Loxley Police Chief, which included the

first amended complaint in the quiet title action, the final orders

from the 2012 and 2015 lawsuits, the 2011 quitclaim deed to the

Bonners, and a statement that Mr. Cooper was not permitted on

the farm. Lt. Kuiken understood this letter to indicate that the

courts had ruled in favor of the Bonners multiple times, further

confirming that Mr. Cooper was not an owner of the property.

On May 27, 2020, Mr. Bonner spotted Mr. Cooper’s truck

and trailer parked on the farm and saw him raking hay aboard a

tractor. After Mr. Bonner called the Loxley Police Department to

report that Mr. Cooper was trespassing, Officer Lister, Sgt. Glass,

and Lt. Kuiken responded and arrived at the scene. On his way

there, Officer Lister spoke to Lt. Anthony Lovell in the

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investigation division, who advised him that Mr. Cooper had no

right to be on the premises and was therefore trespassing.

At the farm, Mr. Cooper defied the officers’ numerous com-

mands to leave the property and continued to drive the tractor

away from them. Finally, Mr. Cooper complied and was hand-

cuffed on the ground. He was charged with criminal trespass in the

second degree and with attempting to elude law enforcement. In

August of 2020, he filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges,

arguing that the arrest occurred outside of Loxley’s police jurisdic-

tion. A month later, the charges were dismissed by the municipal

court for the Town of Loxley.

In September of 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment

for Mr. Cooper’s theft of the hay bales, and on May 24, 2021, he

was arrested. In November of 2021, the Baldwin County circuit

court granted a motion to dismiss the criminal proceedings contin-

gent upon Mr. Cooper’s payment of restitution. Separately, in the

2019 quiet title action filed by the siblings, Mr. Cooper filed a coun-

terclaim. The siblings moved for summary judgment on Mr.

Cooper’s claims––for declaratory judgment and to remove an al-

leged cloud on title. The circuit court granted this motion in De-

cember of 2021.

In January of 2020, Mr. Cooper filed a malicious prosecution

and false imprisonment action against the Bonners arising out of

his September 2019 arrest for trespass, and the complaint was later

amended to include the arrest in May of 2020. The Bonners moved

for summary judgment, arguing that probable cause existed

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because Mr. Cooper did not have a property interest where the ar-

rests occurred. The circuit court granted this motion and dismissed

the action in August of 2022. Most recently, on June 14, 2024, the

Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s final order

granting summary judgment to the siblings in the 2019 quiet title

action.

II

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment based on qualified immunity. See Fils v. City of Aventura, 647

F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper if

“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any ma-

terial fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Once the movant adequately sup-

ports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show

that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial.” Dietz v.

Smithkline Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2010). “Spec-

ulation does not create a genuine issue of fact.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s

Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (ci-

tation omitted). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving

party “must show more than the existence of a ‘metaphysical

doubt’ regarding the material facts.” Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th

1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

III

Mr. Cooper argues that Officer Lister, Sgt. Glass, and Lt.

Kuiken exceeded their discretionary authority and violated his

Fourth Amendment right not to be arrested without probable

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cause. He also argues that the district court erred in determining

that the officers have no liability based on his alleged malicious

prosecution claim for the hay-theft arrest. Finally, he argues that

the district court erred in concluding that the Town of Loxley is

not liable.

A

Under Alabama law, local police officers are authorized to

make an arrest inside the county that contains their police jurisdic-

tion––even if they are outside their immediate municipality:

An arrest may be made, under a warrant or without

a warrant, by any sheriff or other officer acting as

sheriff or his deputy, or by any constable, acting

within their respective counties, or by any marshal,

deputy marshal or policeman of any incorporated city or

town within the limits of the county.

Ala. Code 1975, § 15-10-1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Alabama

courts have repeatedly upheld the lawfulness of arrests occurring

outside of a specific police jurisdiction when the arrest at issue oc-

curred inside the county where the police jurisdiction lay. See e.g.,

Ex parte Pettway, 594 So. 2d 1196, 1201 n.5 (Ala. 1991); Brooks v.

State, 471 So. 2d 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). Further, we must ask

“whether the act complained of . . . would be within, or reasonably

related to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties.

The scope of immunity ‘should be determined by the relation of

the [injury] complained of to the duties entrusted to the officer.’”

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Harbert Intern., Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation omitted).

Here, the arresting officers acted within their discretionary

authority when they arrested Mr. Cooper in Baldwin County,

which encompasses the Town of Loxley. Further, they acted

within the perimeter of their duties, as Lt. Lovell instructed Officer

Lister that Mr. Cooper had no right to be on the property and was

therefore trespassing.

