Joseph Patrick Hyde v. Amanda Bradley

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

September 8, 2010 Session

JOSEPH PATRICK HYDE v. AMANDA BRADLEY

Direct Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Sumner County

No. 81-188 Barry R. Brown, Judge

No. M2009-02117-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 12, 2010

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to be named the

minor child’s primary residential parent or, in the alternative, to increase his parenting time.

The trial court denied Father’s petition, and also denied Father an award of attorney’s fees

and costs under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). Finding that Father failed to meet his

burden to show a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in the

child’s primary residential parent and/or the child’s residential schedule, and that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney’s fees and costs, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which A LAN E. H IGHERS, P.J.,

W.S., and D AVID R. F ARMER, J., joined.

Mark T. Freeman, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joseph Patrick Hyde.

James B. Hawkins and Randy Lucas, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Amanda Bradley.

OPINION

On December 17, 2005, the minor child at issue in this case was born to the Appellee,

Amanda Bradley. Ms. Bradley was not married to the child’s father, Appellant Joseph

Patrick Hyde. The State of Tennessee, ex rel. Amanda Bradley provided Title IV-D support

for the child, and, consequently, filed a petition to establish paternity. Genetic testing

established that Mr. Hyde was the biological father, and in December, 2006, the trial court

adjudicated Mr. Hyde to be the child’s father.1

On May 2, 2007, Ms. Bradley and Mr. Hyde appeared before the Sumner County

Juvenile Court and announced that they had entered into an agreed parenting plan. The Court

found that the parties had agreed, and entered an order on June 1, 2007. Pursuant to the

parties’ agreement, the court ordered that Ms. Bradley would be the primary residential

parent, and that Mr. Hyde would enjoy time with the child pursuant to the residential

schedule entered by the court.2

1

The order adjudicating Mr. Hyde to be the child’s biological father is not contained in the appellate

record.

2

We note that Father submitted his brief and appeal using the terms of “custody” and “visitation.”

As recently explained by this Court:

These terms, while not entirely obsolete, are outmoded when considering

a determination of parental responsibility under the parenting plan statute,

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-401 et seq., which was adopted in

part to change the language of child custody decisions. See Janet Leach

Richards, Richards on Tennessee Family Law, § 8-2(e) (3d ed.2008)

(footnotes omitted). Judge Don. R. Ash, one of the leading proponents of

reform, explained the need to recast the terminology of these decisions:

“The archaic terms ‘custody’ and ‘visitation’ convey ownership over the

child and imply that one party is merely a visitor in the home. These terms

should be replaced with more user-friendly words.” Judge Don R. Ash,

Bridge Over Trouble Water: Changing the Custody Law in Tennessee, 27

U. Mem. L. Rev. 769, 801 (2007) (footnote omitted). The parenting plan

statute did just that, replacing the traditional concepts of joint legal and

physical custody with a new concept: the residential parenting schedule.

19A W. Walton Garrett, Tennessee Practice Series: Tennessee Divorce,

Alimony and Child Custody § 26:3, at 78 (2d rev. ed.2007). As a result,

traditional terms such as custody, visitation, custodial parent, and

noncustodial parent have given way to new terms, e.g., “residential

schedule, temporary and permanent parenting plans, primary residential

parent, alternate residential parent, and parenting responsibilities.”

Richards, supra, at § 8-2(e) (footnotes omitted). Because this change was

intended to inspire parties to move beyond the win-lose mentality present

in previous disputes over parental responsibility, see id., we find it

appropriate to re-frame [Father's] argument in these terms. We note,

however, that the change of terminology does not necessarily undermine

the reasoning of previous opinions deciding custody and visitation disputes

where the same concerns-supporting parent-child relationships, providing

a mechanism for decision-making, allocating time with the child, promoting

the child's best interests-predominated our review.

(continued...)

-2-

On October 19, 2007, Mr. Hyde filed a petition for contempt against Ms. Bradley, and

appeared pro se at the November 19, 2007 hearing on the petition. Following that hearing,

the court found that Ms. Bradley was in willful contempt for failing to adhere to the

residential schedule, as established by the June 1, 2007 order, supra. Ms. Bradley was

ordered to pay Mr. Hyde $250.00 in attorney fees, as well as the court costs.

