Rafti v. Department of Human Services

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Appellate Court Date: 2021.07.13

09:51:51 -05'00'

Rafti v. Department of Human Services, 2020 IL App (2d) 190983

Appellate Court LOUIS RAFTI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF

Caption HUMAN SERVICES, Division of Rehabilitation Services,

Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Second District

No. 2-19-0983

Filed September 23, 2020

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County, No. 18-MR-880;

Review the Hon. Thomas A. Meyer, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Louis A. Rafti, of Woodstock, appellant pro se.

Appeal

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz,

Solicitor General, and Priyanka Gupta, Assistant Attorney General, of

counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Justices McLaren and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and

opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff, Louis Rafti, was found eligible to receive vocational rehabilitation services from

defendant, the Department of Human Services Division of Rehabilitation Services

(Department). Rafti thereafter sought $5017 in funding to enroll in a paralegal certificate

program. The Department denied the request, finding that additional college training was not

necessary for Rafti to obtain employment as a paralegal because Rafti had a Juris Doctor degree

and had practiced law in California for many years. Rafti filed an administrative appeal, and

after a hearing, the hearing officer issued a final administrative decision affirming the

Department’s determination. Rafti sought judicial review, and the circuit court of McHenry

County affirmed. Rafti timely appeals pro se. The issue on appeal is whether the hearing

officer’s decision, affirming the Department’s determination that the paralegal program was

not necessary for Rafti to obtain employment as a paralegal, was clearly erroneous. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On February 23, 2018, Rafti was informed via a letter from the Department that he had

been found eligible to receive vocational rehabilitation services. The Department advised Rafti

that, although he had previously submitted information to the Department about obtaining both

real estate and paralegal training, Rafti must choose one career objective and submit all the

required documentation, which was noted on an attached checklist. Thereafter, the request

would be submitted to a Department supervisor for review.

¶4 On May 15, 2018, Rafti submitted a letter to the Department requesting $5017 in funding

to pay for his enrollment in the “McHenry County College Paralegal Certificate Program” (the

paralegal program). Rafti included his resume, which indicated that he graduated from

Southwestern Law School in July 2004, passed the California bar exam in February 2005, and

practiced public interest law until 2010. Rafti also detailed numerous “legal and personal

achievements” not included on his resume. Rafti stated that “[a]lthough it has been a number

of years since [he] had to stop practicing law because of [his] health, during the interim, [he]

ha[s] had the opportunity to maintain and utilize [his] legal skills.” He described serving as

“Trustee of [his] family’s Trust” and “successfully litigating a Complaint for Administrative

Review in pro se [sic], against the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority. [It] involved an

entirely new area of legal research, regarding this area of the law in particular, and Illinois law

in general.”

¶5 On June 20, 2018, Rafti submitted an “addendum” to the May 15 letter. In the letter, Rafti

explained that, “[a]lthough [he] completed law school, passed the bar exam, and practiced law

in California for five years,” he became disabled in 2010 and was no longer able to work. A

“ ‘clerical error’ ” in January 2014 resulted in a nine-month loss of Social Security disability

payments. During that time, Rafti was unable to pay his bar fees or the cost of required

continuing legal education and, as a result, lost his license to practice law. Rafti moved to

Illinois, but he could not afford to study for and take the Illinois bar exam. He asserted that,

even though the cost to become a licensed attorney in Illinois would be less than the cost of

the paralegal program, his disability made success in reentering the workforce as an attorney

unlikely.

¶6 On June 28, 2018, the Department notified Rafti, via letter, that his request for additional

college training had been reviewed by a supervisor and denied. According to the letter, the

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supervisor found that “[c]ollege training is not necessary for [Rafti] to obtain employment”

and that “the Juris Doctor degree *** should open more opportunity than a Para-Legal Studies

Certificate.”

¶7 On July 26, 2018, Rafti appealed the Department’s decision to deny him funding to enroll

in the paralegal program. In his “Brief in Support of Appeal,” Rafti argued that the paralegal

certificate was “necessary” because he needed to learn “technical functions” such as electronic

document handling, be retrained in legal research and writing, and learn Illinois law. As

evidence, Rafti submitted (1) the February 23, 2018, letter from the Department finding him

eligible for services, (2) his June 20, 2018, addendum, and (3) a previously filed grievance

against the McHenry County College, Department of Financial Aid, alleging disability

discrimination when he was denied a front desk position. He also argued that the Department

had not developed his individualized employment plan within the requisite 90 days.

