United States v. Jo Ann Macrina

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10734

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JO ANN MACRINA,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00216-SCJ-LTW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and BRASHER,

Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This appeal from a trial for public corruption requires us to

decide whether the district court abused its discretion in two evi-

dentiary rulings and in its refusal to give a proposed jury instruc-

tion. Jo Ann Macrina, the former Commissioner of the Department

of Watershed Management for the City of Atlanta, was charged

with taking bribes from a contractor. At trial, the district court ad-

mitted portions of a recorded conversation between Macrina and

federal agents over Macrina’s objection under Federal Rule of Evi-

dence 106. The district court also admitted the Code of Ethics for

city employees over Macrina’s objection that it was irrelevant and

substantially more prejudicial than probative. Later, the district

court declined to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction that any

payments received after an official act were a gratuity and not a

bribe. Because none of these rulings were an abuse of discretion,

we affirm Macrina’s convictions.

I. BACKGROUND

Jo Ann Macrina worked as the Commissioner of the City of

Atlanta’s Department of Watershed Management. She evaluated

proposals for architectural and engineering services for the Depart-

ment. In 2013, the Department solicited proposals for a new archi-

tecture and engineering contract. Eleven contractors submitted

proposals, including a company owned by Lohrasb “Jeff” Jafari.

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23-10734 Opinion of the Court 3

After the initial evaluation process in November 2014, Jafari’s com-

pany was not selected for the contract.

Macrina later made several decisions that revived Jafari’s bid.

She requested a reevaluation of the proposals, replaced two of the

evaluation committee members, requested interviews as part of

the evaluation process, and actively participated in scoring the pro-

posals during the reevaluation. She also scored Jafari’s company

higher than every other evaluator. After the reevaluation, Jafari’s

company was selected for the contract. In May 2016, a few weeks

after the proposal evaluation process concluded, Macrina was fired,

and she went to work for Jafari’s company.

Shortly after she was fired, Macrina contacted the Federal

Bureau of Investigation to “provide information of possible cor-

ruption” in Atlanta. During their conversations with Macrina, the

agents became suspicious of her relationship with Jafari while she

was employed by the Department. The agents interviewed Ma-

crina over 20 times and slowly gathered more information about

her relationship with Jafari and the evaluation process that led to

his company receiving the contract with the Department.

In one meeting, Macrina told the agents that she received

landscaping, $10,000 in cash, and other perks from Jafari while she

worked for the Department. Macrina told the agents that Jafari had

instructed his employees “to buy whatever Jo Ann Macrina

wanted” during a trip to the United Arab Emirates for a water man-

agement conference, including a diamond ring. Macrina said that

Jafari gave her the $10,000 before her trip to “buy whatever she

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

wished with it.” Macrina also told the agents that while she was

Commissioner, Jafari promised to hire her in a top-level position at

his company.

Macrina later met with the agents a final time. In that meet-

ing, she “started backtracking” on her admission about Jafari’s gifts

and stated that the $10,000 payment was a “signing bonus.” Be-

cause her story had changed, the agents secretly recorded the latter

portion of the final interview.

The Bureau referred Macrina for prosecution based on the

agents’ conversations with her. A grand jury later indicted Macrina

for bribery, see 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), and conspiracy to commit

bribery, see id. § 371. Before trial, the government notified Macrina

and the district court that it intended to introduce some portions

of the recording of the final interview between Macrina and the

agents.

In a pretrial motion in limine, Macrina objected under Fed-

eral Rule of Evidence 106 that admitting only portions of the in-

terview would confuse and mislead the jury. Macrina stated in a

footnote in her motion that she sought to admit certain statements

from the recording and that she could “provide the Court” the

“portions of the transcript” that she “requested be played as well”

under Rule 106. Macrina never quoted the statements she wanted

to admit into evidence and never cited the pages of the transcript

for the district court.

The district court denied Macrina’s motion. The district

court explained that the rule of completeness, embodied in

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23-10734 Opinion of the Court 5

Rule 106, narrowly applies only in the context of a defendant’s cus-

todial statements. Because the recorded interview was not a custo-

dial interview, the district court declined to exclude the recording

or admit any other portions of the recording under Rule 106.

The government also sought to admit the City of Atlanta’s

Code of Ethics for city employees. Macrina objected to this evi-

dence in a pretrial motion. She argued that the code was irrelevant

and that its admission would confuse the issue at trial, mislead the

jury, and unfairly prejudice her. The district court overruled her ob-

jection and allowed the government to introduce the code into ev-

idence.

