Jose Vasquez v. DC

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 22, 2024 Decided August 9, 2024

No. 23-7050

JOSE T. VASQUEZ,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND RUBEN AGOSTO, OFFICER,

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cv-02194)

Creighton R. Magid argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, Caroline S. Van Zile,

Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy

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Solicitor General, and Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor

General.

Before: WILKINS and RAO, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: The Metropolitan Police

Department (“MPD”) has twice detained Jose Vasquez for one

reason: He has the same name and date of birth as another man

who is a wanted criminal. Of course, sharing a name and date

of birth with a wanted criminal is not a crime. So, Mr. Vasquez

sued the District of Columbia and one of its officers for

violations of his constitutional rights under Section 1983, and

the District of Columbia alone for negligence, malicious

prosecution, and false imprisonment.

The District Court disposed of the Section 1983 and

negligence claims at summary judgment, but the two other

common law claims went to trial where the jury held the

District of Columbia liable for false imprisonment, but not

malicious prosecution. Though the jury awarded Mr. Vasquez

$100,000 in damages for the false imprisonment claim, he

never received any payout. That is because the District Court

granted the District of Columbia’s renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, it granted

the District of Columbia’s motion for remittitur.

Mr. Vasquez now appeals. As our opinion details, we

affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment,

but vacate its order granting the District of Columbia’s motion

for judgment as a matter of law, and in the alternative

remittitur. In so doing, we reinstate the jury’s verdict and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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I.

For over forty years, a man named Jose Vasquez has

evaded prosecution in Will County, Illinois for murder.

Hoping to detain and prosecute Jose Vasquez, Will County has

entered two warrants into the National Crime Information

Center (“NCIC”) database, which allows police departments

across the country to access its warrants. One warrant charges

Jose Vasquez as a fugitive from justice, and links to the second

warrant (for murder), which underlies the fugitive from justice

charge. Accordingly, if an officer stops the Jose Vasquez listed

in the warrant, and has access to NCIC, they may detain him

and contact Will County so that it can extradite.

Of course, whether another police department should detain

a person based on the information provided by Will County

presupposes that Will County’s NCIC entries are accurate. But

for a long time, that was not the case. Indeed, from 2005

through 2013, the NCIC entry for one of the Will County

warrants contained an egregious error: it named Jose Vasquez

as the suspect, but the social security number and physical

description described a different Jose Vasquez, a man who lives

in Maryland and has never set foot in Will County, Illinois.

Unsurprisingly, Maryland police departments arrested and

detained the wrong Jose Vasquez pursuant to the Will County

warrant on a few occasions. So in 2013, Will County amended

its erroneous NCIC entry to include a new instruction: “DO

NOT DETAIN A VASQUEZ, JOSE [redacted birthday]

[Social Security number redacted] THIS IS NOT SUSPECT.”

Vasquez v. County of Will, No. 17-cv-02194, 2021 WL

4476766, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Vasquez I”). This

amendment seemingly made clear that Maryland’s Jose

Vasquez (the Plaintiff in this case) was not wanted in Will

County.

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Will County’s clarification aside, Mr. Vasquez was

detained twice more by MPD due to the Will County murder

and fugitive warrants. This appeal arises from those two

detentions.

A.

On October 23, 2016, Mr. Vasquez was stopped by Officer

Terence Sutton, an MPD officer, for a traffic violation.

Vasquez I, 2021 WL 4476766, at *2. During this traffic stop,

Officer Sutton searched the name “Jose Vasquez” in the NCIC

database; this search returned two contradictory entries. Id.

One entry returned a Will County warrant for Jose Vasquez for

a failure to appear based on the underlying homicide charge;

the name, date of birth, and social security number recorded in

the fugitive warrant for the wanted Jose Vasquez all matched

those belonging to plaintiff Mr. Vasquez. Id. The other NCIC

warrant entry, for the homicide charge, contained the message

saying “DO NOT DETAIN” the Jose Vasquez with the social

security number that matches plaintiff’s social security

number, because he is “NOT [the] SUSPECT.” Id.