On October 7, 2008, Mr. Hyde filed a second petition for contempt against Ms.

Bradley, and also petitioned the court to make Mr. Hyde the primary residential parent or,

in the alternative, to modify the current parenting plan to allow Mr. Hyde more time with the

child. Specifically, Mr. Hyde asked the court to find Ms. Bradley in civil and criminal

contempt, and asked the court to “deem [Mr. Hyde] the primary residential parent of the

minor child” on alleged grounds that Ms. Bradley had engaged in “intentional and malicious

act[s] of contempt...in her effort to keep...the child from [Mr. Hyde].” It is important to note

that Mr. Hyde’s petition does not state that modification of the child’s residential parent or

schedule would be in the child’s best interests. In fact, from his petition, it appears that Mr.

Hyde’s sole basis for seeking modification of the parenting arrangement is Ms. Bradley’s

alleged contempt in failing to comply with the previous order of the court. On November

13, 2008, Ms. Bradley filed an answer to Mr. Hyde’s petition, wherein she specifically denied

the allegations that she had violated the court’s order and had willfully kept the child from

Mr. Hyde. In addition to denying the material allegations of Mr. Hyde’s petition, Ms.

Bradley also averred that Mr. Hyde had:

repeatedly refused to obey the Court’s Order regarding pickup

time of the child...despite [Ms. Bradley’s] efforts to work with

[Mr. Hyde, he] refuses to pick up the child on time for his

parenting time[,] and is usually between 30 minutes and an hour

late in picking up the child or doesn’t show up at all.

An initial hearing was held on November 19, 2008. At that time, the parties informed

the court that they had reached an agreement to modify the child’s residential schedule

temporarily to allow certain visitation during the holiday season. On November 28, 2008,

the court entered an interim order, allowing the parties’ holiday parenting schedule, but

indicating that the regular schedule would resume on January 9, 2009. The court also set a

2

(...continued)

In re Emma E., No. M2008-02212-COA-R3-JV, 2010 WL 565630 at n. 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2010).

We also note that remnants of the “old” terminology remains in the Code as demonstrated by the use

of the term “custody” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B).

-3-

date for the hearing on Mr. Hyde’s petition for permanent modification of the child’s

residential schedule.

The hearing on Mr. Hyde’s petition began on February 19, 2009. Following this

hearing, the court ordered both parties to attend parenting classes “within a six-month

period” from February 19, 2009. The court then set a court date of July 23, 2009 to review

the matter. An order was entered on April 29, 2009, which indicates that the court “chooses

not to make a permanent ruling in this matter but rather to reset this matter for follow up

hearing.” The order also correctly notes that “both parties have the right to know and

participate in the child’s life.”

At the review hearing on July 23, 2009, both parties provided proof that they had

attended a parenting class as directed by the court. Following that hearing, the court entered

its order on September 10, 2009. From our reading, it appears that the court did not make

substantive changes in the original parenting arrangement; rather, the court’s order clarifies

issues concerning Mother’s Day, Father’s Day, holidays, and summer vacation, including

applicable pick up and drop off times. In addition, Mr. Hyde was granted two non-

consecutive weeks with the child during the summer. The court further ordered that Ms.

Bradley would pay Mr. Hyde’s attorney’s fees. The amount of the attorney’s fees was

reserved, pending submission of Mr. Hyde’s attorney’s affidavit of fees. Following

submission of this information, on September 10, 2009, the court entered an order indicating

that, after review of the affidavit of fees, Ms. Bradley “should be responsible for $0 in

attorney’s fees and $0 in discretionary fees.”

Mr. Hyde appeals, rasing two issues for review, as stated in his brief:

1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to modify the

parenting time in favor or Mr. Hyde.

2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award attorney’s

fees and discretionary costs to Mr. Hyde.