At trial, the government argued that Macrina accepted

bribes in exchange for steering City contracts to Jafari. The govern-

ment presented evidence that Macrina received things of value

from Jafari, including promises of a job and $10,000 in cash before

her trip to the United Arab Emirates. An agent testified that Ma-

crina admitted that Jafari gave her the $10,000 to spend on whatever

she wanted. The government also presented evidence that Macrina

did not disclose the money she received from Jafari on her financial

and travel disclosure forms after the trip. It presented evidence—

including the testimony of one of Jafari’s associates and admissions

from Macrina herself—that she received noncash benefits from

Jafari, like a luxury hotel room, a diamond ring, luggage, bedding,

and about $1,000 in landscaping. And it presented evidence that

Macrina gave Jafari preferential treatment in the contract-selection

process as well as other task-order-project-bid processes.

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

During trial, the government introduced its excerpts of the

recorded interview. Macrina objected by reiterating the arguments

from her pretrial motion. But Macrina again failed to identify any

portion of the recording that she wanted to admit into evidence.

The district court overruled her objection.

Macrina also proposed that the jury be instructed that the

“law does not prohibit a public official accepting or agreeing to ac-

cept a thing of value after performing government business, a gov-

ernment transaction, or a series of government transactions.” The

requested jury instruction stated that if the jury finds that “the De-

fendant accepted or agreed to accept anything . . . of value after

performing government business, a government transaction, or a

series of government transactions, then [it] cannot rely on that

thing of value as a basis to find the Defendant violated the law.”

The district court rejected Macrina’s proposed instruction.

The district court instead instructed the jury on the ele-

ments of the charged offense of bribery. See id. § 666. It told the

jury to determine whether the government proved beyond a rea-

sonable doubt that Macrina “was an agent of the City of Atlanta”

who “accepted or agreed to accept a thing [of ] value[]” and who,

“in return for the acceptance or agreement to accept, . . . intended

to be influenced or rewarded for a transaction or series of transac-

tions of the City of Atlanta involving something worth $5,000 or

more.” And the district court instructed the jury that the govern-

ment had to prove that Macrina “acted corruptly” to convict her.

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23-10734 Opinion of the Court 7

The district court also instructed the jury that Macrina was

not on trial for violating the City ethics code and that the jury could

convict her only if it found that the government proved each ele-

ment of the federal charges beyond a reasonable doubt:

Now, ladies and gentlemen, throughout this trial, you

have heard evidence about various City of Atlanta

ethics rules. This is a federal trial, and the defendant

is not on trial for violating any City ethics rules. De-

fendant is only on trial for violating the federal laws I

have explained to you. Defendant can only be con-

victed of those federal laws if you agree that the gov-

ernment has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each

and every element of those federal laws.

No party objected to this instruction. Indeed, when the district

court proposed the limiting instruction, Macrina’s counsel re-

sponded, “Okay. We can live with that.”

The jury convicted Macrina of bribery and conspiracy to

commit bribery. The district court sentenced her to 54 months for

each conviction, to be served concurrently, and concurrent three-

year terms of supervised release for each conviction.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018). We must

affirm unless the district court made a clear error of judgment or

applied an incorrect legal standard. Id. This Court “may affirm on

any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether that

ground was relied upon or even considered below.” Waldman v.

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017). We also review a re-

fusal to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Focia, 869 F.3d 1269, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing United

States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007)). We reverse

“only if we are left with a substantial . . . doubt as to whether the

jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Browne, 505 F.3d at

1276 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we explain

that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed

the government to play only portions of the recording of the final

interview. Second, we explain that the district court did not abuse

its discretion when it admitted the ethics code into evidence be-

cause it was relevant and not substantially more prejudicial than

probative. Last, we explain that the district court did not abuse its

discretion when it declined to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruc-

tion because the proposed instruction was not an accurate state-

ment of the law.

A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by

Admitting Portions of the Recording.

Macrina challenges the admission of portions of the record-

ing of her final interview. She asserts that additional portions of the

recording should have been admitted under Federal Rule of Evi-

dence 106, which governs “Remainder of or Related Writings or

Recorded Statements.” FED. R. EVID. 106. The rule applies when a

party introduces only part of a writing or recorded statement, and

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23-10734 Opinion of the Court 9

it allows the opposing party to introduce other portions of that

writing or recorded statement that “in fairness ought to be consid-

ered at the same time.” Id. The opposing party must identify the

other portions of the writing or recording that he wants admitted

into evidence:

If a party introduces all or part of a writing or rec-

orded statement, an adverse party may require the in-

troduction, at that time, of any other part—or any

other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness

ought to be considered at the same time.