Nevertheless, Officer Sutton claimed that he did not see the

“do not detain” message and arrested Mr. Vasquez. Id. And

following the arrest, every MPD officer involved in Mr.

Vasquez’s detention assumed that Mr. Vasquez was the Jose

Vasquez wanted in Will County.

The next day, MPD Officer Ernest Cole sent a teletype

message to Will County seeking to confirm that Will County

would extradite Mr. Vasquez. Id. This message did not include

Mr. Vasquez’s social security number. Id. After sending this

message, but before receiving a response from Will County,

Officer Cole initiated a fugitive criminal action against Mr.

Vasquez. Id.

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Then, five days after Officer Sutton arrested Mr. Vasquez,

yet another MPD officer, Officer Ruben Agosto, emailed the

Will County Sheriff’s Office to, once again, seek confirmation

that Will County would extradite Mr. Vasquez. Id. This email

included a photo of Mr. Vasquez along with his fingerprints.

Id. Within hours, Will County responded with a teletype

message that exonerated Mr. Vasquez and requested that MPD

release any holds it had on Mr. Vasquez. Id. Officer Agosto

did not see this message for another six days. Id.

Finally, on November 2, 2016—ten days after the initial

arrest—at Mr. Vasquez’s bond hearing, defense counsel alerted

the court that his client was not the Jose Vasquez wanted in

Will County. Id. In response, the court ordered the U.S.

Attorney’s Office to investigate Mr. Vasquez’s claim of

mistaken identity. Id. The very next day, Officer Agosto found

the Will County message requesting Mr. Vasquez’s release and

forwarded this message to the U.S. Attorney, which dismissed

the charges against Mr. Vasquez. Id.

The details of Mr. Vasquez’s eleven-day detention were

documented in a few ways. MPD gave Mr. Vasquez a PDID

number—a unique identifier that MPD gives to any person it

arrests and detains. J.A. 556–57. This allows MPD officers to

search detainees and review their past encounters with the

Department. J.A. 555, J.A. 560–62. Thus, in Mr. Vasquez’s

case, MPD now had a file containing his social security

number, fingerprints, and information from this arrest, and

eventual release from jail. MPD officers were also able to

access the details surrounding Mr. Vasquez’s bond hearing

through JUSTIS, a system created and maintained by the D.C.

Superior Court.

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B.

Mr. Vasquez was arrested again on March 3, 2017

following a traffic stop. This arrest was based on the same

erroneous NCIC entry that led to his November 2016 arrest.

This time, however, Secret Service—not MPD—handled the

traffic stop. Eventually, Secret Service dropped Mr. Vasquez

off at MPD’s Second District Precinct, thus, placing him in

MPD’s custody.

Mr. Vasquez vehemently protested his detention and

professed his innocence to the MPD officers who detained him.

Indeed, he alerted one officer to his social security number,

which did not match the number listed in the Will County

NCIC entry. J.A. 514, J.A. 517. But to no avail. The officer

dismissed his pleas and, instead, called him a liar and a

murderer. J.A. 517. Mr. Vasquez would, once again, remain

in MPD custody overnight. J.A. 521.

On the morning of March 4th, Officer Leroy Rollins, a

fugitive unit officer located in MPD headquarters, J.A. 731,

wrote the affidavit that supported Mr. Vasquez’s arrest as a

fugitive, J.A. 557–59. To prepare this affidavit, Officer Rollins

searched Mr. Vasquez in the NCIC database and noticed that

his social security number did not match the number on the

Will County warrant. J.A. 651–52. Officer Rollins testified

that he did not investigate further, but instead messaged Will

County asking whether its warrant for Jose Vasquez was still

active and if it would extradite. J.A. 662. This message to Will

County did not mention that Mr. Vasquez’s social security

number differed from the number on the Will County warrant.