¶8 The Department submitted a response and several exhibits. The Department explained that,

although it agreed with Rafti’s decision to seek employment as a paralegal, Rafti failed to

present any evidence that he could not do so with his existing skills and qualifications. The

Department further stated that Rafti refused to attempt to find a paralegal job without first

obtaining the paralegal certificate.

¶9 A telephonic hearing took place on September 6, 2018. Rafti was present in propria

persona. Rehabilitation counselor Joseph O’Donnell and Department supervisor Maria

Martinez-McKinley appeared for the Department.

¶ 10 Rafti testified that the preponderance of the evidence showed that the Department’s denial

of his request to fund paralegal training violated the law and was unsupported by

documentation. Consistent with the arguments in his brief, Rafti testified that he did not

possess the necessary skills to become a paralegal. Rafti testified that he has HIV/AIDS,

chronic kidney disease, and diabetes and, as a result, has been disabled for the past eight years

and unable to work. He stated that he was also disabled for three years beginning in March

1990. He argued that he was not experienced with the required technology, such as electronic

document handling and online legal research programs. He also argued that he needed to

“refresh” his research and writing skills and learn Illinois law. Rafti denied being told by the

Department to apply for paralegal positions. He also argued that the Department failed to

provide him with an individualized plan for employment within 90 days as required.

¶ 11 Martinez-McKinley testified for the Department. She stated:

“Mr. Rafti[,] just based on this hearing you have proven to me that you have the ability

to work as a paralegal. You’ve demonstrated your ability to understand written

information, understand spoken information, do research, present clearly, read and

understand, write clearly. You’ve demonstrated that you have the ability to work as a

paralegal. You’ve not demonstrated that you seeked [sic] employment and you haven’t

been able to get it. And so if our purpose is to help individuals with disabilities obtain

entry level employment and you’re saying at this point the entry level employment that

you are seeking is to work as a paralegal, [the Department’s] *** position, [and] Mr.

O’Donnell’s position[,] is that you have a skill set that can afford you the ability to

work as a paralegal and that we should try and obtain employment for you as a

paralegal.”

Martinez-McKinley noted that the Department’s decision to deny Rafti funding was based on

the fact that he had obtained a law degree and that he had practiced law for over six years in

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California. She asserted that Rafti’s “experience practicing law and experience conducting

himself in a hearing, [and] information that *** he’s filed grievances with [McHenry County

College] ***, [and] sued Illinois Department of Transportation ***[,] all goes to show that Mr.

Rafti has the skill set to work in a paralegal environment.” Martinez-McKinley testified that

“there’s nothing that we have in your file that lets me know that, one, employers are telling

you, well, in order for me to hire you as a paralegal you have to have a paralegal certificate.”

She stated that “some employers prefer to do their own training.” She reaffirmed: “I don’t have

anything that tells me that you’ve tried to get employment as a paralegal and you can’t because

you don’t have a paralegal certificate.”

¶ 12 Martinez-McKinley also testified that the Department had multiple resources available to

assist Rafti in securing employment. Martinez-McKinley testified that O’Donnell could help

Rafti apply for the state’s Successful Disability Opportunity Program, which would place

Rafti’s name on a list of qualified paralegals for all state positions. Martinez-McKinley

testified that O’Donnell was “an expert at submitting this information” and that he could help

Rafti get qualified and graded as a paralegal for state employment. While testifying, Martinez-

McKinley found four paralegal postings on the state website. Martinez-McKinley explained

that, once Rafti was qualified for a position, he would be contacted for the interview. Rafti

responded: “[T]hat sounds promising, but I still think that I’d rather go with something that I

think is a sure bet, which is get the training for that.” Martinez-McKinley read the job

description for one of the postings, which included the following minimum requirement:

“ ‘Requires knowledge, skill and mental development equivalent to completion of four years

of college with core work in such areas as legal, [inaudible], English, statistics or directly

related course work. Preferably requires a Paralegal Certificate.’ ” When Rafti asked how he

would compete for the job without a paralegal certificate, the hearing officer responded:

“You’re going to compete with your Juris Doctor degree.” Rafti stated:

“Well, under the circumstances, it’s much more assured that if I complete the

program I’m going to get a job than if I don’t complete the program under my particular

circumstances. And therefore I’m saying that it’s necessary and to not do it is not

basically the intent of what [the Department] is supposed to do. And as my experience

in [the] legal field has presented me it’s never in anyone’s interest to give up a

substantial right. So I mean I’m asserting my right to this program. That would be my

preference.”