On appeal, Mr. Cooper argues that the officers exceeded

their authority by refusing to defer to the jurisdiction of the munic-

ipal court to ascertain title to the property in the pending quiet title

action. But this claim is irrelevant to our analysis because, as the

district court noted, preventing officers from making arrests for

trespass solely because of pending civil actions over title would hin-

der law enforcement’s efforts and enable Mr. Cooper to trespass

indefinitely so long as he continued to file lawsuits. Therefore, be-

cause Officer Lister, Sgt. Glass, and Lt. Kuiken were acting within

their discretionary authority, Mr. Cooper now must show that the

arrest itself was unconstitutional under clearly established law. See

Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878 (11th Cir. 2003). We are unper-

suaded on this point.

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens “against unrea-

sonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the

Fourth Amendment, “an arrest is a ‘seizure’ of the person.” Case v.

Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009). Whether a sei-

zure is reasonable hinges on the presence of probable cause. See id.

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at 1326. Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have sufficient

“facts and circumstances within their collective knowledge” to

cause a reasonable person to “believe that an offense has been or is

being committed.” United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1324 (11th

Cir. 1983). Probable cause “is not a high bar.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915

F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48

(2018)). Rather, it is a “flexible and fluid concept” that focuses on

the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1286.

In deciding whether probable cause exists, arresting officers

“are not required to sift through conflicting evidence.” Id. (quoting

Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002)). Law enforce-

ment officers are not lawyers, and therefore “we do not expect

them to resolve legal questions or to weigh the viability of most

affirmative defenses.” Id. at 1286 (citing Williams v. City of Albany,

936 F.2d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 1991)). “[T]he presence of some con-

flicting evidence or a possible defense will not vitiate a finding of

probable cause. The touchstone remains the reasonableness of the

officer’s conduct.” Id. at 1287. Further, “[w]hile an officer who ar-

rests an individual without probable cause violates the Fourth

Amendment, this does not inevitably remove the shield of qualified

immunity.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th

Cir. 2007).

Qualified immunity shields public officials from civil liability

if their conduct does not violate clearly established law “of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879

F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). To

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receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that

he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority. See

Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1041 (11th Cir. 2017). This standard

is satisfied if the officer’s actions were “undertaken pursuant to the

performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.”

Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quota-

tion omitted). Once discretionary authority is established, the bur-

den shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is im-

proper. The plaintiff can meet this standard by establishing that (1)

the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the

right at issue was “clearly established at the time of the alleged vi-

olation.” Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2019).

Even if probable cause is absent, a court may grant qualified

immunity to an officer who had “arguable probable cause” to make

an arrest. See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Scarbrough v. Myles,

245 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2021)). “In the false arrest context,

arguable probable cause exists if ‘a reasonable officer, looking at

the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have in-

terpreted the law as permitting the arrests.’” Edger v. McCabe, 84

F.4th 1230, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Garcia v. Casey 75 F.4th

1186, 1187 (11th Cir. 2023)). “An officer lacks arguable probable

cause only if ‘the law on the date of the alleged misconduct makes

it obvious that the [officer’s] acts violated the plaintiff’s rights in the

specific set of circumstances at issue.’” Casey, 75 F.4th at 1186 (in-

ternal citation omitted). Thus, “the dispositive question” is

whether, at the time of the arrest, the law clearly established that

an objective officer could not have reasonably concluded that

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probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Cooper under the circum-

stances. See id. (quoting Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1303 (11th

Cir. 2018)).

Moreover, “the arguable probable cause inquiry in a false ar-

rest case is no different from the clearly established law inquiry.”

Edger, 84 F.4th at 1236 (citing Casey, 75 F.4th at 1187). If we deter-

mine “that the officers had arguable probable cause then we con-

clude that their violation of the law was not clearly established.” Id.

“Clearly established” means that the law is sufficiently clear

such that a reasonable officer would understand that their conduct

is unlawful. See Helm v. Rainbow City, Ala., 989 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th

Cir. 2021) (citing Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63). This standard is not defined

at a high level of generality, see Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64, and the in-

quiry instead “must be undertaken in light of the specific context

of the case.” Edger, 84 F.4th at 1237. In the Fourth Amendment set-

ting, the Supreme Court has “stressed the need to ‘identify a case

where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to

have violated the Fourth Amendment.’” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (in-

ternal citation omitted). There need not be “a case directly on

point,” but “existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the

particular arrest ‘beyond debate.’” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Here, the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Mr.