We review the trial court's conclusions of law under a de novo standard, with no

deference to the conclusions made by the lower court. Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d

566, 569-70 (Tenn. 2002); Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ.,

58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001). A "review of findings of fact by the trial court in civil

actions shall be de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of

the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." Tenn.

R. App. P. 13(d); Kendrick, 90 S.W.3d at 570.

-4-

In applying the de novo standard, "we are mindful that ‘[t]rial courts are vested with

wide discretion in matters of child custody’ and that ‘the appellate courts will not interfere

except upon a showing of erroneous exercise of that discretion.'" Johnson v. Johnson, 169

S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1993)). "Because ‘[c]ustody and visitation determinations often hinge on subtle

factors, including the parents' demeanor and credibility during ... proceedings themselves,’

appellate courts ‘are reluctant to second-guess a trial court's decisions.’” Johnson, 169

S.W.3d at 645 (quoting Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

Change of Primary Residential Parent and/or Modification of the Child’s

Residential Schedule

In these cases, the law is well settled that, when a decree concerning a child’s primary

residential parent and/or residential schedule has been entered, that decree is res judicata and

is conclusive in a subsequent application to change the arrangement, unless some new fact

has occurred, which fact has altered the circumstances in a material way, so that the welfare

of the child requires a change of the original parenting plan. Long v. Long, 488 S.W.2d 729

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). In short, once the trial court has made an initial determination with

respect to a child’s residential schedule, it cannot entertain a subsequent petition to modify

that arrangement absent a material change in circumstances, such that the welfare of the child

demands a redetermination. See, e.g., Massengale v. Massengale, 915 S.W.2d 818, 819

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). A "material change in circumstances" justifying modification of a

child’s residential schedule may include factors arising after the initial determination or

changed conditions that could not be anticipated at the time of the original order. See Blair

v. Badenhope, 940 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Dalton v. Dalton, 858

S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). If the trial court finds that there has been a material

change in circumstances, it will then consider the petition to modify the residential schedule

using a "best interest" standard.3 Woolsey v. McPherson, No. 02A01-9706-JV-00125, 1998

3

The best interests factors are enumerated at T.C.A. § 36-6-106, which provides:

(a) In a suit for annulment, divorce, separate maintenance, or in any other

proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding

a minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis of the best

interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including

the following, where applicable:

(1) The love, affection and emotional ties existing between the parents or

caregivers and the child;

(continued...)

-5-

3

(...continued)

(2) The disposition of the parents or caregivers to provide the child with

food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care and the

degree to which a parent or caregiver has been the primary caregiver;

(3) The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length of time

the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment; provided, that,

where there is a finding, under subdivision (a)(8), of child abuse, as defined

in § 39-15-401 or § 39-15-402, or child sexual abuse, as defined in §

37-1-602, by one (1) parent, and that a nonperpetrating parent or caregiver

has relocated in order to flee the perpetrating parent, that the relocation

shall not weigh against an award of custody;

(4) The stability of the family unit of the parents or caregivers;

(5) The mental and physical health of the parents or caregivers;

(6) The home, school and community record of the child;

(7)(A) The reasonable preference of the child, if twelve (12) years of age

or older;

(B) The court may hear the preference of a younger child on request. The

preferences of older children should normally be given greater weight than

those of younger children;

(8) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other parent

or to any other person; provided, that, where there are allegations that one

(1) parent has committed child abuse, as defined in § 39-15-401 or §

39-15-402, or child sexual abuse, as defined in § 37-1-602, against a family

member, the court shall consider all evidence relevant to the physical and

emotional safety of the child, and determine, by a clear preponderance of

the evidence, whether such abuse has occurred. The court shall include in

its decision a written finding of all evidence, and all findings of facts

connected to the evidence. In addition, the court shall, where appropriate,

refer any issues of abuse to the juvenile court for further proceedings;

(9) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or

frequents the home of a parent or caregiver and the person's interactions

with the child; and

(10) Each parent or caregiver's past and potential for future performance of

parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of

the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and

continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the

child's parents, consistent with the best interest of the child.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, the court has

jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination regarding a minor

child or may modify a prior order of child custody upon finding that the

custodial parent has been convicted of or found civilly liable for the

intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent or legal guardian.

