Prakash v. Parulekar

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Appellate Court Date: 2021.12.09

15:11:08 -06'00'

Prakash v. Parulekar, 2020 IL App (1st) 191819

Appellate Court JAI PRAKASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SATISH PARULEKAR,

Caption Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Fourth Division

No. 1-19-1819

Filed September 30, 2020

Modified upon

denial of rehearing December 3, 2020

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-L-8559; the

Review Hon. Moira S. Johnson, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.

Counsel on Jai Prakash, of Naperville, appellant pro se.

Appeal

William T. Eveland, Hal R. Morris, and Elizabeth A. Thompson, of

Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment

and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff, Jai Prakash, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County that

dismissed with prejudice his two-count amended complaint, which alleged claims of

intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and defamation per se against defendant

Satish Parulekar.

¶2 On appeal, plaintiff argues that he sufficiently pled his IIED and defamation claims, he did

not release those claims in a settlement agreement with the university, and he produced clear

and convincing evidence that defendant’s acts were not immunized from liability.

¶3 For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 1

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 Plaintiff and defendant were both tenured professors of chemical engineering at Illinois

Institute of Technology (IIT). In 2008, plaintiff eliminated the position of associate chair of

the chemical and biological engineering department, which at the time was occupied by

defendant. Later, in 2011, defendant became the department’s acting chair, and plaintiff

reported to him. Also in 2011, plaintiff appointed a research professor who worked on

plaintiff’s off-site research project.

¶6 According to plaintiff, defendant retaliated against him for eliminating the associate chair

position by severely harassing plaintiff in 2011 and 2012. This alleged harassment included

defendant, as the department chair, initiating in 2012 an investigation of plaintiff’s research

projects.

¶7 In August 2013, IIT’s dean and a past provost removed defendant from the acting

department chair position. On November 6, 2013, that past provost and IIT’s general counsel

sent defendant e-mails that stated IIT, after a six-month-long investigation, found no

misconduct by plaintiff.

¶8 Also, on November 6, 2013, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with IIT to

resolve several claims, including the unauthorized reduction of his salary and his proper actions

concerning the appointment of the research professor. Under this agreement, plaintiff received

$37,990.55 and other benefits and released IIT and its current and former employees from

every waivable claim, damage, and liability that he had as a result of any matter from the start

of his employment with IIT through November 6, 2013, arising out of or based upon any act,

omission, or event that occurred or should have occurred prior to November 6, 2013, including,

without limitation, any allegation of defamation, IIED, workplace harassment, retaliation,

whistleblowing, invasion of privacy, and negligence or any other tort.

¶9 In February 2014, defendant made complaints to federal agencies and Argonne National

Laboratory, plaintiff’s key research funding agency, raising the same allegations against

plaintiff of fraud and criminal misuse of federal funds that defendant had raised in IIT’s 2012

investigation. Thereafter, Argonne National Laboratory discontinued plaintiff’s research

project, and federal agents conducted a comprehensive investigation, which included

inspecting documents, interviewing administrators of IIT and Argonne National Laboratory,

In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this

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appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.

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and interviewing plaintiff at his home. On February 21, 2014, IIT’s general counsel sent a

litigation hold letter to IIT individuals, informing them that a federal agency was investigating

plaintiff regarding his research projects. When the federal agency concluded its investigation,

it found no wrongdoing by plaintiff.

¶ 10 On August 8, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging claims of IIED

and defamation per se and “seek[ing] redress for a prolonged pattern of misconduct ***

spanning over seven (7) years.”

¶ 11 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016)), arguing that (1) plaintiff’s pleading

could not rely on any events before November 6, 2013, because his settlement agreement with

IIT limited the time and scope of his claims, (2) any defamation claims before August 8, 2017,

were barred as outside the one-year statute of limitations, and (3) plaintiff’s alleged

embarrassment was not sufficient to plead an IIED claim.

¶ 12 On March 7, 2019, the trial court granted the section 2-615 portion of defendant’s motion

to dismiss, reserved ruling on the section 2-619 portion of the motion, and granted plaintiff

leave to file an amended complaint.

¶ 13 Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged against defendant (count I) a claim of IIED based

on defendant’s pattern of egregious misconduct each year from 2011 to 2018, which was

intended to destroy plaintiff’s research, projects, and career; was extreme and outrageous and

intended to inflict severe emotional distress; and caused plaintiff to suffer extreme emotional,

mental, physical, and financial distress.

