“Our review of the individual statutes within the CON Statute . . . indicates that this article grants applicants a full contested case hearing at which they are allowed to present testimony and evidence contained in their applications.” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- “Our review of the individual statutes within the CON Statute . . . indicates that this article grants applicants a full contested case hearing at which they are allowed to present testimony and evidence contained in their applications.” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA23-351
Filed 6 August 2024
Office of Administrative Hearings, No. 22 DHR 02685
DUKE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM INC., Petitioner,
v.
N.C. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF
HEALTH SERVICE REGULATION, HEALTH CARE PLANNING & CERTIFICATE
OF NEED SECTION, Respondent,
and
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HOSPITALS AT CHAPEL HILL AND
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, Respondent-
Intervenors.
Appeal by Petitioner from final decision entered on 9 December 2022 by
Administrative Law Judge Melissa Owens Lassiter in the Office of Administrative
Hearings. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 November 2023.
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, a Professional Corporation,
by Kenneth L. Burgess, Matthew A. Fisher, Iain M. Stauffer, and William F.
Maddrey, for petitioner-appellant.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Derek
L. Hunter, for respondent-appellee.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Noah H. Huffstetler, III, Candace
S. Friel, Lorin J. Lapidus, Nathaniel J. Pencook, and D. Martin Warf, for
respondent-intervenor.
MURPHY, Judge.
When an appellant challenges the substantive determinations of an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on appeal from a contested case hearing for a
DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
certificate of need, we review the decision for substantial evidence on the whole
record. However, where our statutes dictate the proper scope of administrative
review, the ALJ may not exceed that scope. Here, although we affirm the ALJ in
almost all respects, we must remand for further findings insofar as the final decision
granting the certificate of need relied upon a site other than that presented in the
respondent’s application.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner-Appellant Duke University Health System, Inc. (“Duke”) challenges
on appeal the 9 December 2022 final decision of the ALJ to uphold the conditional
approval of a certificate of need (“CON”) granted to Respondents-Intervenors-
Appellees University of North Carolina Hospitals at Chapel Hill and University of
North Carolina Health Care System (collectively “UNC”) by the North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services (the “Agency”).
Pursuant to N.C.G.S § 131E-183(a)(1) and chapters 5 and 6 of the 2021 State
Medical Facilities Plan (“SMFP”), the Agency determined the need to develop 40
acute care beds and four operating rooms for the Durham/Caswell County health
service areas. The “new acute care beds [and operating rooms] [could not] be
developed without a CON issued by the Agency.” On 15 April 2021, in response to
the need determinations of the SMFP, five applications to develop additional acute
care beds and operating rooms for the Durham County area were submitted to and
reviewed by the Agency. Applications were submitted by Duke and North Carolina
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
Specialty hospital/Southpoint Surgery Center, two Durham County health systems.
Additionally, UNC applied as a new provider in Durham County.
On 1 May 2021, the Agency independently reviewed all applications against
the statutory review criteria found in N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a)1 and the applicable
1 In pertinent part, N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a) provides:
(a) The Department shall review all applications utilizing the
criteria outlined in this subsection and shall determine that an
application is either consistent with or not in conflict with these
criteria before a certificate of need for the proposed project shall be
issued.
(1) The proposed project shall be consistent with applicable
policies and need determinations in the State Medical Facilities Plan,
the need determination of which constitutes a determinative limitation
on the provision of any health service, health service facility, health
service facility beds, dialysis stations, operating rooms, or home health
offices that may be approved.
.....
(3) The applicant shall identify the population to be served by
the proposed project, and shall demonstrate the need that this
population has for the services proposed, and the extent to which all
residents of the area, and, in particular, low income persons, racial and
ethnic minorities, women, handicapped persons, the elderly, and other
underserved groups are likely to have access to the services proposed.
....
(12) Applications involving construction shall demonstrate
that the cost, design, and means of construction proposed represent the
most reasonable alternative, and that the construction project will not
unduly increase the costs of providing health services by the person
proposing the construction project or the costs and charges to the public
of providing health services by other persons, and that applicable
energy saving features have been incorporated into the construction
plans.
N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a)(1), (3), (12) (2023).
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
regulatory review criteria found in 10A NCAC 14C. Southpoint Surgery Center
submitted an application to add four operation rooms based on the need
determination in the 2021 SMFP; UNC Hospitals submitted an application to develop
40 acute care beds and two operating rooms in the Research Triangle Park area.
Meanwhile, Duke submitted three applications: the first was to add 40 acute care
beds and two operating rooms to its existing Durham facility; the second was to
develop two operating rooms; and a final application sought to develop two more
operating rooms at its Ambulatory Surgery Center. The Agency found that
Southpoint Surgery Center failed to demonstrate financial feasibility and failed to
show that its application was not unnecessarily duplicative of existing or approved
services, among other criteria, while it found both Duke and UNCs applications
conforming to all the review criteria. As a result, the Agency denied Southpoint’s
CON application.
Since the need determination in the SMFP places limits on the number of acute
care beds that can be approved by the Agency—40 acute care beds and two other
operating rooms—accepting both the Duke and UNC applications would have
resulted in more acute care beds and operating rooms than the SMFP need
determination for Durham County allowed. The Agency therefore concluded that,
because the SMFP allowed for only 40 acute beds in the Durham County area,
granting Duke’s application would require the denial of UNC’s application and vice
versa. Pursuant to the review criteria under N.C.G.S. § 131E-183, the Agency
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
conducted a comparative analysis review of both Duke and UNC CON applications
for 40 acute care beds, as well as another for the two operating rooms.
On 21 September 2021, “[b]y decision and Required State Agency Findings[,]
the Agency (1) conditionally approved the UNC Hospitals-RTP Application; (2)
conditionally approved [Duke’s Ambulatory Surgery Center’s] Application [for two
additional operating rooms]; (3) denied [Duke’s] [two operating rooms] Application;
(4) denied [Duke’s acute care beds] Application; and (5) denied the Southpoint
Application [for two operating rooms].” By letter and Required State Agency
Findings dated 21 September 2021, the Agency informed Duke that its application
for 40 acute care beds and two operating rooms had been denied. Also on 21
September 2021, the Agency issued the Required State Agency Findings containing
the findings and conclusions upon which it based its decisions.
On 21 October 2021, Duke filed a petition for contested case hearing pursuant
to N.C.G.S § 150B-23 alleging that the Agency had erroneously approved the CON
application of UNC in which UNC sought to develop two operating rooms and 40
acute care beds in Durham County. On 10 November 2021, the OAH issued an order,
by consent of all parties, to grant UNC the right to intervene in the contested case
hearing. The ALJ issued a final decision in which it affirmed the Agency’s decision
finding UNC’s application to be comparatively superior to Duke’s application. Duke
appealed.
ANALYSIS
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
On appeal, Duke challenges the ALJ’s final decision on four distinct bases, all
of which, in substance, challenge the original determinations of the Agency and only
derivatively challenge the ALJ’s final decision insofar as it did not reverse the
Agency. The bases for its challenges on appeal are (A) that the ALJ incorrectly
affirmed the Agency’s determination that UNC’s application was superior to Duke’s
with respect to geographic accessibility; (B) that the ALJ incorrectly affirmed the
Agency’s determination that UNC’s application was superior to Duke’s on the basis
of competition; (C) that the ALJ incorrectly affirmed the Agency’s finding that UNC’s
application conformed with N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a)(3); and (D) the ALJ incorrectly
affirmed the Agency’s finding that UNC’s application conformed with N.C.G.S. §
131E-183(a)(12).
In reviewing the ALJ’s determinations, our standard of review is governed by
N.C.G.S. § 150B-51, which permits a party seeking judicial review to challenge an
ALJ’s final decision
if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency or administrative law judge;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under
[N.C.G.S. §] 150B-29(a), [N.C.G.S. §] 150B-30, or [N.C.G.S.
§] 150B-31 in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b) (2023). “With regard to asserted errors pursuant to
subdivisions (5) and (6) of subsection (b) of [N.C.G.S. § 150B-51], the court shall
conduct its review of the final decision using the whole record standard of review.”
N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(c) (2023).
“In applying the whole record test, the reviewing court is required to examine
all competent evidence in order to determine whether the [final] decision is supported
by substantial evidence.” Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., 235 N.C. App. 620, 622-23 (2014) (marks omitted), disc. rev. denied, 368
N.C. 242 (2015). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 623. “This test does
not allow the reviewing court to replace the [ALJ’s] judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a
different result had the matter been before it de novo.” Mills v. N. Carolina Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 251 N.C. App. 182, 189 (2016) (marks omitted).
A. Relative Geographic Accessibility
We first address whether the ALJ properly affirmed the Agency’s conclusions
as to geographic accessibility. Duke contends that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous
because the Agency had favorably evaluated the UNC application on the basis of
geographic accessibility despite being located in Research Triangle Park, a
nonresidential area of Durham, and had analyzed the geographic access factor in a
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
manner that lacked a coherent guiding principle and deviated from the methodology
of previous reviews. We disagree.
While analyzing the geographic access factor, the ALJ’s final decision
acknowledged many of the issues Duke raises before us and nonetheless affirmed the
Agency’s determination in favor of UNC:
420. The Agency utilized the comparative factor of
Geographic Accessibility in its comparative analysis of the
UNC and Duke Applications. (Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 1609, 1619).
421. In analyzing this comparative factor, the Agency
looked at where each applicant proposes to place the
proposed services. (Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1299). An application
placing the services at issue in a location where there are
not any such services is deemed the more effective
alternative under this factor. (Jt. Ex. 1, p. 253; Carter, Vol.
11, pp. 1874-75).
422. Ms. Sandlin opined that the Agency erred in its
analysis of this comparative factor as having geographic
dispersal of these need determined assets is not critical
because Durham has less land mass than other counties in
North Carolina. (Sandlin, Vol. 6, pp. 1058-67).
423. Mr. Meyer opined that this factor is important because
it is related to access, a foundational principle of the CON
Law. The CON Law seeks to avoid geographic
maldistribution of services, and North Carolina has a
“compelling interest in helping to ensure that all North
Carolinians have access to [. . .] healthcare services[.]”
(Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1299).
424. In the acute care beds review, the Agency noted there
were 1,388 existing and approved acute care beds in the
Durham/Caswell County service area, all of which are
located in the central area of Durham County, illustrated
by the following table:
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
Facility Total AC Address Location
Beds
Duke 1,048 2301 Central
University Erwin Rd, Durham
Hospital Durham County
27710
Duke 316 3643 N. Central
Regional Roxboro Durham
Hospital Rd, County
Durham
27704
North 24 3916 Ben Central
Carolina Franklin Durham
Specialty Blvd, County
Hospital Durham
27704
(Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1609; see also Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1300).
425. Similarly, in the ORs review, the Agency noted that
there were 93 existing and approved ORs in Durham
County, the vast majority of which were concentrated in
the central area of Durham County, illustrated by the
following table:
Facility Type Durham Total Address Location
SA OR ORs
System
NCSH Exiting NCSH 4 3916 Ben Central
Hospital Franklin Durham
Blvd, County
Durham
27704
DUH Exiting Duke 66 2301 Central
Hospital Erwin Rd, Durham
Durham County
27710
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
DRH Exiting Duke 13 3643 N. Central
Hospital Roxboro Durham
Rd, County
Durham
2704
DASC Existing Duke 4 2400 Pratt Central
ASF St, Durham
Durham County
2704
Arringdon Existing Duke 4 5601 South
ASF Arringdon Durham,
Park Dr, near I540
Morrisville at I40
27560
SSC Approved NCSH 2 7810 NC South
ASF Hwy 751, Durham,
Durham near Hwy
27713 147
UNC-RTP Proposed UNC 2 Parcels in South
Hospital [RTP] Durham,
27709 just
below I40
(Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1620).
426. For both the acute care beds and ORs comparative
analyses, the Agency determined that the UNC Application
was the more effective alternative, and Duke’s Applications
were the less effective alternatives for geographic
accessibility. (Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 1609, 1620; Hale, Vol. 1, p.
188).
427. UNC proposed placing the acute care beds in this
Review in the southern area of Durham County, where
there were no existing acute care beds, while Duke
proposed placing additional beds at DUH where there were
already over one thousand existing or approved acute care
beds. (Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1609; Hale, Vol. 1, p. 188). The Agency
also found UNC Hospitals-RTP, Duke Arringdon, and
Southpoint Surgery Center to be more effective because
10
DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
they “propose to develop ORs in South Durham County
where there are currently only six of 93 existing/approved
Durham County ORs[,]” as opposed to the Duke ORs
Application which proposed placing additional ORs at
DUH where there were already sixty-six existing and
approved ORs. (Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1620).
428. Mr. Meyer agreed with the Agency’s analysis of this
comparative factor. (Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1299-1300, 1330-
31). In the beds analysis, the existing facilities in Durham
are concentrated in the center of the county. (Jt. Ex. 97, p.
11; Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1301). Mr. Meyer analyzed the
locations of hospitals in certain populous counties in North
Carolina, including Wake, Mecklenburg, Guilford, and
Forsyth counties, all of which have hospitals in the
perimeter of the county and generally have good
geographic dispersal of hospitals. (Jt. Ex. 103; Meyer, Vol.
7, pp. 1302-1305). His analysis showed that compared to
these highly populated counties, Durham County as
another highly populated county, “does not have an acute
care hospital that’s located anywhere but in the center of
the county,” (Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1305).
429. Similarly, both Mr. Meyer and Mr. Carter observed
that both the UNC Application and the Duke Arringdon
application proposed to place ORs in south Durham
County, and both were deemed the more effective
alternative as to this comparative factor, which they agree
was the correct decision. (Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1330-31;
Carter, Vol. 11, pp. 1886-87).
430. While Durham County has relatively small land mass
compared to other counties, Durham County is the third
most densely populated county in the state, and such
density leads to traffic congestion that can make
geographic dispersion of healthcare facilities more
important. (Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1306-07, 1309-10).
431. Ms. Sandlin produced two maps showing different
amounts of population density in Durham County. In
Sandlin’s initial expert report, the map showing population
11
DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
density illustrated that UNC Hospitals-RTP would be
located in a densely-populated area of the county where
there are no existing hospitals. (Jt. Ex. 54, p. 12; Meyer,
Vol. 7, p. 1309). However, in Sandlin’s rebuttal report, the
map showing population density illustrated there is no
population in the zip code where UNC Hospitals-RTP
would be located, but still showed that the surrounding zip
codes are densely populated. (Jt. Ex. 212; Meyer, Vol. 7,
pp. 1307-09).[] [A footnote affixed to this finding in the
original text reads as follows: “Similarly, there is no
population in the zip code that comprises DUH. (Jt. Ex. 4,
p. 242; Sandlin, Vol. 7, p. 1201; Carter, Vol. 11, p. 1903).”]
432. Mr. Meyer opined that despite the lack of population
in UNC Hospitals-RTP’s zip code, UNC’s primary site is
easily accessible by “the largest, most significant traffic
arteries in that part of the county” such that residents in
densely-populated southern Durham County would have
easy access. (Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1308-09).
433. Mr. Carter likewise explained that the UNC
Application illustrated that UNC Hospitals-RTP is located
along prominent roadways in addition to being located near
the heavily populated southern Durham zip codes. (Carter,
Vol. 10, p. 1703; see also Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 51-58).
434. Ms. Sandlin also opined that UNC Hospitals-RTP is
not near a majority of Durham County zip codes and that
this does not improve geographic access for the majority of
the service area zip codes. (Sandlin, Vol. 6, p. 1061).
435. In contradiction, Mr. Meyer noted that it is more
important for a healthcare facility to be proximate to more
people, rather than more zip codes. (Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1310).
The zip codes in southern Durham County which are near
UNC Hospitals-RTP “comprise more than half of the
population of Durham County.” (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 55; Meyer,
Vol. 7, p. 1310; Sandlin, Vol. 7, pp. 1205-06).
12
DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
436. When looking at population rather than zip codes,
UNC Hospitals-RTP was proximate to over half of the
population of Durham County. (Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1311-12).
437. Mr. Carter added that UNC Hospitals-RTP’s primary
site is “on the border of RTP” and is “near where a lot of
people live.” (Carter, Vol. 11, pp. 1904-05). He further
opined that UNC Hospitals-RTP’s location being in the
southern region of Durham County improves access by
providing another option for those residents. While some of
those residents may still choose one of the existing
facilities, they have another option that may be closer to
where they live. (Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1733). Furthermore,
compared to DUH, UNC Hospitals-RTP would be easier to
find parking and navigate as a smaller facility. (Id. at pp.
1733-34).
438. The fact that DUH may be closer to some residents in
Caswell County and northern Durham County does not
change the Agency’s analysis that UNC Hospitals-RTP
enhances geographic accessibility. In Mr. Meyer’s opinion:
[R]esidents of northern Durham County are not going
to be disadvantaged by this proposal. They will
continue to have the same access to any of those
existing acute care hospitals that they do currently.
This doesn’t take away from their access.
(Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1313-14). Instead, UNC’s proposal
“enhances access for south Durham County residents,”
which is where the greatest need exists for these services
due to the population growth in that area. (Id. at p. 1314).
439. As a small hospital, “the intent is not to serve each
and every patient within Durham County,” because UNC
Hospitals-RTP does not “have the capacity to do that.”
(Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1703-04).
440. Ms. Sandlin testified that the Agency’s analysis of this
comparative factor was inconsistent with the way the
Agency analyzed it in prior reviews. (Sandlin, Vol. 6,
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
pp. 1045-46).
441. Mr. Meyer disagreed with Ms. Sandlin of the Agency’s
prior reviews. While he interpreted Ms. Sandlin’s
testimony as opining that the Agency needs to analyze
geographic accessibility based on municipalities, Mr.
Meyer noted that there is no rule requiring that. Moreover,
analyzing geographic accessibility based on municipalities
is impractical in Durham County, where there is only one
incorporated municipality, the City of Durham. (Meyer,
Vol. 7, pp. 1314-15). More importantly, the geographic
accessibility comparative factor should look at where
people live compared to the existing and proposed services.
(Id. at 1315-16).
442. Likewise, Mr. Carter disagreed with Ms. Sandlin. In
his opinion, the 2020 Forsyth Acute Care Beds Review
mentioned by Ms. Sandlin was an inapt comparison, where
the existing hospitals were more dispersed than the
existing facilities within Durham that are contained in a
five-mile radius. (Carter, Vol. 11, p. 1877)
443. Ms. Sandlin testified that UNC’s analysis splitting
Durham into different regions based on zip codes “seemed
manufactured and illogical.” (Sandlin, Vol. 6, p.
1017).
444. However, Ms. Sandlin’s testimony ignores the fact
that Duke itself, assisted by Keystone Planning while Ms.
Sandlin was still with that company, analyzed geographic
accessibility in this same “manufactured” manner in its
2018 application to develop the Duke Arringdon facility. In
its 2018 application, Duke described the same four zip
codes (27703, 27709, 27707 and 27713) as “South Durham”
that UNC described as south Durham in its application in
this Review. (Compare Jt. Ex. 106, p. 30 with Jt. Ex. 4, p.
54; see also Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1317-18; Sandlin, Vol. 6, pp.
1120-22).
445. Mr. Carter explained the process by which UNC
determined to split Durham County into regions and
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
concluded that UNC divided Durham County into three
regions by zip codes so it could analyze where in the county
a new hospital should be located, which the SMFP does not
discuss in any detail. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1704-06). Mr.
Carter further opined that not all patients within the City
of Durham were equally served by the existing hospitals
due to the lack of available facilities in southern Durham.
In other words, “there aren’t enough facilities to serve
residents in Durham County notwithstanding the fact that
the municipality of Durham may go well into the southern
part of the county.” (Id. at p. 1708).
446. Ultimately, Mr. Meyer agreed with the Agency’s
analysis of this comparative factor, describing it as “an
easy call for the Agency.” (Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1318).
447. Mr. Carter agreed that the Agency was correct in
determining the UNC was the more effective alternative,
and that it was consistent with other findings he has seen.
(Carter, Vol. 11, pp. 1874, 1886). Mr. Carter further opined
that he did not believe “the Agency’s analysis or
conclusions would have been any different if UNC had
proposed a different site really anywhere else in the county
that was not within five miles of another hospital.” (Id. at
p. 1877).
Reviewing the record for substantial evidence, see Surgical Care Affiliates, 235 N.C.
App. at 622-23, we affirm the ALJ’s decision with respect to this factor.
At the threshold, we note that Duke has primarily framed its arguments as
though our task on appeal were to review the determinations of the Agency rather
than the ALJ. However, this is incorrect. While the statute governing judicial review
of administrative decisions, N.C.G.S. § 150B-51, used to contemplate direct judicial
review of Agency determinations, revisions by our General Assembly in 2011 have
refocused our substantive review on the final decision of the ALJ:
15
DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
In 2011, the General Assembly amended the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), conferring upon
administrative law judges the authority to render final
decisions in challenges to agency actions, a power that had
previously been held by the agencies themselves. See 2011
N.C. Sess. Laws 1678, 1685-97, ch. 398, §§ 15-55. Prior to
the enactment of the 2011 amendments, an ALJ hearing a
contested case would issue a recommended decision to the
agency, and the agency would then issue a final decision.
In its final decision, the agency could adopt the ALJ’s
recommended decision in toto, reject certain portions of the
decision if it specifically set forth its reasons for doing so,
or reject the ALJ’s recommended decision in full if it was
clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. See
[N.C.G.S.] § 150B36, repealed by 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws
1678, 1687, ch. 398, § 20. As a result of the 2011
amendments, however, the ALJ’s decision is no longer a
recommendation to the agency but is instead the final
decision in the contested case. [N.C.G.S.] § 150B–34(a).
Under this new statutory framework, an ALJ must “make
a final decision . . . that contains findings of fact and
conclusions of law” and “decide the case based upon the
preponderance of the evidence, giving due regard to the
demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency with
respect to facts and inferences within the specialized
knowledge of the agency.” Id.
AH N.C. Owner LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 240 N.C. App. 92, 98-99
(2015). Thus, our review of substantive issues will be based on the ALJ’s final
decision.
Having established the proper scope of our review, we are entirely satisfied
that substantial evidence exists to support each of the arguments Duke raises on
appeal. While Duke argues that the ALJ’s decision was reversible insofar as it found
UNC’s application favorable on the basis of geographic access in a zip code with no
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
residents, the ALJ cited substantial evidence indicating that the immediately
adjacent zip codes are densely populated—to say nothing of the potential usage the
proposed location may receive from those who work, rather than reside, in the
proposed location of the UNC facility. As to UNC’s allegation that the Agency
deviated from its mode of analysis in previous reviews, rendering its decision
arbitrary and capricious, we cannot say a deviation without a more specific argument
as to why the analysis employed in this case was deficient that such an alleged
deviation constitutes reversible error, especially absent any directly binding law on
point to support such a proposition. The task before the Agency is multifaceted, and
the CON review process does not demand that it apply a fixed lens to every case,
especially where some considerations may be more salient in a given case than in
others. The ALJ’s findings and conclusions with respect to geographic access are
affirmed.
B. Relative Impact on Competition
Second, we address whether the ALJ properly affirmed the Agency’s
conclusions as to the Duke and UNC applications’ relative impact on competition.
Duke argues that the ALJ erroneously affirmed the Agency’s decision with respect to
this comparative factor because the Agency believed the comparative factor of
promoting market competition would always favor a new market entrant and because
the Agency failed to consider “quality, cost, and access” as part of the competition
factor. With these arguments, too, we disagree.
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While the ALJ’s final decision does discuss this factor, we note that Duke’s
stance on this issue takes the form of a broad methodological critique rather than an
allegation that a specific analytical error occurred, making reproduction of this
portion of the record unnecessary. To the extent this argument constitutes an
allegation of legal error, we apply the de novo, rather than whole record, standard of
review. N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(c) (2023) (“With regard to asserted errors pursuant to
subdivisions (1) through (4) of subsection (b) of this section, [subsection (b)(4)
referring to “other error[s] of law[,]”] the court shall conduct its review of the final
decision using the de novo standard of review.”).
At the threshold, we note once again that Duke’s arguments principally
concern the determinations of the Agency and not the ALJ. However, as the ALJ’s
final decision is the proper object of our review, see AH, 240 N.C. App. at 98-99, we
base our analysis primarily on that decision. Bearing that in mind, very few of the
issues raised by Duke on appeal directly apply to the ALJ’s final decision. The
alleged defect that the Agency believed the competition factor would always favor a
new market entrant—a view found neither in the Agency’s written decision nor the
final decision of the ALJ, but sourced to testimony by Agency employees before the
Office of Administrative Hearings—was not present in the reasoning of the ALJ, who
indicated a typical preference for a new market competitor rather than a categorical
one.
However, even if the ALJ’s view had been as categorical as the view Duke
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imputes to the Agency, this would hardly be a case where such reasoning would merit
reversal on appeal. Duke has not disputed the ALJ’s finding that, of the 1,388 acute
care beds in Durham County, only twenty are outside Duke’s control. Nor has Duke
otherwise presented us with any reason to believe UNC’s facility would present more
of a threat to competition for this service in Durham County than its own market
dominance.2 Rather, its arguments largely reduce to a contention that it could not
realistically “win” the competition factor. Barring radically extenuating
circumstances, we do not think an entity controlling more than 98% of a service
within a county should realistically expect to “win” when a neutral third party
considers whether a new market entrant would be the healthier choice for
competition. Cf. Craven Reg’l Med. Auth. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 176
N.C. App. 46, 57 (2006) (“[The petitioner]’s argument appears to be that if it operated
all three of the MRI scanners this would somehow foster competition rather than if a
competitor operated one of the MRI scanners. [The petitioner], in effect, argues that
giving it a monopoly in the service area would increase competition. We decline to
adopt this incongruous line of reasoning.”).
