Opinion

Joel Turner v. United States Postal Service

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Jul 31, 2024
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 30.4%

holding that “the doctrine of coercive involuntariness is a narrow one”

How later courts described this case

holding that “the doctrine of coercive involuntariness is a narrow one”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOEL A. TURNER, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, CH-0752-20-0180-I-1

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE:

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Kurt P. Cummiskey , Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the appellant.

Deborah L. Lisy , Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his alleged constructive suspension appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision

were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,

and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material

evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to

find that the basis for dismissing the appeal is the appellant’s failure to

nonfrivolously allege that his working conditions were made so difficult that a

reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to absent himself

from the workplace, or that the agency denied him reasonable accommodation or

delayed his return to work, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

The appellant is a preference eligible veteran who has been in his current

position with the agency since 2012. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 12 at 17-19,

Tab 15 at 1. On October 4, 2019, the appellant and his acting supervisor had a

verbal altercation. IAF, Tab 10 at 47. A manager held a meeting between the

two employees and others on October 17, 2019, during which the appellant denied

feeling physically threatened by his acting supervisor, but stated he was “afraid of

losing [his] job.” Id. at 47-48. During that meeting, the appellant and his acting

supervisor indicated they could continue to work together. Id. at 47.

According to the appellant, on October 18, 2019, his acting supervisor

“walked pas[t] him . . . shaking his radio and laughing at him.” IAF, Tab 1 at 24.

He alleged that he suffered a reaction of acute anxiety and severe stress on

October 25, 2019, due to “management . . . ignoring concerns” about his acting

supervisor’s ongoing harassment and physical intimidation of him. IAF, Tab 1

at 29, Tab 7 at 6.

He further alleged that he informed his acting manager that he would be

unable to continue working. IAF, Tab 7 at 6. According to the appellant, that

manager promised to provide the appellant with an Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs (OWCP) Form CA-16 after he called her back with his

medical provider’s name. Id. Form CA-16, which can only be obtained through

the employing agency, guarantees payment for medical examination and treatment

an employee requires because of a work-related traumatic injury or an

occupational disease or illness. See 20 C.F.R. § 10.300(a);

https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dfec/fec-faq.htm (last visited July 31, 2024); see also

5 C.F.R. § 1201.64 (stating that the Board may take official notice of matters that

can be verified). The appellant stopped attending work that day and filed OWCP

Form CA-1, Notice of Traumatic Injury and Claim for Continuation of

Pay/Compensation. IAF, Tab 1 at 29-30, Tab 7 at 6. On the Form CA-1, he

indicated that he suffered an ongoing injury due to management “ignoring

concerns of employee losing job.” IAF, Tab 1 at 29. From then on, until his

eventual return to work, he was granted leave without pay (LWOP) in lieu of sick

leave. IAF, Tab 9 at 58-61, Tab 10 at 29-31.

According to the appellant, the agency effectively refused to provide him

with a Form CA-16, despite his manager’s promise to him and a December 2019

grievance settlement in which the agency agreed to provide the form. IAF, Tab 1

at 17, 19, Tab 7 at 6. Also according to the appellant, after he told his health

providers that he needed medical care for an injury incurred at work, they

declined to treat him. IAF, Tab 7 at 6.

The appellant filed this appeal of his alleged constructive suspension and

indicated that he was requesting a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 5-6. He returned to

work on February 5, 2020. IAF, Tab 9 at 53.

In her initial decision, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction without holding the requested hearing. IAF, Tab 16, Initial

Decision (ID) at 1-2. She found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege

that his only meaningful choice was to be absent or that his absence was caused

by the agency’s improper actions. ID at 6-7.

The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)

File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response to the petition for review. PFR File,

Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

Involuntary leaves of absence may be appealable under chapter 75. Savage

v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 19 (2015), overruled in part on

other grounds by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31.

Although various fact patterns may give rise to an appealable constructive

suspension, all constructive suspension claims have two things in common: (1)

the employee lacked a meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it was the

agency’s wrongful actions that deprived the employee of that choice. Id. In

particular, to establish jurisdiction over a constructive suspension on the basis of

intolerable working conditions, an appellant must show that a reasonable person

would have felt compelled to absent himself under the conditions and that the

agency was culpable for these conditions. Id., ¶ 20. In a constructive adverse

action appeal such as this, if an appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation of fact

establishing Board jurisdiction, he is entitled to a hearing at which he must prove

jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. Thomas v. Department of the Navy,

123 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 11 (2016).