¶ 14 Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s conduct before November 6, 2013 (the

effective date of the settlement agreement), included making false statements and maliciously

providing false information about plaintiff’s employment contracts and changing the contract

language without justification or notice to reduce plaintiff’s $130,000 nine-month base salary

to $118,755; harassing plaintiff by questioning his 2011 appointment of the research professor

and falsely stating to IIT’s dean, officials, past provosts, counsel, faculty, and others that

plaintiff had engaged in fraudulent conduct and criminal activity by misusing federal funds

when he appointed the research professor; initiating in 2012, pursuant to defendant’s authority

as the department chair, a false, selective, and retaliatory investigation by IIT of plaintiff’s

research projects; sending to the dean and colleagues of the appointed research professor

malevolent e-mails that disclosed his private and confidential family information and caused

him to resign from his position as a key member of plaintiff’s research group; and in May 2013

sharing with two IIT professors, who had no role in and were unaware of IIT’s investigation

of plaintiff, a confidential letter from a past provost to plaintiff that contained defamatory

information about plaintiff regarding the investigation.

¶ 15 Furthermore, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s conduct after the November 2013 effective

date of the settlement included knowingly making false complaints in February 2014 to federal

agencies and Argonne National Laboratory that accused plaintiff of fraud and misusing federal

funds when he appointed the research professor in 2011, despite defendant’s knowledge that

IIT’s investigation had found no wrongdoing by plaintiff; in 2015, making false and

defamatory statements about plaintiff to IIT faculty members who were not aware of IIT’s

prior investigation of plaintiff; in February 2016, sending to 23 individuals a letter alleging

that defendant had received an anonymous threat letter and alluding to the federal investigation

of plaintiff; in August 2016, sending to 28 people a letter falsely accusing “individual C,”

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whom the letter recipients would understand to be plaintiff, of sending the anonymous threat

letter to defendant, invading defendant’s home, and accessing his computers; in 2017, falsely

blaming plaintiff for sending defendant a letter; and sending 26 people an e-mail on March 4,

2018, that stated that a federal agency was investigating federal grants awarded to an individual

and including attachments to ensure the recipients would identify plaintiff as the subject of the

investigation. Plaintiff asserted that defendant’s false 2014 complaints to federal agencies

resulted in federal agents interviewing plaintiff at his home for over one hour in front of his

family, which was the most embarrassing, humiliating, and traumatic event plaintiff or his

family ever endured, destroyed plaintiff’s mental and physical health, and caused him to have

recurring nightmares and seek medical help.

¶ 16 Plaintiff also alleged against defendant (count II) a claim of defamation per se, based on

false statements defendant made about plaintiff in defendant’s March 4, 2018, e-mail and

attached March 2, 2018, letter. Plaintiff alleged that this e-mail imputed to him the commission

of an indictable criminal offense, prejudiced him in his profession, and suggested that he lacked

integrity in the performance or discharge of his employment duties. Furthermore, defendant

published this correspondence to numerous third parties and caused plaintiff to suffer

emotionally and financially.

¶ 17 Defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code,

arguing plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed under (1) section 2-619(a)(6) of

the Code because his claims based on conduct before November 6, 2013, were released under

the terms of his settlement agreement; (2) section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (id. § 2-619(a)(9)),

because plaintiff’s attempt to sue defendant for reporting him to the federal government

constituted retaliation against defendant for engaging in his right to petition the government,

which was protected conduct under the Citizen Participation Act (Act) (735 ILCS 110/1 et seq.

(West 2016)); and (3) section 2-615 of the Code because plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a

cause of action for IIED.

¶ 18 In his response, plaintiff argued that (1) he did not release any claims against defendant,

who was neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of plaintiff’s settlement agreement with

IIT; (2) the Act did not bar plaintiff’s claims because defendant’s defamatory statements to

many people with no connection to the government were not protected, defendant did not

intend to secure favorable government action but rather acted to harass plaintiff, and plaintiff’s

complaint was filed years after defendant’s complained-of conduct and thus was not

retaliatory; and (3) plaintiff sufficiently pled his IIED claim against defendant, who had been

the department chair, based on his position of power over plaintiff and pattern of misconduct

every year from 2011 to 2018.

¶ 19 On August 14, 2019, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended

complaint with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code and the immunities

afforded by the Act. Plaintiff appealed.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 Section 2-619.1 of the Code “permits a party to combine a section 2-615 motion to dismiss

based upon plaintiff’s substantially insufficient pleadings with a section 2-619 motion to

dismiss based on certain defects or defenses.” Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw &

Culbertson, 338 Ill. App. 3d 156, 164 (2003). A section 2-615 motion to dismiss attacks the

legal sufficiency of a complaint. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 484 (1994).

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Illinois is a fact pleading state, and a court cannot rely upon conclusions of law or conclusory

factual allegations unsupported by specific facts in ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss.