Cooper for criminal trespass on May 27, 2020, because a reasonable

officer, armed with their “collective knowledge,” could believe that

Mr. Cooper was trespassing on the property. See Blasco, 702 F.2d at

1324. During his investigation, Lt. Kuiken received the Bonners’

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deed as proof that they were record title holders and a letter from

their lawyer that noted the repeated rejections of Mr. Cooper’s

ownership claim by the Alabama courts. The letter also informed

the Loxley Police Department that Mr. Cooper did not have per-

mission to be on the property. Further, Lt. Kuiken reviewed the

published November 2018 opinion from the Alabama Supreme

Court, which he reasonably understood to represent that Mr.

Cooper was not an owner. On the day of the arrest, the Loxley Po-

lice Department was once again informed that Mr. Cooper was

trespassing, and Mr. Bonner, a record title owner, demanded his

removal. As the district court concluded, the officers’ duty was not

to “resolve [the] legal question[ ]” of whether Mr. Cooper indeed

owned a one-third interest in the land. See Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286.

In fact, Lt. Kuiken had reason to believe that Mr. Cooper was not

an owner because the Baldwin County circuit court and the Ala-

bama Supreme Court had already rejected his claim to the farm.

Thus, no constitutional violation occurred because the officers had

probable cause for Mr. Cooper’s arrest on May 27, 2020.

At a minimum, arguable probable cause existed for the ar-

rest. “[L]ooking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the ar-

rest[ ], [Officer Lister, Sgt. Glass, and Lt. Kuiken] could have inter-

preted the law as permitting the arrest[ ].” Edger, 84th at 1236–37.

We have upheld qualified immunity for arrests involving trespass

even when legal documentation showed that the arrestee had col-

orable title to the land. See Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531 (11th

Cir. 1990).

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In Strickland, the Huttons conveyed a ranch property to the

Laws under a land sale contract and sought repossession after the

Laws defaulted, allowing the Huttons to record a deed transferring

the property back to themselves. See id. at 1533. The investigating

officer and local sheriff were informed that the Huttons’ deed gave

them a colorable claim to title. Id at 1534. The Huttons then at-

tempted to retake the ranch by cutting the chain lock on the front

gate and driving past a “No Trespassing” sign. See id. The Huttons

were arrested and subsequently sued the sheriff for false arrest. See

id. at 1535.

We reversed the district court’s denial of the sheriff’s motion

for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. The ap-

parent evidence of the Huttons’ trespass at the time of the officers’

arrival at the ranch––a cut lock, a pair of bolt cutters, a rifle, com-

bined with the sheriff’s instruction to arrest––sufficed to show that

the officers had not violated clearly established law. See id. at 1539.

“The Huttons’ beliefs concerning the legality of their entry onto

the ranch property are irrelevant to qualified immunity analysis,

which examines the conduct of the subject government officials

only.” Id. at 1540. Ownership of the property was a disputed issue

when the Huttons were arrested, yet we refused to hold the sheriff

or the arresting officers “to knowledge of property law in deter-

mining probable cause.” See id. at 1542. We thus concluded that the

sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity. See id.

Here, the law in this circuit was not so “clearly established”

in May of 2020 such that a reasonable officer would have viewed

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Mr. Cooper’s arrest as unlawful. As an initial matter, Alabama

courts had rejected Mr. Cooper’s claim to the farm long before his

arrest was effected. But even if we give Mr. Cooper the benefit of

the doubt, his claim still fails. As previously discussed, under our

precedent, officers may have probable cause to arrest for trespass

even when an arrestee is authorized to be on the property. See

Strickland, 919 F.2d at 1541. This is because “what counts for qual-

ified immunity purposes relating to probable cause to arrest is the

information known to the defendant officers . . . at the time of their con-

duct, not the facts known to the plaintiff then or those known to a

court later.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999)

(emphasis added). And what the officers knew at the time of the

arrest here––as evidenced by the previous court decisions, the at-

torney’s letter, the 2011 quitclaim deed, and the phone call from

Mr. Bonner urging officers to remove Mr. Cooper from his farm—

was enough for the officers to believe that Mr. Cooper was tres-

passing. The fact that Mr. Cooper sought to gain ownership

through a pending appeal does not negate the existence of probable

cause.

Even if neither probable cause nor arguable probable cause

existed for the trespass arrest, the officers would still face no liabil-

ity. We have said that “[p]robable cause for an arrest may be found

if there is probable cause to believe any crime was committed.”