(c) As used in this section, "caregiver" has the meaning ascribed to that

term in § 37-5-501.

(continued...)

-6-

499733, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 1999) (citing Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 50

(Tenn. 1975.)); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 743 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Hall

v. Hall, No. 01A01-9310-PB-00465, 1995 WL 316255, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 1995).

Under this standard, the primary inquiry is whether there has been a material change in the

child's circumstances.

We note that the determination of whether a “material change of circumstances” has

occurred requires a different standard depending upon whether a parent is seeking to change

the primary residential parent, or seeking to modify the existing residential parenting

schedule. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)-(C); see also Pippin v. Pippin, 277 S.W.3d

398, 406-07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Massey-Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2007)).4 As previously stated by this Court, “a ‘change in circumstance’ with regard

3

(...continued)

(d) Nothing in subsections (a) and (c) shall be construed to affect or

diminish the constitutional rights of parents that may arise during and are

inherent in custody proceedings.

4

In pertinent part, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)-(C) provides:

(B) If the issue before the court is a modification of the court's prior decree

pertaining to custody, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence a material change in circumstance. A material change of

circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the

child. A material change of circumstance may include, but is not limited to,

failures to adhere to the parenting plan or an order of custody and visitation

or circumstances that make the parenting plan no longer in the best interest

of the child.

* * *

(C) If the issue before the court is a modification of the court's prior decree

pertaining to a residential parenting schedule, then the petitioner must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence a material change of

circumstance affecting the child's best interest. A material change of

circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the

child. A material change of circumstance for purposes of modification of

a residential parenting schedule may include, but is not limited to,

significant changes in the needs of the child over time, which may

include changes relating to age; significant changes in the parent's

living or working condition that significantly affect parenting; failure

to adhere to the parenting plan; or other circumstances making a

(continued...)

-7-

to the parenting schedule is a distinct concept from a ‘change in circumstance’ with regard

to the identity of the primary residential parent.” Massey-Holt, 255 S.W.3d at 607. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) establishes a lower threshold for modification of a residential

parenting schedule. Scofield v. Scofield, No. M2006-00350-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 624351,

at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2007) (citing Rose v. Lashlee, No.

M2005-00361-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2390980, at *2, n. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2006)

(holding that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) “sets a very low threshold for

establishing a material change of circumstances”)).

In Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002) the Supreme Court

discusses what constitutes a material change in circumstances and stated that:

While “[t]here are no hard and fast rules for determining when

a child's circumstances have changed sufficiently to warrant a

change of his or her custody,” the following factors have formed

a sound basis for determining whether a material change in

circumstances has occurred: the change “has occurred after the

entry of the order sought to be modified,” the change “is not one

that was known or reasonably anticipated when the order was

entered,” and the change “is one that affects the child's well-

being in a meaningful way.” Id. (citations omitted). We note

that a parent's change in circumstances may be a material

change in circumstances for the purposes of modifying

custody if such a change affects the child's well-being.

If the petitioner makes a prima facie case of a material change in circumstances,

then the court must determine whether a change in the primary residential parent, or

the child’s residential schedule is in the best interests of the child. In re J.C.S., No.

M2007-02049-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 2924982, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2008).

This determination requires consideration of a number of factors, including those set

forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) to make an initial custody determination, and

those set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(b) to fashion a residential schedule. Id.

If no material change in circumstances has been proven, the trial court is not required

to make a best interests determination and must deny the request for a change of

custody. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)-(C) , 36-6-106. In short, the party

seeking to change a child’s existing primary residential parent or residential schedule

4

(...continued)

change in the residential parenting time in the best interest of the child.

-8-

has the burden of proving that there has been a material change of circumstances.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B). If the petitioner cannot demonstrate that the

child's circumstances have changed in some material way, the trial court should not

reexamine the comparative fitness of the parents, Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 213

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 17, 2000), or engage in a "best

interests of the child" analysis. In the absence of proof of a material change in the

child's circumstances, the trial court should not change custody. Curtis v. Hill, 215

S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2006);

Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W.3d 822, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. May 15, 2000).