Alpha School Bus Co. v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 735 (2009). A section 2-619 motion

“allows for an involuntary dismissal of a claim based on certain defects or defenses.” Illinois

Graphics Co., 159 Ill. 2d at 485. A motion to dismiss pursuant to a release is brought under

section 2-619(a)(6) (People ex rel. Devine v. Time Consumer Marketing, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 3d

74, 78 (2002)), and a motion to dismiss based upon the Act is made pursuant to section 2-

619(a)(9) (Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 54). When ruling on section 2-615 and 2-

619 motions, the court should view the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, while accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Stein v.

Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 12; Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL

App (4th) 120139, ¶ 25.

¶ 22 This court reviews the dismissal of a complaint under sections 2-615 and 2-619 de novo.

Dawson v. City of Geneseo, 2018 IL App (3d) 170625, ¶¶ 11, 17; see also Thomas v.

Weatherguard Construction Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 142785, ¶ 63 (de novo consideration

means the appellate court performs the same analysis that a trial judge would perform). This

court may affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of a complaint “on any basis supported by the

record.” Dawson, 2018 IL App (3d) 170625, ¶ 11.

¶ 23 A. The Effect of the 2013 Settlement Agreement

¶ 24 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s amended complaint was subject to dismissal under section

2-619(a)(6) of the Code because the settlement agreement between plaintiff and IIT prevented

plaintiff from relying on any allegations of defendant’s conduct before the November 6, 2013,

effective date of that agreement to support plaintiff’s claims of IIED and defamation.

¶ 25 “A release is the abandonment of a claim to the person against whom the claim exists.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Borsellino v. Putnam, 2011 IL App (1st) 102242, ¶ 103. A

release is governed by contract law, and the language of the release should be given its plain

meaning. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n v. Wroblewski, 382 Ill. App. 3d 688, 696-97

(2008). “Where the terms of a contractual release are clear and explicit, a reviewing court must

enforce them as written.” Id. at 697. “The interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo

review.” In re Liquidation of Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 171613,

¶ 62. “[W]hen a motion to dismiss is based upon a release, the burden *** shifts to the plaintiff

to sufficiently allege and prove that a material issue of fact exists which would invalidate the

release.” Janowiak v. Tiesi, 402 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1005 (2010).

¶ 26 We described in detail above the relevant provisions of the 2013 settlement agreement

between plaintiff and IIT, and our review of the plain terms of that agreement establishes that

plaintiff released and fully discharged IIT and its current and past employees from all claims

arising before November 6, 2013, including any claims for defamation and IIED. Defendant

was an employee of IIT during the relevant time period, and defendant submitted an affidavit

from an appropriate custodian of IIT’s records, who verified the authenticity of the copy of the

2013 settlement agreement contained in the record. Furthermore, even though the settlement

agreement did not specifically name defendant as a third-party beneficiary, the agreement

adequately defined a class of individual beneficiaries, i.e., current and past employees of IIT,

of which defendant was clearly a member. See Crawford v. Belhaven Realty LLC, 2018 IL

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App (1st) 170731, ¶ 55 (a third party has rights under a contract if he is an intended beneficiary,

i.e., someone whom the parties intended to directly benefit by the performance of the contract,

and courts determine whether a third-party beneficiary is intended by considering the language

of the contract and the circumstances surrounding its execution). Finally, because the

settlement agreement is not ambiguous, we do not consider the e-mails from members of IIT,

which plaintiff offered to support his claim that IIT indicated he could properly file these IIED

and defamation claims against defendant. See Owens v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 316 Ill.

App. 3d 340, 344 (2000).

¶ 27 We conclude that plaintiff released all claims against defendant arising out of pre-

November 6, 2013, conduct. Accordingly, we review the dismissal of plaintiff’s IIED and

defamation claims absent any allegations of defendant’s conduct before that date.

¶ 28 Consequently, plaintiff’s IIED claim is limited to his allegations that defendant knowingly

made false complaints to federal agencies and Argonne National Laboratory in February 2014

that accused plaintiff of fraud and misusing federal funds when he appointed a research

professor in 2011 to work on plaintiff’s off-site research project; based on defendant’s

knowingly false complaints, a federal agency conducted a comprehensive investigation, which

included two federal agents interviewing plaintiff for over one hour at his home in front of his

family; that interview was the most embarrassing, humiliating, and traumatic event plaintiff or

his family ever endured; and that investigation and interview destroyed plaintiff’s mental and

physical health and caused him to have recurring nightmares and seek medical help.

