The opinion
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-13626
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
$219,970.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,
Defendant,
KEVIN HARTLEY,
Claimant-Appellant,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13626
YOLIMA A. HARTLEY,
Claimant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01844-LMM
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Hartley, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of the government in a
civil forfeiture action, proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), for $219,970.00 seized during a traffic stop
(“the Defendant Currency”). On appeal, Hartley first argues that
the district court erred in determining that he did not dispute the
legality of the traffic stop, because his statement in his deposition
that he did not change lanes and did not receive a citation for failure
to maintain his lane was sufficient to dispute Trooper Jordan En-
nis’s statements. Second, Hartley argues that the district court in-
correctly found that several material facts were not in dispute per-
taining to the facts supporting the forfeitability of the Defendant
Currency, and therefore the government could not demonstrate
that the Defendant Currency was linked to illegal activity. Finally,
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23-13626 Opinion of the Court 3
Hartley challenges the district court’s holding rejecting his argu-
ment that the record evidence showed that the government’s ac-
tions with respect to the notice of forfeiture constituted bad faith
or a disregard of his rights.
Because we write only for the parties who are already famil-
iar with the facts, we set out only such facts as are necessary to
understand this opinion.
I. The Traffic Stop and Inventory Search of the Car
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2001). Although pro se pleadings are held to less stringent
standards, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are
deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.
2008). We “may affirm for any reason supported by the record,
even if not relied upon by the district court.” Hill v. Emp. Benefits
Admin. Comm. of Mueller Grp. LLC, 971 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir.
2020) (quotation marks omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving
for summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the dis-
trict court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions
of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and ad-
missions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it be-
lieves demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13626
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has properly
supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to
the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A nonmoving party
may dispute a material fact through a declaration, which “must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissi-
ble in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent
to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine
issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine is-
sue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party at summary judgment and pro se
complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant
does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a
genuine dispute of material fact. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667,
670 (11th Cir. 1990).
We will not reverse where an error was harmless. See Knight
through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 807 (11th Cir. 2017).
A harmless error is one that does not affect a party’s substantial
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23-13626 Opinion of the Court 5
rights, and thus is not a basis for vacating or modifying that judg-
ment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Accordingly, the appellant bears the bur-
den to show an error was not harmless. See Ermini v. Scott, 937 F.3d
1329, 1343 (11th Cir. 2019).
“Traffic stops qualify as seizures under the Fourth Amend-
ment.” United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003).
“An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional impera-
tive that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). As a general matter, the
decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred, that is,
“a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of breaking the law.” Heien v. North Carolina,
574 U.S. 54, 57, 60 (2014) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he con-
stitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does not depend] on the
actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren,
517 U.S. at 813. Only legally obtained evidence may be used to
meet the government’s burden under the civil forfeiture standard.
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Com. of Pa., 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965).
Under Georgia law, “[w]henever any roadway has been di-
vided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehi-
cle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single
lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1).
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The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant before
the government can conduct a search of persons, houses, papers,
and effects. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176‑78 (1984). The
Fourth Amendment affords motor vehicles somewhat less protec-
tion than other property. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 189,
193 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979). 1 For example, law enforcement may con-
duct a warrantless search of a vehicle if the vehicle is readily mobile
and law enforcement has probable cause to search it. United States
v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).
Another exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement is “an inventory search of an arrestee’s personal prop-
erty to itemize its contents pursuant to standard inventory proce-
dures.” United States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889, 910 (11th Cir. 2020).
“The government carries the burden to show that the require-
ments of this exception were met.” Id. The subjective intent of the
officer as to the inventory search is irrelevant, as “the mere expec-
tation of uncovering evidence will not vitiate an otherwise valid
inventory search.” United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th
Cir. 1982). Georgia Department of Public Safety policy provides
an inventory search may be conducted “[w]henever a member ar-
rests the driver/owner of a vehicle and the arrest involuntarily sep-
arates the driver/owner from their vehicle, unless the vehicle is re-
leased to the control of a custodian designated by the driver/owner
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
this Court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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23-13626 Opinion of the Court 7
at the time of the arrest.” Georgia Department of Public Safety
Policy Manual No. 17.06.4(G)(4).
An issue not raised on appeal will be deemed abandoned and
will only be addressed in extraordinary circumstances. United
States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (address-
ing abandonment in a criminal matter), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.
95 (2022). A party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does
not plainly and prominently raise it, for instance by devoting a dis-
crete section of his argument to those claims. Sapuppo v. Allstate
Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). Abandonment
of a claim or issue can also occur when the passing references to it
are made in the “statement of the case” or “summary of the argu-
ment” sections, or when only passing references appear in the ar-
gument section of an opening brief, particularly when the refer-
ences are mere background to the appellant’s main arguments or
when they are buried within those arguments. Id. at 681-82.
