Joseph Williams v. City of Sparks

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH WILLIAMS, No. 23-15465

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v. 3:22-cv-00197-

MMD-CSD

CITY OF SPARKS; CHRISTOPHER

BARE; CHRISTOPHER ROWE;

MATEO TERRASAS; CHARLES OPINION

COLBORN; NATHAN JANNING;

VERNON TAYLOR; AUSTIN

GIBSON,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2024

Las Vegas, Nevada

Filed August 9, 2024

Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., MARK J. BENNETT,

and DANIEL P. COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

2 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

SUMMARY *

Excessive Force/Qualified Immunity

The panel reversed the district court’s denial, on

summary judgment, of qualified immunity to City of Sparks

police officers in an action alleging, among other things, that

the officers used excessive force when they shot plaintiff

multiple times following a 42-minute car chase.

The panel first determined that it had jurisdiction over

this interlocutory appeal because where, as here, defendants

contend on appeal that the district court failed to review the

facts in the light depicted in a video recording, they raise a

question of law over which the appellate court has

jurisdiction.

The panel next determined that the video evidence

clearly contradicted plaintiff’s claim that he was not

attempting to accelerate once police officers blocked his

truck with their police cars. Given the video evidence, the

officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive

force claim because their actions were objectively

reasonable. As in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014),

plaintiff posed a threat to the officers on the scene and the

public at large. Plaintiff led officers on a chase that lasted

forty-two minutes and reached speeds of around 70 miles per

hour. During the chase, he ran several red lights, weaved

between lanes, drove through a chain-link fence, drove in the

wrong direction on the freeway, albeit briefly, and had, for a

significant portion of the chase, his lights off and a blown

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 3

tire. By the time his truck was pinned, he had struck three

patrol vehicles. As in Plumhoff, plaintiff continued his

attempt to flee. Taking into account the duration, speed, and

other hazards of plaintiff’s flight, as well as his clear intent

to flee, he posed a grave public safety risk and police acted

reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.

Exercising pendent jurisdiction over the Monell claims

and the state battery claims, the panel held that the Monell

claims failed as a matter of law because there was no

constitutional violation in the officers’ use of force, and the

battery claim failed because the use of force was not

unreasonable.

COUNSEL

Dale K. Galipo (argued) and Benjamin S. Levine, Law

Offices of Dale K. Galipo, Woodland Hills, California; Peter

Goldstein, Law Offices of Peter Goldstein, Las Vegas,

Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Mariah Northington (argued) and Barrack Potter, Senior

Assistant City Attorneys; Wesley K. Duncan, City Attorney;

Sparks City Attorney's Office, Sparks, Nevada, for

Defendants-Appellants.

4 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

This action stems from the non-fatal shooting of Plaintiff

Joseph Williams by officers of the Sparks Police Department

(SPD). Williams filed suit against Defendants City of

Sparks (the City) and several SPD officers, 1 asserting claims

of excessive force, denial of medical care, municipal

liability, battery, and negligence. Defendants moved for

summary judgment on all claims, arguing that the officers’

use of deadly force was reasonable or, in the alternative, that

the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The district

court issued an order granting Williams’s request to

voluntarily dismiss his claim for denial of medical care and

denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all

remaining claims except the negligence claim. Defendants

appeal the portion of the district court’s order denying

summary judgment. We reverse the denial of summary

judgment as to each of the remaining claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 5, 2020, at around 12:10 AM, SPD dispatch

received a 911 call from a gas station that a male suspect had

stolen alcohol and was “vandalizing” a vehicle in the parking

lot. Dispatch requested an officer response for “larceny” and

advised that the suspect did not appear to have a weapon.

Officers Taylor and Colborn were dispatched, and Officer

Colborn arrived at the gas station at approximately 12:14

1

They are Officers Christopher Bare, Christopher Rowe, Mateo

Terrasas, Charles Colborn, Nathan Janning, Vernon Taylor, and Austin

Gibson.