At the outset of the hearing on Mr. Hyde’s petition, his attorney announced to

the court that Mr. Hyde was proceeding on grounds that Ms. Bradley had failed to

adhere to the parenting plan. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6-101(a)(2)(C). Specifically, Mr.

Hyde’s attorney stated that “Ms. Bradley’s...willful failure, to abide by this Court’s

order regarding custody rises to such a level that it gives [the court] authority to modify

custody.” Based upon this allegation, Mr. Hyde asked the court to make Mr. Hyde the

primary residential parent, or, in the alternative, to award equal parenting time to the

parties. In response, Ms. Bradley argued that, any failure to adhere to the court’s

parenting schedule was because of Mr. Hyde’s refusal to pick the child up at the time

indicated by the court.

From the totality of the record, it is clear that there is a great deal of animosity

between these parties. This is a fact that the trial court acknowledged at the February

19, 2009 hearing, to wit:

I think y’all both love the child, but it doesn’t take a mental

genius to see what’s going on in some of this matter.

* * *

[Ms. Bradley], your outright hatred of [Mr. Hyde] is

astonishing.... The total hatred that you’ve got for this man,

and I’ve been on the bench for 23 years, scares me. Whether

or not you like it, he is the father of your baby. Whether or

not he was there after the baby was conceived, and initially

over a year or two, that’s water over the dam now....

-9-

The Court also noted Mr. Hyde’s part in the parties’ problematic relationship, stating

that Mr. Hyde had also engaged in behavior to aggravate Ms. Bradley, and that he had

been less than forthright in his answers during the hearing. Before sending the parties

to parenting classes, the Court further noted that:

I don’t care how much hatred you [i.e., Ms. Bradley] have

for [Mr. Hyde], by law, you’re going to encourage [the

relationship between the] child [and Mr. Hyde], whether you

like it or whether you don’t like it. Children are not stupid,

especially this child.... She’s a smart kid and can pick up on

mother’s hatred of [Mr. Hyde].

Both parties adhered to the trial court’s mandate to attend parenting classes.

When the hearing resumed, on July 23, 2009, the situation between the parties

appeared to be much less volatile. The Court specifically noted that it had “seen a

change” in the parties’ attitudes. Although the court ultimately declined to change the

child’s primary residential parent, or the child’s residential schedule, it did reiterate

the terms of the custody arrangement, and did caution the parties to continue along the

path toward peaceful co-existence. The court made no other findings relevant to a

determination of material change in circumstances sufficient to change either the

child’s primary residential parent or the child’s residential schedule. Having made no

such findings, the court did not reach the best interests analysis.

In Adelsperger v. Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), perm. app.

denied (Tenn. May 11, 1998) this court stated the following:

No decisions in divorce cases require a more delicate touch

than those involving child custody and visitation. Courts

must strive to devise custody arrangements that promote the

development of the children's relationship with both parents

and interfere as little as possible with post-divorce family

decision-making. See Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629

(Tenn.1996); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 331-32

(Tenn.1993). These decisions are not intended to reward or

to punish parents, see Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443,

453 (Tenn. Ct. App.1991), and, in fact, the interests of the

parents are secondary to those of the children. See Doles v.

Doles, 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App.1992); Griffin v.

-10-

Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App.1992).

While a parent's misconduct may provide some evidence of his or her fitness to

be a child’s primary residential parent, this decision is not, and cannot be, used to

punish the parent.5 It is well established that a child’s residential schedule is to be made

to assure the best interests of the child and not to reward or punish a parent. See

Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d at 485 (neither the mother's move to Mississippi, nor her

motivation for moving provided grounds for making father the primary residential

parent); Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (making father

the primary residential parent, not to punish the mother for her relationship with

another man, but because the father was comparatively more fit); Long v. Long, 488