Here, the district court did not err in determining that there
was no genuine issue of material fact as to the legality of the traffic
stop because Hartley did not dispute the facts supporting Ennis’s
decision to stop him, which demonstrated that Ennis had a reason-
able suspicion that a traffic violation occurred when he executed
the stop. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 57, 60. 2
2 To the extent the district court applied a higher burden by analyzing
whether Ennis had probable cause to execute the stop, rather than the lower
bar of reasonable suspicion, any such error is harmless because Hartley has
not alleged or shown that his substantial rights were affected by the district
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13626
First, Hartley’s argument that the government failed to pro-
vide video evidence of the traffic stop to him or to the court, and
that the government was required to submit this evidence to the
court, is, at least as to the production aspect, contradicted by the
government’s statement that it provided the relevant video footage
to Hartley during discovery. The government corroborated this
by providing the FedEx receipt of its mailing of a CD containing
the photos and videos in its response to Hartley’s motion to strike.
Therefore, we reject Hartley’s argument that he was not provided
such evidence. As to the second aspect of Hartley’s argument—
that the government was required to submit this evidence to the
court because Hartley challenged Ennis’s testimony—as discussed
in greater detail below, Hartley’s conclusory challenges to Ennis’s
testimony do not create a genuine dispute of material fact such that
the government needed to put forth additional evidence to support
Ennis’s affidavit. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587;
Brown, 906 F.2d at 670.
Second, the traffic stop was justified by Ennis’s reasonable
articulated suspicion that Hartley committed a traffic violation be-
cause Ennis attested that he observed Hartley commit a traffic vio-
lation, and Hartley failed to controvert Ennis’s testimony that he
observed Hartley fail to maintain his lane. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 57,
60. A traffic stop is reasonable where, as here, the officer had a
court applying a higher bar to the traffic stop. See Kerr, 856 F.3d at 807; Fed.
R. Civ. P. 61; Ermini, 937 F.3d at 1343.
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23-13626 Opinion of the Court 9
reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. Id. Ennis’s
statement that he observed Hartley fail to maintain his lane, in vi-
olation of O.C.G.A. § 40 6-48(1), is sufficient to show that he had a
reasonable articulable suspicion upon which to base the stop. See
Delgado, 981 F.3d at 897; O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1). Hartley does not
contradict this statement in his affidavit or his deposition. Though
Hartley argues that his deposition testimony stating that he never
changed lanes was sufficient to dispute Ennis’s attestation, this ar-
gument fails: the statute Hartley was cited under, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-
48(1), penalizes the failure to drive within a single lane as well as
changing lanes improperly. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1). Therefore,
Ennis’s statement that Hartley failed to maintain his lane falls
squarely within the conduct prohibited by the statute, and Hart-
ley’s assertion that he did not change lanes fails to dispute Ennis’s
statement.
Several of Hartley’s arguments, such as his argument that
the government failed to provide video of the traffic stop or the
relevance of Ennis’s issuance of a citation for driving on a sus-
pended license rather than failure to maintain his lane, rest on the
incorrect assertion that the government was required to provide
more evidence corroborating the statements in Ennis’s affidavit
than already provided. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Delgado,
981 F.3d at 897. Ennis’s affidavit, sworn under penalty of perjury,
was proper evidence upon which the court could rely at summary
judgment. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The government
therefore sufficiently demonstrated with the evidence provided
that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the purpose
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-13626
and legality of the traffic stop. Because Hartley provided no evi-
dence disputing Ennis’s statements, as his testimony at his deposi-
tion and in his affidavits did not squarely contradict Ennis’s state-
ments, and offers only allegations in his briefs directly challenging
Ennis’s statements, the government was not required to put forth
any further evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48; Brown, 906
F.2d at 670.
Finally, Hartley’s argument that the district court erred by
stating that Hartley’s car was the target of a BOLO fails because the
district court did not rely on the existence of a BOLO in determin-
ing that the traffic stop was permissible. Instead, the district court
relied on Ennis’s statement that he stopped Hartley because he ob-
served Hartley fail to maintain his lane. As discussed above, the
district court properly found that Ennis’s observation of a traffic
violation was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion upon
which to base the stop. Therefore, any such error was harmless
because it was not material to the court’s finding, and Hartley failed
to demonstrate that if the district court erred, such error was not
harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Ermini, 937 F.3d 1343.
Hartley failed to challenge in his initial brief on appeal the
district court’s determination that the inventory search of the vehi-
cle was legal and thus has abandoned the issue.
II. Forfeitability of the Defendant Currency
The Controlled Substances Act provides for the civil forfei-
ture of money “furnished or intended to be furnished by any per-
son in exchange for a controlled substance . . . , all proceeds
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traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys used or intended to
be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6).
