Cristi Campbell v. April Riahi

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 24a0157p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐

CRISTI CAMPBELL, Administratrix of the Estate of

│

Bryana Baker,

│

Plaintiff-Appellant, │

│

v. > No. 23-3793

│

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APRIL RIAHI, individually and in her official capacity │

as an employee of Butler County, Ohio; RICHARD K. │

JONES, individually and in his official capacity as │

Sheriff of Butler County, Ohio; BUTLER COUNTY, │

OHIO; BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, │

Defendants-Appellees. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.

No. 1:20-cv-00678—Douglas Russell Cole, District Judge.

Argued: June 12, 2024

Decided and Filed: July 29, 2024

Before: KETHLEDGE, LARSEN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jacqueline Greene, FRIEDMAN, GILBERT + GERHARDSTEIN, Cincinnati,

Ohio, for Appellant. Angelica M. Jarmusz, FISHEL, DOWNEY, ALBRECHT &

RIEPENHOFF LLP, New Albany, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jacqueline Greene, M.

Caroline Hyatt, FRIEDMAN, GILBERT + GERHARDSTEIN, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Angelica M. Jarmusz, Daniel T. Downey, FISHEL, DOWNEY, ALBRECHT & RIEPENHOFF

LLP, New Albany, Ohio, for Appellees.

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 2

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OPINION

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KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. In September 2018, Bryana Baker committed suicide in

the Butler County Jail, where she had been booked following her arrest on state charges. Baker’s

mother, Cristi Campbell, thereafter brought this suit against the County Defendants, Sheriff

Richard Jones, and a corrections officer, April Riahi, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and Ohio law. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

I.

We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Baker’s mother. On September 19,

2018, police officers in Hamilton, Ohio, arrested Baker on state charges and took her to the

Butler County Jail. The next morning, she began to experience drug-withdrawal symptoms and

became disruptive, so corrections staff moved her from one part of the jail to another. During

that move Baker tried to escape, but a corrections officer quickly caught up with her.

Corrections staff charged Baker with a disciplinary infraction, reclassified her as a “maximum-

security” inmate, and sanctioned her with 60 days in disciplinary isolation, during which she

would be housed in an “isolation cell” with another inmate. A prosecutor also charged Baker

with felony escape. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.34.

Later that morning, a social worker at the jail, Becky Brown, conducted a mental-health

assessment of Baker. Baker told Brown that, prior to her arrest, she had been consuming

methadone and alcohol daily, and fentanyl “here and there.” She also said she had been

diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression, but had stopped taking her medication years

before. When Brown asked Baker why she had tried to escape, Baker said she “just” wanted

help with her withdrawal symptoms. She also said that she was not suicidal, that she had never

attempted suicide, and that she would notify someone if she felt otherwise, because she had two

children “she lived for.” After that conversation, Brown concluded that Baker need not be

placed on suicide watch, and thus cleared her to return to her cell.

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Soon thereafter, Sergeant Vee Hurst escorted Baker to the “J-Block,” which housed

certain female detainees (including those assigned to disciplinary isolation). According to Hurst,

Baker was “upset and crying,” said that she “couldn’t believe she had tried to escape,” and

explained that she was “withdrawing from the drugs.” Once Hurst and Baker arrived, Hurst left

Baker with defendant April Riahi, the sole corrections officer on duty at the time.

The parties dispute what happened next. Viewed in the light most favorable to Baker’s

mother, however, a reasonable jury could find that, about an hour after Baker arrived in the J-

Block, Riahi decided to place her on suicide watch—apparently because she was acting

“erratically” and saying that corrections officers “were trying to kill her.” (Riahi denies making

that decision. According to Riahi, sometime that morning, her supervisor, Sergeant Theresa

Rumpler, called to tell her that someone on the corrections staff had placed Baker “on watch.”

But Rumpler denies ever making that phone call, and Rumpler undisputedly did not work that

day. Thus, a reasonable jury could find Riahi’s testimony on this point not credible.) Riahi then

moved Baker’s personal belongings into a janitorial closet, and recorded in the jail’s computer

system that Baker had been placed “on watch.” Meanwhile, another corrections officer escorted

Baker to a suicide-watch cell in the jail’s booking area, where she remained overnight.