¶ 29 Also as part of his IIED claim, plaintiff alleged defendant engaged in a prolonged pattern

of misconduct that included making false and defamatory statements about plaintiff in 2015 to

IIT faculty who were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation of plaintiff; sending to 23

individuals in February 2016 a letter alleging that defendant had received an anonymous threat

letter and alluding to the federal investigation of plaintiff; sending to 28 people in August 2016

a letter falsely accusing “individual C,” whom the letter recipients would understand to be

plaintiff, of sending the anonymous threat letter to defendant, invading defendant’s home, and

accessing his computers; falsely blaming plaintiff in 2017 for sending defendant a letter; and

sending 26 people an e-mail on March 4, 2018, which stated that a federal agency was

investigating federal grants awarded to an individual and including attachments to ensure the

recipients would identify plaintiff as the subject of the investigation. As a result of defendant’s

prolonged pattern of misconduct, plaintiff suffered extreme emotional, mental, physical, and

financial distress.

¶ 30 Furthermore, plaintiff’s defamation per se claim is limited to his allegations that defendant

sent an e-mail on March 4, 2018, to numerous third parties both inside and outside of IIT; this

e-mail included a March 2, 2018, letter; defendant stated in these materials that the federal

government was investigating federal grants awarded to plaintiff; defendant implied in these

materials, knowingly and falsely, that plaintiff was involved in embezzlement and a financial

conspiracy to defraud the government; many of the third-party recipients of defendant’s March

2018 materials were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation of this matter, which had exonerated

plaintiff of any wrongdoing; the publication of defendant’s March 2018 materials prejudiced

plaintiff in his profession and suggested he lacked integrity in the performance or discharge of

his employment duties; and this publication caused plaintiff to suffer emotionally and

financially.

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¶ 31 B. Immunity Based on the Right to Petition the Government

¶ 32 Plaintiff argues the trial court erred when it dismissed with prejudice his IIED and

defamation per se claims based on immunities afforded under the Act for the protected activity

of petitioning the government to obtain favorable government action.

¶ 33 The Act was created as anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation)

legislation. Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 33. SLAPPs are lawsuits “ ‘aimed at preventing

citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so.’ ” Id.

(quoting Wright Development Group, LLC v. Walsh, 238 Ill. 2d 620, 630 (2010)). “Plaintiffs

in SLAPP suits do not intend to win but rather to chill a defendant’s speech or protest activity

and discourage opposition by others through delay, expense, and distraction.” Id. ¶ 34.

“SLAPPs use the threat of money damages or the prospect of the cost of defending against the

suits to silence citizen participation.” Wright Development Group, LLC, 238 Ill. 2d at 630.

“The purpose of the Act is to give relief, including monetary relief, to citizens who have been

victimized by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits because of their ‘act or acts’ made ‘in

furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in

government.’ ” Id. at 633 (quoting 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008)). A motion to dismiss based

on immunity under the Act is properly raised under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code wherein

the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint is admitted, but the motion asserts that certain

defects or defenses outside of the pleadings defeat the claim. Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 55.

¶ 34 Plaintiff’s lawsuit may only be dismissed due to immunity under the Act if (1) the movant’s

acts were in furtherance of his rights to petition, speak, associate, or otherwise participate in

government to obtain favorable government action; (2) plaintiff’s claims were solely based on,

related to, or in response to the movant’s acts in furtherance of his rights of petition, speech,

association, or other participation in government (this prong is satisfied if the movant

demonstrates that the lawsuit is meritless and was filed in retaliation of the movant’s protected

activities to deter him from further engaging in those activities); and (3) plaintiff failed to

produce clear and convincing evidence that the movant’s acts were not genuinely aimed at

procuring favorable government action. See 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2016); Sandholm, 2012

IL 111443, ¶¶ 45, 52, 56; Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 120005,

¶ 21. If the movant meets his burden under the first two prongs of the analysis, the court must

decide whether the plaintiff has met his burden under the third prong of the analysis. Stein,

2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 17.

¶ 35 If plaintiff’s claims genuinely sought relief for damages for the alleged IIED and

defamation per se by defendant, the claims are not solely based on defendant’s rights of

petition, speech, association, or participation in government (see Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443,

¶ 45), and accordingly, “it is irrelevant whether the defendant[’s] actions were ‘genuinely

aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome.’ ” (id. ¶ 53 (quoting 735

ILCS 110/15 (West 2008))). The clear language of the Act establishes that it was not intended

to protect those who commit tortious acts and then seek refuge in the immunity conferred by

the Act. Id. ¶ 45.