2 Duke points out that UNC, despite currently operating no acute care beds in Durham County,
is already a major medical provider in the greater triangle region, and it further contests the adequacy
of the ALJ’s analysis as to competition on this basis. While we recognize Duke’s concern insofar as a
regional oligopoly may be unhealthy for the state of market competition in the absolute sense, the
ALJ’s assessment of competition was relative, not absolute. Thus, we cannot say the ALJ erred in its
determination that, as between the two regionally dominant providers being considered in the
competitive application process, the one not currently operating acute care beds within Durham
County creates a more favorable impact on competition within the county than the one currently
wielding a near-monopoly for that service.
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Duke also argues that the failure to consider cost and quality of care within
the scope of the competition factor rendered its decision reversibly arbitrary. This
argument is meritless. Impact on the health of market competition is one of eleven
factors considered in the competitive CON review process, several others of which
account for cost and quality of care. We affirm the ALJ’s determinations as to relative
impact on competition.
C. UNC’s Compliance with Criterion 3
We next address whether the ALJ properly affirmed the Agency’s conclusions
as to UNC’s compliance with N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a)(3). N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a)(3),
or “Criterion 3,” provides that a certificate of need applicant
shall identify the population to be served by the proposed
project, and shall demonstrate the need that this
population has for the services proposed, and the extent to
which all residents of the area, and, in particular, low
income persons, racial and ethnic minorities, women,
handicapped persons, the elderly, and other underserved
groups are likely to have access to the services proposed.
N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a)(3) (2023). With respect to Criterion 3, Duke argues that
UNC’s application was insufficient because it relied on unrealistically low projections
for the number of out-of-county patients the proposed facility could be expected to
attract and because UNC’s application allegedly failed to account for the absence of
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high-acuity care at the proposed facility.3 As these arguments are derived from
factual disagreements with the Agency findings—which, in the ALJ review, were
supported by substantial evidence, see Surgical Care Affiliates, 235 N.C. App. at 622-
23—we affirm the ALJ.
In its final decision, the ALJ affirmed the Agency’s conclusion that UNC’s CON
application was in compliance with criterion 3, finding, in relevant part, as follows:
85. Criterion (3) requires the applicant to “identify the
population to be served by the proposed project” and to
“demonstrate the need that this population has for the
services proposed, and the extent to which all residents of
the area, and, in particular, low-income persons, racial and
ethnic minorities, women, handicapped persons, the
elderly, and other underserved groups are likely to have
access to the services proposed.” ([N.C.G.S.] § 131E-
183(a)(3); Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1502).
86. To find an applicant conforming with this Criterion, the
Agency engages in a four-part analysis: (1) the applicant
must identify the population to be served, also referred to
as the patient origin; (2) the applicant must demonstrate
the need of the identified population for the services
proposed; (3) the applicant must project the utilization of
these services by the identified population in the first three
operating years of the project; and (4) the applicant must
project the extent to which the projected population, and
particularly those in medically underserved groups, have
access to the proposed services. (Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1502; Hale,
Vol. 2, p. 224; see also Meyer, Vol. 5, p. 936). To be found
conforming, the information provided by the applicant
must be reasonable and adequately supported. (Hale, Vol.
3 Duke also argues that UNC’s alleged nonconformity with criterion 3 brings it out of
conformity with criteria 1, 4, 5, 6, and 18(a). However, because we determine below that Duke’s
arguments with respect to criterion 3 are without merit, we need not independently evaluate this
argument.
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2, pp. 223-24).
i. Patient Origin
87. The first element of Criterion (3) discusses patient
origin, which is where the applicant projects patients will
come from to utilize the proposed services. (Jt. Ex. 1, p.
1509; Hale, Vol. 2, p. 225). To analyze patient origin, the
Agency reviews the information provided by the applicant
and determines whether that information is reasonable
and adequately supported. (Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 225-26).
88. The UNC Application provided that the patient origin
for UNC Hospitals-RTP would include 90 percent Durham
County residents, with some in-migration from Wake,
Chatham, and Caswell Counties. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 43; Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1690-92).
89. To determine its projected patient origin, UNC
considered the limited size of the facility and the
overwhelming need in Durham County. While UNC could
have used a higher percentage of in-migration in its
projections, doing so would have been more aggressive,
especially given that a small hospital would be less likely
to attract patients from outside of the county. (Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1692-93).
90. Ms. Sandlin acknowledged that her opinions regarding
UNC’s projected patient origin, in-migration, and patient
population were not based on any Duke facilities of similar
size, since there are none. She also did not perform any
analysis of the patient origin of a hospital of similar size
developed by UNC in developing her opinions. (Sandlin,
Vol. 7, pp. 1165-66).
91. Daniel Carter, one of UNC’s expert witnesses, opined
that UNC’s 10 percent in-migration assumption was well-
supported, reasonable, and conservative. (Carter, Vol. 10,
pp. 1695-96). The UNC Application analyzed in-migration
at all 116 acute care hospitals in North Carolina to reach
its 10 percent in-migration assumption, and it also
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accounted for UNC Hospitals-RTP’s smaller size and
densely populated location. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 146-47; Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1693, 1695).
92. Mr. Carter analogized UNC Hospitals-RTP to UNC
Johnston Health in Clayton, a 50-bed community hospital
which is approximately the same distance from Wake
County as UNC Hospitals-RTP would be. At UNC
Johnston Health, there is approximately 9 percent in-
migration from Wake County despite its proximity.
(Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1693-94).
93. Mr. Carter also noted that had UNC proposed higher
in-migration, it would also have the effect of increasing
UNC Hospitals-RTP’s utilization and the financial
feasibility of the project, which would strengthen its
application for both Criteria (3) and (5). (Id. at p. 1693).
Furthermore, he noted that UNC could have supported an
assumption of 20 percent or even 30 percent in-migration
without going beyond its maximum utilization. (Id. at pp.
1694-95).
94. Based upon the information provided in the UNC
Application, the Agency determined that UNC adequately
identified the patient origin for the population it proposed
to serve. (Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1511; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 226-27).
ii. Demonstration of Need
95. The second element of Criterion (3) analyzes whether
the applicant demonstrates that the population proposed
to be served needs the proposed services. (Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1511;
Hale, Vol. 2, p. 231-32). To conduct its analysis of need, the
Agency reviews the information provided by the applicant
and assesses whether that information is reasonable and
adequately supported. (Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 231-32). This
differs from the need determination of Criterion (1), which
focuses on the need determination in the SMFP, rather
than the needs of patients for the proposed services.
96. UNC provided several reasons why the patients it
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proposed to serve at UNC Hospitals-RTP needed the
proposed services. The Agency determined that UNC’s
methodology and resulting projections were both
reasonable and adequately supported. (Sandlin, Vol. 7, p.
1214).
97. The first reason provided by UNC is the population
growth and aging in Durham County. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 48-
50). UNC noted that Durham County is the sixth most
populous county and the third fastest growing county in
North Carolina, with the growth rate expected to continue
into the next decade. (Id. at 48-49). This growth, combined
with the aging of the population, demonstrated that there
will be more patients needing acute care services. (Id. at
49-50; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1700-01).
98. The second reason provided by UNC is the need for a
new hospital in Durham County. As of the date the
applications were submitted, there were no acute care beds
in the southernmost zip codes in Durham County, where
most of the population and growth exists within the county.
(Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 51-55). The UNC Application contained the
following map illustrating the location of existing hospitals
in Durham County and the proposed UNC Hospitals-RTP
location:
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(Id. at 51; see also id. at 53; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1710-11).
99. Additionally, UNC demonstrated that its proposed
services were needed because (1) there has not been a new
hospital opened in Durham County in over 45 years and (2)
Durham County lacks a full-service community hospital.
(Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 51-52).
100. The UNC Application included a table which
displayed UNC’s existing market share of certain zip codes
within Durham County. This table showed that UNC
already has a strong market presence in southern Durham
County (including zip codes 27703, 27713, 27707, 27709)
despite not having any facilities there. (Id. at 54; Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1711-12).
101. The UNC Application also included a table which
displayed the historical population growth by region and
zip code within Durham County. This table showed that a
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majority of the Durham County population lives in the
southern zip codes. As of 2020, 165,824 out of 326,262
people live in the southern zip codes. In addition, those
southern zip codes are the fastest growing zip codes with a
compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”) of 2.4% between
2015 and 2020 and expected CAGR of 1.9% between 2020
and 2025. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 55).
102. In further support of the need for a community
hospital in southern Durham County, UNC described the
development of roadways and businesses in southern
Durham County to emphasize the “sustained growth and
development” of southern Durham County that supports
the need for UNC Hospitals-RTP. (Id. at pp. 56-58; Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1713-14).
103. While the SMFP never states that there is a need for
any hospital, the fact that there is a need for both beds and
ORs in the same area offers the potential for a new
hospital. Combined with the need for low acuity services
in southern Durham County, there is a need for a
community hospital in Durham County. (Carter, Vol. 10,
pp. 1696-98).
104. UNC examined the entire Durham/Caswell service
area when deciding where to locate its hospital. UNC
determined that Caswell County was not an ideal location
for a hospital due to its relative lack of population and
determined that southern Durham County was ideal based
on the need in those densely populated zip codes that
lacked a hospital. (Id. at pp. 1699-702; Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 50-55).
105. A third reason provided by UNC is the need for UNC
Hospitals hospital-based services in Durham County. A
significant number of patients from Durham County use
UNC Health facilities and developing a community
hospital closer to them would meet their needs for higher
frequency, lower acuity services. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 58-60;
Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1714-15).
106. UNC already has physicians in Durham County that
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are part of UNC Health. UNC is focused on meeting the
physician needs in the area and would recruit physicians
to meet those needs. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1715-16; see also
Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 58-59, 382-511). Moreover, UNC Hospitals-
RTP would have the same provider number as UNC
Hospitals, so the same medical staff that performs surgery
in Chapel Hill could do so at UNC Hospitals-RTP. (Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1716-17; see also Jt. Ex. 4, p. 152; Hadar
consistent testimony at Vol. 8, pp. 1464-65).
107. UNC already serves a large number of Durham
County residents even without having a hospital in
Durham County. Moreover, around one-half of patients in
a hospital may not need surgery, and the hospitalists that
would provide those services at UNC Hospitals could also
provide those services at UNC Hospitals-RTP. (Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1718-19).
108. The UNC Application further supported the need for
UNC Hospitals services in Durham County by describing
how UNC Hospitals-RTP “represents an exciting
opportunity to develop a new hospital facility with
innovation as a central design tenet.” (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 59). Mr.
Carter explained that UNC felt that this opportunity to
build a new hospital in Durham County, which had not
presented itself for over 40 years, would allow UNC to
provide care in a more modern, unique, and innovative
way, as it described doing at its other facilities. (Carter,
Vol. 10, p. 1720; Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 58-61).
109. The UNC Application provided examples of its “long
history of embracing innovation to deliver the highest
quality care with the best patient experience.” (Jt. Ex. 4,
pp. 60-61). In developing this application, administrators
of REX Holly Springs and Johnston Health Clayton
provided input of lessons learned from the development of
these relatively new hospitals that could be incorporated
into the development of UNC Hospitals-RTP. (Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1721-23; Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 60-61).
110. As a fourth supporting reason, UNC explained that
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UNC Hospitals-RTP meets the need for acute care beds by
providing lower acuity community hospital beds in
particular, as it projected that convenient, local access to
community hospital services was the primary driver of
need for additional acute care beds in the service area. (Jt.
Ex. 4, pp. 62-69; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1723-30).
111. UNC identified certain lower acuity, high volume
services as “selected services,” and then analyzed Truven
data to illustrate how, “despite the growth at existing
tertiary and quaternary facilities in Durham, the basis of
this growth was the need for lower acuity, community
hospital services.” (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 65; Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1726).
112. UNC demonstrated that of the existing hospitals in
Durham County, Duke Regional is the fastest growing. (Jt.
Ex. 4, p. 64; Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1727). UNC then showed
that the selected services were experiencing greater growth
than other services in the existing Durham hospitals as a
whole, and at DUH and Duke Regional in particular. (Jt.
Ex. 4, p. 65; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1727-29).
113. UNC further demonstrated that south Durham
County residents are seeking lower acuity services more
than the central and north regions of Durham County, with
over 94 patients daily seeking lower acuity services at
existing hospitals. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 66; Carter, Vol. 10, pp.
1731-33).
114. The UNC Application showed that UNC currently
provides the most days of care and experiences the greatest
growth for Durham County residents out of all other
hospitals except for Duke facilities, and that out of those
patients, the highest volume originates from the south
region of Durham County. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 68-69; Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1734-36).
115. The UNC Application further showed that UNC
Hospitals-RTP meets the need for ORs by providing
additional hospital-based ORs, which are well-utilized and
provide flexibility and capacity not otherwise available
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when those ORs are placed in an ambulatory surgical
facility. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 69-71). Notably, UNC pointed out
that while inpatient surgeries have grown at a slower rate
than outpatient surgeries statewide, that trend is the
opposite in Durham County. (Id. at pp. 69-70; Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1736-37). UNC also indicated that there has been
significant growth in outpatient ORs at ASCs, but that
hospital-based ORs would provide the flexibility to meet
the need for inpatient surgeries while still allowing for
outpatient surgeries to be performed as well. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp.