The next day, September 21, Becky Brown spoke with Baker for a second time. Baker

again denied feeling suicidal, but Brown concluded that, because Baker’s drug-withdrawal

symptoms had gotten worse, she should remain on watch for at least another 24 hours. On

September 22, Brown spoke with Baker again, and again Baker denied feeling suicidal. Yet

corrections officers told Brown that Baker had been acting erratically that morning, so Brown

kept her on watch for another 24 hours. The next day, September 23, another social worker at

the jail, Michelle Reimer, evaluated Baker. Baker told Reimer that she was confused “as to why

she was placed on suicide watch,” and said “she could not commit suicide” because she had a

family and children. She also said her drug-withdrawal symptoms had improved. Yet Reimer

concluded that, because Baker was “not able to articulate coping skills,” she should remain on

watch pending “further assessment.”

The next afternoon, September 24, a third social worker at the jail, Christina Dingledine,

evaluated Baker. For the fifth time, Baker denied feeling suicidal; she also said she was no

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 4

longer withdrawing, and explained that she planned to “cope” with her incarceration by positive

self-talk, reading, and walking. She further reported that she had support from her family,

including her mother, grandmother, and two children. After that conversation, Dingledine

removed Baker from suicide watch, concluding that her “current risk level” was “low.” Yet

Dingledine also recorded in Baker’s medical chart that she “was not cleared single-celled”—

meaning that Baker’s cell door should remain open whenever she was alone. That finding was

related to the jail’s “single-celling” policy, under which corrections officers were required to

obtain approval from the mental-health staff before placing any inmate alone in a closed-door

cell (regardless of whether that inmate had been on suicide watch).

Later that afternoon, Baker was transferred back to the J-Block to begin 60 days in

disciplinary isolation, the sanction for her escape attempt. When she arrived, a corrections

officer placed her in Cell J38 with another inmate on disciplinary isolation, Rosanna Herbert.

The record contains few details about what happened that afternoon; but another inmate, Meah

Virge, said that at some point Riahi “came into” the J-Block and called Baker a “whore” and a

“drug-addict bitch” in front of the “whole pod.”

Around noon the next day, September 25, Baker’s cellmate, Herbert, left the jail to go to

court. At that point, Officer Riahi was the sole corrections officer on duty in the J-Block. Once

Herbert left, Riahi kept Baker’s cell door open, consistent with the jail’s “single-celling” policy.

Although Riahi could not access Baker’s medical chart (in which Christina Dingledine had

earlier recorded that Baker was “not cleared single-celled”), she knew that the mental-health staff

had not cleared Baker for “single-celling.”

Over the next few hours, Riahi made “observation rounds” every forty minutes, during

which she “checked on” Baker four or five times. According to Riahi, Baker’s demeanor was

pleasant and each of their interactions was friendly. Baker’s mother says that Riahi’s testimony

on that point is not credible, however, in light of Meah Virge’s account of what Riahi had

apparently said to Baker the day before—namely, that Baker was a “whore” and a “drug-addict

bitch.” In any event, the parties agree that Baker never expressed suicidal ideation to Riahi or

anyone else in the jail.

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 5

Meanwhile, at some point that afternoon—likely around 4:00 p.m.—Herbert arrived back

from court and returned to the cell she shared with Baker. About a half hour later, Baker called

Riahi (using an intercom in her cell) and reported that Herbert had “threatened” her. Riahi went

to investigate and found Baker and Herbert yelling at each other, “saying, she’s crazy, no she’s

crazy, get her out of my cell.” Riahi tried to calm them down, but they kept “bickering back and

forth,” so she promptly called another jail official, Noah Fisher, to see whether he could find

them new cellmates. Fisher apparently could not, so Riahi called her supervisor, Sergeant Vee

Hurst, and told her that Baker and Herbert were arguing. Hurst told Riahi to “handle it,” and

suggested that she “get them different cellmates” when she had time.