J.A. 659–60. At his arraignment, that afternoon, Mr. Vasquez

was released after his attorney alerted the presiding judge that

MPD previously arrested and detained him based on this

mistaken identity a few months earlier. See Vasquez I, 2021

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WL 4476766, at * 2; Vasquez v. District of Columbia, No. 17-

cv-02194, 2023 WL 2682290, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2023)

(“Vasquez II”).

C.

Following the March 2017 detention, Mr. Vasquez sued; a

few of his claims are relevant to this appeal. Mr. Vasquez

brought constitutional claims arising under Section 1983

against Officer Agosto and the District of Columbia based on

the 2016 arrest. These claims did not survive summary

judgment. See Vasquez I, 2021 WL 4476766, at *8–10. Mr.

Vasquez also brought three common law claims (negligence,

false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution) against the

District of Columbia based on his 2017 arrest. The negligence

claim did not survive summary judgment, but the malicious

prosecution and false imprisonment claims went to trial. See

id. at *4–6.

The jury returned a mixed verdict. It ruled for Mr.

Vasquez on the false imprisonment claim, but it ruled for the

District of Columbia on malicious prosecution. On the former,

the jury awarded Mr. Vasquez $100,000. Vasquez II, 2023 WL

2682290, at *8. After the jury verdict, the District of Columbia

renewed its judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Vasquez’s false

imprisonment claim, and in the alternative moved for

remittitur. The District Court vacated the jury’s verdict and its

award, granting the District of Columbia’s renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, granting the

motion for remittitur. See id. at *9.

Mr. Vasquez appeals the grants of summary judgment as

to his constitutional claims, as well as the District Court’s order

granting the District of Columbia judgment as a matter of law

or, in the alternative, remittitur. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

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II.

We begin with Mr. Vasquez’s respective Section 1983

claims against Officer Agosto and the District of Columbia.

We review the District Court’s grants of summary judgment de

novo. Lane v. District of Columbia, 887 F.3d 480, 487 (D.C.

Cir. 2018). As we explain, because both Defendants (the

movants below) demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and [they are] entitled to judgment as a

matter of law,” we affirm the District Court’s judgment. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A.

Mr. Vasquez advances a novel argument that Officer

Agosto unreasonably seized him in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. As best we understand, Mr. Vasquez contends

that an officer undertakes a Fourth Amendment duty to

conclusively determine whether a detainee is unlawfully seized

when the officer begins an investigation into the detainee’s

innocence within a certain time period. This duty is breached,

Mr. Vasquez’s argument continues, if the officer fails to

sufficiently monitor the investigation and, consequently,

ignores exculpatory evidence. Officer Agosto provides a

straightforward response: Qualified immunity forecloses Mr.

Vasquez’s claim.

“An official sued under [Section 1983] is entitled to

qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated

a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established

at the time of the challenged conduct.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). The

“clearly established” standard is quite demanding as it requires

a showing that “any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes

would have understood that he was violating” the plaintiff’s

constitutional right. Id. at 779. An official is said to have

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sufficient notice if there is “controlling authority” or “a robust

consensus of cases of persuasive authority,” id. at 780, that

clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct “in the particular

circumstances that he or she faced,” id. at 779 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

The District Court agreed with Officer Agosto, and easily

disposed of this argument because Mr. Vasquez failed to cite a

single case “from the Supreme Court or this Circuit that would

hold an officer accountable in circumstances like those faced

by Officer Agosto.” Vasquez I, 2021 WL 4476766, at *7. So

too here.

Minutes into oral argument, Mr. Vasquez’s counsel

conceded that “there is strangely a paucity of case law on this

precise situation.” Oral Arg. 7:15. This concession kills Mr.

Vasquez’s appeal. There is simply no way that the proposed

theory of Fourth Amendment liability is “clearly established”

if, when asked to present one case in support of his theory,

counsel submits that no such case exists.

