Opinion

TIG Insurance Company v. Republic of Argentina

  • 110 F.4th 221
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jul 30, 2024
Status
Published
Cited by
8 cases
Authority
More cited than 57.6%

concluding that an agreement is “made by” a foreign state, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(6), “if it legally binds that sovereign to arbitrate with the party opposing the sovereign’s sovereign immunity”

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that an agreement is “made by” a foreign state, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(6), “if it legally binds that sovereign to arbitrate with the party opposing the sovereign’s sovereign immunity”
  • analyzing alter ego status to determine whether instrumentality’s arbitration agreement binds foreign state for purposes of immunity waiver
  • Plaintiff does not meet her burden by mentioning arguments only in “the most skeletal way” in opposing dismissal.

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 5, 2024 Decided July 30, 2024

No. 23-7064

TIG INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO

INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND INTERNATIONAL

SURPLUS LINE INSURANCE COMPANY,

APPELLANT

v.

REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, AS SUCCESSOR TO CAJA NACIONAL

DE AHORRO Y SEGURO AND CAJA NACIONAL DE AHORRO Y

SEGURO,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-mc-00129)

Mark N. Bravin argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Theresa B. Bowman.

Rathna J. Ramamurthi argued the cause for appellee

Republic of Argentina. With her on the brief were Carmine D.

Boccuzzi Jr. and Charles M. Asmar. Thomas R. Lynch entered

an appearance.

2

Before: RAO, WALKER, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.

GARCIA, Circuit Judge: This appeal involves an insurance

company’s efforts to enforce two judgments against the

Republic of Argentina. It implicates several questions

concerning the scope of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., which grants foreign states

immunity from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts in the

United States, subject to certain express exceptions. We

conclude that two of those exceptions—the arbitration and

waiver exceptions—may apply in this case, and remand to the

district court for further analysis and factfinding.

I

The following facts and procedural history are drawn from

undisputed facts and prior decisions involving the parties. See

TIG Ins. v. Republic of Argentina (“TIG I”), 2019 WL 3017618

(D.D.C. July 10, 2019), vacated and remanded, TIG Ins. v.

Republic of Argentina (“TIG II”), 967 F.3d 778 (D.C. Cir.

2020); Int’l Ins. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d

392 (7th Cir. 2002).

A

TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”) is a private insurance

company resulting from a series of mergers of other insurance

companies. For simplicity, we refer to TIG and its

predecessors as “TIG.” In 1979, TIG entered into two

reinsurance contracts with Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguros

(“Caja”), a state-owned Argentine company. Reinsurance, put

simply, is insurance for insurers. TIG agreed to pay Caja a

share of the premiums TIG received on underlying insurance

policies in exchange for Caja’s payment of a share of certain

3

losses TIG became obligated to pay under those policies. TIG

alleges that Caja repeatedly failed to pay TIG as promised.

Beginning in the 1990s, the Republic of Argentina

(“Argentina”) issued a series of resolutions addressing Caja’s

corporate status and operations. In 1994, Argentina declared

Caja dissolved and placed it in the process of liquidation. In

1998, Argentina declared “transferred to the National Treasury

the liquidated liabilities and the contingent liabilities and

assets” of Caja “derived from the reinsurance businesses active

in the international private market.” J.A. 237.

In 2000, TIG initiated arbitral proceedings against Caja for

failing to pay under the reinsurance contracts. TIG won by

default. In 2001, TIG confirmed that arbitral award against

Caja in the Northern District of Illinois (the “2001 judgment”)

in default proceedings. The Seventh Circuit upheld the

judgment. See Int’l Ins., 293 F.3d at 401.

After the 2001 judgment, Argentina issued additional

resolutions about Caja’s status. In 2003, Argentina transferred

to its Legal Undersecretary responsibility for handling Caja’s

international docket of foreign court litigation and international

arbitrations “through . . . final conclusion” of each matter. J.A.

887. In 2005, Argentina transferred to itself Caja’s

“liquidated” and “contingent assets and liabilities.” J.A. 252.

In 2016, TIG initiated a second arbitral proceeding, again

alleging breach of the reinsurance contracts, but this time

against Argentina. TIG won by default, with the arbitral panel

accepting TIG’s position that Argentina was Caja’s successor-

in-interest and therefore subject to the arbitration provision in

the contracts. In 2018, TIG confirmed the second arbitral

award against Argentina, again in the Northern District of

Illinois, and again by default (the “2018 judgment”).

4

Later in 2018, TIG learned that Argentina had listed real

estate for sale in the District of Columbia. Prompted by this

discovery, TIG registered the 2001 and 2018 judgments in the

District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1963. TIG

simultaneously filed an omnibus motion for emergency relief,

attachment-related relief, and a writ of execution on the

property. Soon after, Argentina pulled the real estate listing

from the market, despite pending offers to buy the property. In

the district court, Argentina opposed TIG’s omnibus motion,

relying on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976

(“FSIA”).

B

The FSIA “confers on foreign states two kinds of

immunity.” Republic of Argentina v. NML Cap., Ltd., 573 U.S.

134, 142 (2014). The first is jurisdictional immunity, pursuant

to which “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction

of the courts of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1604, subject

to several enumerated exceptions, see id. §§ 1605–1607. The

second is execution immunity, which further protects foreign

sovereigns by ensuring that in the event of an adverse

judgment, the sovereign’s property in the United States “shall

be immune from attachment[,] arrest[,] and execution,” id. §

1609, again subject to several enumerated exceptions, see id.

