The opinion
07/26/2024
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs July 9, 2024
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEDRICK WIGGINS
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
No. 14-01751 Chris Craft, Judge
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No. W2024-00035-CCA-R3-CD
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The pro se Defendant, Dedrick Wiggins, appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee
Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the
Defendant has not raised a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
MCMULLEN, P.J., and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., joined.
Dedrick Wiggins, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Johnny Cerisano, Assistant Attorney
General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Leslie Byrd, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
FACTS
On November 6, 2013, Larry Richards was shot to death on the front porch of a
Memphis residence after being pursued by a group of five or six men in two separate
vehicles who exited their vehicles and fired multiple gunshots at him as he ran onto the
porch screaming for help. State v. Wiggins, No. W2017-00926-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL
3815061, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2018), no perm. app. filed. A next-door neighbor
witnessed the shooting from inside his home and called 911 after the assailants had fled.
Id. Prior to his death, the victim told two responding police officers that the Defendant
was the one responsible and “that the shooting was ‘over a girl.”’ Id. at *1-2.
The Defendant was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for first degree
premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and three counts of convicted felon in
possession of a firearm. Id. at *1. At the conclusion of the May 2016 trial, the jury
convicted the Defendant of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder in both
counts one and two, and the Defendant pled guilty as a Range II, multiple offender to three
counts of convicted felon in possession of a firearm in counts three through five. Id. at *5.
The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction in count two into the second
degree murder conviction in count one and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender
to thirty-five years at 100% for that conviction. Id. Pursuant to the terms of the
Defendant’s negotiated plea agreement for the remaining three counts, the trial court
sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to six years for counts three and four and
four years for count five “and ordered all to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence
of thirty-five years.” Id.
On November 21, 2023, the Defendant filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. Proc., Rule 36.1.” As best as we can understand from the pro
se motion, the Defendant alleged that he was illegally sentenced as a Range II multiple
offender for the murder conviction and illegally ordered to serve 100% of the sentence,
that his three convictions for convicted felon in possession of a firearm violated the
prohibition against double jeopardy because he was in possession of only a single firearm
during the offense, and that his dual convictions for second degree murder violated double
jeopardy principles because there was only one murder and no proof of either a robbery or
an attempted robbery as charged in the felony murder count of the indictment. The
Defendant asserted that these various “fatal errors” rendered all his sentences illegal and
justified Rule 36.1 relief.
On December 4, 2023, the trial court denied the motion on the basis that all the
sentences were authorized by statute and the motion failed to state a colorable claim for
Rule 36.1 relief. On January 4, 2024, the Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to this
court.
ANALYSIS
The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing
his motion without appointing counsel or requiring a response from the State. The State
argues that the trial court properly denied the motion without a hearing because the
Defendant failed to allege an illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule 36.1.
Rule 36.1 provides “a mechanism for the defendant or the State to seek to correct
an illegal sentence.” State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208-09 (Tenn. 2015). An illegal
sentence is defined as “one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly
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contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(2). When a defendant files a
motion under Rule 36.1, the trial court must determine whether the motion “states a
colorable claim that the unexpired sentence is illegal[.]” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(3).
In the context of Rule 36.1, a colorable claim is a claim that, “if taken as true and
viewed in a light most favorable to the moving party, would entitle the moving party to
relief under Rule 36.1.” State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 593 (Tenn. 2015). Our supreme
court has classified the three categories of sentencing errors: clerical errors (those arising
from a clerical mistake in the judgment sheet), appealable errors (those for which the
Sentencing Act specifically provides a right of direct appeal), and fatal errors (those so
profound as to render a sentence illegal and void). Id. at 594-95. Fatal errors are “sentences
imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme, sentences designating release
eligibility dates where early release is statutorily prohibited, sentences that are ordered to
be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served consecutively, and sentences
not authorized by any statute for the offenses.” Id. Only fatal errors render sentences
illegal. Id.
We agree with the trial court and the State that the Defendant has not alleged a
colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief. The range classification issue raised by the Defendant
is an appealable error that is not cognizable in a Rule 36.1 motion. See, e.g., State v. Ramos,
No. M2016-02187-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 2800148, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28,
2017), no perm. app. filed (“Finally, Defendant’s claim that . . . his offender classification
is incorrect is classified as an appealable error and therefore not proper for a Rule 36.1
motion.”); State v. Williams, No. W2015-00662-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1385613, at *2
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2016), no perm. app. filed (“Although the Petitioner may have
contested the propriety of his offender classification on direct appeal, Rule 36.1 is not an
alternative mechanism to challenge the findings of the trial court.”). The Defendant’s claim
that his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy is also not a cognizable claim for
Rule 36.1 relief. See State v. Johnson, No. M2023-01477-CCA-R3, 2024 WL 2795847, at
*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2024) (“[T]his court has repeatedly held that violations of
double jeopardy principles are not colorable claims for purposes of Rule 36.1.”) (citations
omitted).
CONCLUSION
Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the
Defendant’s motion for Rule 36.1 relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
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JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE
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