Mr. Vasquez’s briefing relies primarily on one case,

Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2006). But

Gregory does not come close to providing Officer Agosto with

sufficient notice that his conduct was unlawful. In Gregory, a

state police employee was alleged to have “intentionally

withheld exculpatory information in order to continue

Plaintiff’s detention without probable cause.” Id. at 751. But

here, Mr. Vasquez suggests that Officer Agosto negligently

failed to uncover the existence of readily available exculpatory

evidence. There is no way Officer Agosto, who is alleged to

have negligently investigated, was put on notice that his

conduct was unconstitutional because other state police

employees intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence to aid

a criminal prosecution.

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Therefore, Gregory’s facts are clearly distinguishable

from the facts that Mr. Vasquez alleges, and do not aid his

attempt to clear qualified immunity’s high bar. Indeed, the

Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts not to define clearly

established law at a high level of generality, since doing so

avoids the crucial question whether the official acted

reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.”

Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 779 (cleaned up). This instruction is

“especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where

… it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the

relevant legal doctrine … appl[ies] to the factual situation the

officer confronts.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)

(cleaned up). We are bound by, and necessarily heed, those

instructions here. The District Court correctly granted

qualified immunity to Officer Agosto.1

B.

Mr. Vasquez’s attempt to hold the District of Columbia

liable for alleged constitutional injuries similarly fails.

Municipal liability under Section 1983 is quite limited and

extends only to a local government’s official policies,

practices, or customs that are “responsible for a deprivation of

rights protected by the Constitution.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Naturally, Monell liability begins with a “predicate

constitutional violation.” Lane, 887 F.3d at 488. Without this

1

In his reply brief, Mr. Vasquez argues that he need not provide a

robust authority of case law because the constitutional violation here

is patently obvious. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199

(2004) (recognizing that there are some cases where it is “obvious”

that the officer has violated a constitutional right); see also Taylor v.

Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 (2020) (same). Arguments raised for the first

time on reply are forfeited; therefore, we do not address it here. See,

e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 1 F.4th 40, 46 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

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initial showing, “it is inconceivable that the city could be

liable.” Id. (cleaned up).

On appeal, Mr. Vasquez attacks two MPD policies: (1) its

protocols for handling teletype messages and (2) its protocols

(or lack thereof) for determining whether a person has been

correctly identified as a fugitive from justice. In so doing, Mr.

Vasquez attempts to make the general point that if MPD had

better policies and protocols in place, Mr. Vasquez would not

have been misidentified and wrongly detained. Maybe so. But

municipalities are not liable under Section 1983 for all “harm-

causing … policies,” and Mr. Vasquez does not cite to a single

case that explains how MPD’s alleged negligence is

unconstitutional. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.

115, 123 (1992).

Thus, we reiterate one of Lane’s closing takeaways, it is

“inconceivable” that a municipality is liable under Monell

where the plaintiff fails to show a “predicate constitutional

violation.” 887 F.3d at 488 (quoting City of Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). To the extent that Mr.

Vasquez alleges that the District of Columbia violated the

Fourth Amendment based on the actions of MPD officers, that

argument is foreclosed by Monell itself: “a municipality cannot

be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in

other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under

[Section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436

U.S. at 691. Similarly, the invocation of the Fifth Amendment

in Mr. Vasquez’s complaint is unavailing because there is no

cognizable argument that demonstrates the Fifth Amendment’s

relevance to the facts Mr. Vasquez’s complaint alleges. The

District Court correctly granted the District of Columbia’s

motion for summary judgment.

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III.

Mr. Vasquez also appeals the District Court’s judgment as

a matter of law, which vacated the jury’s finding that the

District of Columbia was liable for false imprisonment. Mr.

Vasquez further asks that if we agree with him that the District

Court erred when it vacated the jury’s finding, we should also

reverse the District Court’s alternative grant of remittitur that

reduced the jury’s $100,000 award to $6,000. Here, we agree

with Mr. Vasquez.

A.

At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that Mr.