§§ 1610–1611.

Because of the FSIA’s dual immunities, parties seeking

judicial enforcement of an award against a foreign state face

two hurdles: They must “establish both that the foreign state is

not immune from suit and that the property to be attached or

executed against is not immune” from execution. TIG II, 967

F.3d at 781.

In 2018, facing TIG’s omnibus motion, Argentina raised

execution immunity and prevailed. According to the district

court, Argentina’s property was immune from execution

5

because Argentina had taken the property off the market. This

meant that the property was not “used for a commercial

activity”—a prerequisite for certain of the FSIA’s execution

immunity exceptions—at the time the court’s writ would issue.

TIG I, 2019 WL 3017618, at *3–4; see 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).

TIG appealed, and we vacated and remanded. We held

that whether a property is “used for a commercial activity”

depends on the “totality of the circumstances” at the time when

the motion for a writ of attachment is filed, not when the writ

would issue. TIG II, 967 F.3d at 785; see also Bainbridge Fund

Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 102 F.4th 464, 468–70 (D.C. Cir.

2024) (applying the “totality of circumstances” test to the same

Argentina-owned property in a suit involving a different

judgment creditor).

On remand, Argentina again moved to dismiss. It

continued to argue that the property was not used for

“commercial activity” and therefore immune from execution.

But Argentina also raised jurisdictional immunity under the

FSIA. In response, as relevant to this appeal, TIG argued that

two of the FSIA’s exceptions to jurisdictional immunity

applied: the arbitration exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6), and

the waiver exception, id. § 1605(a)(1).

TIG argued that two provisions in Caja’s reinsurance

contracts triggered those exceptions, and that Argentina now

stood in Caja’s shoes. First, Caja had agreed to submit disputes

under the contracts to arbitration in Chicago, Illinois (the

“arbitration provision”). J.A. 305, 325. Second, Caja had

agreed that “all matters arising hereunder shall be determined

in accordance with the law and practice” “of any court of

competent jurisdiction within the United States” (the “choice-

of-law provision”). J.A. 304, 324.

TIG argued that Argentina was bound by these contract

provisions just like Caja because of Argentina’s relationship to

6

Caja. Relevant to this appeal, TIG offered two theories. The

first was that Argentina became Caja’s “successor-in-interest”

by issuing the official resolutions, under which Argentina

“expressly assumed all of Caja’s legal obligations, assets, and

liabilities” under the reinsurance contracts. Appellant’s Brief

50. TIG’s second theory was that Argentina used Caja as an

“alter ego.” Under the alter ego principle, a court can find that

an entity like Caja lacks a separate identity from another

controlling entity. See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco

Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”), 462 U.S. 611,

623–30 (1983).

The district court construed Argentina’s motion to dismiss

as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) and issued two decisions,

requesting supplemental briefing in between. The court sided

with Argentina on all issues. For the 2018 judgment, the

district court held that the Illinois district court lacked

jurisdiction over Argentina because none of TIG’s asserted

exceptions applied. The district court also rejected TIG’s

request for jurisdictional discovery. For the 2001 judgment,

the court held that TIG needed to amend the judgment back in

Illinois to name Argentina before seeking enforcement in

federal court here. Based on these rulings, the district court

concluded that it need not revisit the execution immunity

dispute.

TIG sought reconsideration on several issues, which the

district court denied. TIG then appealed.

II

We review a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction de novo with

respect to legal conclusions. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 77

F.4th 1077, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2023). We review a denial of

jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. Urquhart-

Bradley v. Mobley, 964 F.3d 36, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2020). We

7

likewise review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for

abuse of discretion. Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 23 (D.C.

Cir. 2015).

III

TIG argues that two FSIA exceptions independently

provided the Illinois district court jurisdiction over Argentina

to enter the 2018 judgment. We start with the arbitration

exception. Contrary to the district court, we conclude that the

exception may apply subject to further analysis and factfinding

on remand.

A

The arbitration exception provides, in relevant part, that a

foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of a

United States court for an action

brought, either to enforce an agreement made by

the foreign state with or for the benefit of a

private party to submit to arbitration all or any

differences which have arisen or which may

arise between the parties with respect to a

defined legal relationship . . . or to confirm an

award made pursuant to such an agreement to

arbitrate.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).

As the district court recognized, the parties’ dispute is

limited. See TIG Ins. v. Republic of Argentina (“TIG III, Part

One”), 2022 WL 1154749, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022). The

parties agree that the reinsurance contracts are agreements that

call for the arbitration of “any differences.” And they agree

that the arbitral award confirmed in the 2018 judgment arises

from the reinsurance contracts. Their only disagreement is

whether the reinsurance contracts’ arbitration provision was

8

“made by” Argentina because Caja, not Argentina, signed the

contracts with TIG. See Appellant’s Brief 42–50; Appellee’s

Brief 21–27.

In TIG’s view, a court should determine whether the

arbitration agreements were “made by” Argentina by deciding

whether Argentina, as a nonsignatory to the contract, is

nonetheless bound by the agreement under ordinary contract

law principles. See Appellant’s Brief 42–48. And here, TIG

says, Argentina is so bound. Id. at 48–50.