S.W.2d 729, 733 (reversing the trial court's change of primary residential parent to the

father, which decision was based on the mother's boyfriend visiting until late hours);

see also Williams v. Williams, 263 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tenn. 1953) (noting that, although

father was in contempt, best interests of child are paramount). Likewise, in the present

case, Ms. Bradley has been previously found in contempt for not allowing Mr. Hyde his

ordered visitation; however, Mr. Hyde has often failed to show up on time to pick the

child up. In short, there is fault on the part of both parents. However, we cannot go

so far as to say that the inappropriate conduct on the part of either parent rises to a

level sufficient to warrant a change in the child’s primary residential parent or a

change in the present residential schedule. In short, there is no proof that there has

been a material change in circumstances so as to warrant a change in the current

arrangement. Having determined that Mr. Hyde has failed to satisfy his burden to

show a material change in circumstances, the trial court did not reach the best interests

analysis. We find this issue to be without merit.

Attorney’s Fees

Mr. Hyde asked the court to award him attorney’s fees and costs in

5

Both the courts and the legislature have recognized the importance of enabling the child to maintain

a relationship with the non-custodial parent. See Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 564 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(10). A custodial parent's consistent efforts to thwart a close and

continuing relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent through failure to provide visitation

could constitute a material change in circumstances since the original order foresaw such visitation. Evidence

of such efforts by the custodial parent would also be relevant in a best interests and comparative fitness

analysis.

-11-

bringing his

petition. After hearing evidence, the court stated that reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs would be taxed against Ms. Bradley, pending receipt of Mr. Hyde’s attorney’s

affidavit of fees. However, as set out above, the court ultimately denied these fees in its

September 10, 2009 order, wherein the court stated that, after review of the affidavit

of fees, Ms. Bradley “should be responsible for $0 in attorney’s fees and $0 in

discretionary fees.” Mr. Hyde asserts that this ruling was in error, and contends that

he should be awarded the attorney's fees he incurred in the trial court pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-103.

Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-103(c) provides:

The plaintiff spouse may recover from the defendant spouse,

and the spouse or other person to whom the custody of the

child, or children, is awarded may recover from the other

spouse reasonable attorney fees incurred in enforcing any

decree for alimony and/or child support, or in regard to any

suit or action concerning the adjudication of the custody or

the change of custody of any child, or children, of the

parties, both upon the original divorce hearing and at any

subsequent hearing, which fees may be fixed and allowed by

the court, before whom such action or proceeding is

pending, in the discretion of such court.

This statute vests discretionary authority in the court to award such fees in

custody cases. Shofner v. Shofner, 181 S.W.3d 703, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App.2004). "In

determining whether an award for attorney's fees is warranted, we should consider,

among other factors, the ability of the requesting party to pay his or her own attorney's

fees, the requesting party's success on appeal, and whether the requesting party has

been acting in good faith." Id. (citing Parchman v. Parchman, No.

W2003-01204-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2609198, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.17, 2004)).

We review the trial court's decision concerning the award of attorney’s fees using the

less stringent "abuse of discretion" standard of review. Richardson v.. Spanos, 189

S.W.3d 720, 729 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial

court's ruling “will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the

propriety of the decision made.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001)

(citations omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “applies an incorrect

legal standard, or reaches a decision which is against logic or reasoning or that causes

-12-

an injustice to the party complaining.” Id. The abuse of discretion standard does not

permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id.

In this case, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in declining to award

Mr. Hyde his attorney's fees. This finding is true regardless of the fact that the court

stated that it would award fees after review of the affidavit of fees. It is well settled that

a trial court speaks through its orders. Palmer v. Palmer, 562 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1997). In its September 10, 2009 order denying any award of attorney’s fees,

the court provides no explanation for its decision. It is not the purview of this Court

to trace the genesis of this apparent change in the trial court’s mind; rather, we must

determine if the trial court’s ultimate decision is based upon an abuse of discretion. In

the instant case, we find that it is not. From the totality of the circumstances, it appears

that the financial equities between the parties are fairly even. Moreover, and as

discussed above, both parties bear some fault in the failure to adhere to the court

ordered parenting plan. From the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hyde his attorney’s fees and costs in this

case.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court. Costs of this

appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Joseph Patrick Hyde, and his surety, for which

execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

-13-