70-71; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1737-38).
116. UNC also supported the need for other services at
UNC Hospitals-RTP, including observation beds,
procedure rooms, C-Section rooms, imaging, laboratory,
and other services, which are needed to support the
patients to be seen at UNC Hospitals-RTP. (Jt. Ex. 4, p.
71; Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1738).
117. Based on the information UNC provided, the Agency
found UNC’s analysis of need to be reasonable and
adequately supported. (Jt. Ex. 1, []p. 1512; Hale, Vol. 2, pp.
232-34).
....
iii. Projected Utilization
125. The third element of Criterion (3) evaluates the
reasonableness and adequacy of the support for the
applicant’s projected utilization. (Hale, Vol. 2, p. 235).
126. The Agency does not require applicants to use
particular assumptions or methodologies to develop their
utilization projections; instead, the assumptions and
methodology used by each applicant must be reasonable
and adequately supported. (Cummer, Vol. 4, p. 670;
Sandlin, Vol. 6, pp. 1115-16).
127. Ms. Sandlin acknowledged that projected utilization
at a facility may not necessarily line up with an applicant’s
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actual experience for various reasons. (Sandlin, Vol. 7, pp.
1193-94).
128. The need methodology and projected utilization for the
UNC Application were contained in Form C Utilization –
Assumptions and Methodology in Section Q of the
application. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 141-60). UNC projected
utilization for the acute care services, surgical services, and
ancillary and support services proposed in its application.
(Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 1512-20; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 236-39).
129. UNC used Truven data as the basis for its utilization
projections, which both the Agency witness and expert
witnesses agreed is frequently utilized by applicants and is
a reliable source of data. (Hale, Tr. pp. 237-38; Meyer, Vol.
5, pp. 941-43; Carter, Vol. 11, pp. 1953-55).
130. At the hearing, Mr. Carter explained in detail the
assumptions and methodologies used in the UNC
Application. The UNC Application began by describing the
service area and emphasizing the focus on Durham
County, which “sets the stage for” UNC’s focus on Durham
County in the methodology. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 141-42; Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1739-40).
a. Selected Services
131. The UNC Application next discussed acute care bed
utilization, looking first to all days of care for Durham
County residents statewide. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 142; Carter, Vol.
10, p. 1740). Mr. Carter notes that while many
methodologies look no further than this, the UNC
Application took the extra step of identifying certain high
acuity services that it would exclude from the potential
days of care to be provided at UNC Hospitals-RTP, as UNC
did not propose to provide high acuity, tertiary and
quaternary services at UNC Hospitals-RTP. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp.
142-43; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1740-41).
132. The remaining services utilized by UNC were called
the Selected Services. (See Jt. Ex. 4, p. 143).
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133. The decision to exclude certain services was the
product of discussions within UNC and the expertise of Mr.
Carter. Certain services like cardiac catheterization were
excluded because there was no need for a cardiac
catheterization unit in the SMFP; other services like
neurosurgery could have been included, but given that
UNC Hospitals is located nearby, it made sense not to
duplicate those services. Moreover, given that UNC
Hospitals-RTP is proposed to be a community hospital,
UNC prioritized lower-acuity, high-frequency, high-
volume cases. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1744-45).
134. UNC decided not to include ICU services at UNC
Hospitals-RTP in part based on its recent experience
developing community hospitals in Wake and Johnston
Counties. Through those facilities, UNC learned that it did
not make sense to develop ICU units due to the low volume
of patients needing those services compared to the
resource-intensive staffing that is required for those beds.
(Id. at pp. 1763-65).
135. As explained in the UNC Application, the rooms at
UNC Hospitals-RTP were designed to be flexible spaces
that would be built to standards such that they could
provide ICU-level care as needed. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 38). If UNC
Hospitals-RTP learns as it begins operating that more ICU
beds are needed, it could decide to make those beds
permanent ICU beds, which would not require any
additional construction or renovation, or any CON
approval. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1761-62, 1765).
136. UNC accomplished the exclusion of high acuity
services from its analysis by removing diagnosis related
groups (“DRGs”) associated with the excluded high acuity
services from the dataset. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1741-42,
Vol. 11, pp. 1897-98). The exclusion of these services
resulted in a 31.1 percent reduction in 2019 days of care for
Durham County residents. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 143; Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1742-44).
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137. While the Agency does not require applicants to
exclude services in its methodology, UNC chose to do so to
underscore the conservativeness of its projections and to
reiterate UNC’s intention not to develop a quaternary
academic medical center in Durham County. (Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1742-43).
138. Ms. Sandlin did not conduct any analysis utilizing
DRG weights to determine the reasonableness of UNC’s
projections. (Sandlin, Vol. 7, p. 1222; Carter, Vol. 10, pp.
1767-68). She also opined that there is no specific cutoff or
threshold for DRG weights that are associated with ICU
level of care. (Sandlin, Vol. 7, p. 1223).
139. Mr. Carter likewise opined that there is no bright-line
rule for a DRG weight for ICU services. (Carter, Vol. 10,
pp. 1756-58).
140. Mr. Carter even analyzed the data UNC relied upon
in its analysis and discovered that had UNC applied a
bright-line rule excluding DRG weights of over 3.5, only
approximately ten percent of the patient days of care for
UNC Hospitals-RTP were over that threshold. (Id. at pp.
1759-61).
141. Moreover, those patients without exception had a
comorbid condition or major complication that led their
condition to progress beyond a 3.5 DRG weight. In those
cases, if UNC Hospitals-RTP could not provide the higher
level of care needed, they could be transferred to an
appropriate facility. (Id. at pp. 1760-61).
142. Ultimately, even if there were ICU patients that were
not excluded from UNC Hospitals-RTP’s selected services
patients, the projections in the UNC Application would not
be impacted. (Id. at p. 1762).
143. Ms. Sandlin created and utilized a Venn diagram as a
demonstrative exhibit to show the alleged overlap between
UNC’s selected services, ICU, post-ICU, and pediatric
patients. (Duke Ex. 227). On cross-examination, however,
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Ms. Sandlin admitted that she did not know what
percentage each of the “bubbles” or “circles” on her diagram
represented for each service and that her exhibit was not
drawn to scale. (Sandlin, Vol. 7, pp. 1218-20). Ms. Sandlin
further acknowledged that she did not quantify the
numbers or percentage of patients that the diagram was
intended to represent. (Sandlin, Vol. 7, p. 1220; Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1765-67).
144. Regardless of the exclusion of certain high acuity
services, UNC Hospitals-RTP will be able to stabilize high
acuity patients in an emergency in need of tertiary or
quaternary care and transfer them to another hospital that
can treat their condition, as it does at its other community
hospitals in the greater Triangle area. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp.
1745-46; Hadar, Vol. 8, p. 1454).
b. Methodology
145. Next, UNC projected potential days of care for the
selected services in Medicine, Surgery, and Obstetrics
through 2029, which is the third project year, using a
CAGR based on historical growth rate for those services.
(Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 143-44; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1746-47). Duke,
in its expert testimony, did not criticize UNC’s growth
rates or methodology included on page 144 of the UNC
Application. Mr. Carter opined the growth rates and
methodology to be reasonable based on the historical
growth rates for Durham County. (Carter, Vol. 10, p.
1747). UNC then showed the potential days of care for
Durham County residents for the first three fiscal years of
the project. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 144; Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1747).
146. After that, UNC discussed its market share
assumptions for UNC Hospitals-RTP, which is typically
analyzed for any new healthcare facility that needs to
project a volume of services to be provided. (Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1747-48). Since UNC already treats many Durham
County patients at its existing facilities outside of Durham
County, UNC conservatively projected that UNC
Hospitals-RTP would serve three-fourths of UNC’s existing
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Opinion of the Court
market share of Durham County residents. (Jt. Ex. 4, p.
145; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1748-50). In the third full project
year, this results in a 7.7 percent market share of Durham
County patient days for the selected services, leaving 92.3
percent of Durham County patient days to be treated at
any other facility in the state. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1750-
52).
147. After isolating Durham County and narrowing down
days of care based on selected services and UNC’s market
share of Durham County patient days, UNC was then able
to project the patient days by service for Durham County
residents, yielding an average daily census (“ADC”) of 26.5
patients in the third project year. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 146; Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1768-69).
148. The next part of the methodology in the UNC
Application demonstrated why the 26.5 ADC was
reasonable. UNC noted that its 2019 ADC for Durham
County residents for selected services at its existing
facilities was 24.4. This highlighted how reasonable and
conservative it is to project that UNC Hospitals-RTP would
serve only about two more patients per day than UNC
currently serves, after UNC Hospitals-RTP is open and
operational. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 146; Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1769).
UNC also provided more information about its in-
migration assumptions. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 146-47; Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1769-70).
149. UNC further highlighted the conservativeness of its
methodology by noting that the amount of patients UNC
Hospitals-RTP projects to serve is only part of the projected
growth of Durham County residents over the next ten
years. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 148; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1770-71). In
comparison, the Duke Beds Application proposed to
increase patient days by roughly 40,000 in less than ten
years. (Jt. Ex. 2, p. 95; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1771-72). Based
on this observation, Mr. Carter opined that it was not
unreasonable for the UNC Application to project to reach
10,700 patient days over a ten-year period of time,
especially since UNC already had more patient days for
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Opinion of the Court
these lower acuity services at hospitals outside of Durham
County. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1772-73).
150. In its Comments, Duke claimed that UNC relied on a
shift in volume to support its projections. (Jt. Ex. 1, pp.
176-78; Sandlin, Vol. 6, p. 990). UNC responded, however,
that this claim was incorrect, because UNC was taking a
portion of the new growth in patient days in Durham
County. (Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 309-12; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1773-
75). Regardless, Ms. Sandlin acknowledged that it is
reasonable in theory to assume that developing a facility in
an area where patients live will cause the existing market
share for that provider to increase. (Sandlin, Vol. 6, pp.
1115-16).[4]
151. Ms. Sandlin testified that UNC’s projections were
unreasonable because the patients that UNC currently
treats are going to UNC Hospitals for specialty services.
(Id. at pp. 994-96). Mr. Carter refuted Ms. Sandlin’s
testimony, opining that Ms. Sandlin ignored UNC’s
exclusion of high acuity patients in its methodology.
(Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1775-76). Moreover, Ms. Sandlin
acknowledged that she had not done any analysis of the
acuity level of services provided to Durham County
patients currently seeking care at UNC. (Sandlin, Vol. 7,
pp. 1159-60).
152. UNC also projected emergency department (“ED”)
utilization in its assumptions and methodologies. (Jt. Ex.
4, pp. 149-51; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1776-77). A hospital is
required to have an emergency department in North
Carolina, though there are no statutes or rules that apply
to emergency department projections. (Sandlin, Vol. 7, p.
1215; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1778-79).
4 At several points in its final decision—most notably, findings 150 and 155—the ALJ used
language that signaled the existence of conflicts in the evidence without explicitly clarifying which
testimony it deemed more credible. While these areas of the final decision were not specifically
challenged on the basis of indecisive wording, we note that, in other areas of our caselaw, a gesture to
conflicts in the evidence without an explicit resolution by the factfinder may support a challenge on
appeal to the finding in question. We therefore note that the better practice for a factfinder is to
explicitly, rather than implicitly, signal how it resolves conflicts in evidence.
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153. UNC’s ED utilization projections were not based solely
on ED admissions in Durham County; rather, it analyzed
all ED admissions of Durham County residents receiving
care throughout the state. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 150; Carter, Vol.
10, pp. 1777-78). As Mr. Carter opined, even if the ED
utilization projection methodology was wrong, as a
hospital, UNC Hospitals-RTP is required to include an ED,
and there is no standard the Agency applies to ED
utilization that would cause the UNC Application to not be
approvable. (Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1778-79).
154. UNC began projecting OR utilization by assuming
that each surgical inpatient is one surgical inpatient case.
(Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 155-56; Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1779). UNC then
analyzed projected outpatient cases and concluded that
there would be 1.5 outpatient surgeries for every inpatient
surgery. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 155; Carter, Vol. 10, pp. 1779-80).
155. Although Duke’s expert witness testified that UNC’s
OR utilization projections were unreasonable because its
acute care beds projections were unreasonable, both of
UNC’s expert witnesses refuted this testimony. Mr. Carter
opined that UNC’s OR utilization projections were
conservative. The projections showed that some of the
surgical cases would need to be performed in procedure
rooms based on the relatively small capacity of 2 ORs in
UNC’s proposal. (Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1781). Mr. Meyer
opined that UNC’s projections were reasonable, and
conservative based on his experience in healthcare
planning. (Meyer, Vol. 5, pp. 943-44).
156. UNC similarly projected utilization for imaging and
ancillary services, observation beds, procedure rooms, and
LDR and C-Section rooms. (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 151-55, 159-60).