We modify the initial decision to find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously

allege that the actions of his acting supervisor would cause a reasonable person to

absent himself.

As to the appellant’s claim that his acting supervisor created intolerable

working conditions that caused him to take LWOP, the administrative judge

found that the appellant had a meaningful choice whether to work and “[i]t is not

the fault of the agency if a 24 year Postal employee has no available sick leave to

cover his absences.” ID at 6. The appellant disputes that his sick leave balance is

relevant to whether he was constructively suspended. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. We

agree.

If an agency requires or forces an employee to take leave, his resulting

absence may be a constructive suspension. Thomas, 123 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 14. For

example, the Board has found that an appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she

was constructively suspended when an agency required her to either report to a

workplace that violated her medical restrictions or take leave. Id. Here, the

appellant did not allege that his absence resulted from his lack of sick leave.

IAF, Tab 1 at 17, Tab 7 at 6. Nor did he claim that the agency forced him to take

leave in general, or forced him to use unpaid leave as opposed to using paid leave

in particular. 2 IAF, Tab 1 at 17, Tab 7 at 6. Therefore, we agree with the

appellant that the administrative judge erred to the extent she considered the

appellant’s sick leave balance in assessing his claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11; ID

at 6-7. Nonetheless, because we agree with the administrative judge as to the

outcome of this appeal, her error does not state a basis to reverse the initial

decision. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984)

(finding that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive

rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).

The administrative judge also found that the appellant had a meaningful

choice as to whether to work. ID at 6-7. The appellant alleged below that the

agency forced him to absent himself because of intolerable working conditions

which caused him acute anxiety and severe stress. IAF, Tab 7 at 6. On review,

he continues to assert he was medically unable to work during the period at issue,

PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-8.

The appellant did not have any available sick leave. IAF, Tab 9 at 53, Tab 10 at 29.

However, the record suggests that he had available annual leave. IAF, Tab 9 at 53,

Tab 10 at 29.

To the extent that the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to

nonfrivolously allege that he had no choice but to be absent from work, we

disagree. ID at 6. The record below contains a statement from his health care

provider that he was unable to work beginning on October 25, 2019, due to his

anxiety and stress. IAF, Tab 9 at 55. This statement is sufficient evidence to

meet the appellant’s burden to nonfrivolously allege that he had no choice but to

be absent. See Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 468,

¶ 10 (2015) (finding that an appellant lacked a meaningful choice as to whether to

be absent during an alleged constructive suspension when his psychological

condition precluded him from reporting to work), aff’d, 833 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir.

2016).

Nonetheless, we find that the appellant failed to meet his jurisdictional

burden. To establish jurisdiction over a constructive suspension on the basis of

intolerable working conditions, an appellant must show that a reasonable person

would have felt compelled to absent himself under the conditions and that the

agency was culpable for these conditions. Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 20. We

find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the agency created

intolerable working conditions that would have compelled a reasonable person in

his position to take leave from work.

The appellant asserted in a declaration made under penalty of perjury that

his acting supervisor had been harassing him “for some time” when, “earlier in

October of 2019,” the supervisor invited him to fight on the workroom floor.

IAF, Tab 7 at 7. Vague, conclusory, or otherwise unsupported allegations do not

satisfy the Board’s nonfrivolous pleading standard. See Green v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 59, ¶¶ 10-11 (2009) (finding that an appellant’s

allegations that coworkers “spread[ ] rumors” about him because they were

“trying to get back at [him] for some reason” were vague and general, thus falling

short of nonfrivolous allegations of intolerable working conditions that could

establish jurisdiction over his allegedly forced resignation); Dodson v. U.S.

Postal Service, 67 M.S.P.R. 84, 87 (1995) (finding that the appellant failed to set

forth specific assertion of fact, which, if proven, would support her claim that her

retirement resulted from “duress” and “misinformation”); Collins v. Defense

Logistics Agency, 55 M.S.P.R. 185, 189-90 (1992) (finding, in the context of an

appeal in which the appellant argued that she was forced to resign because of

discrimination and retaliation, that her failure to make allegations specifying the

particular acts of harassment, discrimination, or retaliation directed toward her

warranted dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without affording her a

jurisdictional hearing), modified on other grounds by Ferdon v. U.S. Postal

Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329-30 (1994); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s)(1) (providing that

a nonfrivolous allegation is one that is more than conclusory). Accordingly, the

appellant’s bare allegation that he was harassed by his supervisor “for some time”

is insufficient to indicate that the agency subjected him to intolerable working

conditions.