According to TIG, Argentina is Caja’s successor-in-

interest. Under successorship principles, when a nonsignatory

takes certain steps in relation to a contract (such as, in many

jurisdictions, assuming another entity’s liabilities under that

contract), the nonsignatory can be treated as bound to the

contract’s obligations, no different than the original party. See

BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Village of Monroe, 93 F.4th 595, 598

n.1 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Successors in interest stand in the shoes of

their predecessors . . . as if they were parties to the original

agreements and actions of their predecessors.” (cleaned up));

Aguas Lenders Recovery Grp. v. Suez, S.A., 585 F.3d 696, 700–

01 (2d Cir. 2009). TIG submits that Argentina’s official

resolutions expressly “assumed” Caja’s assets and liabilities

flowing from the reinsurance contracts, as well as future legal

obligations related to those contracts. After those resolutions,

in TIG’s view, Argentina cannot pick and choose which

provisions of the contracts it wishes to be bound by; it is bound

by all, including the arbitration provision. TIG points to cases

where courts have held that arbitration provisions specifically

may be enforced against the successors-in-interest of the

original signatories. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief 26–27

(collecting cases); see also 21 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts

§ 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed. 2017) (“Under an assumption theory, a

party may be bound by an arbitration clause if its subsequent

conduct indicates that [it] is assuming the obligation to

9

arbitrate, despite being a nonsignatory.”). According to TIG,

because Argentina is Caja’s successor-in-interest to the

reinsurance contracts, it is bound by the arbitration provision,

and the reinsurance contracts are “made by” Argentina for the

purposes of the arbitration exception.

Argentina offers a different approach. Rather than

assessing whether the sovereign is bound by the arbitration

provision, Argentina argues that a court should simply ask

whether the sovereign (or its alter ego) originally signed the

contract containing the provision. Under Argentina’s proposed

inquiry, it is irrelevant whether Argentina assumed Caja’s

assets and liabilities under the reinsurance contracts (which

Argentina disputes). Because only Caja signed the reinsurance

contracts, Argentina says, the reinsurance contracts were not

“made by” Argentina. See Appellee’s Brief 42–49.

The district court agreed with Argentina. It held that an

arbitration agreement is only “made by” the parties who signed

the contract “at the time of formation.” TIG III, Part One, 2022

WL 1154749, at *7. So “even if Argentina is Caja’s successor-

in-interest” and “assumed Caja’s contractual liabilities,” “the

arbitration agreements were nonetheless not ‘made by’

Argentina so as to waive sovereign immunity.” Id. at *8. The

district court therefore did not analyze whether Argentina is

successor-in-interest to Caja under the reinsurance contracts.

See id.

B

On appeal, TIG again urges that if Argentina adopted the

arbitration agreement under successorship principles, then the

agreement qualifies as one “made by the foreign state . . . to

submit to arbitration” under the FSIA’s arbitration exception.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). We agree with TIG and conclude that

an agreement is “made by” a sovereign if it legally binds that

sovereign to arbitrate with the party opposing the sovereign’s

10

sovereign immunity. That question is answered by resort to

ordinary principles of contract law, which may include

successorship and assumption if the governing law recognizes

them. We reject the contrary view, under which an arbitration

agreement can only be “made by” a sovereign that was an

original party to it.

Our analysis begins with the statute’s text. We must read

the statutory text as a whole and assess the words in the context

in which they are used. See, e.g., Textron Lycoming

Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO Corp. v. UAW, 523 U.S.

653, 657 (1998) (“It is not the meaning of ‘for’ we are seeking

here, but the meaning of ‘suits for violation of contracts.’”

(alteration omitted)); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,

341 (1997). The key phrase here is “an agreement made by the

foreign state . . . to submit to arbitration.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(6). That phrase supports TIG’s position that an

arbitration agreement is “made by” a sovereign that later adopts

the agreement just as much as a sovereign who was a party to

the agreement when it was initially made.

To “make” in the context of making a contract or

agreement is commonly understood to include later adoption of

that agreement. For example, both TIG and the district court

cite the then-current version of Black’s Law Dictionary, which

defined to “make a contract” as “[t]o agree upon, and conclude

or adopt, a contract.” Make a Contract, Black’s Law

Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). This

understanding of to “make”—as TIG urges—encompasses a

nonoriginal signatory who later adopts an agreement to

arbitrate.

Moreover, the word “agreement” as it appears in the

statutory phrase is best understood as an act that has the legal

consequence of requiring the sovereign to arbitrate. See

Agreement, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (“In law, a

11

concord of understanding and intention between two or more

parties with respect to the effect upon their relative rights and

duties, of certain past or future facts or performances.”); see

also Contract, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (“An

agreement between two or more persons which creates an

obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.”). If the

sovereign is not an original signatory but takes actions that

cause it to adopt and become subject to the agreement, nothing

in the ordinary meaning of the statutory text suggests the

sovereign does not qualify as having “made” the “agreement.”

Argentina’s original-parties-only argument would perhaps

gain some force if we instead looked at the words “made by”

in isolation. After all, “make”—the word stem of “made”—

can mean “[t]o cause to exist”; “[t]o form, fashion or produce”;

or “[t]o do, perform, or execute.” Make, Black’s Law

Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Zooming in on just those words, as

Argentina would have us do, one could conclude that Argentina

could only “make” an agreement that it participated in drafting.

But, as already explained, that is not how we interpret statutes.

We must read the statutory text as a whole and in context; doing

so here supports TIG’s view, not Argentina’s.

In adopting Argentina’s reading, the district court found it

important that “made by” is a “past participial phrase.” TIG

III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *7. The court then

concluded that “made by” refers only to the parties present at

“the time of formation.” Id. The use of a verb tense can be

significant in construing statutes. See, e.g., United States v.

Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.

v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 63 n.4 (1987).

But here it is not obvious that any tense applies to the phrase

“made by.” Cf. TIG II, 967 F.3d at 782–83 (declining to

associate any tense with “used” in the phrase “used for a

commercial activity”). Moreover, even accepting the view that

the phrase is past tense would do nothing to support

12

Argentina’s position. Relative to the time when an “action is

brought” to “enforce” an arbitration agreement, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(6), both the moment an agreement is first created and

the moment a nonsignatory adopts the agreement would be in

the past. The facts of this case illustrate the point: If

Argentina’s actions in the 1990s and 2000s caused it to adopt

the arbitration agreement, then it can be said to have “made”

the agreement at that past time.

The district court also stated—and Argentina repeats on

appeal—that “if Congress had intended the arbitration

exception to” apply here, it could have said the exception

applies to “agreements that ‘bound’ or ‘governed’ foreign

states, as opposed to agreements that those states ‘made.’” TIG

III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *7; see Appellee’s Brief

41. True enough. But Congress also could have specified that

an agreement be “signed by” or “originated by” the foreign

state if it intended the contrary reading. That the statute could

have been more specific in either direction “does not aid our

inquiry.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.

The district court also found its original-signatories-only

reading supported by the fact that the arbitration exception

exists at least in part to implement the Inter-American

Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, a

multilateral treaty commonly known as the Panama

Convention. TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *7

(citing An Act to Implement the Inter–American Convention

on International Commercial Arbitration, Pub. L. No. 100-669,

102 Stat. 3969 (1988)). That convention applies to “parties”

who have “undertake[n] to submit to arbitral decision any

differences that may arise or have arisen between them” in an

“agreement.” Inter-American Convention on International

Commercial Arbitration art. 1, Jan. 30, 1975, T.I.A.S. 90-1027,

1438 U.N.T.S. 245. Neither that language nor any other aspect

of the convention that we can identify, however, speaks to

13

whether a sovereign that takes steps to assume or adopt a

contract is covered. The convention therefore does not assist

our analysis. 1

Our understanding of the exception is reinforced by the

FSIA’s broader context. Congress enacted the FSIA with the

“express goal of codifying the restrictive theory of sovereign

immunity.” Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S.

169, 182 (2021). Under the restrictive theory, in contrast to

“the absolute or classical theory of sovereign immunity,”

“immunity extends to a sovereign’s public but not its private

acts.” Id. “Most of the FSIA’s exceptions” give effect to “the

overarching framework of the restrictive theory” by targeting

situations where a sovereign has engaged in private acts. Id. at

182–83. And here, Argentina is alleged to have entered the

private insurance industry through its assumption of Caja’s

business, including its assets and liabilities. A rule under which

a sovereign is free to take over another entity’s obligations

under a contract with an arbitration provision yet escape the

immunity-waiving effect of the arbitration agreement would

seem to frustrate the FSIA’s basic aim. Cf. Aguas Lenders, 585

F.3d at 701 (“Successorship doctrine prevents parties to

contracts from using evasive, formalistic means lacking

economic substance to escape contractual obligations.”).

1

The district court’s brief discussion of the exception’s purpose

cited a Second Circuit decision that expressed skepticism in dicta

towards the “applicability” of an “equitable doctrine” like “benefits

estoppel” as a basis to “abrogate a state’s immunity under” the

arbitration exception. Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz, 2 F.4th

42, 67 (2d Cir. 2021). In support, the Second Circuit noted that the

exception’s purpose was to “implement” the Panama Convention.

Id. at 68 n.28 (quotation omitted). Gater Assets does not explain how

the Panama Convention supports an original-signatories-only

reading of the exception, nor does the decision engage in the broader

statutory interpretation we must here.

14

Finally, Argentina contends that an interpretation focusing

on whether the agreement binds the sovereign is improper

because the FSIA “replac[ed] the old executive-driven, factor-

intensive, loosely common-law-based immunity regime.”

NML Cap., Ltd., 573 U.S. at 141. It is true that the FSIA

embodies Congress’s effort to replace a body of common law

addressing sovereign immunity that lent itself to “inconsistent

application” by the Department of State, which then enjoyed

“primary responsibility” for deciding immunity claims.

Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010). The question

posed here, though, is not whether the FSIA displaced the

common law of sovereign immunity—which it surely does—

but rather whether Congress intended the FSIA to displace the

substance of common law on other subjects, such as contract

law, that would inform the meaning of the FSIA’s immunity

exceptions. Cf. id. at 320 (asking “whether Congress intended

the FSIA to supersede the common law” on the specific subject

at issue).

There is no indication that Congress intended the FSIA to

displace common-law contract principles that inform our

understanding of what constitutes the “making” of an

“agreement.” As we have noted, many sources of law “allow

a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract

through assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego,

incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories,

waiver[,] and estoppel.” Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556

U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (cleaned up). For example, when

Congress added the FSIA arbitration exception in 1988, the

common law in at least some jurisdictions had already

developed to recognize that “[o]rdinary contract principles

determine who is bound” to an agreement, and “the mere fact

that a party did not sign an arbitration agreement does not mean

that it cannot be held bound by it.” Interocean Shipping Co. v.

Nat’l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir.

1975); see Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684

15

F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1982); Lumbard v. Maglia, Inc., 621 F.

Supp. 1529, 1534–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

We see nothing in the FSIA’s arbitration exception that

“purports to alter” otherwise applicable “background

principles” concerning who is bound by arbitration agreements.

