Opinion

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Richard A. Demonbreun

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Jun 28, 2011
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge Andy D. Bennett
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.2%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 13, 2011 Session

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON

COUNTY, TENNESSEE v. RICHARD A. DEMONBREUN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 09C851, 09C852 Thomas W. Brothers, Judge

No. M2010-02060-COA-R3-CV - Filed June 28, 2011

Property owner seeks review of the trial court’s decision that two citations were properly

issued against him because he did not have a permit for hosting historic home events on his

property as required by the Metropolitan Government. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

A NDY D. B ENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which F RANK G. C LEMENT, J R.

and R ICHARD H. D INKINS, JJ., joined.

Larry Lamont Crain, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellant, Richard A. Demonbreun.

Richard A. Demonbreun argued on appeal.

Andrew David McClanahan, James William Jefferson Farrar, and Raleigh Alexander

Dickerson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Metropolitan Government of Nashville

and Davidson County, Tennessee.

OPINION

B ACKGROUND

In 2008, Mr. Richard Demonbreun held a bed and breakfast permit for property

located at 746 Benton Avenue in Nashville. He sought a “historic home event” permit, but

the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) denied his application on April 17, 2008.1 According

1

The hearing was held April 17, 2008, and Mr. Demonbreun’s application for a special exception

was denied because it failed to receive the necessary number of affirmative votes for approval. The order

(continued...)

to representations made by both parties during oral argument, Mr. Demonbreun did not

appeal the BZA’s denial. On May 19, 2008, Mr . Demonbreun hosted a graduation gathering

attended by 15 to 20 people, and on August 4 and 5, 2008, a local advertising agency held

a corporate meeting at the bed and breakfast. As a result of these two occurrences, the

Metropolitan Codes Department issued two citations to Mr. Demonbreun for violating Metro

Code § 17.40.580.2 The general sessions court found Mr. Demonbreun in violation of Metro

Code § 17.40.580 and assessed a penalty of $50 plus court costs for each violation. He

appealed the decision as to both citations to the circuit court, which consolidated the appeals.

A trial was held May 19, 2010. The court found that “[a]t the time of the Citations at issue

in the case, Mr. Demonbreun did not have a permit that allowed him to host home events,”

and ordered him to pay the fines assessed by the general sessions court and all court costs.

S TANDARD OF R EVIEW

This court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of

correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13(d). The trial

court’s conclusions of law receive no such presumption of correctness. Nelson v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999).

A NALYSIS

Metro Code § 17.04.060B states that, “‘Historic bed and breakfast homestay’ means

three or fewer furnished guest rooms for pay within a private, owner-occupied historically

significant structure. Meals may be provided to overnight guests. The maximum stay for any

guest shall be fourteen consecutive days.” There is no dispute that Mr. Demonbreun operates

his bed and breakfast establishment pursuant to a historic bed and breakfast homestay permit.

The dispute between the parties is about what the permit allows Mr. Demonbreun to do. He

maintains that the activities for which he was cited fall within the ambit of his bed and

breakfast permit. Metro maintains that Mr. Demonbreun should have obtained a historic

home event permit before engaging in the activities for which he was cited.3 Under the

1

(...continued)

was actually entered on April 18, 2008.

2

Metro Code § 17.40.580 requires a certificate of compliance before a use requiring a permit can be

undertaken. The citations were issued because Mr. Demonbreun did not have a certificate of compliance for

the holding of historic home events.

3

Technically, as noted in footnote 2, infra, the citations were issued because Mr. Demonbreun did

not have a certificate of compliance for the holding of historic home events. Of course, he could not have

(continued...)

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Metro Code, a “‘Historic home event’ means the hosting of events such as, but not limited

to, weddings or parties for pay in a private home which has been judged to be historically

significant by the historical commission.” Metro Code § 17.04.060B.

We begin by examining the requirements of the Metro Code. We apply the same rules

of construction to ordinances as we do to statutes. State ex rel. Moore & Assocs., Inc. v.

Cobb, 124 S.W.3d 131, 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). When construing statutes, courts are to

give effect to the legislative intent. Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn.

1977). “This legislative intent or purpose is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and

ordinary meaning of the language used, when read in the context of the entire statute, without

any forced or subtle construction to limit or extend the import of the language.” Id.

Therefore, the intent, as derived from the ordinary meaning of the language used in the

ordinance, controls.

Metro Code § 17.04.060 is admittedly sparse about what a bed and breakfast located

in a historic home can do. It indicates that Mr. Demonbreun can provide up to three guest

rooms for pay and provide meals to his overnight guests. This language implicates a well-

known canon of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means

“the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another (of the same kind).” D & E Constr.

Co., Inc. v. Robert J. Denley Co., Inc., 38 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting City of

Knoxville v. Brown, 260 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tenn. 1953)). Thus, the provision of food is

limited to meals. We agree with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s observation, albeit in a

slightly different context, “that serving meals means something more than peanuts[,]

popcorn, potato chips, and an occasional sandwich.” Baird v. State, 167 S.W.2d 332, 334

(Tenn. 1943). The ordinance additionally limits the provision of meals to overnight guests.