¶ 36 Addressing plaintiff’s IIED claim first, we determine whether defendant’s complained-of

actions after the November 6, 2013, release were protected under the Act by considering

whether his actions were in furtherance of his constitutional rights of petition, speech,

association, or participation in government to obtain favorable government action. Defendant’s

complaints to federal agencies in February 2014 were made to government officials in an effort

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to obtain favorable government action by way of preventing plaintiff from allegedly misusing

federal funds in the appointment of a research professor. See 735 ILCS 110/10 (West 2016);

see also Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler, 405 Ill. App. 3d 113, 120 (2010). However, defendant’s

alleged prolonged pattern of misconduct from 2015 to 2018—i.e., making false and defamatory

statements about plaintiff to IIT faculty members who were unaware of IIT’s prior

investigation of plaintiff and sending numerous people in 2016 and 2018 letters alluding to the

federal investigation of plaintiff and falsely accusing him of sending defendant an anonymous

threat letter, invading defendant’s home, and accessing defendant’s computers—were not

actions in furtherance of defendant’s right to petition or participate in government to obtain

favorable government action. Defendant’s assertion to the contrary is not supported by citation

to any relevant authority. See U.S. Bank v. Lindsey, 397 Ill. App. 3d 437, 459 (2009) (a

reviewing court is not a repository into which a party may dump the burden of argument or

research, and the failure to support an argument with pertinent authority results in forfeiture of

the argument). Defendant cannot credibly argue that his alleged conduct from 2015 to 2018 of

sending correspondence to various nongovernment people both inside and outside of IIT was

an effort to obtain an investigation of plaintiff’s alleged misconduct because IIT in 2012 had

already conducted its six-month-long investigation and exonerated plaintiff of any wrongdoing

and defendant had already filed his complaints with the federal agencies in 2014.

¶ 37 Although defendant met his burden under the first prong of the analysis to obtain immunity

under the Act for his complaints to federal agencies in 2014, he did not meet this burden for

his alleged prolonged pattern of misconduct from 2015 to 2018 based on his false statements

about plaintiff to people who were not members of a government agency. Furthermore, even

if a movant’s activities were the kind that the Act is designed to protect, a plaintiff’s lawsuit is

not necessarily deemed a SLAPP and therefore subject to dismissal under the Act. Stein, 2013

IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 16.

¶ 38 Under the second prong of the analysis, defendant has the burden to show that plaintiff’s

IIED claim was solely based on, related to, or in response to defendant’s acts in furtherance of

his right to petition the government. See Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters v. Jursich,

2013 IL App (1st) 113279, ¶ 20. To satisfy this burden, defendant must affirmatively

demonstrate that plaintiff’s suit was retaliatory and meritless. Garrido v. Arena, 2013 IL App

(1st) 120466, ¶ 18. To determine whether plaintiff’s IIED claim was retaliatory within the

meaning of the Act, we consider (1) the proximity in time between the protected activity and

the filing of the complaint, and (2) whether the damages requested are reasonably related to

the facts alleged in the complaint and present a good-faith estimate of the injury sustained. See

Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶ 23. Furthermore, a movant “for dismissal under the Act

can show that a claim is ‘meritless’ only ‘if a movant disproves some essential element of the

nonmovant’s claim.’ ” Chadha v. North Park Elementary School Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st)

171958, ¶ 95 (quoting Garrido, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶ 19).

¶ 39 Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on August 8, 2018, which was over four years after defendant

made his February 2014 complaints to the federal agencies. In addition, plaintiff’s IIED claim

was not intended to chill the protected activities to petition or participate in government

because defendant had already participated in the protected activity of petitioning the

government in February 2014, plaintiff had already been allegedly injured by defendant’s

petitioning, and there was no basis for defendant to further petition the government and cause

plaintiff further injury. See id. ¶ 98. Furthermore, plaintiff, who seeks compensatory damages

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for his destroyed mental and physical health and extreme emotional and financial distress, does

not seek millions of dollars in punitive damages like the classic SLAPP situation (see id. ¶ 99),

and defendant fails to show that plaintiff’s ad damnum was unreasonable.

¶ 40 It was defendant’s burden to “show that there are undisputed facts that demonstrate

plaintiff’s claim is meritless.” Ryan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120005, ¶ 26. Because this court

reviews a motion to dismiss under the Act pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code, we must

presume the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s IIED claim. Id. ¶ 22. A claim is meritless if the

moving party disproves some essential element of the nonmovant’s claim. Garrido, 2013 IL

App (1st) 120466, ¶ 19. Therefore, we may consider whether plaintiff has alleged sufficient

facts to show the claim was genuine and not factually baseless. Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443,

¶ 43; Garrido, 2013 IL App (1st) 120466, ¶ 23.

