Com. v. Holmes, B.

J-A12037-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

BRANDON ALEXANDER HOLMES :

:

Appellant : No. 572 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 10, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001076-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

BRANDON ALEXANDER HOLMES :

:

Appellant : No. 2210 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 3, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004371-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 18, 2024

Appellant, Brandon Alexander Holmes, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County on

October 3, 2023. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-A12037-24

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:

From December 2018 through September 2019, Defendant

and several co-conspirators robbed, attempted to rob or staged

robberies of delivery trucks which were in the process of

transporting packages of prescription drugs to multiple

pharmacies. Defendant engaged in these actions on six (6)

separate occasions in two (2) different counties.

On December 24, 2018, Defendant's co-defendant, Eugene

Fortune, a delivery driver for Fard Enterprises, took part in an

event in which he falsely informed authorities that his delivery

truck had been robbed. Specifically, Mr. Fortune drove a Fard

Enterprises truck to the Quick Courier Service headquarters in

Whitemarsh Townsihp, [sic] Pa in order to pick up packages of

prescription drugs intended for delivery to local pharmacies.

Sometime following his departure from this facility, Mr. Fortune

walked into the Springfield Township Police Department to inform

authorities that he had been the victim of a carjacking which

occurred at approximately 7:00 a.m. in the vicinity of Plymouth

Road and Falcon Way in Plymouth Township, Pa. Mr. Fortune

stated that a black sedan had followed him on his route when he

left the Quick Courier Service facility and proceeded to force him

to pull over. Mr. Fortune further indicated that an individual

jumped out of the black sedan, pointed a gun at him and forced

him to move into the passenger seat of the delivery truck while

the individual holding the gun entered the driver's seat and began

to drive the truck. Mr. Fortune relayed that this individual drove

the truck to the area of Stenton Avenue in Springfield Township,

Pa, at which time Mr. Fortune jumped out of the vehicle and ran

to the Springfield Township Police Department. Authorities

eventually found the delivery truck in Philadelphia, Pa. Following

the recovery of the truck, Quick Courier Service employees

performed an inventory of the contents and determined that the

value of the items stolen by the assailants was approximately

$37,900.

Authorities later had suspicions that Mr. Fortune was not

being truthful regarding his description of what occurred with

respect to the December 24, 2018 robbery. Specifically, while he

was providing a statement at the Plymouth Township Police

Department a few days following the robbery, Mr. Fortune was

asked if he would be willing to consent to a search of his cell

phone. Mr. Fortune agreed to this request, but indicated that his

cell phone was in his car. Authorities asked Mr. Fortune to retrieve

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his phone and were confused when Mr. Fortune had not returned

after fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed. Authorities went outside

and noticed that Mr. Fortune's vehicle was no longer in the parking

lot. Mr. Fortune eventually returned to the police station after

having been absent for approximately forty (40) minutes.

When Mr. Fortune returned to give another statement at the

Plymouth Township Police Department several months later, he

explained that the reason he left the premises when providing his

previous statement was due to the fact that he realized he did not

have his phone in his car and he needed to return to his residence

in order to retrieve his phone. Authorities, however, had

performed a cell site analysis of Mr. Fortune's phone which

revealed that Mr. Fortune actually had his cell phone in the vicinity

of the Plymouth Township Police Department when he arrived to

provide his prior statement. The cell site analysis further revealed

that Mr. Fortune was utilizing the phone when he left during his

statement to travel back to his residence. Thus, authorities knew

Mr. Fortune was not being truthful. Authorities had also executed

a search warrant on call detail records related to Mr. Fortune's cell

phone and discovered that in the hours leading up to the robbery

on December 24, 2018, Mr. Fortune's cell phone was

communicating with a phone number ending in 8528 (the “8528

Cell Phone”). In fact, from 11 p.m. on December 23, 2018 to the

time of the robbery on December 24, 2018, the call detail records

noted forty-four (44) transactions between the 8528 Cell Phone

and Mr. Fortune's phone. The 8528 Cell Phone was later revealed

to belong to Defendant. Thus, authorities concluded that Mr.

Fortune had assisted in staging the December 24, 2018 incident

to look like a robbery and placed him under arrest.