Id. The rule does not limit its application to only certain kinds of

writings or recorded statements.

The district court denied Macrina’s Rule 106 objection on

the ground that Rule 106 applies only to custodial statements. The

district court erred, but we affirm on another ground.

The district court misunderstood Rule 106. Our precedents

have never limited the application of the rule to custodial state-

ments. The contrary idea stems from a misreading of precedents

that hold that we do not ordinarily allow self-serving hearsay to be

introduced through other witnesses because it evades cross-exami-

nation in contravention of the hearsay rule, see United States v. Cun-

ningham, 194 F.3d 1186, 1199 (11th Cir. 1999), and that Rule 106 ex-

tends to “post-arrest oral statements,” United States v. Santos, 947

F.3d 711, 730 (11th Cir. 2020). In Cunningham, we held that a de-

fendant “cannot attempt to introduce an exculpatory statement

made at the time of his arrest without subjecting himself to cross-

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10 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

examination” because the hearsay rule forbids that attempt. 194

F.3d at 1199. But Cunningham was not limited to the context of

Rule 106 or the context of custodial statements. Its holding involves

a general rule against admitting self-serving hearsay. And our hold-

ing in Santos, which extended Rule 106 to post-arrest oral state-

ments, did not limit the application of Rule 106 to custodial state-

ments. See 947 F.3d at 730.

Nothing in the text of Rule 106 limits its application to cus-

todial statements. The rule applies to criminal and civil cases. If

Rule 106 had a custodial requirement, it would not apply in any

civil case that did not involve custody. We decline to hold that

Rule 106 applies to only custodial statements without a clear tex-

tual warrant.

Yet we affirm on another ground. Macrina’s objection

should not have been sustained because Rule 106 does not make an

entire writing or recorded statement always admissible, and Ma-

crina failed to timely identify the specific portions of the recording

that she wanted to admit.

Rule 106 “‘does not automatically make the entire docu-

ment admissible’ once one portion has been introduced.” Id. (quot-

ing United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 944 (11th Cir.

1988)). Instead, “Rule 106 permits introduction only of additional

material that is relevant and is necessary to qualify, explain, or place

into context the portion already introduced.” Id. (citations and in-

ternal quotation marks omitted). Rule 106 refers to the evidence to

be introduced under the rule as “any other part—or any other writing

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23-10734 Opinion of the Court 11

or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the

same time.” FED. R. EVID. 106 (emphasis added). The objecting

party must point to the specific portions he wants admitted so that

the district court can assess their admissibility on fairness grounds.

Our sister circuits read the rule the same way that we do.

The Eighth Circuit has held that the party seeking to admit a con-

versation under Rule 106 “must specify the portion of the testi-

mony that is relevant to the issue at trial and that qualifies or ex-

plains portions already admitted.” United States v. King, 351 F.3d 859,

866 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

And the Fifth Circuit has explained the need for specificity in ana-

lyzing fairness under Rule 106. See United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d

699, 727–29 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Herman, 997 F.3d 251,

267 (5th Cir. 2021). It explained that it did “no violence to criminal

defendants’ constitutional rights by applying Rule 106 as written

and requiring that a defendant demonstrate with particularity the

unfairness in the selective admission of his post-arrest statement.”

Branch, 91 F.3d at 729 (emphasis added). A defendant must point to

exact quotations or directly cite the portions of document or re-

cording to benefit from the fairness analysis of Rule 106. See id. at

728–29; Herman, 997 F.3d at 267.

The text of Rule 106 requires the opposing party to intro-

duce “any other part” of a writing or recording that should be con-

sidered for fairness. FED. R. EVID. 106. The rule does not provide

that a party may invoke the rule and never specify the parts he

wishes to admit. And the specificity requirement correctly places

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

the burden of production on the party seeking to introduce the ev-

idence.

If we allowed general objections to suffice under Rule 106,

the district court would have to review the entire writing or record-

ing and determine if certain portions were needed for fairness.

Here, the district court would have had to review the entire 1-hour-

and-45-minute-long recording carefully and identify portions that

might be admissible under Rule 106. That obligation would be un-

duly burdensome for a district court during trial. The party seeking

to benefit from Rule 106 is already familiar with the evidence and

is better positioned to identify additional portions that should be

admitted for fairness. To benefit from Rule 106, a party must iden-

tify for the district court the specific additional parts of a writing or

recording.