Vasquez had to establish two elements to prove his false

imprisonment claim: “(1) MPD officers detained [him] against

his will and (2) the detention was unlawful.” Vasquez II, 2023

WL 2682290, at *3 (internal quotations omitted). As to the

second element, the District Court further instructed the jury

that “false imprisonment can occur even if the confinement

began lawfully but has become unlawful over time.” Id. A

detention becomes unlawful over time, the instruction

continued, “when a defendant is under a duty to release the

plaintiff but does not do so.” Id. The refusal to release the

plaintiff “with the intention of confining the plaintiff is a

sufficient act of confinement to make the defendant liable for

false imprisonment.” Id.

The District Court then instructed the jury on the specific

circumstances in Mr. Vasquez’s case that would give rise to a

duty to release:

Whether MPD had a duty to release Mr. Vasquez

depends upon the belief of its officers that Mr.

Vasquez was the person named or otherwise

described in the Will County warrant with such

13

sufficiency as to justify their belief that he was the

person wanted by Will County. If officers of the MPD

later learned that Mr. Vasquez was undoubtedly not

the person wanted by the Will County warrant, MPD

was required to release Mr. Vasquez unless he

objected to his release.

Id. The jury returned a verdict finding the District of Columbia

liable for false imprisonment and awarded Mr. Vasquez

$100,000 in damages. Id. at *1. This verdict, we have

repeatedly explained, will not be “lightly disturb[ed].” McGill

v. Muñoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Muldrow v. Re-

Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Radtke v.

Lifecare Mgmt. Partners, 795 F.3d 159, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2015);

Xereas v. Heiss, 987 F.3d 1124, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

“We review de novo a district court’s disposition of a

motion for judgment as a matter of law, in the sense that we

apply to the jury’s decision the same forgiving standard as did

the district court.” Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1344

(D.C. Cir. 1999). So as not to infringe on the jury’s functions,

when reviewing the entire record, we “must draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and [we] may not

make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150

(2000). Though we give “credence” to the “uncontradicted and

unimpeached” evidence from the movant, “at least to the extent

that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses,” we

“must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that

the jury is not required to believe.” Id. at 151; see also Zellner

v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007) (When ruling

on a judgment as a matter of law, “the court must bear in mind

that the jury is free to believe part and disbelieve part of any

witness’s testimony.”). Under this standard, “[j]udgment as a

matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence and all

14

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-

sided that reasonable men and women could not have reached

a verdict in plaintiff’s favor.” McGill, 203 F.3d at 845 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. Const.

amend. VII (“no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise

reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according

to the rules of the common law”).

Start with Officer Rollins’s testimony, the officer who

prepared the affidavit that supported the charge against Mr.

Vasquez as “a fugitive from the State of Illinois.” J.A. 649.

Officer Rollins told the jury that before he prepares an

affidavit, he runs the person’s name through NCIC to see “if

that person, in fact, has a warrant that the agency had charged

him with.” J.A. 707. Officer Rollins further testified that he

was aware that the person wanted in Will County had a

different social security number from the one listed in Mr.

Vasquez’s arrest packet at the time Officer Rollins prepared the

affidavit. J.A. 650–51; see also J.A. 357 (Officer Rollins’s

affidavit explaining that he verified the warrant through

NCIC). And notably, Officer Rollins was aware of the

differing social security numbers because he printed a report

from Cobalt, an internal MPD system, that contained

information about Mr. Vasquez. J.A. 651.

Despite noticing the difference in social security numbers,

Officer Rollins told the jury that he did not bother to further

investigate. J.A. 652. That is because, in Officer Rollins’s

view, a difference in social security numbers did not “raise a

red flag” or demonstrate that he was detaining the wrong Jose

Vasquez. J.A. 651–52.

In finding the District of Columbia liable for false

imprisonment, the jury was free not to credit Officer Rollins’s

testimony about the significance of the social security number

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mismatch. To the jury, the social security numbers could have

done far more than raise a red flag—they could have

undoubtedly demonstrated Mr. Vasquez’s innocence.

Therefore, we must ask a simple question: Was it reasonable

for the jury to find that Officer Rollins undoubtedly knew that

Mr. Vasquez was not wanted in Will County because his social

security number differed from the number listed in the warrant?