On May 14, 2019, Donald Carter, a delivery driver for Quick

Courier Service, had loaded his van with prescription drugs to

deliver to local pharmacies and departed from the headquarters

in Whitemarsh Township at approximately 7:45 a.m. to make his

deliveries. Mr. Carter turned onto Militia Hill Road and

subsequently observed a dark colored sedan behind him which

had illuminated emergency lights on its dashboard. Mr. Carter

believed the sedan was attempting to perform a traffic stop and

he pulled over to the side of the road. An individual described as

a tall, husky African-American male subsequently exited the dark

colored sedan and approached the driver's side of the van. This

individual instructed Mr. Carter to turn the car off, give him the

keys and get out of the van. Mr. Carter complied with these

instructions and the assailant proceeded to walk him around to

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the passenger's side of the van, pat him down and place a

handcuff on his left wrist. The assailant attempted to handcuff

both of Mr. Carter’s hands, but was unsuccessful due to the

minimal distance between the two cuff mechanisms. During this

portion of the encounter, Mr. Carter observed that another

individual had exited the sedan and was rummaging through the

pharmaceuticals located inside the delivery van. Mr. Carter noted

this individual was a slender African-American who possessed a

light complexion.

The assailant who handcuffed Mr. Carter began to rummage

through the pharmaceuticals with the other assailant for

approximately seven (7) minutes. Eventually, Mr. Carter heard

the sound of the doors closing and the screeching of the sedan's

tires as it drove away at a high rate of speed. Mr. Carter proceeded

to duck behind the delivery van and call Quick Courier Service to

inform them of what had just transpired. Mr. Carter subsequently

drove back to headquarters and the authorities were contacted.

An individual at headquarters who had law enforcement

experience was able to remove the handcuff from Mr. Carter’s

wrist and this piece of evidence was supplied to authorities. Quick

Courier Service employees performed an inventory of the van's

contents and determined that the value of the items stolen by the

assailants was approximately $4,900.

On June 4, 2019, Ilhomjon Mirzoev was driving a truck for

a courier service named Venskyy Express containing

pharmaceuticals and supplies from Harrisburg, Pa which were

intended for delivery to the Quick Courier Service headquarters in

Whitemarsh Township. When he attempted to turn into the Quick

Courier Service facility in the early morning hours, Mr. Mirzoev

missed his entrance and in the process of turning around,

observed a gold Buick which was blocking his path. A short

African-American individual emerged from the Buick and

approached the passenger side window of the truck to ask for

directions to Allentown, Pa. Mr. Mirzoev responded that he was

not from the area and, almost immediately, another African-

American individual emerged from the Buick who was wearing a

mask and gloves and was also brandishing a firearm. This

assailant proceeded to strike the back of Mr. Mirzoev’s head with

the firearm approximately four (4) to five (5) times. Following this

assault, the assailant with the firearm forced his way into the

delivery truck and instructed Mr. Mirzoev to sit on a milk crate in

between the driver’s and front passenger’s seats. The shorter

assailant also forced his way into the truck and sat down in the

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front passenger’s seat while the other assailant sat in the driver's

seat and began to drive the truck. A third assailant operated the

Buick, which followed behind the delivery truck during this time.

Mr. Mirzoev did not have a chance to observe the third assailant.

Mr. Mirzoev had fears he was going to be killed and asked

the assailants not to harm him since his wife was pregnant. The

assailants took Mr. Mirzoev's wallet and cell phone and zip tied his

hands together. The assailants proceeded to drive the truck for

approximately three (3) miles and later stopped the truck and

removed items from inside before departing in the Buick. Mr.

Mirzoev exited the truck after the assailants had fled and began

to walk along the street until he was able to flag down a detective

from the Springfield Township Police Department. The detective

administered aid and was able to locate the delivery truck a few

blocks away. The detective later received a report that Mr.

Mirzoev's wallet had been located approximately two hundred

(200) yards from the location of the truck. When authorities went

to retrieve the wallet, they located Mr. Mirzoev's cell phone and a

pair of black latex gloves which were subsequently logged into

evidence. Quick Courier Service employees later performed an

inventory of the truck's contents and determined that the value of

the items stolen by the assailants was approximately $9,600. The

Pennsylvania State Police performed a DNA analysis on the

recovered latex gloves and determined that the DNA found on the

gloves matched either Defendant’s DNA profile or the DNA profile

of any of his paternal relatives.