¶ 41 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s IIED claim was meritless because his actions could never

rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law since much of

defendant’s alleged misconduct was barred by the 2013 settlement agreement. As discussed

above, we have determined that the settlement agreement released the alleged misconduct of

defendant that occurred before November 6, 2013. Nevertheless, plaintiff has alleged that

defendant, despite knowing that IIT’s investigation had exonerated plaintiff of any wrongdoing

and after defendant had reported his complaints in 2014 to the federal agencies, engaged in a

prolonged pattern of extreme and outrageous conduct from 2015 to 2018 by making false

statements to numerous nongovernment people that accused plaintiff of, inter alia, fraud,

misusing federal funds and threatening defendant, all of which caused plaintiff to suffer severe

emotional distress. We find that defendant has failed to establish that plaintiff’s IIED claim

was meritless and retaliatory. We therefore conclude that plaintiff’s IIED claim did not qualify

as a SLAPP and the trial court erred in dismissing this claim with prejudice under the Act.

¶ 42 Regarding plaintiff’s defamation per se claim, defendant argues it also was based on his

protected right to petition the government. According to the amended complaint and

disregarding allegations about defendant’s activity before the November 6, 2013, effective date

of the settlement agreement, plaintiff alleged defendant sent a March 4, 2018, e-mail to

numerous nongovernmental third parties both inside and outside of IIT; this e-mail included a

March 2, 2018, letter; defendant stated in these materials that the federal government was

investigating federal grants awarded to plaintiff; defendant implied in these materials,

knowingly and falsely, that plaintiff was involved in embezzlement and a financial conspiracy

to defraud the government; many of the third-party recipients of defendant’s March 2018

materials were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation of this matter, which had concluded that

plaintiff had not engaged in any wrongdoing; the publication of defendant’s March 2018

materials prejudiced plaintiff in his profession and suggested he lacked integrity in the

performance or discharge of his employment duties; and this publication caused plaintiff to

suffer emotionally and financially by impugning his integrity and affecting his career.

¶ 43 Taking all well-pled facts as true, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, and

viewing the pleading in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff’s

defamation claim was not meritless where defendant failed to satisfy his burden under the first

and second prongs of the Act’s immunity analysis. Specifically, defendant was not acting to

further his right to petition or otherwise participate in government to obtain favorable

government action because he had already filed his complaints with the federal agencies in

2014 when he sent his e-mail and attached letter in March 2018 to numerous people who were

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not affiliated with any government agency. Furthermore, plaintiff’s defamation claim was not

solely based on defendant’s acts in furtherance of his right of petition or other participation in

government because the lawsuit was filed over four years after defendant filed his complaints

with the federal agencies and defendant has not offered any evidence to show that plaintiff’s

defamation claim lacked merit. The well-pled allegations of the amended complaint show that

IIT’s six-month-long investigation in 2012 of plaintiff’s conduct, including his use of federal

funds for his research projects, concluded that he did not engage in any wrongdoing.

Furthermore, there is no indication that defendant’s complaints to federal agencies in 2014

about plaintiff’s alleged misuse of federal funds, embezzlement, and financial conspiracy to

defraud the government resulted in any findings or actions against plaintiff.

¶ 44 We, therefore, conclude that plaintiff’s defamation claim does not qualify as a SLAPP and

the trial court erred in dismissing this claim with prejudice under the Act.

¶ 45 C. Failure to State a Cause of Action

¶ 46 Finally, defendant argues that even if dismissal of the amended complaint was improper

under subsections 2-619(a)(6) or (a)(9) of the Code, dismissal is proper under section 2-615

based on plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action for IIED and defamation. Specifically,

defendant argues that (1) he did not have a position of power or authority over plaintiff because

he was not the department chair at the time of the alleged conduct from 2014 to 2018, (2) the

alleged conduct did not constitute extreme and outrageous behavior, and (3) the six alleged

incidents that occurred from 2014 to 2018 fall far short of the type of conduct Illinois courts

have found actionable for claims of IIED.

¶ 47 To state a cause of action for IIED, a plaintiff must plead that (1) the defendant’s conduct

was extreme and outrageous, (2) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe,

and (3) the defendant knew that severe emotional distress was certain or substantially certain

to result from such conduct. Miller v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,

181 Ill. App. 3d 954, 956 (1989). “ ‘The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so

severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.’ ” McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d

78, 86 (1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j, at 77 (1965)). “[T]he tort

does not extend to ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other

trivialities.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d, at 73 (1965)). Factors

courts may consider to determine whether a defendant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous

include the intensity and duration of the distress, defendant’s degree of power or authority over

the plaintiff, defendant’s abuse of a position that gives him actual or apparent power to damage

the plaintiff’s interests, whether defendant reasonably believed that his objective was

legitimate, and defendant’s awareness that the plaintiff is susceptible to emotional distress by

reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. Id. at 86-90.