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 5

AM. Officer Colborn pulled behind Williams’s truck and

activated his overhead lights. Williams fled in his truck.

Colborn pursued Williams with his siren and overhead

lights active. Colborn radioed other officers about the

pursuit, noting that Williams was driving between 30 and 45

miles per hour and that there was no pedestrian traffic on the

road. At several points, Williams slowed his truck to a stop,

waited briefly, and then continued fleeing. He also ran

multiple red lights. During this time, SPD dispatch informed

the officers of Williams’s identity, residence, and criminal

history of “battery with a deadly weapon and eluding.”

Around four minutes into the pursuit, Williams drove his

truck into a dead-end street and stopped his truck. The

officers exited their patrol vehicles and shouted for Williams

to step out of his vehicle and to keep his hands up. Williams

refused to exit the vehicle. For over ten minutes, the officers

attempted to reason with Williams and have him exit his

vehicle. Williams began yelling at the officers, revved the

engine of his truck, and drove through a chain-link fence to

flee the area. The officers continued their pursuit of

Williams.

The officers attempted a pursuit intervention (PIT)

maneuver on Williams’s truck as he turned onto a major

road. His truck spun around and accelerated past the

officers, turning back onto the major road. Williams

continued fleeing the officers for several minutes. He ran

two more red lights with his speed ranging from about 35 to

50 miles per hour. During this time, Colborn reported “no

traffic” on the roads. Eventually, Williams ran a third red

light and turned onto the freeway. The freeway had light

traffic going in the opposite direction. Williams’s speed

ranged between 55 and 70 miles per hour.

6 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

The pursuit continued on or near the freeway for around

twenty minutes. Officers deployed spike strips, which

dispatch confirmed were “effective” in puncturing the front

passenger tire of Williams’s truck. Although still fleeing,

Williams slowed down to about 50 miles per hour. Williams

continued driving on the freeway, swerving between lanes at

speeds of about 35 to 45 miles per hour. Officers attempted

another PIT maneuver on Williams’s truck, but it was

unsuccessful. Williams exited the freeway and ran two stop

signs before turning back onto the freeway. By that point in

time, Williams was driving on a flat tire, without any lights

on, and briefly on the wrong side of the freeway before

crossing the dirt median onto the correct side. Colborn drove

up to the rear driver side of Williams’s truck but had to back

off when Williams suddenly braked and turned toward

Colborn’s patrol vehicle. Colborn radioed in that Williams

had “just tried to ram [him].” Williams continued driving,

weaving between lanes and with sparks coming from the

truck’s punctured wheel. Officers then performed a

successful PIT maneuver, causing the truck to spin around

and enter the ditch separating eastbound and westbound

traffic.

Williams continued driving, now in the direction of the

officers. The rear passenger wheel of his truck ran over the

hood of Colborn’s patrol vehicle. Then, the back of his truck

hit the front of Officer Bare’s vehicle. Williams came to a

stop once Officer Janning wedged his patrol vehicle

underneath the truck, pinning it against Officer Terrasas’s

patrol vehicle. After Williams’s truck stopped moving,

Officer Gibson positioned his patrol vehicle next to

Janning’s, in front of and facing the truck. Williams was

effectively boxed in by Janning, Gibson, and Terrasas.

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 7

The truck’s engine then made a loud, continuous noise,

and a cloud of dirt and debris formed near the back of the

truck. Colborn, Gibson, Janning, Taylor, and Terrasas all

exited their vehicles and shouted commands, including

“Stop the car!”, while firing dozens of rounds into the cabin

of the truck. Gibson fired his rounds from behind the back

bumper of his patrol vehicle; Janning fired his rounds from

behind his patrol vehicle; Colborn fired his rounds from

behind Williams’s truck; Taylor fired his rounds while

taking cover from behind his patrol vehicle; and Terrasas

fired his rounds as he walked from his patrol vehicle toward

the truck’s rear passenger corner. The officers continued

firing for approximately 14 seconds, during which

Williams’s engine continued making a loud noise. Several

bullets struck and injured Williams. This ended the forty-

two-minute chase.