157. Based on the information provided by UNC, the
Agency found UNC’s projected utilization to be reasonable
and adequately supported, because UNC:
(1) used publicly available data to determine Durham
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Opinion of the Court
County residents’ potential days of care for UNC
Hospitals-RTP’s projected services,
(2) used an historical 2-yr compound annual growth
rate (“CAGR”) to project days of care going forward,
and
(3) based its projected surgical, obstetrics, emergency,
imaging/ancillary, and observation bed services on
historical Truven data for Durham County residents,
relevant historical UNC Hillsborough experience, or
UNC Health services for Durham County residents.
(Jt. Ex. 1, p. 1520; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 239-40).
158. The Agency also found UNC’s projection that 90
percent of its patient population would come from Durham
County to be reasonable because the southern part of
Durham County was highly populated, and any nearby
Wake County residents have a number of healthcare and
hospital choices in Wake County. (Hale, Vol. 2, p. 317).
In light of these findings, the ALJ made the following conclusions of law:
45. To conform with Criterion (3), an applicant’s projected
patient origin, demonstration of need, and projected
utilization must be reasonable and adequately
supported.
46. The Agency correctly determined that UNC’s projected
patient origin for UNC Hospitals-RTP, including 90
percent Durham County residents and its conservative 10
percent in-migration assumption, was reasonable and
adequately supported.
47. The Agency also correctly determined that UNC’s
demonstration of need for UNC Hospitals-RTP based on
the population growth and aging of the population in
Durham County, the need for a new hospital in Durham
County (particularly the southern area), the need for UNC-
Hospitals’ hospital-based services in Durham County, and
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Opinion of the Court
the need for acute care beds (especially community hospital
beds) and ORs in Durham County, was reasonable and
adequately supported.
48. The Agency further correctly determined that UNC’s
projected utilization for all service components at UNC
Hospitals-RTP was reasonable and adequately supported.
49. Substantial evidence in the record of this case supports
the Agency’s determination that the UNC Application was
conforming with Criterion (3).
As reproduced above, these findings and conclusions demonstrate that the ALJ
extensively considered UNC’s proposal with respect to the service of in-county
patients. While we will not belabor the issue by reciting the support for each of the
more than eighty findings by the ALJ pertaining to Criterion 3 generally, we
specifically note that the alleged underprediction of patient days provided by UNC’s
proposed facility in light of the absence of high-acuity services—one of the primary
issues raised by Duke in this appeal—was considered and rejected at finding 151, et
seq. This finding was supported by testimony in the record indicating that, despite
Duke’s expert having opined that UNC overestimated its patient day projections at
the new facility, UNC’s projection methodology specifically accounted for the absence
of high-acuity services at the new facility—a projected patient reduction of 31 percent.
Similarly, Duke’s argument on appeal that the UNC application unrealistically
projected the number of patients originating from Durham County to be served was
also addressed and rejected by the ALJ on the basis that UNC statistically grounded
its claims about the relative need for the facilities in Durham County and in-
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Opinion of the Court
migration rates at comparable UNC facilities, with the ALJ consistently noting that
UNC conservatively projected its Durham-resident patient volume to account for
such considerations. These findings, too, were supported by testimony on the record.
Despite this evidentiary support in the ALJ’s final decision, Duke asks us to
overturn the result below on the basis of alleged failures in the reasoning of the
Agency. However, our task on appeal is not to evaluate the reasoning of the Agency,
but the reasoning of the ALJ. Compare N.C.G.S. § 150B-51 (2023) (governing appeals
from the Office of Administrative Hearings to the Court of Appeals) with N.C.G.S. §
150B-23 (2023) (governing appeals from the Agency to the Office of Administrative
Hearings); see also AH, 240 N.C. App. at 98. Where the reasoning of the ALJ is
supported by substantial evidence, we will not overturn the ALJ’s final decision
simply because the ALJ weighed the evidence in a manner unfavorable to the
appellant, Mills, 251 N.C. App. at 189; and, here, the ALJ’s decision was amply
supported. We will not, therefore, overturn its determination that UNC’s application
conformed with Criterion 3.
D. UNC’s Compliance with Criterion 12
Finally, we address whether the ALJ properly affirmed the Agency’s
conclusions as to UNC’s compliance with N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a)(3). N.C.G.S. § 131E-
183(a)(12), or “Criterion 12,” provides that a certificate of need applicant
shall demonstrate that the cost, design, and means of
construction proposed represent the most reasonable
alternative, and that the construction project will not
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
unduly increase the costs of providing health services by
the person proposing the construction project or the costs
and charges to the public of providing health services by
other persons, and that applicable energy saving features
have been incorporated into the construction plans.
N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a)(12) (2023). Duke argues that UNC’s proposal was
nonconforming with Criterion 12 in that the hospital’s primary proposed location in
RTP was subject to restrictive covenants not accounted for in the application, while
the alternate proposed site occupies a property that straddles proposed expansion of
a highway and is otherwise limited by power lines, a public greenway trail, and water
hazards.
In its final decision, the ALJ affirmed the Agency’s conclusion that UNC’s CON
application was in compliance with Criterion 12, making the following findings of
fact:
200. Analysis of this Criterion contains three elements: (1)
whether the cost, design, and means of construction
proposed represent the most reasonable alternative; (2)
whether the construction project will not unduly increase
the cost of providing health services by the person
proposing the project; and (3) whether energy-saving
features have been incorporated into the construction
plans. (Id.; Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1271-72).
201. The UNC Application satisfied the first element by (1)
providing drawings of its site plan and floor plan in Exhibit
C.1 and (2) explaining that the proposed construction and
layout for the hospital was based on a “configuration that
provides the most efficient circulation and throughput for
patients and caregivers,” based on “best practice
methodologies,” as well as “relationships and adjacencies
to support functions while also preventing unnecessary
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Opinion of the Court
costs.” (Jt. Ex. 4, pp. 112-13, 233-39; Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1273).
202. UNC satisfied the second element of Criterion (12) by
explaining that while the UNC Hospitals-RTP project
would be capital intensive, UNC set aside excess revenues
to fund the project, such that the project could be completed
without increasing costs or charges to the public to help
fund it. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 113). UNC provided a letter from the
Chief Financial Officer of UNC Hospitals certifying the
availability of accumulated cash reserves to fund the
project. (Id. at p. 292; Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1273-74).
203. Finally, UNC satisfied the third element of Criterion
(12) by showing that its proposed hospital would be energy
efficient and conserve water, and that UNC would develop
and implement an Energy Efficiency and Sustainability
Plan. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 113; Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1274).
i. Zoning of UNC’s Primary Site
204. Because a CON is “valid only for the . . . physical
location . . . named in the application,” applicants also are
required to identify a proposed site for a new facility. (N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 131E-181(a); Jt. Ex. 4, p. 114; Meyer, Vol. 7,
pp. 1272, 1282). The applicant should specify an address,
a parcel number, or intersection of roads. (Meyer, Vol. 7,
p. 1272).
205. The primary site for UNC Hospitals-RTP identified in
the UNC Application is located in southern Durham
County in the Research Triangle Park (“RTP”) at the
convergence of North Carolina Highway 54 and North
Carolina Highway 147, also known as the Triangle
Expressway. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 114). At the time of the filing of
the UNC Application, the property, also known as the
Highwoods Site, was owned by Highwoods Realty Limited
Partnership (“Highwoods”). (Id. at 115). UNC provided a
Letter of Intent for UNC Health to purchase the property
from Highwoods along with its application. (Id.at 517-23).
206. The CON Law does not regulate or even mention
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Opinion of the Court
zoning. (Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1281). Nonetheless, Section 4(c)
of Criterion (12) in the Agency’s application form is entitled
“Zoning and Special Use Permits.” (Hale, Vol. 2, p. 244).
This Section requires an applicant to first describe the
current zoning at the proposed site, and then, “[i]f the
proposed site will require rezoning, describe how the
applicant anticipates having it rezoned[.]” (Jt. Ex. 4, p.
115; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 266-67).
207. The Agency contemplates that a proposed site for a
project may not be properly zoned for the proposed project
at the time the application is submitted, by asking
applicants the questions posed in Section 4(c). (Hale, Vol.
2, pp. 246, 267).
208. The fact that a site identified in an application may
need rezoning does not make an application nonconforming
with Criterion (12) or non-approvable. (Id. at p. 267;
Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1281-82, Vol. 8, p. 1398). The Agency
frequently approves applications that propose projects to
be developed on sites that require rezoning before they can
be used to develop the proposed services. (Hale, Vol. 2, p.
246; Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1277-78). In Mr. Meyer’s 25 years
of healthcare planning experience, he cannot recall a time
when the Agency denied an application due to the fact that
a site needed to be rezoned. (Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1278).
209. Moreover, the Agency is tasked with applying the
CON Law and related rules, not with considering an
applicant’s compliance with other laws like zoning
ordinances. Therefore, the Agency does not review
applicable zoning laws or restrictive covenants when it
reviews an application. (Hale, Vol. 2, p. 266; see also
Craven Reg’l Med. Auth. [v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 176 N.C. App. 46, 57-58 (2006)]).
210. Rezoning of sites identified in CON applications
typically does not occur until after a CON has been
awarded. (Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1277).
211. According to the UNC Application, UNC’s primary
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Opinion of the Court
proposed site “will require rezoning.” UNC noted that it
anticipated having the property rezoned:
The proposed site is located in Research Triangle
Park across the street from the Research Triangle
Foundations Frontier and HUB RTP developments
that have an SRP-C zoning designation. UNC
Hospitals currently is working with land use counsel,
the property owner, and Research Triangle
Foundation management to have the property
rezoned to permit hospital use. With the guidance of
land use counsel, UNC Hospitals will engage with
Durham Planning staff, the Durham Planning
Commission, and the Durham Board of County
Commissioners to complete the rezoning process.
Additionally, UNC Hospitals will, with the
cooperation of the Research Triangle Foundation,
work with the Research Triangle Park Owners and
Tenants Association (O&T) to amend the Research
Triangle Park Covenants, Restrictions, and
Reservations by resolution to permit hospital use. . .
..
(Jt. Ex. 4, p. 115; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 268-69).
212. Applicants are not required to submit letters of
support with their CON application; however, it is common
for CON applicants to do so. (Hale, Vol. 2, p. 260; Carter,
Vol. 10, pp. 1790-91). The UNC Application included a
letter of support from Scott Levitan, CEO of the Research
Triangle Foundation (“RTF”). (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 512). Mr.
Levitan’s letter indicated that the RTF supported the UNC
Application; however, it did not make any reference to the
property being rezoned or restrictive covenants being
amended. (Id.; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 280-82).
213. UNC was not required to submit the letter of support
from Mr. Levitan or anyone else on behalf of RTF to be
approvable. (Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 280-81; Carter, Vol. 10, p.
1791).
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
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ii. UNC’s Primary Site in the Research Triangle Park
214. The RTP is an approximately 7000-acre university
research park located in Durham and Wake Counties, with
5,600 acres, or 80 percent, located in Durham County.
(Levitan, Vol. 5, pp. 774, 799-800). There are currently no
people living in the RTP. (Id. at 897).
215. Scott Levitan is the President and CEO of the
Research Triangle Foundation (“RTF”), a position he has
held for approximately five years. (Id. at 769). In this
position, Mr. Levitan reports to the RTF Board, which
includes representatives of UNC, Duke, NC State
University, and North Carolina Central University. (Id. at
773-74).
216. The RTF is a 501(c)(4) entity founded approximately
63 years ago for the purpose of facilitating coordination
among UNC, Duke, and NC State University and to
enhance the wellbeing of the residents of North Carolina.
(Id. at 769-70). The RTF administers the activities of the
RTP Owners and Tenants Association (“O&T”). (Id. at
770). The RTF also owns certain property within the RTP.
(Id.).
217. There are two types of zoning within the RTP: Science
Research Park (“SRP”) and Science Research Park –
Commercial (“SRP-C”). (Id. at 777-78). SRP-C zoning is
more lenient than SRP zoning but only covers 101 acres in
RTP known as the RTP Hub, which is a mixed-use
development intended to serve as a “town center” for RTP.
(Id. at 780-81). The Hub includes Boxyard, a retail center
containing food and retail vendors; Frontier, an innovation
campus for startups and emerging companies; residential
multi-family apartments; and other businesses not focused
on scientific research. (Id. at 781, 829-31).
218. There are also restrictive covenants covering RTP that
restrict the property to certain uses. (Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 191-
255). According to Mr. Levitan, these restrictive covenants
do not currently permit the development of a hospital at
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Opinion of the Court
UNC’s primary site. (Levitan, Vol. 5, p. 785).
219. The primary site for UNC Hospitals-RTP is adjacent
to the RTP Hub. (Id. at 783-84). In the recent past, the
RTF allowed a parcel of property adjacent to the RTP Hub
to be rezoned from SRP to SRP-C to allow the development
of a fire station in Durham County. The RTP also allowed
a text amendment to the RTP restrictive covenants to allow
a school on a particular parcel in Wake County. (Id. at 782-
83, 895-96).
220. David Meyer is a 35-year resident of Durham County
in addition to his healthcare planning expertise. Mr.