Arthur Andersen LLP, 556 U.S. at 630. Instead, the FSIA

provides no guidance on how covered agreements can be made,

and thus necessarily requires courts to look to other sources of

law to make those determinations. The Supreme Court reached

a similar conclusion in construing the Federal Arbitration Act,

explaining that the Act does not “alter background principles

of state contract law regarding the scope of agreements

(including the question of who is bound by them).” Id. Instead,

that Act requires looking to an “external body of law” to

resolve those questions. Id. So too here.

Indeed, both the district court and Argentina accept that at

least one external, common-law principle already bears on

what qualifies as an arbitration “agreement made by a foreign

state.” See TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *8–10;

Appellee’s Brief 15. This is the “alter ego” principle. Under

that principle, a court can find that one entity lacks a separate

identity from another controlling entity. The actions of the first

entity can then be imputed to the sovereign for the purposes of

waiving sovereign immunity. See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629–30.

And specific to the arbitration exception, in line with

Argentina’s and the district court’s view, we have assumed that

when a sovereign’s “alter ego” enters into an agreement, that

agreement is “made by” the sovereign. See GSS Grp. Ltd. v.

Nat’l Port Auth. of Liberia, 822 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

In this case, TIG argues that Caja was Argentina’s alter ego,

which we address in Section V. But the key point for present

purposes is that Argentina does not dispute that if Caja were

Argentina’s “alter ego,” then the reinsurance contracts’

16

arbitration agreements are properly said to be “made by”

Argentina.

Reconciling Argentina’s position with our precedent

would therefore require us to declare that the FSIA recognizes

the alter ego principle as the one and only external, common-

law method of binding a nonparty to an arbitration agreement.

We can identify no basis in the FSIA or logic for that

conclusion. See 21 Williston § 57:19, p. 183 (listing both “alter

ego” and “assumption” as examples of several grounds on

which “a party, despite being a nonsignatory to an arbitration

agreement, may be equitably bound to arbitrate under

traditional principles of contract and agency law”).

C

In sum, we hold that under the FSIA’s arbitration

exception, an agreement can be “made by” sovereigns other

than original signatories. We further hold that because the

FSIA provides no law to guide the determination whether an

enforceable arbitration agreement exists, that question must be

answered based on external sources of law.

On remand, the district court must first consider what

source of law governs the question of enforcement of the

arbitration provision. That is because the precise legal test for

whether (and how) a successorship theory can compel

arbitration against a nonsignatory can be different from one

jurisdiction to another. This is generally a question of state

law. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,

944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties agreed to

arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts generally . . . should apply

ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of

contracts.”). But there may be arguments that federal common

law or another source of law governs. Cf. Bancec, 462 U.S. at

623 (declining to decide whether international law or federal

common law governs the question of a state instrumentality’s

17

separate juridical status). The parties have not briefed this

choice-of-law issue; the district court must consider it on

remand.

The district court must then determine whether, under that

law, Argentina is subject to the arbitration provision. This will

likely involve factfinding on the existence of a successorship

relationship, if any, between Argentina and Caja. Indeed, there

appears to be at minimum a dispute of fact over whether

Argentina assumed liabilities under the reinsurance contracts.

Compare J.A. 220 (TIG affidavit stating that annex to one

Argentine resolution specifies liabilities to TIG), with

Appellee’s Brief 6 (citing declarations and claiming that the

liabilities were not active when Argentina began issuing its

resolutions). The district court must resolve this dispute and

any others that may bear on the analysis required by the source

of law governing the question of enforcement of the arbitration

provision against Argentina.

IV

We turn now to the second exception TIG contends

provided the Illinois district court jurisdiction over Argentina

to enter the 2018 judgment: the waiver exception. Again,

contrary to the district court here, we conclude that the

exception may apply subject to further analysis and factfinding

on remand.

A

The FSIA’s waiver exception “recognizes two species of

waiver”: explicit and implicit. Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic

of Iraq, 24 F.4th 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2022). This case concerns

the latter, which provides that a United States court has

jurisdiction for an action “in which the foreign state has waived

its immunity . . . by implication.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). We

“constru[e] the implied waiver provision narrowly.” Creighton

18

Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 122 (D.C. Cir.

1999).

The FSIA does not define what constitutes waiver by

implication. Our court has identified “only three

circumstances” in which a sovereign will be treated as having

impliedly waived its immunity. Khochinsky v. Republic of

Poland, 1 F.4th 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). They

are the sovereign’s: (1) “executing a contract containing a

choice-of-law clause designating the laws of the United States

as applicable”; (2) “filing a responsive pleading without

asserting sovereign immunity”; or (3) “agreeing to submit a

dispute to arbitration in the United States.” Id. at 8–9 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The legislative history of the FSIA

provides only” these “three examples of implicit waivers by a

foreign state, and courts” including ours “have been reluctant

to recognize an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity in other

circumstances.” Wye Oak Tech., Inc., 24 F.4th at 691 (citation

omitted); see H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976); S. Rep. No.

94-1310, at 17–18 (1976).

TIG argues all three scenarios here. The district court

found none of them applicable. TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL

1154749, at *10–11; TIG Ins. v. Republic of Argentina (“TIG

III, Part Two”), 2022 WL 3594601, at *5–7 (D.D.C. Aug. 23,

2022). We address the arbitration and choice-of-law scenarios

together before addressing the responsive-pleading scenario.