The officers coordinated a plan to get Williams out of the

truck. They tried first to deploy a 40-millimeter less-lethal

foam launcher to punch out the truck’s rear window.

However, the window did not break. Terrasas then moved

his patrol vehicle away from Williams’s passenger door.

Williams opened the passenger door, exchanged words with

the officers, and lay down on the ground. Colborn placed

Williams in handcuffs and checked where he had been hit.

Expedited paramedics then arrived and transported Williams

to the hospital.

On May 2, 2022, Williams filed this lawsuit, asserting

seven claims against Defendants: (1) excessive force;

(2) denial of medical care; (3) municipal liability for

ratification; (4) municipal liability for inadequate training;

(5) municipal liability for unconstitutional custom, practice,

or policy; (6) battery; and (7) negligence. The claims all

8 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

stem from the officers’ use of deadly force and additional

40-millimeter less-lethal foam rounds.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment

involving all seven claims. On March 24, 2023, the district

court issued an order which, in relevant part, denied

summary judgment on all claims except the negligence

claim. 2 The district court denied summary judgment on the

excessive force claim and qualified immunity defense

because there were genuine factual disputes about the threat

Williams posed to the officers once they blocked his truck

and whether he was attempting further flight. For

substantially the same reason, the district court declined to

reach Williams’s excessive force argument concerning the

number of lethal rounds fired, declined to reach Defendants’

excessive force argument concerning the use of the 40-

millimeter less-lethal foam launcher, and denied summary

judgment on the battery and municipal liability claims.

Defendants timely appealed the denial of summary

judgment. 3

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD REVIEW

We have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified

immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The denial of

summary judgment is usually not an immediately appealable

final decision, but “that general rule does not apply when the

summary judgment motion is based on a claim of qualified

immunity.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 771 (2014).

2

Williams sought to voluntarily withdraw his Fourth Amendment denial

of medical care claim. The district court construed his request as a

motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a)(2) and granted the motion.

3

Williams did not attempt to cross-appeal any portion of the district

court’s order.

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 9

That is “because ‘pretrial orders denying qualified immunity

generally fall within the collateral order doctrine.’” Estate of

Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 772). Therefore, “in the

qualified immunity context, we typically have jurisdiction

over interlocutory appeals from the denial of summary

judgment.” Id. “We review the district court’s conclusions

regarding qualified immunity de novo” and “consider all

disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938,

946 (9th Cir. 2017). “Although we ‘assum[e] that the

version of material facts asserted by the [plaintiff] is correct,’

we may consider facts offered by the defendant that are

‘uncontradicted by any evidence in the record.’” Hopson v.

Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2023) (alterations in

original) (citations omitted).

Williams contends that the appeal is based only on

factual disputes that are unreviewable on interlocutory

appeal. We disagree. “While appellate review does not

extend to claims in which the determination of qualified

immunity depends on disputed issues of material fact, any

issue of law, including the materiality of the disputed issues

of fact, is a permissible subject for appellate review.” Hart

v. City of Redwood City, 99 F.4th 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2024)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has

recognized that a genuine issue of fact does not exist where

a party’s assertion of fact is plainly contradicted by a video

recording. See Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 777 (stating, based on

evidence captured by video cameras on police vehicles, that

“the record conclusively disproves [the plaintiff’s] claim”).

We have noted the same. See Hernandez v. Town of Gilbert,

989 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e are not required to

accept a non-movant’s version of events when it is clearly

10 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

contradicted by a video in the record.” (cleaned up)). Where,

as here, defendants contend on appeal that the district court

failed to review the facts in the “light depicted in the

videotape,” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1218 (9th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381

(2007)), they raise a question of law over which we have

appellate jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

I. Excessive Force Claim and Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials from § 1983 liability “unless (1) they violated a

federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the

unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the

time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63

(2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

(2012)). “We may consider the two prongs of the qualified

immunity analysis in any order.” Chism v. Washington, 661

F.3d 380, 386 (9th Cir. 2011). We begin with the first prong.