¶ 13 On September 26, 2018, the hearing officer affirmed the Department’s denial of funding

for Rafti to enroll in the paralegal program, stating that Rafti “has not demonstrated, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that further training would reduce an impediment to gaining

employment.” The hearing officer noted that Rafti “had not applied for any paralegal jobs” and

that he “has a law degree and previous work history related to the field he wishes to pursue.”

¶ 14 On November 27, 2018, Rafti filed a “1st Amended Pro Se Complaint for Administrative

Review,” alleging that the hearing officer’s decision was clearly erroneous. Rafti argued that

(1) the evidence demonstrated that paralegal training was necessary for him to overcome

impediments to employment, (2) the hearing officer’s decision was based primarily on the

Department’s unsupported statements that “ ‘[Rafti] was formerly an attorney, and is therefore

now able to obtain employment as a paralegal,’ ” (3) the Department failed to provide Rafti

with an individualized plan for employment within 90 days, and (4) the hearing officer’s

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decision violated “various and many State and Federal Statutes and Regulations that govern

the Vocational Rehabilitation Program.”

¶ 15 Following briefing and a hearing, the circuit court of McHenry County affirmed the hearing

officer’s decision. The court explained that Rafti had not presented evidence that the paralegal

certificate was necessary and that, to the contrary, the Department’s unrebutted testimony

showed that Rafti already possessed the skills necessary to secure employment as a paralegal.

The court concluded that the Department’s decision was “not against the manifest weight of

the evidence.”

¶ 16 This timely appeal followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Federal Act) (29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2018))

authorizes federal grants to states that assist individuals living with disabilities to “prepare for

and engage in gainful employment” (id. § 720(a)(2)(B)). To qualify for these grants, states

must submit plans for the creation and implementation of “individualized plan[s] for

employment” (IPE) for eligible individuals. Id. § 721(a)(9)(A). The IPE must contain, among

other things, an “employment outcome,” which should be “consistent with the individual’s

unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, interests, and informed

choice of the eligible individual, consistent with the general goal of competitive integrated

employment.” Id. § 722(b)(4)(A). The IPE must also identify the specific services “needed to

achieve the employment outcome.” Id. § 722(b)(4)(B)(i)(I); see id. § 723(a) (vocational

rehabilitation services are those “necessary to assist an individual with a disability in preparing

for [and] securing *** an employment outcome that is consistent with the strengths, resources,

priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, interests, and informed choice of the individual”).

Although the individual must be allowed to “exercise informed choice” in developing the IPE

and must ultimately agree to it, the state’s vocational rehabilitation counselor must approve the

IPE. Id. § 722(b)(3)(B); see 89 Ill. Adm. Code 572.50(a) (2018).

¶ 19 Illinois’s provision of vocational rehabilitation services is governed by the Rehabilitation

of Persons with Disabilities Act (State Act) (20 ILCS 2405/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)), which

authorizes the Department to cooperate with the federal government in providing these services

(id. § 3(a)). The State Act directs the Department “[t]o prescribe and supervise such courses of

vocational training and provide such other services as may be necessary for the habilitation

and rehabilitation of persons with one or more disabilities.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 3(b).

Consistent with federal requirements, the Department must develop an IPE for employment

before it can provide services to an eligible individual. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 590.20 (2012).

Generally, it must do so within 90 days of deeming the individual eligible. 89 Ill. Adm. Code

572.50(d) (2018). To begin, the Department conducts an assessment, during which it works

with the “customer” 1 to determine an “employment outcome” and “the vocational

rehabilitation services needed to achieve the employment outcome.” (Emphasis added.) 89 Ill.

Adm. Code 553.100(b), (c) (2001). Then, in collaboration with the customer, the Department

creates an IPE, which “identifies the program of services that will assist the individual to

achieve an employment outcome consistent with the customer’s unique strengths, resources,

1

“ ‘Customer’ means a person who has requested, been referred for, is receiving, or has received

any DHS-DRS services.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code 521.20 (2018).