As a result of the enactment of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Re-
form Act (“CAFRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 981 et seq., in 2000, the govern-
ment must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property is subject to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). We look at
the “totality of the circumstances” when determining whether the
government met its burden. United States v. $121,100.00 in U.S. Cur-
rency, 999 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1993). The government may
use circumstantial evidence, hearsay, and evidence gathered after
it filed the civil forfeiture complaint to meet its burden. United
States v. $291,828.00 in U.S. Currency, 536 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir.
2008). Additionally, the government is not required to produce ev-
idence connecting the money to a particular narcotics transaction.
United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). It need only show that the money was related to some illegal
drug transaction. Id. Both the district court and our Court evaluate
the evidence presented with a commonsense view to the realities
of normal life. $291,828.00, 536 F.3d at 1237; see $242,484.00,
389 F.3d at 1160. We have recognized that “[a] common sense re-
ality of everyday life is that legitimate businesses do not transport
large quantities of cash rubber-banded into bundles and stuffed in
packages in a backpack” because “there are better, safer means of
transporting cash if one is not trying to hide it from the authori-
ties.” $242,484.00, 389 F.3d at 1161.
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Once the government meets its burden, the burden shifts to
the claimant to prove by a preponderance of evidence either a de-
fense to the forfeiture or that the property is not otherwise subject
to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d); United States v. Cleckler, 270 F.3d
1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001). The claimant may satisfy its burden
either by refuting the government’s evidence or by producing evi-
dence that demonstrates the claimant is an innocent owner. 18
U.S.C. § 983(c), (d); Cleckler, 270 F.3d at 1334. The non-movant
must demonstrate that there is indeed an issue of material fact that
precludes summary judgment. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,
929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence
supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there
must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find
for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.
1990).
The government met its initial burden to show that the De-
fendant Currency (which was found in Hartley’s car during the traf-
fic stop) was related to illegal drug activity by offering Officer
Caillouet’s affidavit, Officer Ennis’s affidavit, and the surveillance
photographs, which, taken together, showed that Hartley was af-
filiated with Peters during the window in which Peters was en-
gaged in drug trafficking activities. Shortly before the officers saw
Hartley with Peters, the investigation by law enforcement had lo-
cated Peters’ tractor-trailer at a warehouse affiliated with the drug
distribution scheme being investigated. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1);
242,484.00, 389 F.3d at 1160. Caillouet stated that Hartley drove
Peters around and provided the tools with which he worked on the
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tractor-trailer used to move cocaine shortly before Peters’ arrest,
when he was found to be in possession of 13 kilograms of cocaine
in his tractor-trailer. And Ennis stated that the Defendant Currency
was packaged in a manner consistent with the proceeds of illegal
activities. In that vein, this Court has noted that “[a] common
sense reality of everyday life is that legitimate businesses do not
transport large quantities of cash rubber-banded into bundles and
stuffed in packages in a backpack.” See $242,484.00, 389 F.3d at 116.
Taken together, a commonsense view of this evidence supports the
conclusion that the Defendant Currency was related to drug traf-
ficking activity. See $291,828.00, 536 F.3d at 1237.
Hartley also failed to meet his burden to show that the De-
fendant Currency was not subject to forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. §
983(d); Cleckler, 270 F.3d 1331, 1334. First, as the government
notes, Hartley did not introduce any evidence of innocent owner-
ship of the Defendant Currency or propose any manner in which
he acquired it. He did not attest in his affidavit to a legitimate
source for the money. And at his deposition, he confirmed that his
annual income during the relevant period averaged around $50,000
from performing odd jobs but repeatedly evaded questioning as to
where the Defendant Currency came from, what it was for, and
why he was travelling with such a large amount of cash. In sum,
despite ample opportunity, Hartley did not offer evidence of, or
even truly allege, innocent ownership.
Nor did he offer even a scintilla of evidence, beyond his own
unsupported assertions in his briefs, to refute the government’s
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-13626
demonstration that the Defendant Currency was linked to illegal
activity. See Walker, 911 F.2d at 1577. In his deposition, he stated
only that the money “was nothing illegal.” While Hartley did chal-
lenge the validity of the narcotics detection dog alert below, the
district court explicitly found that even without considering the
alert, the government presented sufficient evidence of the Defend-
ant Currency’s link to illegal activity. So too, here, Hartley failed
to refute the other evidence put forth by the government.