A police officer’s application of deadly force to restrain

a subject’s movements “is a seizure subject to the

reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). Accordingly,

any such use of deadly force must be “objectively

reasonable.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham identified several

factors to consider when evaluating the strength of the

government’s interest in the force used: (1) “the severity of

the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and

(3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. “The most

important Graham factor is whether the suspect posed an

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 11

immediate threat to anyone’s safety.” Nehad v. Browder,

929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019).

These factors are not exclusive. Bryan v. MacPherson,

630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010). We still must “examine

the totality of the circumstances and consider whatever

specific factors may be appropriate in a particular case,

whether or not listed in Graham.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Other relevant factors may include the

availability of less intrusive force, whether proper warnings

were given, and whether it should have been apparent to the

officer that the subject of the force used was mentally

disturbed.” Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus, 871 F.3d 998, 1006

(9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “With

respect to the possibility of less intrusive force, officers need

not employ the least intrusive means available, so long as

they act within a range of reasonable conduct.” Id. (cleaned

up).

When weighing these competing factors two key

principles must be kept in mind. First, “‘[t]he

“reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Kisela v.

Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 103 (2018) (quoting Graham, 490

U.S. at 396). Second, “‘[t]he calculus of reasonableness

must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are

often forced to make split-second judgments—in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at

396–97).

12 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

A. Whether the video evidence clearly contradicts

Williams’s claim that he was not attempting to

accelerate

At the heart of the parties’ factual dispute is whether

Williams was attempting to accelerate when the officers

opened fire. The district court explained: “Crucial to

Defendants’ argument is . . . ‘[t]he fact the officers shot at

[Williams] multiple times while he was actively attempting

to run over an officer and flee’” (alterations in original).

Williams contends that he “never attempted to flee after [his]

truck came to a stop and was pinned in between two police

vehicles.”

Citing the body camera recordings from Colborn,

Terrasas, Gibson, and Taylor, as well as the dash camera

recordings from Colborn and Gibson, the district court

determined that the video evidence did not clearly show that

Williams was attempting to accelerate—“the thick cloud that

formed during these crucial few seconds . . . affects the

visibility such that one cannot clearly see what actually

transpired.” Accordingly, the district court construed the

record in Williams’s favor and assumed in its analysis that

his truck tires were not spinning and that “the noise coming

from the truck’s engine was not a result of Williams trying

to accelerate.”

On appeal, Defendants argue that the district court erred

by ignoring video evidence that clearly shows the tires

spinning, citing the dash camera recording from Janning.

Our review of the record confirms the same. See Scott, 550

U.S. at 380 (“When opposing parties tell two different

stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,

so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 13

motion for summary judgment.”). Unlike the vantage points

relied on by the district court, Janning’s dash camera footage

plainly depicts the rear tire of Williams’s truck as he is being

boxed in. The video shows white lettering on the side of the

tire and then shows those letters begin to blur as the engine

revs—a clear indication that the tire was spinning. The

video also shows those letters reappearing as the tire stopped

spinning, about a minute after the shooting stopped. The

video thus “contradicts the version of the story” told by

Williams about the seconds leading up to the shooting. See

id. at 378; see also id. at 380–81 (“[The plaintiff’s] version

of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no

reasonable jury could have believed him. The [c]ourt . . .

should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have

viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”).

Williams was clearly attempting to accelerate—and

therefore attempting to flee—when the officers opened fire.

Our analysis proceeds on that basis. 4

B. Use of deadly force

The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the

excessive force claim concerning the use of deadly force

because their actions were objectively reasonable.