Because Macrina did not identify specific portions of the re-

cording that she wanted to admit, she did not comply with

Rule 106. At trial, Macrina generally objected to the introduction

of the recorded excerpts but did not offer other specific excerpts

for admission: her counsel adopted only the argument raised in the

pretrial motion. But Macrina’s pretrial motion also did not identify

the specific portions of the recording that she wanted to admit.

The only mention of specific portions of the recording ap-

pears in a footnote of Macrina’s pretrial motion. In the footnote,

Macrina stated that the district court had already received a copy

of the full transcript of the recording and that “counsel [could] pro-

vide the Court with a copy of the transcript that shows the portions

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23-10734 Opinion of the Court 13

of the transcript in yellow highlight that the government intends

to play to the jury and in blue highlight what Ms. Macrina has re-

quested be played.” She did not provide the highlighted transcript

to the district court before trial. Indeed, she did not submit the

highlighted transcript to the district court until after the verdict.

Before trial, Macrina only offered to provide the portions she wanted

the district court to admit.

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by

Admitting the Code of Ethics.

Macrina argues that the district court abused its discretion

when it admitted the City Code of Ethics into evidence. She con-

tends that the code was not relevant and that even if it were rele-

vant, its admission was substantially more prejudicial than proba-

tive. We disagree.

Relevant evidence is admissible unless the Constitution, a

federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules pre-

scribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. Id. R. 402. “The

standard for what constitutes relevant evidence is a low one.”

United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1120 (11th Cir. 2002). Evi-

dence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less

probable” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the ac-

tion.” FED. R. EVID. 401.

The City code was relevant to prove Macrina’s corrupt in-

tent. Evidence of violations of ethical rules or regulations can es-

tablish corrupt intent and be admissible if it is relevant to the

charged conduct. See United States v. Stefan, 784 F.2d 1093, 1098

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

(11th Cir. 1986) (evidence of violations of a civil statute were ad-

missible in a criminal trial because the civil violations established

the defendant’s knowledge that he was violating the criminal stat-

ute); see also United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 433 (4th Cir. 1993)

(evidence of the judicial canon of ethics was admissible and rele-

vant to prove intent and absence of mistake when coupled with an

appropriate limiting instruction); United States v. Harvard, 103 F.3d

412, 422 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Evidence of civil banking regulations is

admissible for the limited purpose of showing the defendant’s mo-

tive or intent.”). For example, a failure to follow disclosure require-

ments can be evidence of corrupt intent. United States v. Roberson,

998 F.3d 1237, 1249 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that, among other ev-

idence, “nondisclosure of the [bribe] payments” and “the failure of

the parties to inform [federal agencies] of their financial relation-

ship support the inference that the payments were made with a

corrupt state of mind”); United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1197

(11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he extent to which the parties went to conceal

their bribes is powerful evidence of their corrupt intent.”). Because

her failure to comply with the code makes Macrina’s intent to ac-

cept a bribe more probable, the code is relevant evidence. See FED.

R. EVID. 401.

Macrina argues that even if the code were relevant, the dis-

trict court abused its discretion because the admission of the code

was substantially more prejudicial than probative. She contends

that the government’s repeated references to the code confused

and misled the jurors. The government responds that the evidence

was highly probative and that cross-examination and a limiting

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23-10734 Opinion of the Court 15

instruction to the jury cured any undue prejudice. We agree with

the government.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the district court may

exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially out-

weighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair preju-

dice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. FED. R. EVID. 403;

see also Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1120. Rule 403 is an “extraordinary rem-

edy” that the district court “should invoke sparingly, and the bal-

ance should be struck in favor of admissibility.” Tinoco, 304 F.3d at

1120 (alterations adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). When we review issues under Rule 403, we “look at the

evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its

probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.”

United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th Cir. 1989). We defer

to the discretion of the district court on “whether the probative

value was outweighed by an unfair prejudice,” and we reverse the

decision to admit the testimony “only if it were clearly an abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 533 (11th Cir.

1996).