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priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, career interests, and informed choices.” 89 Ill. Adm.

Code 572.30(b) (2011). “The customer’s case record must contain documentation and

justification for any decision to provide, deny, or alter any services.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code

572.100 (2011).

¶ 20 As part of the services provided by the Department, “[v]ocational, technical, or academic

training may be available to a customer *** as appropriate.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code 590.220 (2012).

If a customer with prior postsecondary training seeks another degree, the Department will

evaluate the following information “to determine if there is a need for further post-secondary

training that would lead to employment: A) number of credit hours previously earned,

B) degree and certifications currently held, C) previous work history related to degree held,

and D) reasons the customer is not employed with current qualifications.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code

590.220(a)(2) (2012).

¶ 21 If a customer disagrees with a determination denying him services, he may file an

administrative appeal. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 510.20(a) (2003). Before the hearing officer, the

customer “shall have the responsibility to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the

action or inaction by [the Department] was not in accordance with federal or State laws or

regulations, against [the Department’s] policy, *** or inappropriate for the customer.” 89 Ill.

Adm. Code 510.105(f) (2003). The hearing officer’s decision is the agency’s final

administrative decision. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 510.120(a)(2) (2003); see Williams v. Department

of Human Services Division of Rehabilitation Services, 2019 IL App (1st) 181517, ¶ 18.

¶ 22 Further appeal “must be made to the courts by common law writ of certiorari.” 89 Ill. Adm.

Code 510.120(c) (2003); Williams, 2019 IL App (1st) 181517, ¶ 18. “The nature and extent of

judicial review under certiorari is virtually the same as review under the [Administrative]

Review Law [(735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2018))].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Williams, 2019 IL App (1st) 181517, ¶ 19. “[C]ourts are ‘limited to [considering] *** the

evidence submitted in the administrative hearing and may not hear additional evidence.’ ” Id.

(quoting King’s Health Spa, Inc. v. Village of Downers Grove, 2014 IL App (2d) 130825,

¶ 32). And, “ ‘[a]s a general rule, issues or defenses not raised before the administrative agency

will not be considered for the first time on administrative review.’ ” Id. (quoting Carpetland

U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 396-97 (2002)).

¶ 23 Our standard of review depends on the issue presented. Id. ¶ 21. The issue here presents a

mixed question of fact and law because, given the facts, the issue is whether the Department

correctly denied Rafti’s request per the applicable regulations. See id. ¶ 22 (finding that “the

hearing officer’s determination that [the plaintiff’s] request for services did not meet the

requirements of the program as set forth in the statutory and regulatory scheme [citation],

present[ed] a question of fact and law”). Mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed “under

the largely deferential clear error standard.” Id. ¶ 21. 2 An agency’s decision is clearly

erroneous only if, after viewing the entire record, the court has a “ ‘definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Id. ¶ 22 (quoting Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal

Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 211 (2008)).

2

Rafti argues that the trial court erred by applying the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard

when reviewing the hearing officer’s decision. He is correct. Nevertheless, any error is harmless

because this court reviews the hearing officer’s decision, not the trial court’s decision. See Sarkis v.

City of Des Plaines, 378 Ill. App. 3d 833, 836 (2008).

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¶ 24 We turn to the merits. Rafti contends that he introduced evidence sufficient to show that

the paralegal training program was “necessary for him to overcome the impediment to

employment posed by disability discrimination.” We disagree. Although Rafti claims that the

training will teach him skills specific to paralegals and Illinois law, as well as refresh his legal

research and writing skills, Rafti failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that

such training was “necessary” (20 ILCS 2405/3(b) (West 2018)). 3 The evidence established

that Rafti had a law degree and had practiced law for many years until 2010. Martinez-

McKinley testified that Rafti’s submissions to the Department demonstrated his abilities to

work as a paralegal. Indeed, in his May 15, 2018, letter to the Department requesting funding

to enroll in the paralegal program, Rafti detailed numerous “legal and personal achievements”

not included on his resume. Rafti stated that, “[a]lthough it has been a number of years since

[he] had to stop practicing law because of [his] health, during the interim, [he] ha[s] had the

opportunity to maintain and utilize [his] legal skill.” Rafti described serving as “Trustee of

[his] family’s Trust” and “successfully litigating a Complaint [f]or Administrative Review in

pro se [sic], against the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority. [It] involved an entirely new

area of legal research, regarding this area of the law in particular, and Illinois law in general.”