The Supreme Court addressed a case with substantially

similar facts in Plumhoff, which we find instructive. 572

U.S. at 776–77. There, the driver led officers on a chase that

“exceeded 100 miles per hour and lasted over five minutes.”

4

Williams argues in the alternative that “Defendants never identified this

portion of the video in their motion for summary judgment” and

“therefore forfeited this argument below, then waived it by failing to

argue plain error here” (emphasis removed). Williams is incorrect.

Defendants cited to this portion of Janning’s dash camera footage

numerous times in the underlying summary judgment briefing.

14 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

Id. at 776. Eventually, the driver’s car collided with a police

vehicle and came to a temporary standstill with its front

bumper flush against a police cruiser. Id. Just before the

officers fired into the vehicle, the driver “was obviously

pushing down on the accelerator because the car’s wheels

were spinning.” Id. Thus, “[u]nder the circumstances at the

moment when the shots were fired, all that a reasonable

police officer could have concluded was that [the driver] was

intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was allowed to

do so, he would once again pose a deadly threat for others

on the road.” Id. at 777. The Court determined that “the

police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that

risk.” Id.

Williams posed a similar threat to the officers on the

scene and the public at large. He led officers on a chase that

lasted forty-two minutes and reached speeds of around 70

miles per hour. During the chase, Williams ran several red

lights, weaved between lanes, drove through a chain-link

fence, drove in the wrong direction on the freeway, albeit

briefly, and had, for a significant portion of the chase, his

lights off and a blown tire. By the time his truck was pinned,

he had struck three patrol vehicles. As in Plumhoff,

Williams continued his attempt to flee. He “was obviously

pushing down on the accelerator because the car’s wheels

were spinning.” Id. at 776. It is reasonable that an officer,

without the benefit of hindsight, might fear that Williams’s

truck would gain traction at any moment, maneuver out of

the pin, and accelerate forward into traffic. 5 Based on the

5

Williams suggests that “it was clear that the truck was immobilized.”

But much of his argument relies on post hoc observation, including that

Williams’s truck remained stationary for the fourteen seconds when

shots were fired and thereafter. We do not find this reasoning persuasive.

“The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 15

engine revving and the tires spinning, Williams appeared

“intent on resuming his flight” and would have “once again

pose[d] a deadly threat for others on the road.” Id. at 777.

At a minimum, two of the Graham factors weigh in

Defendants’ favor, including the “most important”

consideration of “whether the suspect posed an immediate

threat to anyone’s safety.” Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1132; see

Estate of Lopez, 871 F.3d at 1005 (noting that another

Graham factor is “whether the suspect is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight” (cleaned up)).

In line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Plumhoff, 6 we

hold that Williams—taking into account the duration, speed,

and other hazards of his flight, as well as his clear intent to

flee—“posed a grave public safety risk” and that “the police

acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.” 572

U.S. at 777. That the district court identified disputes of fact

as to other considerations, is immaterial. See id. (holding

that police acted reasonably without analyzing other factors

such as the severity of the crime at issue, whether proper

warnings were given, or the availability of less intrusive

force).

Nor was the number or duration of rounds fired

excessive. “It stands to reason that, if police officers are

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

20/20 vision of hindsight.” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 103 (cleaned up).

6

The district court distinguished this case from Plumhoff on the basis

that “Williams was not ‘obviously pushing down on the accelerator’”

and that “it is far from clear whether Williams ‘never abandoned his

attempt to flee’ during the 15-second timeframe in which the Officers

fired their dozens of rounds” (quoting Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 776–77).

As explained above, Williams was obviously attempting to accelerate.

The district court erred by assuming otherwise.