B

For the arbitration and choice-of-law scenarios, TIG relies

on the same basic theory it raised for the arbitration exception:

Because Argentina took affirmative steps that render it Caja’s

successor-in-interest, Argentina has agreed to the contracts’

arbitration and choice-of-law provisions, and it has therefore

impliedly waived immunity. Appellant’s Brief 23–41.

Argentina responds that what matters for implied waiver is not

19

whether Argentina is bound by the provisions, but rather

whether there is evidence that it subjectively intended to

withdraw its sovereign immunity. Appellee’s Brief 27–38.

Here, it says, TIG points to none. Id.

We do not read the implied waiver provision to require

evidence of subjective intent to waive sovereign immunity. As

explained, this court has already endorsed three scenarios,

drawn from the statute’s legislative history, in which an

implied waiver will be found. See supra pp. 18 (collecting

cases). Those examples depend on the sovereign taking

specific steps which “the courts” have held indicate a

willingness to submit to litigation in this country. H.R. Rep.

No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1310, at 17–18

(1976). The nature of the examples necessarily entails an

objective, rather than subjective, assessment of intent. As the

Second Circuit has put it, these “three examples are persuasive

evidence that Congress primarily expected courts to hold a

foreign state to an implied waiver of sovereign immunity by

the state’s actions in relation to the conduct of litigation.”

Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d

239, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1996).

When a sovereign takes the specified acts, nothing in our

cases nor the FSIA’s legislative history they draw on indicates

that there must be a further inquiry into whether the sovereign

affirmatively believed it was waiving immunity. There is, for

example, no suggestion in the statute or our precedent that if a

sovereign “fil[ed] a responsive pleading without asserting

sovereign immunity” or “agree[d] to submit a dispute to

arbitration in the United States,” Khochinsky, 1 F.4th at 9

(quotation omitted), there would nevertheless be a further

inquiry into whether the sovereign subjectively intended to

waive its sovereign immunity by doing so. The FSIA instead

deems the sovereign to have the requisite intent when it takes

the specified steps because they “indicate[] its amenability to

20

suit” in this country. Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26

F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit has

similarly concluded that if a sovereign is the successor-in-

interest to a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate in the

United States, it may be found to have impliedly waived its

sovereign immunity under Section 1605(a)(1). Gen. Star Nat’l

Ins. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 434, 440

(6th Cir. 2002).

We emphasize again, however, that beyond the three

examples we have endorsed where it is appropriate to find

implied waiver, the provision must be applied “narrowly.”

Creighton Ltd., 181 F.3d at 122.

The district court correctly framed the analysis at the

outset as whether Argentina “agreed to” the provisions at issue.

TIG III, Part Two, 2022 WL 3594601, at *5–6. It then

embarked on a different inquiry into Argentina’s subjective

intent, rather than analyzing whether Argentina is properly

treated as agreeing to the provisions and therefore as having

implicitly waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at *7. Implied

waiver thus requires the same conceptual inquiry described

above for the arbitration exception: If Argentina’s conduct

renders it subject to those provisions as a matter of law, it has

impliedly waived its sovereign immunity.

On remand, because TIG contends here that Argentina’s

succession to both the choice-of-law and arbitration provisions

are bases for implied waiver, the district court must analyze

enforcement of the arbitration provision, per the inquiry we set

out for the arbitration exception, but it must also analyze

whether, under the applicable source of law, TIG can enforce

the choice-of-law provision against Argentina on a

successorship theory.

21

C

As mentioned, the other scenario for implied waiver is

when a sovereign files “a responsive pleading without asserting

sovereign immunity.” Ivanenko v. Yanukovich, 995 F.3d 232,

239 (D.C. Cir. 2021). We will not find a waiver on this ground

“absent a conscious decision to take part in the litigation and a

failure to raise sovereign immunity despite the opportunity to

do so.” Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

905 F.2d 438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted).

Here, TIG emphasizes that when Argentina opposed TIG’s

motion for emergency relief in 2018 and 2019, it argued only

execution immunity defenses, not jurisdictional immunity

defenses. Argentina’s decision to wait, TIG says, is akin to

filing a responsive motion without asserting sovereign

immunity.

As the district court explained, TIG’s argument fails for

the simple reason that Argentina has not filed a responsive

pleading in this case. Argentina entered a special appearance

in the case to contest jurisdiction and subsequently filed

motions seeking dismissal by asserting the court’s lack of

jurisdiction on various grounds. See TIG III, Part One, 2022

WL 1154749 at *3–4, *10. “[A] motion to dismiss . . . is not

considered a responsive pleading.” Bowden v. United States,

176 F.3d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Adkins v. Safeway,

Inc., 985 F.2d 1101, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Only complaints,

answers, replies to counterclaims, and third-party complaints

and third-party answers are ‘pleadings.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 7(a))). Because Argentina has not filed a responsive

pleading, the third scenario of implied waiver is not present

here.

22

V

TIG also argues, as a separate theory relevant to multiple

FSIA exceptions, that Argentina used Caja as its alter ego. The

district court rejected TIG’s argument, and we agree.

A

Under the FSIA, the “instrumentality” of a sovereign is

afforded both sovereign immunity and a presumption of

separateness from the sovereign. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 627.

That presumption “applies to jurisdictional issues.” Foremost-

McKesson, Inc., 905 F.2d at 446. This means that actions taken

by the instrumentality that waive its own immunity will not

necessarily be imputed to the sovereign to waive its immunity.