Though Hartley attempts to refute the government’s evi-
dence by questioning various facts, such as the date and location of
Peters’ arrest, they are ultimately immaterial to the government’s
case, and therefore fail to refute the forfeitability of the Defendant
Currency. See Clark, 929 F.2d at 608. He does correctly state that
law enforcement did not observe him handling drugs, but as the
government did not allege that Hartley personally handled drugs
during the surveillance window, this statement does not refute the
government’s evidence supporting forfeiture. See Clark, 929 F.2d
at 608; Walker, 911 F.2d at 1577. Hartley argues that, if the govern-
ment reasonably believed the Defendant Currency was related to
illegal activity, it would have used the Defendant Currency as prob-
able cause to search Peters’ trailer. However, that argument does
not undermine the government’s evidence because Hartley offers
no evidence of the actual grounds upon which law enforcement
searched Peters’ trailer. In sum, Hartley’s several arguments and
his vague statement in his deposition that the Defendant Currency
was not obtained illegally are insufficient to defeat the govern-
ment’s demonstration that no genuine issue of material fact exists
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23-13626 Opinion of the Court 15
as to the forfeitability of the Defendant Currency. See Clark, 929
F.2d at 608. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding
that the government showed by a preponderance of the evidence
that the Defendant Currency was furnished or intended to be fur-
nished in exchange for a controlled substance, or proceeds derived
from such an exchange, and therefore subject to forfeiture. See 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1).
III. Notice of Forfeiture
After seizing property for administrative forfeiture, the gov-
ernment is required to provide notice by publication and to send
written notice to all interested parties. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1607(a). The publication requirement may be satisfied by pub-
lishing once each week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the judicial district where the property was
seized. 28 C.F.R. § 8.9(a)(1)(i). The personal written notice must
explain the date on which the notice was sent and the deadline for
filing a claim; the property seized and the date, statutory basis, and
place of the seizure; and the identity of the seizing agency and
where a claim may be filed. Id. § 8.9(b). The agency’s notice also
must meet the constitutional requirement of due process. Mesa
Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1196 (11th Cir. 2005). To
be constitutional, notice need only be “reasonably calculated, un-
der all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pen-
dency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” Id. at 1196-97 (quotation marks omitted). The gov-
ernment need not prove that it provided actual notice; it need only
show an attempt to provide actual notice. Id. at 1197.
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Upon motion by the government, a court may extend the
period for sending notice for up to 60 days, which may be further
extended by the court for 60-day periods, as necessary, if the court
determines, based on a written certification of a supervisory official
in the headquarters office of the seizing agency, that there is reason
to believe that notice may have an adverse result, including: endan-
gering the life or physical safety of an individual; flight from prose-
cution; destruction of or tampering with evidence; intimidation of
potential witnesses; or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investi-
gation or unduly delaying a trial. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(C), (D).
Once notified, one may choose to allow the forfeiture to
proceed administratively by doing nothing or compel the govern-
ment to initiate a judicial forfeiture action by filing a claim for the
property. See id. § 983(a)(2)(A), (3)(A). A claim must be made
within 35 days of the mailing of notice or, if the letter is not re-
ceived, within 30 days after the date of final publication of notice
of seizure. Id. § 983(a)(2)(B). After that deadline, there is a limited
mechanism for appealing a forfeiture:
Any person entitled to written notice in any nonjudi-
cial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture
statute who does not receive such notice may file a
motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture with re-
spect to that person’s interest in the property, which
motion shall be granted if—
(A) the Government knew, or reasonably should
have known, of the moving party’s interest and failed
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23-13626 Opinion of the Court 17
to take reasonable steps to provide such party with
notice; and
(B) the moving party did not know or have reason to
know of the seizure within sufficient time to file a
timely claim.
Id. § 983(e)(1). A motion under § 983(e) is the exclusive remedy for
seeking to set aside a forfeiture declaration under a civil forfeiture
statute. Id. § 983(e)(5); see also Mesa Valderrama, 417 F.3d at 1195.
As a protection against bad faith and misconduct, we have
discretion to exercise equitable jurisdiction if the claimant’s “failure
to properly seek legal relief resulted from errors of procedure and
form or the government’s own misconduct.” In re $67,470.00,
901 F.2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1990). However, our “decision to
invoke equitable jurisdiction is highly discretionary and must be
exercised with caution and restraint.” Id. at 1544. “Such jurisdic-
tion, therefore, is only appropriate in exceptional cases where eq-
uity demands intervention.” Id.
Here, the district court did not err in determining that there
was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the government
complied with the notice requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(C)
and (D) because the government properly sought and received ex-
tensions of the notice period, and Hartley failed to put forth evi-
dence to show that those extensions were fraudulent or otherwise
irregular. The district court also did not err in concluding that there
was no evidence the government acted with unclean hands, as the
extensions were not shown to be fraudulent or irregular.
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18 Opinion of the Court 23-13626
Moreover, the district court also noted that Hartley did receive ac-
tual notice and was able to pursue his claim, so Hartley was not
deprived of a remedy at law.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.