We think so. The jury verdict here was consistent with

federal law, which recognizes that a social security number is

a “means of identification.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). Indeed,

numerous courts have ruled that a social security number is

“unique and therefore sufficient alone to identify a specific

individual.” United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230, 234 (4th

Cir. 2008); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 710 (1986);

Baysal v. Midvale Indem. Co., 78 F.4th 976, 979 (7th Cir.

2023); Tschida v. Motl, 924 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 2019).

Given the commonly understood importance of social security

numbers for identifying individuals, it would have been

reasonable for the jury to conclude that Mr. Vasquez’s social

security number was proof of his identity.

Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably found that

Officer Rollins undoubtedly knew Mr. Vasquez was not

wanted in Will County when he learned that Mr. Vasquez’s

social security number was not the same as the social security

number listed on the Will County warrant. Of course, in his

testimony, Officer Rollins attempted to wriggle out of the

straightforward conclusion that a person with a particular social

security number is not the same person as someone with a

different social security number, but the jury was not required

to credit his equivocation. We disagree with the District

Court’s reasoning given in support of its judgment as a matter

of law for three reasons.

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First, the District Court reasoned that “a mere difference

in Social Security numbers” could not mean that “Officer

Rollins undoubtedly knew that Plaintiff was not the Jose T.

Vasquez described in the Will County warrant and thus had a

duty to release him.” Vasquez II, 2023 WL 2682290, at *5.

But whether this difference is “mere,” or significant, is a factual

judgment that the jury, and the jury alone, must make. Here,

the jury could have reasonably found that this was no “mere”

difference—it was determinative; the District Court’s opposing

view substituted its judgment for the jury’s and encroached on

the jury’s functions.

Second, as the District Court saw it, “Plaintiff presented

no evidence to undermine the reasonableness of Officer

Rollins’s reliance on the Secret Service’s confirmation of

Plaintiff as the person wanted by Will County.” Id. Here too,

the District Court substituted its judgment for the jury’s and,

by extension, encroached on the jury’s fact-finding duties. In

ruling for Mr. Vasquez, the jury had the opportunity to consider

whether Officer Rollins’s reliance on Secret Service’s

confirmation was reasonable when he had his own

confirmation that Mr. Vasquez was not wanted in Will County

based on the difference in social security numbers.

Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that confirms

what Secret Service knew about Mr. Vasquez other than the

fact that he shared a birthdate and name with the Jose Vasquez

wanted in Will County. Thus, the jury could have reasonably

placed little weight on Secret Service’s confirmation that Mr.

Vasquez was the Jose Vasquez wanted in Will County.

Finally, to the extent that the District Court “buttressed”

its decision to overturn the verdict based on the jury’s finding

for the District of Columbia on Mr. Vasquez’s malicious

prosecution charge, we disagree that the verdicts were fatally

inconsistent. Id. at *6. In a false imprisonment claim “neither

17

malice nor wrongful intent are controlling considerations” and

“such allegations, insofar as they refer to false arrest or false

imprisonment are mere surplusage.” Clarke v. District of

Columbia, 311 A.2d 508, 511 (D.C. 1973); see also Marshall

v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1380 (D.C. 1978)

(“[M]alice is not [required]” to prove false imprisonment.). To

the contrary, the jury was instructed that Mr. Vasquez could

prevail on his malicious prosecution claim only if “Officer

Rollins acted with malice.” J.A. 964. The jury could

reasonably have found that while Officer Rollins undoubtedly

knew that Mr. Vasquez was not wanted in Will County, his

filing of the fugitive charge was not done with malicious intent.

Accordingly, the jury’s finding for Mr. Vasquez is reinstated,

and we vacate the District Court’s order granting judgment as

a matter of law.

B.