Martinez-McKinley also noted that Rafti had filed a grievance against McHenry County

College, which demonstrated Rafti’s proficiencies in legal writing and analysis. This evidence

documents Rafti’s qualifications and abilities and supports the Department’s justification for

denying him funding for paralegal training.

¶ 25 Rafti argues that a paralegal position demands certain technical skills, such as electronic

document management and the use of computerized research programs. He contends that

without the requisite training he would not be qualified for a paralegal position. However,

during the hearing, Martinez-McKinley identified four postings on the State of Illinois website

for paralegal positions, and she listed the minimum requirements. To be sure, the job listing

that Martinez-McKinley read on the record stated a preference for a paralegal certificate;

however, it was not a requirement. Evidence that training may be useful does not establish by

a preponderance of the evidence that such training is necessary. Indeed, as the hearing officer

noted, Rafti’s legal degree and experience as a practicing attorney qualified him for the

positions.

¶ 26 Rafti also argues that he presented evidence of “the pervasiveness of disability

discrimination in employment,” pointing to a grievance he filed against McHenry County

College, alleging disability discrimination based on its failure to hire him for a front desk

position through the college’s work-study program. However, evidence that Rafti was not hired

for a work-study job does not establish the necessity for paralegal training.

3

Rafti seems to challenge the Department’s interpretation of the terms “necessary” (see 20 ILCS

2405/3(b) (West 2018)) and “need for” (see 89 Ill. Adm. Code 590.220(a)(2) (2012)), arguing that these

terms “should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the terms ‘competitive integrate employment’

and [to be] ‘qualified’ for” as set out in the Federal Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(42 U.S.C. § 12001 et seq. (2018)). However, Rafti did not challenge the Department’s construction of

these terms below and thus has forfeited the issue. See Nwaokocha v. Illinois Department of Financial

& Professional Regulation, 2018 IL App (1st) 162614, ¶ 66. In any event, the Department does not

disagree that it must provide services that are necessary for individuals to be qualified and competitive

for their approved employment outcome. The Department disagrees with only Rafti’s contention that

acquiring a paralegal certificate is necessary for Rafti to reach his employment goal.

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¶ 27 Rafti also argues that the Department improperly based its decision on information

obtained outside the record, such as the job postings referenced by Martinez-McKinley.

However, Rafti did not object to the consideration of this evidence during the hearing; thus, he

has forfeited any argument as to whether the evidence was properly considered. See Goral v.

Illinois State Board of Education, 2013 IL App (1st) 130752, ¶ 31 (failure to object to evidence

during the hearing or raise the issue in a complaint for administrative review results in

forfeiture).

¶ 28 Rafti also seems to argue that expert testimony was required to support the Department’s

conclusion that Rafti was qualified to work as a paralegal. He asserts that there was no

indication that either O’Donnell or Martinez-McKinley had any experience with legal

employment. To be sure, “where an administrative agency makes factual determinations

involving technical concepts unique to its expertise, expert testimony must be introduced into

the record supporting the agency’s position.” (Emphasis omitted.) Chase v. Department of

Professional Regulations, 242 Ill. App. 3d 279, 285 (1993)); see Heabler v. Illinois

Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2013 IL App (1st) 111968, ¶ 19 (expert

in private detective industry testified as to whether detective’s conduct was unethical,

unprofessional, or dishonorable in light of the custom and practice in the industry). However,

the Department’s determination that Rafti was qualified to work as a paralegal did not involve

“technical concepts unique to its expertise.” See Chase, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 285. Thus, no expert

testimony was required. As noted, the Department’s determination was supported at the

hearing with evidence concerning Rafti’s education and abilities, in conjunction with several

job postings for paralegal positions showing that Rafti was well qualified for a paralegal

position.

¶ 29 Finally, we note that Rafti does not argue on appeal that the Department violated its

obligations to provide him with an IPE within 90 days. See 89 Ill. Adm. Code 572.50(d) (2018).

Therefore, he has forfeited the argument. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018)

(“Points not argued [in the opening brief] are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief,

in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).

¶ 30 Based on the foregoing, after a review of the entire record, we cannot say that the hearing

officer’s decision to affirm the Department’s denial of funding for Rafti to enroll in the

paralegal program was clearly erroneous.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

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