The appellant’s declaration also fails to discuss with any specificity his

acting supervisor’s alleged invitation to fight, IAF, Tab 7 at 6, though there are

some details about that incident in the record. In particular, the record contains

the notes of the appellant’s manager from her discussion with him on October 17,

2019, and a complaint the appellant filed with the agency’s Office of the

Inspector General (OIG) on October 31, 2019, IAF, Tab 10 at 25-26, 47-48. The

appellant stated in his OIG complaint that his acting supervisor gave him

instructions in an “unacceptable” manner, which made the appellant feel that he

had to walk away. Id. at 26, 47. As the appellant walked away, he said that he

was going to go see a manager, at which point the acting supervisor asked the

appellant what he said. Id. The appellant turned around, and his acting

supervisor then said, “Here I am. Here I am. I’m right here.” Id. at 26. At the

time, the acting supervisor allegedly pointed a parcel or mail piece that he was

holding in the appellant’s face. 3 Id. at 47. During the October 17, 2019 meeting

about the incident with his manager, the appellant was asked if he felt unsafe, and

he replied, “No, I just don’t trust him, I am not afraid of him. I’m afraid of losing

my job.” Id. The appellant and his acting supervisor agreed during that meeting

that they would be able to continue working together. Id.

The appellant has not indicated that his prior descriptions of the October 4,

2019 incident are inaccurate or otherwise provided the Board with a separate

account of the incident. Even if proven, these alleged facts would not establish

that a reasonable person in the appellant’s position would have no choice but to

take leave. Difficult or unpleasant working conditions are generally not so

intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign. Brown v. U.S. Postal

Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 15 (2011), aff’d per curiam, 469 F. App’x 852 (Fed.

Cir. 2012); cf. Staats v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

(holding that “the doctrine of coercive involuntariness is a narrow one”). The

appellant continued working for 3 weeks after the incident and stated

approximately 1 week before he began absenting himself that he did not feel

unsafe or afraid of the acting supervisor and that he could continue working with

him. IAF, Tab 7 at 47. Accordingly, the October 4, 2019 incident would not

cause a reasonable person in the appellant’s position to feel that he had no choice

but to be absent beginning on October 25, 2019.

On review, the appellant seems to cite to a grievance worksheet completed

by a union steward on his behalf and contained in the record below. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 4; IAF, Tab 1 at 24. In addition to referring to the October 4, 2019

incident, the worksheet indicates that on October 18, 2019, the appellant’s acting

supervisor walked past the appellant while “shaking his radio and laughing at

him.” IAF, Tab 1 at 24. Even if proven, this incident would not cause the

The appellant identified the item his acting supervisor was holding as “a long IPP.”

IAF, Tab 10 at 47. IPP is an acronym for an irregular parcel or mail piece. U.S. Postal

Service, Publication 32, Glossary of Postal Terms, List of Acronyms/Abbreviations

(July 2013), https://about.usps.com/publications/pub32/ (last visited July 31, 2024).

reasonable person to feel compelled to take leave. See Brown, 115 M.S.P.R. 609,

¶ 15.

The appellant further asserted that he was “physically intimidated” by his

supervisor on October 25, 2019, leading him to suffer a reaction of acute anxiety

and severe stress. IAF, Tab 7 at 6. But the appellant fails to describe this event

in any detail. On review, the appellant’s representative indicates that on

October 25, 2019, the supervisor “harassed [the] [a]ppellant further and violated

his personal space.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, this description is still too

conclusory to support a finding that the appellant was subjected to working

conditions that would cause a reasonable person in his position to be compelled to

take leave. See Collins, 55 M.S.P.R. at 189-90. Even considering all of the

appellant’s assertions as a whole, we find that he has failed to nonfrivolously

allege that he was subjected to working conditions from which a reasonable

person would have felt compelled to absent himself.