¶ 48 Stripped of all allegations of conduct before November 6, 2013, concerning released

claims, and accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, the count I IIED claim of the amended

complaint essentially alleged that for approximately five years defendant intentionally and

knowingly made false statements about plaintiff engaging in fraudulent and criminal activity

by (1) making false statements to federal agencies and Argonne National Laboratory in 2014

that accused plaintiff of misusing federal funds despite defendant’s knowledge that IIT had

exonerated plaintiff after conducting a thorough investigation of this same claim; (2) making

false and defamatory statements about plaintiff in 2015 to IIT faculty who were not aware of

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IIT’s prior investigation and exoneration of plaintiff; (3) sending to 23 individuals in February

2016 a letter alleging that defendant had received an anonymous threat letter and alluding to

the federal investigation of plaintiff; (4) sending to 28 people in August 2016 a letter falsely

accusing “individual C,” whom the letter recipients would understand to be plaintiff, of sending

the anonymous threat letter to defendant, invading defendant’s home, and accessing his

computers; (5) falsely blaming plaintiff in 2017 for sending defendant a letter; and (6) sending

26 people an e-mail on March 4, 2018, which stated that a federal agency was investigating

federal grants awarded to an individual and including attachments to ensure the recipients

would identify plaintiff as the subject of the investigation. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of

defendant’s prolonged pattern of misconduct, plaintiff suffered extreme emotional, mental,

physical, and financial distress.

¶ 49 Regarding the question of the outrageousness of defendant’s conduct, defendant argues

that plaintiff’s six alleged incidents that occurred from 2014 to 2018 fall far short of the type

of conduct Illinois courts have found actionable for IIED claims. Defendant cites, for example,

Miller v. Linden, 172 Ill. App. 3d 594, 597 (1988), where the plaintiff’s complaint stated an

IIED cause of action based on allegations that the defendant went to the plaintiff’s residence

on 13 separate occasions over a 10-month period and engaged in a variety of harassing conduct

that ranged from beating on the door and shouting obscenities to honking her car horn for

several minutes—sometimes in the presence of the plaintiff’s family and neighbors—and

continuing to do so even after being warned by the plaintiff’s attorney about the plaintiff’s

physical and emotional distress.

¶ 50 We conclude that the amended complaint alleged sufficient facts, well beyond mere insults

and trivialities, to allege the outrageous conduct element of the tort. The alleged misconduct

intensely attacked plaintiff’s professional integrity and career for a lengthy duration of five

years. Although defendant was not the department chair at the time of the alleged misconduct,

he abused his position as a tenured professor to damage plaintiff’s reputation and career by

using the same false accusations defendant made in 2012 during his tenure as the department

chair and broadly publishing those accusations to IIT administration and faculty members and

numerous other people in the larger academic and business communities who did not know

that IIT’s investigation had exonerated plaintiff. Furthermore, based on IIT’s exoneration of

plaintiff, defendant did not reasonably believe his objective was legitimate. A reasonable trier

of fact could easily conclude that defendant’s alleged conduct was so outrageous as to be

regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.

¶ 51 Additionally, plaintiff pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that he suffered severe

emotional, mental, physical, and financial distress as a result of defendant’s conduct.

According to the amended complaint, in every year from 2014 to 2018, defendant knowingly

used false allegations to attack plaintiff’s integrity, reputation, research projects, and career

and caused him to lose financial support for his research. Plaintiff alleged that defendant’s

prolonged and pervasive attacks caused plaintiff financial distress, destroyed his mental and

physical health, and caused him to have recurring nightmares and seek medical help. These

allegations, if proved, establish the severe emotional distress necessary to the tort.

¶ 52 Regarding whether defendant acted intentionally or with the knowledge that severe

emotional distress was certain or substantially certain to result, the allegations support this

element of the tort. Defendant knew that IIT’s six-month-long investigation in 2012 had

exonerated plaintiff of any wrongdoing regarding defendant’s claims that plaintiff had engaged

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in fraud and the criminal misuse of federal funds. Nevertheless, defendant, in addition to filing

complaints with federal agencies in 2014 regarding these same claims, continued making these

false claims to IIT faculty, Argonne National Laboratory, and numerous other people for

several years. Furthermore, defendant knew that his false claims had adversely affected

plaintiff’s work and resulted in federal agents conducting a comprehensive review of plaintiff’s

projects, which included interviews with plaintiff and faculty and administration at IIT and

Argonne National Laboratory. Moreover, defendant continued publishing his false allegations

to numerous people inside and outside of IIT. Such allegations sufficiently demonstrate that

defendant intended or at least knew with reasonable certainty that his conduct would damage

plaintiff’s reputation, research, and career and cause him to suffer severe emotional distress.

