The opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CA-00911-COA
IN THE INTEREST OF C.R., A MINOR, AND APPELLANT
F.R., A MINOR: D.R.
v.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CHILD APPELLEE
PROTECTION SERVICES
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/26/2017
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SUSAN RHEA SHELDON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MARION COUNTY YOUTH COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DEAN HOLLEMAN
MARY CATHERINE PENROSE MITCHELL
PATRICK TAYLOR GUILD
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LAWRENCE ELDER HAHN
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - JUVENILE JUSTICE
DISPOSITION: APPEAL DISMISSED - 12/17/2019
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND C. WILSON, JJ.
C. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. D.R. appeals an order from the Marion County Youth Court adjudicating his two
children, F.R. and C.R., as abused children.1 Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss D.R.’s
appeal.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. In April 2017, the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS)
1
In view of our disposition of this case, we use initials for both the minor children
and their father, the appellant, in order to protect the identity of the children and preserve
confidentiality of further youth court proceedings.
received a report of alleged abuse of F.R. and C.R. by their father, D.R. The report stemmed
from D.R. spanking F.R. on January 25, 2017.
¶3. After CPS conducted forensic interviews of the children and D.R., the Marion County
Youth Court Referee filed “Intake Orders,” referring the matters for formal proceedings by
the youth court. The Marion County prosecuting attorney then filed two petitions with the
youth court, alleging that F.R. and C.R. were abused children within the purview of the
Youth Court Law, Mississippi Code Annotated sections 43-21-101 through - 915 (Rev.
2015).
¶4. The youth court held an adjudication hearing on both petitions on May 22, 2017.
Following the hearing, the youth court adjudicated F.R. and C.R. as abused children.2 The
youth court then entered a disposition order without holding a disposition hearing. In its
disposition order, the youth court merely withheld disposition, relinquished jurisdiction, and
transferred the matter to a chancery court for further proceedings. D.R. now (prior to
disposition) appeals from the youth court’s adjudication order.
DISCUSSION
¶5. The issue of jurisdiction has not been raised by the parties on appeal. But “[w]hether
raised by the parties or not, this Court is required to note its own lack of jurisdiction.”
Darnell v. Darnell, 199 So. 3d 695, 696 (¶3) (Miss. 2016) (quoting Michael v. Michael, 650
So. 2d 469, 471 (Miss. 1995)). D.R. has appealed directly from the youth court’s
adjudication order without first allowing the youth court or the chancery court to conduct a
2
The youth court adjudicated C.R. as an abused child due to sibling risk.
2
disposition hearing and enter a disposition order as required by law.3 Accordingly, D.R.’s
appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
¶6. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-601(1) (Rev. 2015), “[i]f [a]
child has been adjudicated . . . an abused child, the youth court shall immediately set a time
and place for a disposition hearing which shall be separate, distinct and subsequent to the
adjudicatory hearing.” (Emphasis added). Further, “[a]fter consideration of all the evidence
and the relevant factors [presented at the disposition hearing], the youth court shall enter a
disposition order . . . recit[ing] that a child is found to be . . . an abused child.” Miss. Code
Ann. § 43-21-603(6) (Supp. 2019) (emphasis added).4
¶7. This court has previously held that although separate and distinct, the adjudication and
disposition phases of a youth court determination are “both a part of the same overall
proceeding for purposes of appeal.” J.P.C. v. State, 783 So. 2d 778, 781 (¶9) (Miss. 2000)
(regarding a youth-delinquency proceeding). In J.P.C., we likened the time gap between a
youth court’s adjudication and disposition phases to criminal proceedings in which there is
often an interim period between a formal adjudication of guilt and sentencing. Id. at 780
(¶7). We concluded that to allow a party to appeal from a youth court’s adjudication order
prior to the required disposition hearing (and subsequent disposition order) would
“effectively deny that court the power to conduct the required disposition hearing and impose
3
As noted supra, the youth court entered a disposition order; however, in the order,
the court expressly withheld disposition and then relinquished jurisdiction and transferred
the matter to the chancery court for further proceedings.
4
In certain circumstances, the requisite disposition order must contain particular
information or findings by the court. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-603(7)-(8).
3
[the] appropriate [disposition] until the appeal was decided.” Id.
¶8. Here, the youth court did not conduct a separate disposition hearing as required by
statute. And although the court entered a disposition order, which notes that F.R. and C.R.
have been adjudicated as abused children, the order expressly states that the youth court was
“withhold[ing] disposition,” “relinquish[ing] jurisdiction,” and “transfer[ring] this matter to
chancery court.” In other words, when D.R. noticed this appeal, neither the youth court nor
the chancery court had completed the statutorily required steps antecedent to a proper appeal.
Because there is not yet a final appealable order of disposition in this case, we dismiss this
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶9. APPEAL DISMISSED.
BARNES, C.J., J. WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J., NOT
PARTICIPATING.
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