In the alternative, the District Court granted the District of

Columbia’s motion for remittitur and reduced the jury’s award

from $100,000 to $6,000. Vasquez II, 2023 WL 2682290, at

*9. Though we generally review the District Court’s decisions

on remittitur for abuse of discretion, “a more searching inquiry

is required” where, as here, the District Court reduces the jury’s

award. See Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018,

1023 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered

Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). That is

because when judges modify a jury’s verdict, we risk

“encroach[ing] on the jury’s important fact-finding function.”

Id. (quoting Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 589 F.2d 723, 729

(D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co.,

409 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“we must consider that the

agency to whom the Constitution allocates the fact-finding

function in the first instance—the jury—has evaluated the facts

18

differently”). We conclude that the District Court overstepped

its bounds in this instance.

A 94% reduction of a jury award is a vast exercise of

discretion that must be supported with ample justifications.

Here, the crux of the District Court’s analysis centered on

damages awarded by other juries that considered somewhat

similar facts. Vasquez II, 2023 WL 2682290, at *9. Critically,

however, none of the proffered cases were truly comparable,

because none were described as involving plaintiffs who would

have been, like Mr. Vasquez, particularly traumatized by

another false imprisonment due to his past wrongful arrests.

See J.A. 518–22. Here, the jury was free to consider such

evidence. See J.A. 966 (instructing the jury that it could

consider how Mr. Vasquez’s “prior arrest and detention in 2016

by MPD affected [him] on March 3rd and 4th of 2017.”).

Furthermore, the jury could also rightly consider the

increased emotional harm caused by the fact that Mr.

Vasquez’s protestations of innocence did not just go unheeded;

they were mocked with the response that he was a “liar” and a

“murderer.” J.A. 515–16, 519. Indeed, the jury was instructed

that “[e]lements to consider when deciding a damages award

include any mental pain and suffering, fear, inconvenience,

indignity, insult, humiliation, or embarrassment that Mr.

Vasquez proves he suffered directly because of defendant’s

conduct.” J.A. 967. The jury could have reasonably found that

the callous actions and stinging epithets of District of Columbia

officials proved each and every one of those elements.

Though the District of Columbia claims that actions taken

before Officer Rollins saw the mismatched social security

numbers are irrelevant to damages, the jury could have

reasonably found that those actions aggravated the emotional

injuries caused by the later-occurring wrongful detention, as

19

they were instructed to that effect regarding evidence of his

2016 wrongful detention. J.A. 966. Other than a passing

reference to emotional harm, the District Court focused

exclusively on the five-hour length of wrongful detention as the

basis for damages, and did not discuss at all the evidence of Mr.

Vasquez’s frustration or the police officers’ mocking when

granting remittitur. It is well settled that “a decision maker

abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor.”

Amador Cnty. v. Dep’t of Interior, 772 F.3d 901, 904 (D.C. Cir.

2014).

Last, as we have previously explained, “it is awkward to

discuss the size of an award through comparison with past

decisions.” Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (quoting Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 16 (Wyo.

1980)). Thus, district courts must proceed with caution when

comparing jury awards “[b]ecause of the unique circumstances

of each case as well as the adjustments which would

necessarily have to be made for inflation.” Id. (quoting

Mariner, 610 P.2d at 16)). Further, “[a] court must be

especially hesitant to disturb a jury’s determination of damages

in cases involving intangible and non-economic injuries.”

Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1024.

Here, where the District Court failed to adequately

consider all of the elements of damages that the jury could have

properly relied upon to reach its verdict, where the damages

were almost exclusively non-economic and thus particularly

within the province of the jury’s subjective judgment, and

where the amount of the damages award is not so great as to

“shock the conscience,” the granting of remittitur was an abuse

of discretion. See Doe v. Binker, 492 A.2d 857, 863–64 (D.C.

1985).

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IV.

To conclude, we affirm the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment to Officer Agosto and the District of

Columbia. But we vacate the District Court’s judgment as a

matter of law and alternative grant of remittitur as to Mr.

Vasquez’s false imprisonment claim and remand for

reinstatement of the jury’s verdict. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(2);

Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 323 n.4

(1967); see also Taylor, 409 F.2d at 146, 149.

So ordered.