The district court did not abuse its discretion. Even if the

admission of the code could have unfairly prejudiced Macrina, the

limiting instruction cured that unfairness. We have held that a lim-

iting instruction in the context of Rule 403 evidence may mitigate

the risk of unfair harm. See id. at 533–34; see also Samia v. United

States, 143 S. Ct. 2004, 2013 (2023) (“Evidence at trial is often ad-

mitted for a limited purpose, accompanied by a limiting

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16 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

instruction. And our legal system presumes that jurors will attend

closely the particular language of such instructions in a criminal

case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow them.”

(alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-

ted)). The district court instructed the jury that Macrina was not on

trial for violating the code and that she could be convicted only if

the government proved each element of the charged offenses be-

yond a reasonable doubt. And Macrina consented to that limiting

instruction when it was proposed. Because we “presume that ju-

rors follow the instructions given by the district court,” United

States v. Almanzar, 634 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2011), this limiting

instruction mitigated any risk of undue prejudice.

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When

It Rejected Macrina’s Proposed Bribery Instruction.

Macrina argues that the district court erred when it refused

to instruct the jury that the statute defining the charged offense,

section 666(a)(1)(B), prohibits bribes but not gratuities. Macrina

contends that if the jury accepted the government’s view—that

Macrina agreed to accept certain things of value from Jafari after

performing official acts benefiting him—the payment would be a

gratuity and not a bribe. She maintains that her requested jury in-

struction on the bribery-gratuity distinction was crucial and that

the failure to give this instruction prejudiced her. The government

responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

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declining to give Macrina’s proposed instruction because the in-

struction misstated the law. We again agree with the government.

The refusal to give a requested jury instruction is an abuse

of discretion if the instruction “is a substantially correct statement

of the law”; “was not covered by the charge actually given”; and

“dealt with some point in the trial so important that failure to give

the instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to present

an effective defense.” Focia, 869 F.3d at 1282. A defendant must es-

tablish each condition to warrant a reversal for abuse of discretion.

See id. at 1283.

Macrina’s proposed jury instruction purported to explain

the difference between a bribe and a gratuity. Whether a payment

is a bribe or a gratuity can be “difficult to discern” because “the

distinction, in many cases, will turn on the intent of the payer.”

United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997). “If the

payer’s intent is to influence or affect future actions, then the pay-

ment is a bribe. If, on the other hand, the payer intends the money

as a reward for actions the payee has already taken, or is already

committed to take, then the payment is a gratuity.” Id. (citing

United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1159 (1st Cir. 1993)).

Macrina’s proposed instruction wrongly asserted that a pay-

ment received after an official act is completed is always a gratuity

and can never be a bribe. As the Supreme Court recently explained

in Snyder v. United States, a payment after an official act can violate

section 666 if an official earlier agrees to the future reward and ac-

cepts payment after completion of the act. 144 S. Ct. 1947, 1959

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-10734

(2024). In Snyder, the Supreme Court held that gratuities are not a

crime under section 666. Id. at 1954. But the Court made clear that

the key difference between a gratuity and a bribe is whether the

official and the payer agreed to a payment for the official act. See id.

If there were an agreement before the official act was complete to

make a payment for that act, the payment received after the act

could still be considered a bribe. See id.

Macrina’s proposed jury instruction misstated the law be-

cause it failed to acknowledge the importance of the timing of an

agreement to receive payment. Her proposed instruction stated

that accepting a thing of value after the official action was complete

would never be a bribe. Macrina requested that the jury be in-

structed that the “law does not prohibit a public official accepting

or agreeing to accept a thing of value after performing government

business, a government transaction, or a series of government

transactions,” and that if the jury finds that “the Defendant accepted

or agreed to accept anything . . . of value after performing govern-

ment business, a government transaction, or a series of govern-

ment transactions, then [it] cannot rely on that thing of value as a

basis to find the Defendant violated the law.”

Snyder held that if an official agrees to accept payment for an

official act and does not receive payment until after the act is com-

plete, the payment is still considered a bribe. See id. The Supreme

Court posited a hypothetical in which “a bribe [is charged] where

the agreement was made before the act but the payment was made

after the act.” Id. The Supreme Court noted that an “official might

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23-10734 Opinion of the Court 19

try to defend against the bribery charge by saying that the payment

was received only after the official act and therefore could not have

‘influenced’ the act.” Id. But the Court explained that this argument

must fail: “By including the term ‘rewarded,’ Congress made clear

that the timing of the agreement is the key, not the timing of the

payment, and thereby precluded such a potential defense.” Id. So

the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give Ma-

crina’s proposed jury instruction, which erroneously made the tim-

ing of the payment instead of the timing of the agreement the key

issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM Macrina’s convictions.