Permission to hold historic home events allows the hosting of “events such as, but not

limited to, weddings or parties for pay.” Metro Code § 17.04.060B. The words “such as”

indicate that the items following, weddings and parties, are provided as examples of events

which may be hosted. The words “but not limited to” reinforce the notion that weddings and

parties are not the only events that may be held. The purposes of the gatherings and the

activities associated with the gatherings are not expressly limited.

The facts concerning the May 19, 2008 activity at Mr. Demonbreun’s property are

basically uncontroverted. Approximately 15 to 20 people gathered there prior to a high

3

(...continued)

the certificate of compliance if he did not have a permit for holding historic home events in the first place.

References by all parties and this court to a historic home events permit refer to the granting of a special

exception for such events by the BZA.

-3-

school graduation. Mr. Demonbreun claims that the property was used as a “rendevous

point.” He charged a rental fee for his three guest rooms, but the trial court found that there

is no evidence that anyone spent the night there.4 He provided snacks and beverages and was

reimbursed for their cost. Adults and children were observed in the yard. Some of them held

plates in their hands. One woman was observed holding a graduation cap and gown. Mr.

Demonbreun also provided valet parking service.

Mr. Demonbreun characterizes this gathering as merely people visiting with his

guests. He views the provision of snacks as a part of the hospitality business in which his

bed and breakfast is engaged. We respectfully disagree. While there is no requirement that

his room-renters actually spend the night, one cannot use the room fees as a substitute for an

event charge. What occurred on May 19, 2008, was beyond the scope of a bed and breakfast

permit. Food was served to people who were not overnight guests. While nothing prevents

overnight guests from having visitors, having too many visitors makes the activity into an

event. The activity of May 19, 2008, fell squarely within the definition of a historic home

event under the Metro Code and, therefore, required BZA permission to hold historic home

events and a certificate of compliance.

The facts leading to the second citation are not in dispute. On August 4 and 5, 2008,

a Nashville company held a corporate meeting at Mr. Demonbreun’s property.

Approximately 12 employees attended the day-and-a-half meeting. Mr. Demonbreun rented

all three rooms but does not recall anyone staying there as overnight guests. Testimony

indicated that all the cars of the attendees left the evening of the 4th and returned the morning

of the 5th . Mr. Demonbreun provided food and drinks for an additional charge.

Even if some attendees stayed at the bed and breakfast overnight on August 4, what

occurred was not a social visit by friends, family or acquaintances of Mr. Demonbreun’s

overnight guests. The property’s visitors on August 4 and 5, 2008, were there for a corporate

meeting. Such activity is beyond the scope of a bed and breakfast and satisfies the definition

of a historic home event. Therefore, BZA permission to hold historic home events and a

certificate of compliance were required.

In his brief, Mr. Demonbreun maintains that:

The [bed and breakfast] permit issued by the Board on October 18, 1995,

contains no conditions (“none”) whatsoever on the venue for business activity,

4

At oral argument, Mr. Demonbreun stated that he remembered testifying that people spent two

nights there. At the May 19, 2010 hearing, when asked if anyone stayed in the rooms, Mr. Demonbreun

stated, “I don’t know if they did or not. I don’t think they did, but I don’t know.”

-4-

yet the Metropolitan Government now seeks to unconstitutionally limit the

activities being engaged in by the defendant even though they have no impact

whatsoever on the historic neighborhood where it is located and are customary

and reasonable in the bed and breakfast/hospitality industry.

The October 1995 permit is for a bed and breakfast. The ordinance defines the scope of

activities for such establishments and, as previously discussed, the activities for which Mr.

Demonbreun was cited exceed the scope of his bed and breakfast permit.

Mr. Demonbreun also claims that the Metro ordinance is so ambiguous and vague that

one must guess at its meaning. Suffice it to say that, while more specificity might be a

benefit, we do not find the ordinance either ambiguous or vague.

Finally, Mr. Demonbreun’s oral argument and brief make references to the “illegal”

denial of his application for a historic home event permit in April and October, 2008. He

never appealed the April 2008 denial, so that denial is final. Thus, he had no historic event

permit at the time of the May and August 2008 activities that are the subject of this appeal.

The subsequent application for and denial of an application is irrelevant to this appeal.5

C ONCLUSION

The decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of appeal are assessed against the

appellant, Mr. Richard A. Demonbreun, for which execution may issue if necessary.

______________________________

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

5

We note, however, that this court recently upheld the trial court’s decision to reverse the BZA’s

denial of Mr. Demonbreun’s October 2008 application to hold historic home events. See Demonbreun v.

Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, M2009-00557-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2416722 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10,

2011). For the reason stated above, the prior decision is irrelevant to this matter. Therefore, Mr.

Demonbreun’s motion to consider the post-judgment fact of the prior opinion is denied.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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