holding that a defendant who pleaded guilty did not waive his Second Amendment challenge to a statute of conviction when this claim did not “contradict the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a defendant who pleaded guilty did not waive his Second Amendment challenge to a statute of conviction when this claim did not “contradict the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
USCA11 Case: 22-13084 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 07/31/2024 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13084
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BENJAMIN TYREE TOWNSEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00050-JA-PRL-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13084
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Benjamin Townsel appeals his convictions for three counts
of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), and one count of possession of a firearm with an oblit-
erated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). Townsel
argues that his convictions should be vacated because the statutory
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the posses-
sion of firearms with obliterated serial numbers run afoul of the
Second Amendment and because Congress lacked authority under
the Commerce Clause to prohibit the possession of a firearm
simply because the weapon previously moved in interstate com-
merce. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
On three separate occasions over several months, Townsel,
who is a convicted felon, possessed a firearm. The serial number on
one of these firearms was scratched and unreadable. A grand jury
charged Townsel with three counts of being a felon in possession
of a firearm and one count of possession of a firearm with an oblit-
erated serial number. He pleaded guilty. The district court sen-
tenced Townsel to a total of 144 months’ imprisonment.
This is Townsel’s appeal.
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22-13084 Opinion of the Court 3
II.
Ordinarily, when a defendant enters a valid guilty plea, he
waives any non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. United
States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014). But Townsel’s
guilty plea did not waive his constitutional challenges to the statu-
tory prohibitions on felons possessing firearms or the possession of
firearms with obliterated serial numbers. See Class v. United States,
583 U.S. 174, 181 (2018) (holding that a defendant who pleaded
guilty did not waive his Second Amendment challenge to a statute
of conviction when this claim did not “contradict the terms of the
indictment or the written plea agreement”).
Although we generally review de novo the constitutionality
of a statute, we review for plain error when a defendant raises a
constitutional challenge to a statute of conviction for the first time
on appeal. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010).
To show plain error, a defendant must establish (1) there was error,
(2) that was plain, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial
rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or pub-
lic reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. An error is plain only if it
is contrary to a federal statute or on-point precedent from this
Court or the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Hoffman,
710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013).
III.
On appeal, Townsel challenges the constitutionality of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits individuals with felony con-
victions from possessing firearms or ammunition, and 18 U.S.C.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13084
§ 922(k), which prohibits anyone from possessing a firearm with a
removed, altered, or obliterated serial number. He raises two types
of constitutional challenges to each of these statutes. First, he ar-
gues that the statutory prohibitions run afoul of the Second
Amendment. Second, he says that Congress lacked authority under
the Commerce Clause to enact these restrictions. We address each
issue in turn.
A.
We begin with the Second Amendment challenges. Accord-
ing to Townsel, § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing fire-
arms and § 922(k)’s prohibition on the possession of firearms with
obliterated serial numbers violate the Second Amendment, which
states that: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the secu-
rity of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Because Townsel
raises his Second Amendment challenges for the first time on ap-
peal, we review for plain error only. We conclude that he has not
established plain error.
We begin our analysis with the Supreme Court’s decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the Court
considered a Second Amendment challenge to a District of Colum-
bia law that barred the private possession of handguns in homes.
Id. at 635. After considering the text and history of the Second
Amendment, the Court concluded that it conferred on an individ-
ual a right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 595. The Court held that
the ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Second
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22-13084 Opinion of the Court 5
Amendment. Id. at 635. But the Court noted that “nothing in [its]
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. at
626. The Court labeled these prohibitions as “presumptively law-
ful.” Id. at 627 n.26.
After Heller, we considered a constitutional challenge to
§ 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms. See United
States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010). We rejected this
challenge, holding that “statutes disqualifying felons from pos-
sessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the
Second Amendment.” Id. at 771.
Several years later, the Supreme Court considered a Second
Amendment challenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime that
limited when a law-abiding citizen could obtain a license to carry a
firearm outside the home. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 11 (2022). The Court recognized that “the Second
and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry
a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Id. at 10. It explained
that to determine whether a restriction on firearms was constitu-
tional, courts must begin by asking whether the firearm regulation
at issue governs conduct that falls within the plain text of the Sec-
ond Amendment. Id. at 17. If the regulation covers such conduct, a
court may uphold it only if the government “affirmatively prove[s]
that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that de-
limits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at
19. Bruen emphasized that Heller established the correct test for
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13084
determining the constitutionality of gun restrictions. See id. at 39.
And, like Heller, Bruen described Second Amendment rights as ex-
tending only to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. at 26 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
After Bruen, we considered another Second Amendment
challenge to § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284
(11th Cir. 2024). We held that the challenge was foreclosed by
Rozier, which “interpreted Heller as limiting the [Second Amend-
ment] right to law-abiding and qualified individuals and as clearly
excluding felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-pos-
session bans as presumptively lawful.” Id. at 1293 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). We observed that in Bruen, the Supreme
Court continued to describe the right to bear arms as extending
only to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, we affirmed the defendant’s convic-
tion. Id.
Based on Bruen, Townsel challenges § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition
on felons possessing firearms and § 922(k)’s prohibition on the pos-
session of firearms with obliterated serial numbers. He argues that
these bans “are not consistent with this country’s historical tradi-
tion of firearms regulations.” Appellant’s Br. 7. But Townsel cannot
show plain error because he has not identified any on-point prece-
dent from this Court or the United States Supreme Court holding
that the prohibitions set forth in § 922(g)(1) or § 922(k) violate the
Second Amendment.
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22-13084 Opinion of the Court 7
B.
We now turn to Townsel’s Commerce Clause challenges to
§ 922(g)(1) and § 922(k). He argues that “Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers do not permit it to criminalize the intrastate posses-
sion of a firearm simply because it crossed state lines in the past.”
Appellant’s Br. 30. Because Townsel raises the Commerce Clause
challenges for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error
only.
We conclude that Townsel failed to establish plain error. He
has not identified any on-point precedent from this Court or the
United States Supreme Court holding that Congress exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the prohi-
bitions set forth in § 922(g)(1) or § 922(k). Indeed, Townsel
acknowledges that his challenges are foreclosed by precedent in
which we rejected a similar Commerce Clause challenge. See
United States v. Pritchett, 327 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
AFFIRMED.