16 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat

to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the

threat has ended.” Id. In other words, “if lethal force is

justified, officers are taught to keep shooting until the threat

is over.” Id. Here, during the fourteen seconds when the

shots were fired, Williams did not abandon his attempt to

flee. The engine can be heard revving throughout, and the

tires continued to spin and kick up dust. The question would

be closer if, for example, Williams had taken his foot off the

accelerator and officers nevertheless fired a second volley of

shots. But that did not occur here. Even Williams concedes

in his answering brief that “[t]here was no change in

circumstances during the approximately 17 seconds from the

time the truck was pinned in, the shooting occurred, and the

shooting ended.” Once Williams attempted to accelerate his

vehicle, the officers did not need to risk their safety by first

waiting to see if his attempt would be successful, and they

acted reasonably in firing the immediate fourteen-second

volley of shots in response to that effort. Having fired that

initial volley, the officers then reasonably ceased firing, as

Williams’s further attempts at acceleration proved fruitless.

Because we find no constitutional violation in the

officers’ use of force, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

We reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment

on this claim. 7

7

Williams also argues that “[i]ntentionally firing the 40mm [foam

rounds] and striking Williams constituted excessive force” because he

“still posed no threat to officers.” This argument fails because, as

Defendants observe, Williams has presented no evidence that he was

actually struck by a foam round.

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 17

II. Municipal Liability and Battery Claims

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,

690–95 (1978), “established that municipalities can be liable

for infringement of constitutional rights, under certain

circumstances.” Horton ex rel. Horton v. City of Santa

Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2019). “In particular,

municipalities may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional

injuries pursuant to (1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive

practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or

discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.”

Id. at 602–03. “A plaintiff must . . . show ‘deliberate action

attributable to the municipality [that] directly caused a

deprivation of federal rights.’” Id. at 603 (quoting Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)).

A municipality is not entitled to assert the defense of

qualified immunity. See id. Thus, the jurisdictional rule that

allows Defendants to seek interlocutory review of the denial

of qualified immunity does not extend to the municipal

liability claims. See Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d

1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2018). Nevertheless, we may exercise

pendent jurisdiction and “review an otherwise non-

appealable ruling when it is ‘“inextricably intertwined” with

. . . [an] order properly before us.’” Doe v. Regents of Univ.

of Cal., 891 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Meredith v. Oregon, 321 F.3d 807, 812–13 (9th Cir. 2003)).

This standard is met only when the issues are “(a) . . . so

intertwined that we must decide the pendent issue in order to

review the claims properly raised on interlocutory appeal, or

(b) resolution of the issue properly raised on interlocutory

appeal necessarily resolves the pendent issue.” Id. (quoting

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1285 (9th Cir. 2000)).

18 WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS

We exercise pendent appellant jurisdiction over the

Monell claims in this case because they are “inextricably

intertwined” with the excessive force claim and qualified

immunity defense. 8 The Monell claims fail as a matter of

law because we found no constitutional violation in the

officers’ use of force. See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204

F.3d 893, 906 (9th Cir. 2000). We therefore reverse the

district court’s denial of summary judgment on the

municipal liability claims.

For substantially the same reason, we exercise pendent

appellate jurisdiction over the state battery claim. “Under

Nevada law, police officers ‘are privileged to use that

amount of force which reasonably appears necessary,’ and

are liable only to the extent they use more force than

reasonably necessary.” Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d

471, 478 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ramirez v. City of Reno,

925 F. Supp. 681, 691 (D. Nev. 1996)). “The standard for

common-law assault and battery by a police officer thus

mirrors the federal civil rights law standard: Liability

attaches at the point at which the level of force used by a

peace officer exceeds that which is objectively reasonable

under the circumstances.” Ramirez, 925 F. Supp. at 691.

Because the officers’ use of force was not unreasonable, the

battery claim fails. Cf. Monzon v. City of Murrieta, 978 F.3d

1150, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying California law).

Accordingly, we reverse.

8

The district court denied summary judgment on the Monell and battery

claims in light of the “triable issues of material fact” that precluded

summary judgment on the excessive force claim.

WILLIAMS V. CITY OF SPARKS 19

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

decision denying summary judgment on the excessive force,

municipal liability, and battery claims and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.