On August 20, 2019, Mr. Mirzoev was again driving a

Venskyy Express truck containing pharmaceuticals and supplies

from Harrisburg, Pa which were intended for delivery to the Quick

Courier Service headquarters in Whitemarsh Township. At

approximately 3:30 a.m., when Mr. Mirzoev was about to tum into

the Quick Courier Service facility, he observed orange traffic cones

blocking the road. Mr. Mirzoev stopped approximately twenty (20)

feet in front of the cones and subsequently observed the same

two (2) assailants that he had encountered during the June 4,

2019 event. The taller assailant approached the driver's side of

the truck and pointed a firearm at Mr. Mirzoev from a distance of

ten (10) feet. This firearm was equipped with a laser scope which

illuminated a red dot onto the area around Mr. Mirzoev’s right

shoulder. Mr. Mirzoev immediately put the truck into reverse,

drove away from the scene and contacted the authorities. The

assailants were not able to steal anything from the truck during

this encounter.

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On September 3, 2019, Barry Gobert was driving a truck for

a courier service named On Time Delivery based out of

Duncansville in Blair County, Pa. At approximately 4:30 a.m., Mr.

Gobert arrived at On Time Delivery’s terminal and picked up

packages for delivery. Mr. Gobert subsequently drove to a facility

owned by Value Drug in Allegheny Township to pick up sealed

containers with items for delivery to local pharmacies. Upon

leaving the Value Drug facility at approximately 5:10 a.m., Mr.

Gobert observed a black (possibly Dodge) van leaving the parking

lot of a neighboring business. The van ignored a stop sign and

pulled in front of Mr. Gobert's truck on Theater Drive. The two

vehicles proceeded down Theater Drive at approximately ten (10)

to fifteen (15) miles per hour when the black van suddenly came

to a stop in the middle of the road. An African-American male

emerged from the van and approached the passenger side of the

truck. This individual was about six (6) feet tall, weighed

approximately one hundred and eighty (180) to two hundred

(200) pounds and proceeded to ask Mr. Gobert for directions to

Penn State Altoona. Mr. Gobert provided directions and the

individual returned to the black van at which time he appeared to

have a brief discussion with other occupants inside the van.

The same individual subsequently exited the van with

another African-American male who was approximately five (5)

feet, seven (7) inches tall and weighed approximately one

hundred and fifty (150) to one hundred and sixty (160) pounds.

These two men positioned themselves at the driver’s and

passenger’s side of the truck respectively. Mr. Gobert heard a

noise indicating the individual standing on the passenger’s side

was attempting to open the door to the truck and simultaneously

observed the individual at the driver’s side pulling out a firearm.

This individual instructed Mr. Gobert to get out of the truck. Mr.

Gobert informed this assailant that he was “the wrong guy” and

proceeded to attempt to drive his truck away. During this

sequence, the black van attempted to cut the truck off but Mr.

Gobert kept driving and was able to escape after striking the van

with his truck. Mr. Gobert subsequently parked at a nearby

business and was able to contact the authorities and his

supervisor.

On September 9, 2019, Michael Beskid, a delivery driver for

Quick Courier Service, was in the process of transporting materials

from Harrisburg, Pa to the Quick Courier Service headquarters in

Whitemarsh Township. At approximately 3 a.m., Mr. Beskid was

driving up a hill approximately a half-mile away from the facility

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when he noticed red and blue lights emanating from a vehicle

behind him. Mr. Beskid pulled off to a side road and stopped his

vehicle. Mr. Beskid subsequently observed an individual emerge

from the vehicle and approach the driver’s side of his truck. This

individual was a light skinned, thin build African-American male in

his early twenties and who had a height of between five (5) feet,

seven (7) inches and six (6) feet. Mr. Beskid noticed that this

individual did not appear to be a police officer and he immediately

drove away with his flashers on after saying “no.” No one followed

Mr. Beskid following this encounter and he proceeded to drive to

the Quick Courier Service headquarters to contact the authorities.