In addition to alleging intolerable working conditions, the appellant has

asserted that the agency discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his

disability. IAF, Tab 1 at 17. The administrative judge did not address this claim,

and the appellant does not repeat it on review. An appellant can establish a

constructive suspension claim on the basis that he absented himself because the

agency improperly denied his reasonable accommodation request. See Bean v.

U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 14 (2013). Here, however, the appellant

has failed to allege that he requested accommodations that would have allowed

him to continue working. Accordingly, the appellant’s conclusory assertion that

the agency failed to accommodate his disability does not constitute a nonfrivolous

allegation that the agency coerced him into absenting himself. See Hosozawa v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 7 (finding that an appellant

nonfrivolously alleged her resignation was involuntary when it followed the

agency’s denial of her request to telecommute, which her doctor indicated would

have permitted her to continue working); Mengine v. U.S. Postal Service,

82 M.S.P.R. 123, ¶¶ 7, 12 (1999) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that his

disability retirement was involuntary on the basis of a failure to accommodate

when he failed to nonfrivolously allege that there was an accommodation

available that would have allowed him to continue his employment).

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the agency’s delay in providing

the Form CA-16 caused his continued absence.

In addition to asserting that he was coerced into absenting himself, the

appellant argues that the agency’s delay in providing the Form CA-16 forced him

to continue to be absent. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-11. He raised the same argument

below, and the administrative judge found that the appellant also bore

responsibility for obtaining this form and that the agency’s delay in providing it

did not satisfy his burden of proof. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 7 at 6. We need not reach

the issue of whether the appellant was responsible for obtaining the Form CA-16

because, as discussed below, he failed in any event to nonfrivolously allege that

the agency’s delay in providing it forced him to remain absent. We modify the

initial decision accordingly.

The appellant indicated that the agency’s denial of the Form CA-16

prevented him from receiving medical care and delayed his ability to return to

work. IAF, Tab 7 at 6. However, the only specific allegation he provides along

these lines is that he was “turned away from health care providers when [he] told

them [his] need for medical care was caused by an injury at work.” Id. The

appellant did not explain how the lack of the Form CA-16 prevented him from

obtaining medical treatment. Id. To the extent that he is alleging that a health

care provider or providers declined to treat him without the form, we find that

such an allegation fails to meet the nonfrivolous pleading standard because it is

both conclusory and implausible on its face. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). The Form

CA-16 merely guarantees payment by the Federal Government for certain medical

examinations and treatments. https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dfec/fec-faq.htm . We

are unaware of any authority or practice which would require a health care

provider to possess the form before they could treat an individual for a condition,

regardless of the cause.

To the extent that the appellant implies that he could not afford to treat his

medical condition and needed the Form CA-16 so that the Federal Government

would be obliged to pay for it, he has failed to make such an assertion or provide

any factual allegations in support of it. Further, the appellant ultimately provided

a note to the agency from what appeared to be his treating health care provider,

belying any claim that he was unable to receive treatment. IAF, Tab 9 at 55.

Thus, such a claim similarly fails to satisfy the nonfrivolously pleading standard.

See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s)(1). Accordingly, we find that the appellant failed to

nonfrivolously allege that he needed the Form CA-16 in order to obtain treatment

that would allow him to return to work. We therefore need not reach whether the

agency’s delay in providing the form was wrongful. 4

Because the appellant’s allegations fell short of nonfrivolously alleging he

suffered a constructive suspension, we affirm the administrative judge’s

determination that he was not entitled to a hearing, as modified above. 5 ID at 1-2,

11.

On review, the appellant contends that during the proceedings below the agency raised

arguments and assertions which “besmirch[ed] his good name,” and he takes issue with

the fact that the administrative judge acknowledged them in her initial decision. PFR

File, Tab 1 at 11. To the extent that the appellant is alleging that the administrative

judge was biased, we are not persuaded. An administrative judge’s conduct during the

course of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if the administrative

judge’s comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that

would make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d

1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555

(1994)). The appellant has alleged no such comments or actions.

Because the appellant raised a claim of discrimination in this constructive adverse

action appeal, and the Board has now issued a Final Order dismissing the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction, the agency is required, under Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) regulations, to reissue a notice under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f)

giving the appellant the right to elect between a hearing before an EEOC administrative

judge and an immediate final decision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the