A few minutes later—about 4:45 p.m.—Riahi heard Baker and Herbert yelling at each

other again, this time louder than before. Riahi therefore separated them by moving Herbert to

an adjacent cell (Cell J39), the only then-vacant cell in the J-Block. At that point, Riahi kept

both Baker and Herbert’s cell doors open, mindful of the jail’s “single-celling policy.” She then

called Hurst for a second time, told her she had separated them, and said she was trying to find

them new cellmates. She also recorded in the jail’s computer system (at 4:53 p.m.) that

“[i]nmates Baker and Herbert had to be separated due to continuous arguing, while in isolation.

The arguing had escalated into verbal threats. Due to the ongoing issues, both inmates were

separated[.]”

Less than ten minutes later, right around 5:00 p.m., Baker threw Herbert’s “papers” onto

the floor outside her cell and yelled, “come get [your] shit.” Baker and Herbert then started

chasing one another “in and out” of their cells on the second floor of the J-Block. Riahi

therefore promptly separated them, walked Baker back to Cell J38, and closed the cell door. She

then closed Herbert’s cell door, returned to the first floor, and called Hurst for a third time.

According to Hurst, Riahi told her that “she had to shut their doors” because they kept “running

into each others cells” and “screaming at each other.” Riahi and Hurst then began discussing

what to do next.

Not more than ten minutes later, while Riahi was still on the phone with Hurst, another

inmate yelled out that Baker “was hanging in her cell.” Riahi hung up the phone and ran to

Baker’s cell, where she found her hanging from a bedsheet tied to her locker. Riahi removed

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 6

Baker from the bedsheet, began administering CPR, and called for an ambulance. Paramedics

soon arrived and took Baker to the hospital, where she died a few days later.

Baker’s mother thereafter sued Officer Riahi, Butler County Sheriff Richard Jones, and

Butler County, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio law. She alleged that Riahi

had been deliberately indifferent to the risk that Baker would commit suicide, in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. She also alleged a supervisory-liability claim against County Sheriff

Jones, and municipal-liability claims against Butler County. She further alleged state-law claims

against Riahi and Jones for wrongful death and negligence. The district court later granted

summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. This appeal followed.

II.

We review the district court’s decision de novo. See Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th

391, 399 (6th Cir. 2022). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Boler v.

Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 414 (6th Cir. 2017).

A.

Baker’s mother first argues that the evidence in her case would allow a reasonable jury to

find that Officer Riahi was deliberately indifferent to the risk that Baker would commit suicide,

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S.

239, 244 (1983). Riahi counters that she is entitled to qualified immunity on the facts as we must

construe them here. To demonstrate she is not entitled to that immunity, Baker’s mother must

show that (1) Riahi violated Baker’s constitutional rights and that (2) those rights were “clearly

established” at the time of the challenged conduct—meaning the caselaw would have made clear

to Riahi that her conduct “was unlawful in the situation [s]he confronted.” District of Columbia

v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal quotations marks omitted).

We skip to the question whether Riahi’s action violated any clearly established right. See

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Fourteenth Amendment requires (among

other things) that jail officials take reasonable measures “to protect pretrial detainees from

harm.” Lawler v. Hardeman County, 93 F.4th 919, 926 (6th Cir. 2024). At the time of the

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 7

alleged constitutional violation here, a plaintiff alleging a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-

indifference claim needed to prove two elements: first, that the detainee faced a “substantial risk

of serious of harm”; and second, that the defendant understood yet “consciously disregarded”

that risk—meaning the defendant knew of the risk and responded unreasonably to it. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 840 (1994); see Beck v. Hamblen County, 969 F.3d 592, 600-02

(6th Cir. 2020). An unreasonable response, in this context, means a response that amounts to

more than ordinary negligence. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (citation omitted); Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

“A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7,

11 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A case “directly on point” is not

required for a plaintiff’s right in particular circumstances to be clearly established; but “existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (quoting

Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). That means, except in an “obvious” case, the

plaintiff must point to pre-existing Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit precedent that would have put

a reasonable officer on notice that her specific conduct was unlawful. Rivas-Villegas v.

Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021) (per curiam); see also Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford

Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 992-93 (6th Cir. 2017).