Meyer opined that UNC’s location adjacent to the RTP Hub
made sense from a health planning perspective. He
likened UNC Hospitals-RTP to REX Hospital’s adjacency
to Cameron Village in Raleigh, now known as the Village
District, to support the notion that a hospital being
adjacent to a multi-use district in the midst of a highly
populated area is sensible. (Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1274-76, Vol.
8, pp. 1389-91).
221. Initially, UNC explored purchasing a site owned by
Keith Corp. within the RTP, but not adjacent to the RTP
Hub, and having the site rezoned to allow UNC to build a
hospital there. When approached by Keith Corp. about this
proposal, Mr. Levitan was not comfortable setting a
precedent of SRP-C zoning in areas other than the Hub;
however, Mr. Levitan eventually suggested that UNC
approach Highwoods about purchasing its property
adjacent to the Hub. (Levitan, Vol. 5, pp. 832, 839-42).
222. Mr. Levitan discussed UNC using the Highwoods Site
for its proposed hospital at a [11 February] 2021, RTF
Development Committee meeting. (Jt. Ex. 119; Levitan,
Vol. 5, pp. 843-44). Following that meeting, Mr. Levitan
emailed members of the RTF Development Committee who
were not affiliated with either Duke or UNC and obtained
their approval to continue cooperating with UNC’s
proposal. (Jt. Ex. 117; Levitan, Vol. 5, pp. 844-49).
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
223. In particular, RTF Board member Smedes York
stated: “I believe this could be positive as it ‘anchors’ the
location without changing the ‘sizzle’ of the Hub area. We
need the ‘personality’ of Boxyard and other parts of what
we have planned. Rex Hospital’s previous location was
adjacent to Cameron Village which was a positive.” (Jt. Ex.
117).
224. To change the zoning of the primary site, UNC would
need to seek approval for rezoning from Durham County
and would also need to seek approval from the RTP O&T
to amend the restrictive covenants. (Levitan, Vol. 5, p. 785,
798). To Mr. Levitan’s knowledge, there has never been a
healthcare facility like a hospital permitted in the RTP.
(Id.).
225. Although the ultimate decision to allow the
development of UNC Hospitals-RTP on the Highwoods Site
is up to the RTP’s O&T, Mr. Levitan has already begun the
process of running the proposal through the relevant
committees for a recommendation to the RTP’s O&T.
UNC’s proposal was first brought before the RTF
Development Committee. Mr. Levitan believed he “had the
imprimatur of the Development Committee to continue
conversations in support of the hospital application on the
part of the foundation . . . .” (Id. at 796-97). Based on this
direction from the Development Committee, Mr. Levitan
cooperated with UNC in its efforts to build a hospital
within the RTP. (Jt. Exs. 15, 42; Levitan, Vol. 5, pp. 837-
38).
226. Mr. Levitan did not discuss his letter of support with
the RTF Board or Development Committee before signing
it, as he is frequently asked to sign letters of support and
does not generally bring those to the RTF Board or other
committees for review. (Levitan, Vol. 5, p. 799).
227. Mr. Levitan gave conflicting testimony about whether
he was aware Duke might be applying for the same need
determined assets in Durham County as UNC. (Compare
Levitan, Vol. 5, pp. 786-87 with pp. 822-23). Despite Mr.
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
Levitan’s apparent confusion, this Tribunal finds that Mr.
Levitan appears to have been aware that Duke may have a
conflicting interest with UNC’s proposed hospital, based on
his [11 February] 2021 email to certain members of the
RTF Development Committee. In this email, Mr. Levitan
noted he was “[k]eeping conflicted folks out of the
conversation”—i.e., people who were affiliated with either
Duke or UNC—and sought their approval to recommend
the Highwoods site to UNC. (See Jt. Ex. 119).
228. Mr. Levitan’s Letter of Support indicated that the RTF
supported UNC’s Application; however, it did not make any
reference to the property being rezoned or restrictive
covenants being amended. (Id.; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 280-82).
At the time the letter was submitted, Mr. Levitan
understood the letter would be used “as support for UNC’s
certificate of need application for a hospital in RTP.”
(Levitan, Vol. 5, pp. 790-92).
229. UNC reasonably believed its statements regarding the
zoning of the primary site were accurate at the time UNC
submitted its Application. In an email to Scott Selig and
Tallman Trask, Levitan stated, “I think Duke is going to
need to pursue its interests in this matter, but based on the
direction from the DevComm meeting, we have cooperated
with this initiative.” (Jt. Ex. 42; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 283-287).
Similarly, in a [20 May] 2021 meeting of the RTF
Development Committee, the meeting minutes reflected
that at a prior meeting, that “committee suggested to UNC
that they could pursue extending the SRP-C zoning across
the street if Highwoods was interested in selling their
land.” (Jt. Ex. 15; Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 287-88).
230. The Agency’s Team Leader Ms. Hale did not review
any documents prior to the Agency decision that suggested
UNC would not be able to have the primary site rezoned or
the restrictive covenants amended. (Hale, Vol. 2, p. 291).
231. On or about [13 May] 2021, the Triangle Business
Journal published an article discussing UNC’s proposed
new hospital in the RTP. (Jt. Ex. 130; Levitan, Vol. 5, p.
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Opinion of the Court
808). Following the publication of this article, Mr. Levitan
was asked by the RTF Executive Committee to clarify his
letter of support. (Levitan, Vol. 5, pp. 804, 816). The
Executive Committee gave Mr. Levitan the language to
include in his second letter verbatim. (Levitan, Vol. 5, pp.
808, 813-14, 827-28).
232. At the hearing and at his deposition, Mr. Levitan used
the terms “clarify,” “rescind,” and “withdraw”
interchangeably to mean the same thing. (Levitan, Vol. 5,
p. 816). Given the text of the [12 July] 2021 Letter and Mr.
Levitan’s testimony, the [12 July] 2021 Letter was a
clarification of the RTF’s position on the UNC Application,
rather than a rescission or withdrawal of support.
233. After the RTF Executive Committee decided a
clarifying letter should be sent to the Agency, Mr. Levitan
sent an email to the Agency stating that his letter of
support, which he described as “an outdated
correspondence” was included in the UNC Application. In
that email, Mr. Levitan asked to speak with either Ms.
Inman or Lisa Pittman, the Agency’s Assistant Chief of
Certificate of Need, regarding “the process and deadlines
for submitting comment on UNC Health’s application.”
(Duke Ex. 200; Hale, Vol. 3, pp. 332-33; Levitan, Vol. 5, pp.
810, 812-13).
234. Mr. Levitan subsequently spoke with Ms. Inman, who
informed him that the deadline for submitting public
comments to the CON Section had passed. Ms. Inman told
Mr. Levitan he could still submit a letter and that she
would “make every effort” to ensure it was seen by the CON
Section. (Levitan, Vol. 5, p. 810).
235. After speaking with Ms. Inman, Mr. Levitan sent his
second letter, dated [12 July] 2021 to the Agency. (Jt. Ex.
46). Mr. Levitan submitted his [12 July] 2021 letter to the
Agency after the end of the public comment period in this
Review. (Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 283, 308-09, 336). Mr. Levitan
stated in the [12 July] 2021 Letter, in relevant part, that
he was “writing to clarify [his] prior letter dated 13 April
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Opinion of the Court
2021,” and that “[u]ntil a certificate of need has been
awarded and any appeals to the determination of the
Healthcare Planning and Certificate of Need Section have
been exhausted, RTF will not consider a zoning change for
the proposed site in RTP.” (Jt. Ex. 46; Levitan, Vol. 5, pp.
818-19).
236. In a [3 September] 2021, letter to Jud Bowman,
Chairman of the RTF Board, Vincent Price, President of
Duke University, characterized Duke’s position on the [12
July] 2021 Letter as follows:
[Mr. Levitan] then sent a follow up letter on July 12th
to the State CON analyst stating that the Foundation
would not consider a zoning change until after the
CON determination and any appeals. This second
letter is also deeply troubling. It did not withdraw the
endorsement by RTF of UNC’s application. It
continued to support placing a hospital within the
RTP. It was also provided outside the prescribed
public comment period, so cannot by law be
considered by the State; thus, its purpose is unclear
to me.
(Jt. Ex. 25).
237. Though the Agency received Mr. Levitan’s [12 July]
2021 Letter, the Agency did not consider Mr. Levitan’s
second letter, and did not include the letter as part of the
Agency File because the letter was submitted after the end
of the public comment period. (Jt. Ex. 91; Hale, Vol. 1, pp.
177-78, 308-09, 336, 339). Mr. Levitan advised the RTF
Executive Committee that he had submitted the clarifying
letter and that it was submitted outside the public
comment period. (Levitan, Vol. 5, pp. 814-15).
238. At the hearing, Mr. Levitan opined that UNC’s
description on page 115 of the UNC Application regarding
the zoning of the primary site was accurate. (Id. at pp. 833-
38).
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Opinion of the Court
iii. Issues Raised by Duke Regarding UNC’s Proposed
Sites
239. Duke’s Comments raised issues regarding UNC’s
primary site and pointed to UNC’s statement that rezoning
was needed. Duke indicated that “the rezoning will require
not only Durham County approval but also compliance
with the applicable covenants and restrictions affecting
Research Triangle Park to which the site is subject,” and
attached the RTP restrictive covenants to its comments.
(Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 185, 191-255).
240. Duke had no knowledge or factual basis to support its
comments regarding the UNC Application’s primary site or
conformity with Criterion (12).
241. Duke provided no expert testimony in support of its
contention that the UNC Application was nonconforming
with Criterion 12. (Sandlin, Vol. 6, p. 955).
242. Catharine Cummer was the only fact witness Duke
called in its case. Ms. Cummer serves dual roles as
regulatory counsel and in strategic planning for Duke and
has primary responsibility for ensuring the preparation of
all CON applications submitted by Duke. (Cummer, Vol.
3, pp. 410-11). Ms. Cummer was not tendered or accepted
as an expert witness in this case. Ms. Cummer has never
been qualified as an expert witness in any kind of case. She
has no expertise in finance, is not a clinician and has never
served as a healthcare or certificate of need consultant.
Ms. Cummer has never been employed as a project analyst
or in any other capacity by the Agency. She has never
served on the SHCC or its subcommittees. (Cummer, Vol.
4, pp. 579-82). Ms. Cummer is not on the Real Estate
Development Committee or any other committee of the
RTF Board. She is not a member of the RTF Board of
Directors. (Id. at p. 647).
243. Duke included multiple pages of comments regarding
the primary and alternative sites proposed by UNC and its
conformity with Criterion 12. Duke also included a copy of
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Opinion of the Court
the RTP Restrictive Covenants in its Comments against
the UNC Application. (Id. at pp. 638-39; Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 191-
255). Ms. Cummer was sent a copy of the RTP Restrictive
Covenants from Dr. Monte Brown. (Cummer, Vol. 4, p.
645).
244. Duke relied heavily upon its Comments filed against
the UNC project as a purported basis for alleging Agency
error in this matter and argued that the Agency failed to
appropriately consider its Comments, in particular those
comments regarding Criterion 12. In its Comments, Duke
alleged:
Notably, the Board [Research Triangle Foundation
Board] has historically denied all rezoning
applications to allow for health care facilities. In fact,
DUHS is informed and believes that UNC has
previously asked for permission to put a healthcare
facility on the RTP campus itself, which was denied.
(Jt. Ex. 1, p. 185).
245. Ms. Cummer was primarily responsible for the
preparation of the Duke Comments regarding Criterion
(12). On cross-examination, contrary to the above
Comment, Ms. Cummer admitted she had no personal
knowledge regarding any prior applications for rezoning
related to healthcare facilities at the RTP and had no
personal knowledge regarding what other applications, if
any, had been submitted by UNC to the RTP. (Cummer,
Vol. 4, pp. 646-49).
246. Instead, Ms. Cummer relied upon a discussion with
Scott Selig, Vice President of Real Estate and Capital
Assets for Duke University and a designated member of the
Real Estate Development Committee of the RTF, for the
factual basis of Duke’s contentions in its Comments to the
Agency. (Cummer, Vol. 4, pp. 646-47).
247. On cross-examination, Ms. Cummer’s testimony was
impeached by the following deposition testimony of Mr.
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
Selig:
Question: Okay. Well, regardless of who prepared it,
there’s a statement in here, right here it says,
‘Notably, the board has historically denied all
rezoning applications to allow for healthcare
facilities.’ Is that accurate?
Answer: I have no idea.
Question: Okay. Can you recall a time when the RTF
board has denied rezoning for a healthcare
facility?
Answer: No.
Question: Okay. The following sentence says, ‘In fact,
UNC has previously asked for permission to put a
facility on the RTP campus itself, which was denied.’
Is that accurate?
Answer: I have no idea.
Question: Do you know anything about UNC asking
permission to put a facility on the RTP campus itself
being denied?
Answer: No.
(Jt. Ex. 157, p. 140; Cummer, Vol. 4, pp. 646-51). After such
impeachment, Ms. Cummer agreed that she would defer to
Mr. Selig’s personal knowledge of such questions regarding
the history of the RTF and any submissions, approvals or
denials made for zoning. (Cummer, Vol. 4, p. 652).