See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela,

200 F.3d 843, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2000). TIG has not disputed,

either in the district court or on appeal, that Caja is an

instrumentality of Argentina for the purposes of alter ego

analysis, and therefore that a presumption of separateness

applies for purposes of that analysis. See TIG III, Part One,

2022 WL 1154749, at *9.

“That presumption can be overcome,” however, if the

instrumentality is the sovereign’s alter ego. Transamerica

Leasing, Inc., 200 F.3d at 847. An alter ego relationship exists

in either of two situations: (1) the “corporate entity is so

extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of

principal and agent is created” or (2) “recognition of the

instrumentality as an entity apart from the state ‘would work

fraud or injustice.’” Id. at 848 (quoting Bancec, 462 U.S. at

629). Under either scenario, the actions of the alter ego

corporation can be imputed to a sovereign to work a waiver of

sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 905

F.2d at 446.

23

As the parties agree, see Appellant’s Brief 54; Appellee’s

Brief 47, TIG bore “the burden of asserting facts sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss regarding the . . . relationship,”

Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 905 F.2d at 447; see GSS Grp. Ltd.,

822 F.3d at 605 n.9. 2 TIG’s lackluster effort to present its alter

ego theory below fails under that standard.

TIG’s procedural opportunity to assert facts supporting its

alter ego theory came in its opposition to Argentina’s motion

to dismiss after our remand. Yet in that submission TIG

sketched its alter ego theory in only the most skeletal way and

failed to allege any relevant facts or put forward any relevant

evidence. See J.A. 634–35. TIG does not dispute that Caja was

initially established in 1915 as an independent entity. See

Appellant’s Brief 59. The only facts TIG identified as showing

that Caja was Argentina’s alter ego at the time Caja entered the

reinsurance contracts in 1979 were Argentina’s liquidation

resolutions in the 1990s and 2000s. See J.A. 634–35. TIG

claimed without elaboration that the resolutions “confirm that

Caja existed under Argentina’s complete control” and “was in

some stage of significant undercapitalization,” which are

2

The district court stated that TIG bore the burden of proof on

this issue. TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL 1154749, at *8. TIG

challenges that conclusion, pointing to our cases applying the FSIA

exceptions generally, which instead set out a burden-shifting

approach under which the plaintiff bears a burden of production, but

then the sovereign must prove that the immunity exception at issue

does not apply. Appellant’s Brief 54–58. At the same time, we have

suggested that a plaintiff does in fact bear the burden of proof on the

specific question of whether a nominally independent entity was a

sovereign’s alter ego. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 905 F.2d at

447. As explained, however, the parties in this case agree that at the

motion-to-dismiss stage a plaintiff bears the burden of asserting

plausible facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. We

therefore need not resolve the parties’ dispute over who bears the

burden of proof later in the suit.

24

“‘critical’ factors in determining whether an entity is an ‘alter

ego’ of the sovereign.” J.A. 634 (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v.

Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 2006)).

The key questions, however, are whether Argentina

exerted “complete domination” over Caja, Transamerica

Leasing, Inc., 200 F.3d at 848, or whether Caja was effectively

Argentina’s “agent,” id. at 849, when Caja entered the

reinsurance contracts with TIG in 1979. On their face, the far-

later-in-time resolutions do not speak to those questions at all.

And aside from citing the resolutions, TIG made no argument

about why the resolutions supported its alter ego claim. Again,

TIG stated only that the resolutions “confirm” a controlling

relationship and vaguely asserted—without specific

connection even to the resolutions—that Caja was

undercapitalized. J.A. 634–35. This is plainly insufficient to

survive Argentina’s motion to dismiss.

For similar reasons, TIG also failed to meet its burden on

the alternative alter ego theory that treating Argentina and Caja

as separate would work “fraud or injustice.” Bancec, 462 U.S.

at 629 (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S.

307, 322 (1939)). TIG’s opposition memorandum was devoid

of any argument directed to this theory. The district court thus

correctly concluded, on the record before it, that TIG had

“proffered no evidence that Argentina manipulated Caja when

the insurance contracts were signed so that Argentina could

benefit from them without risk.” TIG III, Part One, 2022 WL

1154749, at *10. Nor had it put forth “evidence that Argentina

used Caja ‘to defeat any statutory policy of either [Argentina]

or the United States.’” Id. (quoting Transamerica Leasing Inc.,

200 F.3d at 854) (alteration in original). Nor did it offer

“evidence that Argentina is trying to reap the benefits of

American courts while avoiding potential downside.” Id.

TIG’s evidence suggested “simply a run of the mill alleged

25

contractual breach,” not fraud or injustice. Id. (quoting GSS

Grp. Ltd., 822 F.3d at 608).

Finally, TIG argues in its reply brief that the district court

should have considered whether Argentina and Caja were alter

egos at some later time, such as after Argentina issued the

official resolutions. See Reply Brief 27. But because TIG did

not raise this argument in its opening brief, it is forfeited. See

Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

In sum, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that

TIG failed to meet its burden of asserting facts to demonstrate

that Caja and Argentina were alter egos as a basis to impute

Caja’s actions to Argentina and to thus form a basis for

Argentina’s waiver of sovereign immunity.

B

TIG also argues that the district court abused its discretion

by denying its request for jurisdictional discovery and a later

motion for reconsideration on the alter ego issue. Both

arguments fail.

TIG first contends that the district court abused its

discretion in denying TIG jurisdictional discovery.