Here, regardless of whether Riahi subjectively perceived the potential risk that Baker

would commit suicide, Baker’s mother has not cited—nor have we found—any case that would

have put Riahi on notice that her decision to close Baker’s cell door was “so unreasonable as to

violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Beck, 969 F.3d at 595. At that time, Riahi was responding

to an ongoing altercation between two cellmates, which had escalated over the course of nearly

thirty minutes. Twice Riahi tried to defuse the altercation; but when Baker and Herbert started

“going in and out” of their cells attempting “to get” each other, Riahi closed each of their cell

doors “to avoid a physical altercation.” At that moment—as the sole corrections officer on

duty—Riahi was forced to balance competing exigencies: the potential risk that Baker might

harm herself, on the one hand, and the risk that Baker and Herbert might harm each other (or

another inmate), on the other. No “clearly established law” from our court or the Supreme Court

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 8

“prohibited” Riahi from balancing those considerations by closing Baker’s cell door for ten

minutes while seeking assistance from her supervising officer. City of Escondido v. Emmons,

586 U.S. 38, 43 (2019) (per curiam); see Arrington-Bey, 858 F.3d at 992.

Each of the cases that Baker’s mother cites is materially distinguishable from this one.

She first argues that we should deny immunity to Riahi under our decision in Troutman v.

Louisville Metro Department of Corrections, 979 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2020). In that case, like this

one, medical staff had cleared the inmate to return to the prison’s general population on the

ground that he was not suicidal; and in that case a corrections officer later placed the inmate in a

closed-door single-cell without medical authorization. Id. at 478-79. The similarities essentially

end there. In Troutman, the corrections officer undisputedly knew that the inmate had attempted

suicide the week before, and later admitted that his “gut reaction” counseled against moving him

to a single cell. Id. at 480. More to the point, the officer there made a calculated judgment to

move the inmate to a single cell days after he received a “disciplinary infraction.” Id. at 479-80.

Here, by contrast, Officer Riahi’s decision to close Baker’s cell door came in the midst of a fluid,

escalating altercation that presented competing exigencies. Cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998) (“[L]iability for deliberate indifference to inmate welfare rests upon

the luxury enjoyed by prison officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the

chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations.”).

Troutman involved no such exigencies and thus does not “govern the facts of this case.” Rivas-

Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6.

The same is true of the next case that Baker’s mother cites, namely, Perez v. Oakland

County, 466 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2006). In Perez, as in Troutman, the officer’s decision to

single-cell the inmate involved no immediate tradeoff between competing interests. Id. at 421-

22, 425-26. So that case too does not clearly establish that Riahi’s conduct was unlawful in this

one.

Finally, Baker’s mother cites our unpublished decision in Linden v. Washtenaw County,

167 F. App’x 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2006). But “unpublished cases cannot define clearly established

law.” Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 368 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). And Linden

is distinguishable for the same reasons as Troutman and Perez are. True, in Linden the

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 9

corrections officer placed the inmate in an “isolated maximum security cell” to avoid a “potential

altercation.” Linden, 167 F. App’x at 414, 423. But that altercation was not ongoing and hence

the corrections officer was not required to balance competing exigencies on-the-spot. See id. at

414, 423-24.

At the time of Baker’s suicide, no case from the Supreme Court or this court established

that Riahi’s actions were unconstitutional at the time she took them. Riahi is therefore entitled to

qualified immunity as to the federal claim against her.

B.

Baker’s mother next argues that the district court mistakenly dismissed her supervisory-

liability claim against County Sheriff Richard Jones. Yet a “necessary predicate” of supervisory

liability under § 1983 “is the existence of clearly established law indicating the subordinate’s

actions were unconstitutional.” Bambach v. Moegle, 92 F.4th 615, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2024); see

Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 245 (6th Cir. 2016). Here, as shown above, Officer

Riahi did not violate Baker’s clearly-established constitutional rights; so the derivative claim

against Sheriff Jones likewise fails.

C.

Baker’s mother also asserts various municipal-liability claims against Butler County. To

establish municipal liability for a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show that her injuries

were caused by a municipal “policy or custom.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Baker’s mother first argues that Butler County is liable for Officer Riahi’s alleged

constitutional violation because (she says) the County has a policy of inadequately training and

supervising its officers, a “custom of inaction to constitutional violations,” and no “effective

system for communicating” concerns about inmate health and safety. To establish municipal

liability on any of these bases, Baker’s mother must prove (among other things) that the

County’s various failures amounted to “a policy of deliberate indifference” to Baker’s

constitutional rights. Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996); see Mosier v.