248. Ms. Cummer then testified that Dr. Monte Brown,
Vice President of Administration for the Duke University
Health System, had provided her with the factual basis for
those representations made by Duke to the Agency.
However, on cross-examination, Ms. Cummer’s testimony
was impeached with the following deposition testimony of
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Opinion of the Court
Dr. Brown:
Question: And with respect to the primary site in the
RTP, why do you say that was not a viable site?
Answer: Because we had always been told, the entire
time I was here at Duke, that you can’t put healthcare
in the RTP.
Question: Who had told you that?
Answer: I don’t know. It’s kind of folklore. Scott
[Selig], Tallman [Trask], my predecessor, we had
always stayed out of it.
(Jt. Ex. 147, p. 39; Cummer, Vol. 4, p. 654). Ms. Cummer
acknowledged that she did not speak with any other
persons regarding the content of this section of the
Comments. (Cummer, Vol. 4, p. 655).
249. At hearing, Dr. Brown could not recall the factual
basis supporting Duke’s contention in this regard. (Brown,
Vol. 10, pp. 1630, 1634).
250. Despite Duke’s comments opposing the proposed site
for UNC Hospitals-RTP, Dr. Brown sent an email
communication to other Duke representatives calling the
UNC primary location a “prime location.” (Jt. Ex. 12). Dr.
Brown also sent an email stating that “DUHS honored the
RTP rules and has purchased land at Page Road and Green
Level Road to accomplish its goals outside the RTP. Had
the RTP allowed for medical, we likely would have chosen
differently.” (Jt. Ex. 17).
251. Dr. Brown acknowledged he made no investigation or
inquiry whether the zoning for the primary site proposed
by UNC could be modified by the Durham County zoning
authorities. (Brown, Vol. 10, p. 1633).
252. The unrefuted factual testimony from UNC
established that there was no factual basis supporting
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
Duke’s contention that UNC had previously sought
permission to put a healthcare facility on the RTP campus
and was denied. In its Response to Comments, UNC
disputed Duke’s statements regarding UNC’s primary site
as UNC was “not aware of the Research Triangle
Foundation Board purportedly historically denying all
rezoning applications to allow for healthcare facilities[,]”
nor was UNC “aware of any situation in which it asked for
permission to put a healthcare facility on campus.” (Jt. Ex.
1, p. 320). Ms. Hadar testified unequivocally, that UNC
has not previously sought to put a facility on the RTP
campus prior to the UNC Hospitals-RTP Application.
(Hadar, Vol. 8, p. 1467).
253. Moreover, Ms. Hale’s testimony established that a
project analyst may, but is not required to, research
information outside of the application to understand what
is contained in an application. (Hale, Vol. 1, p. 193). Ms.
Hale was aware of the Agency doing such additional
research in one other review—the 2016 Wake County MRI
Review. (Hale, Vol. 1, pp. 194-97). While zoning
ordinances, real estate deeds, and restrictive covenants
may be public documents that the Agency could locate and
review, the Agency was not required to do so and did not
feel the need to do so with respect to UNC’s primary site.
(Hale, Vol. 1, pp. 197-98, Vol. 2, pp. 300-01). Further, the
Agency does not request additional information from
applicants who are involved in a competitive review. (Hale,
Vol. 2, pp. 277-78).
iv. The Alternate Site Identified in the UNC Application
254. UNC also identified an alternate site for its proposed
new hospital. (Jt. Ex. 4, p. 114, n. 30). The alternate site
is located along Highway 70 in Durham County and would
not require any rezoning. (Id. at 515-16). The alternate
site is also close to power, water, and sewer services. (Id.
at 516).
255. Duke raised concerns about UNC’s alternate site in its
Comments alleging the following: “However, that site has
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Opinion of the Court
even more fundamental obstacles to development than the
primary site. . . . The bigger issue, however, is that the
alternate site will be rendered unavailable for the proposed
use by a NCDOT highway project in planning stages. . . .”
(Jt. Ex. 1, p. 186). For that reason, Duke took the position
in its Comments that UNC’s alternate site is not a viable
possible location for UNC Hospitals-RTP. (Cummer, Vol.
4, p. 661).
256. By letter dated [3 September] 2021, during the
Agency’s review of the UNC and Duke Applications, Dr.
Vincent Price, President of Duke University, sent a four-
page letter to the Chair of the Board of Directors for the
Research Triangle Foundation, Jud Bowman (“Dr. Price
Letter”). (Jt. Ex. 25). In his letter, Dr. Price aired several
grievances regarding the UNC Hospitals-RTP project, its
proposed primary site in the RTP, and the support letters
from Mr. Levitan regarding the same. Dr. Price’s Letter
represented to the RTF that:
It seems to me that the only cure for this highly
concerning matter is for the Board to recuse itself
going forward from any decision that relates to the
CON application or eventual award, regardless of who
is successful in the CON process. Note that UNC’s
application does include an alternate site that does
not require RTF action that does not require RTF
rezoning.
(Id. at 3).
257. Thus, while the Comments filed by Duke represent
that the alternate site is “not viable,” the Dr. Price letter to
the RTF makes no reference to Duke’s public position on
the alternate site and implies that the alternate site is
viable.
258. Duke attempted to distinguish its position in these
two documents by claiming that it was merely pointing out
that UNC had represented the alternate location to be
viable and that the “alternate site has nothing to do with
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Opinion of the Court
the Research Triangle Park or Research Triangle
Foundation, so there would be nothing for the board to do
as to the viability or not of an alternate site.” (Cummer,
Vol. 4, p. 668). Dr. Brown confirmed in his testimony that
he did not discuss whether this representation by Dr. Price
was inconsistent with the representations in Duke’s
Comments. (Brown, Vol. 10, p. 1645). Though it could cite
no factual support for the same, Duke continued to stand
by its Comments in Opposition. (Id. at 1652). Nonetheless,
this answer did not explain why Dr. Price addressed UNC’s
alternate site at all if its existence was not relevant to the
RTF.
259. Ms. Cummer, the author of the Comments, also
reviewed and provided comments on a draft of Dr. Price’s
Letter prior to it being sent to the RTF (Cummer, Vol. 4, p.
666), and was therefore aware of the inconsistent
representations made by Duke to the Agency regarding the
alternate site and those made to the RTF regarding the
same.
260. At hearing, Dr. Brown acknowledged that he provided
the information in Duke’s Comments about the proposed
NCDOT highway project on UNC’s alternate site. Yet, he
also conceded that he did not investigate whether (1) the
proposed alternate site had actually been acquired for the
highway project or (2) whether there were any restrictions
on what UNC could do with the alternate site property if it
had not been acquired by NC DOT or if UNC had acquired
the property. (Brown, Vol. 10, pp. 1635-36). Dr. Brown
also testified that UNC admitted, in its application, that a
highway project was planned for its alternate site. (Id. at
p. 1635).
261. However, Mr. Carter clarified that the UNC
Application provided information about the alternate site
but did not speculate “as to the future of that parcel of land
or how it may be used other than for a proposed hospital.”
(Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1792).
v. UNC Can Make a Material Compliance Request if it
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
Ultimately Cannot Develop a Hospital at its Primary Site
262. A material compliance request is a letter to the Agency
stating why the applicant cannot proceed with the project
exactly as described in its application. (Hale, Vol. 2, pp.
247, 276-77; Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1283). The applicant would
include in its request the reasons why they could not
develop the project at the site and identify an alternate site
for the Agency to consider as a location for the assets
awarded in the CON. (Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 247-48; Meyer, Vol.
7, p. 1283). Through this process, a modification in plans
can be deemed by the Agency to be in “material compliance”
with the representations in the approved application.
263. The Agency routinely approves material compliance
requests and has approved material compliance requests to
develop projects at alternate sites. (Hale, Vol. 2, p. 248;
Cummer, Vol. 4, pp. 680-81; Meyer, Vol. 7, p. 1283). For
example, in 2018, Mr. Meyer assisted an ASC in making a
material compliance request to the Agency seeking to
develop its ASC in a location within Brunswick County at
a different site. The Agency approved this request. (Jt. Ex.
100; Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1284-85).
264. Regardless of whether UNC develops UNC Hospitals-
RTP at the primary site, UNC would be able to submit a
material compliance request to the Agency to approve a
new location for the facility. UNC could make a similar
request if it ultimately was unable to have the primary site
rezoned appropriately. (Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1285-86).
265. Notably, Duke itself experienced issues with a site
identified in a 2018 CON application for ORs in Orange
County. (Id. at p. 1286). The 2018 Orange County OR
Review was a competitive review in which Duke and UNC
both applied for 2 ORs in Orange County. (Cummer, Vol.
4, p. 681). The Agency ultimately awarded the CON to
Duke, and UNC challenged this award in a contested case.
(Id. at p. 681-82). Duke engaged Keystone Planning, Mr.
Meyer’s company, to develop Duke’s application, and later
serve as an expert witness, in that review. (Meyer, Vol. 7,
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Opinion of the Court
pp. 1286-87).
266. In that review, Duke had leased a location on Sage
Road, which location was approved by the Agency.
However, during the course of the Agency’s review of the
application, Duke identified certain remediation and code
issues that it believed made it financially more favorable
for the project to be developed at a different location. In
response, Duke determined that it could make a successful
request for a material compliance determination to change
the location. (Cummer, Vol. 4, pp. 685-88; Meyer, Vol. 7,
pp. 1286-87).
267. Duke did not inform the Agency during the course of
the review that it had identified potential issues with its
proposed site. (Cummer, Vol. 4, p. 691). Because the
original site was still available to Duke during the course
of the review, the “information in the application that the
site was available was correct.” (Id. at p. 693). According
to Ms. Cummer, “[s]o unless an[d] until we were interested
in seeking a different site or doing anything else, there was
nothing to inform the agency of.” (Id.)
268. In both his expert report and deposition testimony in
the 2018 Orange County OR Review, Mr. Meyer
emphasized that the issues with Duke’s ASC site in its
CON application were immaterial, as Duke could submit a
material compliance request, which the Agency routinely
approves. (Jt. Exs. 101, 102; Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1287-89).
269. Ms. Cummer also cited to an occasion when Duke
previously withdrew a CON application after learning it
had relied upon incorrect and overstated data. She
explained that the data error was so significant that it
made the application infeasible as presented. (Id. at pp.
697-98).
270. Mr. Meyer’s opinion concerning UNC’s conformity
with Criterion (12) and the ability of an approved applicant
to submit a material compliance request in the event of site
issues is consistent between this Review on behalf of UNC
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Opinion of the Court
and the 2018 Orange County OR Review on behalf of Duke.
(Id.).
271. Mr. Carter agreed with the Agency’s conclusion that
the UNC Application was conforming with Criterion (12),
as UNC provided all information requested by the Agency
for this Criterion. (Carter, Vol. 10, p. 1790). Mr. Carter
opined that the Agency’s analysis of this Criterion was
consistent with the way the Agency has analyzed Criterion
(12) in previous reviews. (Id. at 1792). Mr. Carter also
opined that the specific location of UNC Hospitals-RTP was
not material to UNC’s demonstration of need for this
project, but rather the location of the facility within the
southern region of Durham. (Carter, Vol. 11, pp. 1982-83).
272. Ms. Sandlin offered no opinions with respect to UNC’s
conformity with Criterion (12). (Sandlin, Vol. 6, p. 955; see
also Jt. Exs. 54, 146).
273. The Agency considered Duke’s Comments in its
analysis of UNC’s conformity with Criterion (12). In its
analysis of Criterion (12), the Agency noted “there is some
question as to whether or not the first site can be rezoned
for a hospital” and indicated it had reviewed Duke’s
Comments. (Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 1575-76; Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1280-
81, Vol. 8, pp. 1393-94). The Agency was aware that the
site has not yet been rezoned and that Duke questioned the
possibility of rezoning the site. (Id.).
274. Ultimately, the Agency found that UNC had
adequately explained its proposed project and its plans for
accomplishing the required rezoning, such that it was
conforming with Criterion (12). (Jt. Ex. 1, pp. 1575-76;
Hale, Vol. 2, pp. 274-75).
In light of these findings, the ALJ made the following conclusions of law:
73. The Agency correctly determined that the UNC
Application identified a proposed site and adequately
demonstrated that the cost, design, and means of
construction of UNC Hospitals-RTP represent the most
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
reasonable alternative, will not unduly increase the cost of
service to the public, and incorporates energy saving
features.
74. UNC provided adequate information requested by the
Agency in the application related to Criterion (12),
including describing how it anticipated having the property
rezoned.
75. The Agency reasonably assessed potential zoning and
restrictive covenant issues with the primary site for UNC
Hospitals-RTP and correctly determined that the UNC
Application was conforming with Criterion (12)
nonetheless. Moreover, the Agency did not err in not
seeking additional information regarding the zoning and
restrictive covenants at the primary site. “There is no
provision in [N.C.G.S.] § 131E-183, nor Chapter 131E,
which permits the Agency to independently assess whether
the applicant is conforming to other statutes.” (Hale, Vol.