Appellant’s Brief 57–60. We have said that “in order to get

jurisdictional discovery,” the party seeking discovery “must

have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable

it to show that the court has . . . jurisdiction over the

defendant.” Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless

PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We have also

explained that jurisdictional discovery in a case like this one

involving a claim of sovereign immunity “should be carefully

controlled and limited.” Phx. Consulting Inc. v. Republic of

Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000). “A district court has

broad discretion in its resolution of discovery problems that

26

arise in cases pending before it.” In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods.

Liab. Litig., 653 F.2d 671, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Here, TIG did not offer the district court any explanation

of what relevant facts it believed jurisdictional discovery would

uncover. TIG’s opposition to Argentina’s motion to dismiss

included two sentences on the subject that effectively

attempted to reserve its right to conduct discovery on the alter

ego issue if the district court ruled against it on its other

theories. See J.A. 635. We have rejected similar efforts. See

GSS Grp. Ltd., 680 F.3d at 812. TIG needed to, at a minimum,

explain in its opposition “what facts additional discovery could

produce that would affect [the court’s] jurisdictional analysis.”

Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1147

(D.C. Cir. 1994). Because TIG failed to develop and support

its request, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying jurisdictional discovery.

TIG’s challenge to the district court’s denial of its motion

for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b) also lacks merit. See Appellant’s Brief 61–67. With its

motion for reconsideration, TIG submitted to the court a

supplemental record that included a new declaration from its

legal expert and translated versions of Argentinian laws and

records which TIG contended bore on Argentina and Caja’s

relationship. The district court denied TIG’s motion on the

ground that TIG’s “new” evidence was “previously available.”

J.A. 1113 (quoting Parker v. John Moriarty & Assocs., 221 F.

Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2016)). TIG fails to show the district

court abused its discretion. A “district court should not grant a

motion for reconsideration unless the moving party shows new

facts or clear errors of law which compel the court to change

its prior position.” Nat’l Ctr. for Mfg. Scis. v. Dep’t of Def.,

199 F.3d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On appeal, TIG argues

that much of its evidence in the supplemental record was

“decades old and difficult to find,” Appellant’s Brief 62, but

27

makes no claim that the evidence was unavailable before the

district court ruled on its alter ego theory. We therefore reject

TIG’s efforts to rely on its supplemental evidence, and the

district court thus did not abuse its discretion when it denied

TIG’s motion for reconsideration on its alter ego theory.

VI

We turn last to the 2001 judgment. Unlike the 2018

judgment naming Argentina, the 2001 judgment names Caja.

But TIG also seeks to enforce the 2001 judgment against

Argentina. Before the district court, Argentina raised two

defenses. First, it argued that TIG needed to seek amendment

of the 2001 judgment to substitute Argentina as the judgment

debtor before TIG could rely on that judgment to attach

Argentina’s property. Second and independently, Argentina

invoked its sovereign immunity and denied applicability of any

of the FSIA exceptions for many of the same reasons already

discussed.

The district court agreed with Argentina on the first

argument and did not address the immunity defenses. See TIG

III, Part Two, 2022 WL 3594601, at *7. The district court

concluded that TIG was required to “go before the Northern

District of Illinois to amend or alter the judgment before it can

serve as a basis for an enforcement action against Argentina.”

Id. The court also stated that this was true even “to the extent

that Argentina is the successor-in-interest to Caja and this

successorship is sufficient to enforce the 2001 judgment

against Argentina.” Id.

That conclusion was incorrect. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1963, a

registered judgment “shall have the same effect as a judgment

of the district court of the district where registered and may be

enforced in like manner.” This means that once, as here, a

judgment is registered in another federal district court, “the

judgment may be enforced there in accordance with the law of

28

that state as though originally rendered by that court.” 12

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3012 (3d ed. 2014). Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) is to the same effect and

provides that the procedure on execution—and in proceedings

supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—

generally follows the procedure of the state where the federal

court is located. Based on Section 1963 and Rule 69(a)(1), we

see no basis for a conclusion that the Northern District of

Illinois must first determine whether a judgment it issued can

be amended or otherwise enforced in the District of Columbia

against an entity not named in the judgment. Cf. RMA Ventures

Cal. v. SunAmerica Life Ins., 576 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir.

2009).

The district court here thus erred by requiring TIG to first

return to the Northern District of Illinois before seeking

enforcement against Argentina here. On remand, the district

court must determine whether the 2001 judgment, having now

been registered in D.C., may under D.C. law be enforced

against Argentina on a successorship theory. Argentina

remains free to raise its sovereign immunity defenses apart

from this question.

VII

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of TIG’s

request for jurisdictional discovery and vacate the district

court’s decisions granting Argentina relief from the judgment. 3

Because we find that the arbitration exception and the

implied waiver exception may permit TIG’s claims, we vacate

the dismissal of TIG’s claims relating to the 2018 judgment.

3

Because we vacate the orders granting relief from the 2018

judgment, we need not separately resolve the appeal from the denial

of TIG’s motion to reconsider those orders.

29

We also vacate the district court’s decision that TIG cannot

enforce against Argentina the 2001 judgment until TIG seeks

amendment in Illinois. We remand to the district court for

further analysis and to conduct any necessary factfinding on

these issues, consistent with the instructions we have provided

in this decision.

However, because the district court’s decisions properly

resolved several issues, on remand, TIG is precluded from

advancing an alter ego theory to establish jurisdiction over

Argentina under the FSIA. It is also precluded from arguing

that Argentina failed to raise its immunity in a responsive

pleading as a basis to apply the implied waiver exception.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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