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 10

Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 549 (6th Cir. 2024). Yet a municipality “cannot exhibit fault rising to the

level of deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly

established.” Arrington-Bey, 858 F.3d at 994 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus—

because Officer Riahi did not violate a clearly established right—it follows that her employer,

Butler County, was not deliberately indifferent to such a right. See id. at 995. Butler County is

entitled to summary judgment on these claims.

Baker’s mother also argues that Butler County can be held liable under § 1983 because,

she says, it “ratified” Riahi’s actions by concluding later that she “used appropriate judgment[.]”

Yet the County approved of Riahi’s actions only after the putative violation occurred, which

means that the County itself did not cause it. See Pineda v. Hamilton County, 977 F.3d 483, 496

(6th Cir. 2020). Butler County is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.

D.

Finally, Baker’s mother argues that Riahi and Jones acted recklessly and thus should not

receive Ohio statutory immunity as to the state-law claims for wrongful death and negligence.

Officers are entitled to that immunity from Ohio state-law claims unless they acted “with

malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2744.03(A)(6)(b). As relevant here, an officer acts in a reckless manner when she consciously

disregards or is indifferent towards “a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is

unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.”

Argabrite v. Neer, 75 N.E.3d 161, 164 (Ohio 2016). That definition creates “rigorous standards”

that are “difficult to establish[.]” Id.

Here, Baker’s mother must show that Riahi’s decision to close Baker’s cell door for ten

minutes—under the circumstances Riahi encountered then—was so “perverse” as to amount to

“substantially greater than negligent conduct.” A.J.R. v. Lute, 168 N.E.3d 1157, 1161-62 (Ohio

2020); see Caudill v. City of Columbus, 97 N.E.3d 800, 807 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).

When Riahi closed Baker and Herbert’s doors, she was responding to an ongoing and

escalating altercation that required her to balance competing hazards to Baker and other

prisoners. Baker’s mother argues that—rather than close the door to both Baker and Herbert’s

No. 23-3793 Campbell v. Riahi, et al. Page 11

cells—Riahi should have closed only Herbert’s cell door. But at that point Riahi had reason to

think that Baker might have posed a threat to inmates other than Herbert—in part because,

moments before Riahi shut Baker’s cell door, Baker had undisputedly chased Herbert into her

cell near a second-floor railing, during which time another inmate was passing out dinner trays

nearby. And had Baker harmed that inmate (or any other), that inmate may well have sued Riahi

for failing to protect her from a substantial risk of harm. See, e.g., Rager ex rel. G.C. v. McMinn

County, 2023 WL 4927252, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023) (stating that an officer “had a duty to

immediately segregate” a dangerous inmate). Baker’s mother also argues that “Baker could have

been placed in booking.” That might be true, but Baker’s mother offers no evidence that Riahi

could have moved Baker to booking right at that moment; for it is also undisputed that Riahi was

the sole corrections officer on duty in the J-Block, and thus could not have left her post to escort

Baker there.

Moreover, the arguments that Baker’s mother makes now come with the benefit of

hindsight, as well as a degree of reflection—in which Riahi herself had little ability to engage

during the short, chaotic interval at issue here. Nor does anyone dispute that—during that

interval—Riahi sought to minimize the time during which the two inmates’ doors were closed.

“[T]he standard for proving recklessness is high, so a court may enter summary judgment in

those cases where the conduct does not indicate a disposition to perversity.” Caudill, 97 N.E.3d

at 807. Although the question is arguably close, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not

find that Riahi’s conduct during that short interval was so perverse as to amount to recklessness

under Ohio law. Neer, 75 N.E.3d at 164; see Arrington-Bey, 858 F.3d at 996. She is therefore

entitled to Ohio statutory immunity.

Finally, as to the state-law claims against Sheriff Jones, Baker’s mother makes no

argument for why the Sheriff acted “recklessly” under Ohio law, nor otherwise explains why he

should be held liable for the actions of his subordinate, Riahi. As a result, Baker’s mother has

forfeited these claims. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997).

* * *

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.