Manners v. Canella, 891 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis

added). Here, such probable cause, and at a minimum arguable

probable cause, existed for officers to infer that Mr. Cooper had

committed a crime under Alabama law when he intentionally fled

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from them. Mr. Cooper knew the officers were trying to arrest him

but defied their commands and continued to drive the tractor

away. Although Mr. Cooper argues that he was initially unaware

that the officers intended to arrest him, the relevant inquiry asks

what an “objectively reasonable officer in [the] [d]efendants’ posi-

tion could have believed” at the time of the arrest. See Gates, 884

F.3d at 1300 (“[W]e have never pronounced a rigid requirement

that an arresting officer must have specific evidence of the subjec-

tive intent and knowledge of a subject beyond the subject’s con-

duct that otherwise gives rise to probable cause to arrest.”). “It is

not [Mr. Cooper’s] post-hoc explanation of his actions that count.

What matters [for arguable probable cause] is what a reasonable

police officer under the circumstances could infer from those ac-

tions.” Id at 1302. Based on the record before us, a reasonable of-

ficer could have interpreted Mr. Cooper’s actions as an attempt to

flee—providing, at a minimum, arguable probable cause for the ar-

rest.

B

To prove a Fourth Amendment violation due to malicious

prosecution, the plaintiff must prove both (1) a violation of the con-

stitutional right and (2) the elements of the common law tort. See

Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Paez,

915 F.3d at 1285). Under the common law elements of malicious

prosecution, Mr. Cooper “must prove that the officers ‘instituted

or continued’ a criminal prosecution against him, ‘with malice and

without probable cause,’ that terminated in his favor and caused

damage to him.” Id. (quoting Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285). If the conduct

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alleged does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the officers are

entitled to qualified immunity. See Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285.

The district court correctly concluded that the officers face

no liability on Mr. Cooper’s claim for malicious prosecution arising

out of the presentation of the hay-theft case to a grand jury. None

of the officers involved in the trespass arrest on May 27, 2020, were

involved in Mr. Cooper’s subsequent hay theft arrest on May 24,

2021.

Mr. Cooper agreed to restitution in exchange for a dismissal

of charges, and he is therefore barred from disputing the existence

of probable cause. Terminations due to “settlements in which the

defendant admitted guilt” are generally “fatal to a plaintiff’s ability

to establish the absence of probable cause.” Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d

1278, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (“[A] plaintiff who

settled a prosecution by paying part of the amount his accuser de-

manded was estopped from contesting the absence of probable

cause.”). As the district court determined here, there is no evidence

to suggest that Mr. Cooper agreed to restitution under protest or

under a declaration of innocence. This prevents Mr. Cooper from

disputing the existence of probable cause as to the hay-theft arrest.

C

We have determined that the evidence is insufficient to

show a constitutional violation stemming from Mr. Cooper’s ar-

rests in May of 2020 and May of 2021. As a result, we need not con-

sider liability for the Town of Loxley. See Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d

1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that when there is no

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-11261

constitutional violation, it is unnecessary to consider the county’s

liability); Vineyard v. Cnty. of Murray, Ga., 990 F.2d 1207, 1211 (11th

Cir. 1993) (“Only when it is clear that a violation of specific rights

has occurred can the question of § 1983 municipal liability for the

injury arise.”).

Even if we determined that there was evidence of a consti-

tutional violation, Mr. Cooper’s claims against the Town of Loxley

fail because he has not shown that “the municipality had an official

policy that was ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”

Vineyard, 990 F.2d at 1211 (citations omitted). Although “there are

limited circumstances in which an allegation of a ‘failure to train’

can be the basis for liability under § 1983,” Mr. Cooper did not offer

such evidence here and he has abandoned that contention. See City

of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). He grounds his

claims against the Town of Loxley on alleged actions taken by the

Loxley Police Chief as “the primary policy maker,” but this partic-

ular theory fails. As the district court noted, it was not alleged in

the complaint and “[a] plaintiff may not amend [his] complaint

through argument in a brief opposing summary judgement.” Gil-

mour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004).

In any event, no evidence supports this new theory. Proof of a cus-

tom or policy usually requires a history of widespread abuse, yet

Mr. Cooper failed to show any history of similar issues regarding

probable cause determinations. See Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d

1346, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 1998). Further, Mr. Cooper’s personal rec-

ollection of events that day alone is insufficient to reveal a policy

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or custom so widespread as to impose independent liability on the

Town of Loxley.

IV

The district court’s grant of summary judgment as to all of

Mr. Cooper’s claims is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.