2, p. 266; see also Craven Reg’l Med. Auth., 176 N.C. App.
at 58[] . . .). Therefore, the Agency did not err in not
engaging in further analysis of the zoning or restrictive
covenants beyond what was contained in the Agency
findings.
76. The letter of support from Mr. Levitan was not
necessary to the approval of the UNC Application;
nonetheless, Mr. Levitan’s support letter was consistent
with UNC’s representations in the UNC Application and
its Responses to Comments.
77. The Agency was correct to exclude Mr. Levitan’s
clarifying letter of [12 July] 2021 from the Agency File
because it was submitted after the end of the public
comment period. Had the Agency considered that letter
and used it as a basis to deny the UNC Application, it
would have been reversible error.
78. Mr. Levitan’s clarifying [12 July] 2021 Letter did not
state that the RTF would deny any efforts to rezone the
primary site; instead, it simply noted that the RTF would
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Opinion of the Court
not take action until a CON has been awarded and any
appeals exhausted. (Jt. Ex. 46; see also Jt. Ex. 25). Thus,
had the Agency considered the [12 July] 2021 Letter, the
Agency would have been incorrect to use it as a basis for
UNC’s nonconformity with Criterion (12).
79. While Duke raised questions about UNC’s alternate
site, Duke presented no competent evidence as to the
unavailability of that site. Neither Ms. Cummer nor Dr.
Brown are qualified as an expert in real estate,
condemnation, or highway construction. Their testimony
suggesting UNC could not develop a hospital at the
alternate site is unreliable, and the undersigned gives it no
weight.
80. If UNC is ultimately unable to develop a hospital at the
UNC Hospitals-RTP primary site due to zoning or
restrictive covenant issues, UNC may submit a material
compliance request for another suitable site, consistent
with prior Agency decisions approving alternate sites
following issuance of a CON. (See [N.C.G.S.] § 131E-181;
Hale, Vol. 2, p. 248; Meyer, Vol. 7, pp. 1283-89; Jt. Exs. 100-
102). The Agency has the discretion to evaluate any
request to develop the proposed hospital at a different
location and determine whether such project would be in
material compliance with UNC’s representations in the
UNC Application. [N.C.G.S.] § 131E-189(b).
81. Substantial evidence in the record supports the
Agency’s determination that the UNC Application was
conforming with Criterion (12).
Here, while the ALJ’s decision critiques at length Duke’s failure to ground its
contentions concerning medical providers’ historical inability to create facilities in
RTP in fact, it does admit that the primary location is currently subject to zoning
requirements and restrictive covenants that would, as they stand currently, prevent
the construction of the proposed facility. Moreover, under N.C.G.S. § 131E-181(a),
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Opinion of the Court
“[a] certificate of need shall be valid only for the defined scope, physical location, and
person named in the application.” N.C.G.S. § 131E-181(a) (2023). The application in
this case concerned only the RTP location and not the proposed alternative location
discussed by the ALJ, so the scope of the consideration should have been limited to
the primary proposed location.5 Thus, much of the ALJ’s reasoning was unsound
insofar as it treated the presence of the zoning requirements and covenants as
unproblematic and considered the alternative site in the determination of whether
the CON should issue.6
As we review the determination as to Criterion 12 only for substantial evidence
on the record and do not interfere with the credibility and weighting determinations
of the ALJ, Surgical Care Affiliates, 235 N.C. App. at 622-23, we note that the
reasoning of the ALJ concerning UNC’s compliance with Criterion 12 may have been
5 In so holding, we express no opinion on whether the ALJ could have permissibly considered
an alternate site for the proposed facility if that alternate site had been included in UNC’s application.
6 Moreover, to the extent the ALJ used the subsequent possibility of UNC filing a material
compliance request to justify its reliance on the availability of the alternate site, we have treated the
material compliance request process arising under N.C.G.S. § 131E-181(b) as analytically independent
of, and distinct from, the grant or denial of a CON ab initio. See Craven, 176 N.C. App. at 59 (“The
CON Section granted [the] request for a material compliance determination after the CON was issued.
[The petitioner] is asking this Court to review events which occurred after the issuance of the final
agency decision.”); see also N.C.G.S. § 131E-181(b) (2023). We understand the possibility of rectifying
issues with a proposed facility as a remedial mechanism, not an invitation to lower the threshold at
which an initial proposal is deemed satisfactory under our statutory criteria, and the absence of any
caselaw in the course of our research in which the future possibility of a material compliance request
has constituted substantial evidence to grant a CON appears to confirm this view. While the ordinary
rule is that the ALJ is “authorized to establish its own standards in assessing whether an applicant”
conforms with the criteria in N.C.G.S. § 131E-183(a), this rule only applies where review requirements
have not been specified by our General Assembly. AH, 240 N.C. App. at 100; see also N.C.G.S. § 131E-
177(1) (2023). In this case, our General Assembly clarified in N.C.G.S. § 131E-181(a) that an
application’s consideration is limited to the physical location described. N.C.G.S. § 131E-181(a)
(2023).
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
independently supported, but not definitively so. Namely, even setting aside the
ALJ’s reasoning concerning the alternate location and its qualms with the support
proffered by Duke for its challenge to UNC’s CON application, the ALJ’s invocation
of prior cases where certificates of need have been awarded prior to zoning
amendments and finding that RTP has recently altered its zoning restrictions to
accommodate a fire station and its covenants to accommodate a school suggests it
found the proposal at the location listed in UNC’s application satisfactory under
Criterion 12. However, given the possibility that the ALJ would not have awarded
UNC the CON without the additional consideration of the proposed alternative site
and a future material compliance request, we have no way of knowing whether the
ALJ’s conclusion would have followed from only the allowable considerations.
Under N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b), “[t]he court reviewing a final decision may affirm
the decision or remand the case for further proceedings. It may also reverse or modify
the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced
because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are[,]” inter alia,
“[u]nsupported by substantial evidence . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b) (2023). For the
reasons explained above, the ALJ’s decisions as to Criterion 12 were, for purposes of
our review, supported by substantial evidence. However, the use of considerations
outside the scope of the ALJ’s review casts doubt on whether the ALJ herself would
have reached the same conclusions as to Criterion 12 when taking only the proposed
location in the application into account. Accordingly, we remand to the ALJ for
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
consideration of whether UNC’s application, taking into account only the site
proposed in its application and setting aside the possibility of a future material
compliance request, satisfied Criterion 12.
In particular, the ALJ should give due consideration to the possibility that a
potential inability to change RTP’s applicable covenants could result in substantial
cost being passed to patients. While the ALJ appears to have been satisfied with the
likelihood that both the zoning restrictions and applicable covenants could be
amended as necessary to accommodate the proposed UNC facility given a recent
history of amendments to permit the construction of a fire station and a school, the
final decision makes no meaningful reference to the financial ramifications of a
failure to amend either. This is especially troubling with respect to the restrictive
covenants, the termination of which requires the consent of the owners of 90% of the
subject property and the amendment of which is subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure
any changes are “reasonable in light of the contracting parties’ original intent” in the
event one of the affected property owners is dissatisfied with the amendment.
Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 360 N.C. 547, 559 (2006); but see Kerik
v. Davidson Cnty., 145 N.C. App. 222, 228 (2001) (emphasis added) (“[A]doption,
amendment, or repeal of a zoning ordinance is a legislative decision that must be
made by the elected governing board[.]”). When considering the potential for property
owners with an interest in maintaining these covenants to disallow the construction
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
Opinion of the Court
of the new facility7 in isolation of UNC’s ability to pivot to a location not listed in its
application, the ALJ may make a new determination in accordance with whether it
is satisfied that UNC has demonstrated that the project “will not unduly increase the
costs of providing health services” at the site proposed in the application. N.C.G.S. §
131E-183(a)(12) (2023).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the ALJ with respect to geographic access, competition, and
Criterion 3; however, because we cannot determine whether the ALJ would have
found UNC’s application in conformity with Criterion 12 without considering matters
outside the scope of its CON application, we remand to the Office of Administrative
Hearings for further findings.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART.
Judge STADING concurs.
Judge GRIFFIN concurring in part and dissenting in part by separate opinion.
7 Or, perhaps more concerningly, consent only for an exorbitant price.
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No. COA23-351 – DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS.
GRIFFIN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with Parts A, B, and C of the majority opinion. However, I dissent
from Part D because there was substantial evidence that UNC’s application
conformed with Criterion 12 and I would therefore affirm the ALJ’s decision.
Criterion 12 provides that
[a]pplications involving construction shall demonstrate
that the cost, design, and means of construction proposed
represent the most reasonable alternative, and that the
construction project will not unduly increase the costs of
providing health services by the person proposing the
construction project or the costs and charges to the public
of providing health services by other persons, and that
applicable energy saving features have been incorporated
into the construction plans.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-183(a)(12) (2023); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-183(a)(1), (3).
The majority holds the ALJ erred by considering evidence regarding a secondary
location that was not included on UNC’s CON application when determining whether
the application for the RTP location conformed to Criterion 12.
The standard of review is set forth by section 150B-51 of the North Carolina
General Statutes. “With regard to asserted errors pursuant to subdivisions (5) and
(6) of subsection (b) of [N.C.G.S. § 150B-51], the court shall conduct its review of the
final decision using the whole record standard of review.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-
51(c) (2023). The whole-record test requires this Court to determine whether the
Agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Craven Reg’l Med. Auth. v.
DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
GRIFFIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 176 N.C. App 46, 52, 625 S.E.2d 837, 841 (2006)
(internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind could conclude supports a decision. Parkway Urology, P.A. v. N.C.
Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Servs., 205 N.C. App. 529, 535, 696 S.E.2d 187, 192 (2010)
(internal marks and citations omitted).
This Court may not “replace the agency’s judgment as between two reasonably
conflicting views” even if it may be possible to reach a different result if the matter
were reviewed de novo. Id. “Rather, a court must examine all the record evidence –
that which detracts from the agency’s findings and conclusions as well as that which
tends to support them – to determine whether there is substantial evidence to justify
the agency’s decision.” N.C. Dep’t. of Env’t. & Nat. Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 660,
599 S.E.2d 888, 895 (2004) (internal marks and citations omitted). Substantial
evidence is “relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Dialysis Care of N.C., LLC v N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 137
N.C. App. 638, 646, 529 S.E.2d 257, 261 (2000) (internal marks and citations omitted).
The majority correctly points out that a CON is specific to what is listed on the
application. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-181(a) (2023) (“A certificate of need shall be valid
only for the defined scope, physical location, and person named in the application.”).
While an ALJ may generally “establish standards and criteria or plans required to
carry out the provisions and purposes of [a CON]”, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131E-177(1)
(2023), the ALJ may not utilize requirements that conflict with what has been
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
GRIFFIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
specified by our General Assembly, AH N.C. Owner LLC v. N.C. Dept. of Health &
Hum. Servs., 240 N.C. App. 92, 100, 771 S.E.2d 537, 542 (2015) (internal citations
omitted).
Here, the ALJ considered a secondary location not included on the application.
These considerations were error. However, as the majority states, the ALJ’s decisions
concerning Criterion 12 were supported by other allowable substantial evidence.
UNC provided drawings of its site plan and floor plan and explained how the
construction was designed to be efficient for the provision of services based on “best
practice methodologies” while preventing unnecessary costs. UNC also explained
that even though the project would be capital intensive, there was funding set aside
to ensure the project could be completed without increasing costs. A letter from the
Chief Financial Officer of UNC Hospitals was included to certify the availability of
funds to be used on this project. Additionally, UNC showed that it would design and
implement an Energy Efficiency and Sustainability Plan to demonstrate that the
proposed hospital would be energy efficient and conserve water. Although UNC’s
proposed site required rezoning, UNC anticipated having the property rezoned and
indicated that it would work with Durham County and the Research Triangle
Foundation to achieve the rezoning required. UNC also supplied a letter of support
from the CEO of the Research Triangle Foundation. There was also testimony at the
hearing indicating CON applications are almost never denied due to the fact that a
site needs to be rezoned.
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DUKE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., INC. V. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
GRIFFIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
All of this evidence is permissible as it relates only to the primary site that is
included on the application. See Living Centers-Southeast, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t. of
Health & Hum. Servs., 138 N.C. App. 572, 580, 532 S.E.2d 192, 197 (2000) (“Our
review of the individual statutes within the CON Statute . . . indicates that this
article grants applicants a full contested case hearing at which they are allowed to
present testimony and evidence contained in their applications.” (emphasis added)).
I would hold that this is substantial evidence as a reasonable mind may accept this
evidence as adequate in support of the conclusion that UNC’s application conforms
with Criterion 12.
Our standard of review demands we stop here. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51(b)
(2023) (“The court reviewing a final decision may affirm the decision or remand the
case for further proceedings. It may also reverse or modify the decision if the
substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . [u]nsupported by substantial evidence.”
(emphasis added)). As UNC’s application provided substantial evidence supporting
the ALJ’s decisions regarding Criterion 12, I would affirm that part of the ALJ’s
decision, as well.
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