¶ 53 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s IIED claim does not rise to the level of intensity or

duration that no reasonable person could be expected to endure because Illinois courts have

found conduct far more egregious than that alleged by plaintiff here to be nonactionable. To

support this claim, defendant cites Ulm v. Memorial Medical Center, 2012 IL App (4th)

110421, ¶ 42, Vickers v. Abbot Laboratories, 308 Ill. App. 3d 393, 411 (1999), Lundy v. City

of Calumet City, 209 Ill. App. 3d 790, 794 (1991), Grey v. First National Bank of Chicago,

169 Ill. App. 3d 936, 945 (1988), and Gibson v. Chemical Card Services Corp., 157 Ill. App.

3d 211, 213 (1987). Defendant’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. Ulm, Vickers, Lundy,

Grey, and Gibson are distinguishable because those IIED claims were dismissed under motions

for summary judgment, not section 2-615 motions to dismiss.

¶ 54 Plaintiff’s specific pleading of defendant’s many acts toward him, as detailed above,

indicates, at this pleading stage of the proceedings, extreme and outrageous conduct going

beyond mere indignities, annoyances, or trivialities, as well as severe emotional distress

suffered by plaintiff and an intentional or reckless state of mind on the part of defendant.

Accepting the allegations in count I as true, we conclude that plaintiff’s amended complaint

adequately states a cause of action for IIED.

¶ 55 To state a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant

made a false statement about the plaintiff, (2) the defendant made an unprivileged publication

of that statement to a third party, and (3) the publication caused damages. Kainrath v. Grider,

2018 IL App (1st) 172270, ¶ 32. Relevant to this case, words that impute a person has

committed a crime or lacks integrity in performing his employment duties and words that

prejudice him in his profession are considered defamation per se (Goral v. Kulys, 2014 IL App

(1st) 133236, ¶ 41), i.e., so obviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to his

reputation may be presumed (Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388, 390 (1995)).

“A complaint for defamation must set forth the words alleged to be defamatory ‘clearly and

with particularity.’ ” Krueger v. Lewis, 342 Ill. App. 3d 467, 470 (2003) (quoting Lykowski v.

Bergman, 299 Ill. App. 3d 157, 163 (1998)).

¶ 56 Stripped of all allegations of conduct before November 6, 2013, concerning released

claims, and accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, count II of the complaint essentially alleges

that defendant sent an e-mail on March 4, 2018, to numerous third parties both inside and

outside of IIT; this e-mail included a March 2, 2018, letter; defendant stated in these materials

that the federal government was investigating federal grants awarded to plaintiff; defendant

implied in these materials, knowingly and falsely, that plaintiff was involved in embezzlement

and a financial conspiracy to defraud the government; many of the third-party recipients of

defendant’s March 2018 materials were not aware of IIT’s prior investigation of this matter,

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which had concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in any wrongdoing; the publication of

defendant’s March 2018 materials prejudiced plaintiff in his profession and suggested he

lacked integrity in the performance or discharge of his employment duties; and this publication

caused plaintiff to suffer emotionally and financially.

¶ 57 Many of these allegations set forth only a summary of the types of statements that

defendant allegedly made instead of a precise and particular account of defendant’s alleged

statements. This lack of specificity prevents the court from determining as a question of law if

the alleged statement is defamatory and prevents defendant from properly formulating a

response. See Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 492 (2009). However, the record before us

does not indicate that plaintiff would not be able to allege these facts with the requisite

specificity to state a cause of action sufficient to survive a section 2-615 motion to dismiss.

RBS Citizens, National Ass’n v. RTG-Oak Lawn, LLC, 407 Ill. App. 3d 183, 192 (2011).

Furthermore, allowing plaintiff leave to amend his defamation claim a second time would not

be futile or prejudicial to defendant where the trial court did not dismiss with prejudice the

amended complaint based on a failure to plead a claim under section 2-615 of the Code but,

rather, based on an erroneous application of the Act under section 2-619 of the Code.

¶ 58 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 59 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court that dismissed with

prejudice plaintiff’s IIED and defamation claims based on immunity afforded under the Act

for the protected activity of petitioning the government. We also reject defendant’s assertion

that section 2-615 of the Code provides another basis to dismiss plaintiff’s IIED and

defamation claims with prejudice. We remand this cause to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this decision.

¶ 60 Reversed and remanded.

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