The Pennsylvania State Police performed a DNA analysis of

the handcuffs recovered following the May 14, 2019 robbery and

discovered that DNA belonging to co-Defendant Malik Fowler was

present. Authorities were later able to determine Mr. Fowler's cell

phone number and performed an examination of cell phone

records associated with this number. These records revealed that

this cell phone had multiple communications with a cell phone

number registered to co-Defendant Daniel McLaughlin around the

time of the May 14, 2019 and June 4, 2019 robberies. Authorities

proceeded to execute a search warrant on the records associated

with Mr. McLaughlin's cell phone number and found that it had

multiple communications with the 8528 Cell Phone registered to

Defendant around the time of the May 14, 2019 and June 4, 2019

robberies. Eventually, investigators were able to determine that

co-Defendants Antonio Brown and Kyshaan Williams were also

involved in several of these robberies.

Lieutenant William Mitchell, supervisor of the Major Crimes

Unit of the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office and an

expert in historic call detail record analysis, conducted a cell site

analysis of each co-defendant's cell phone. During this analysis,

Lieutenant Mitchell found that Defendant's cell phone was

accessing cell sites in the vicinity of each of the five (5) robberies

and one (1) staged robbery during the time frame when these

incidents occurred. This cell site analysis also revealed that one or

more of Defendant's co-Defendants were also present at the time

of these incidents.

On November 7, 2019, authorities took Defendant into

custody. Following his arrest, Defendant provided a statement in

which he admitted his role in several of the robberies. On January

24, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Suppression of Evidence

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related to this statement. On April 18, 2022, following a hearing,

the court denied Defendant’s suppression motion.

From May 31, 2022 to June 3, 2022, the court held a jury

trial in which the jury found Defendant guilty of the charges

referenced [below]. On June 6, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a

notice of intent to seek mandatory sentences with respect to

Defendant’s three (3) robbery - fear of serious bodily injury

convictions and one (1) kidnapping conviction pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9714. Specifically, the Commonwealth contended that

in light of Defendant’s prior 2017 conviction for robbery - fear of

serious bodily injury, these new convictions constituted a second

set of convictions involving a crime of violence and were therefore

each subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of at least ten

(10) years of total confinement under Section 9714. Defendant

did not object to the imposition of the mandatory minimum

sentences.

Prior to sentencing, Defendant was able to obtain

documentation indicating that when authorities committed him to

Montgomery County Correctional Facility (“MCCF”) following his

arrest and statement on November 7, 2019, prescription

medications Pyridium and Ciprofloxacin were brought into the

prison with Defendant upon his admission and forwarded to

medical personnel at the prison. On September 26, 2022,

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion

for New Trial asserting that this supposedly newly discovered

evidence supported the conclusion that the police coerced an

involuntary confession from Defendant by giving him access to

prescription pain medication. Specifically, Defendant alleged that

authorities knew Defendant was addicted to prescription pain

medications and provided him with these drugs in an effort to

overcome his free will.

At the sentencing hearing on October 3, 2022, the court

denied Defendant’s motion following argument, without prejudice

to Defendant's ability to raise the claim again in a post-sentence

motion. The court subsequently imposed an aggregate sentence

of three-hundred and ninety-six (396) to seven-hundred and

ninety-two (792) months of imprisonment (thirty-three (33) to

sixty-six (66) years). On October 11, 2022, Defendant filed timely

post-sentence motions in which he again requested dismissal of

the charges or, in the alternative, a new trial based upon the

documentation Defendant obtained following trial. On February 3,

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2023, following a hearing (the January 2023 Evidentiary Hearing),

the court denied Defendant’s post-sentence motions.

On March 1, 2023, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On March 2, 2023, the court issued an Order directing Defendant

to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (the "Concise Statement") within

twenty-one (21) days. On March 23, 2023, Defendant filed a

timely Concise Statement.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 2-10.

The trial court filed its 1925(a) opinion on August 29, 2023. This

appeal followed. Appellant raises eight issues for our review, verbatim:

1. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or

about December 24, 2018, Mr. Holmes committed or agreed to

commit an unlawful taking of movable property of another with

intent to deprive him thereof, where no witnesses positively

identified him as a participant in the theft and where there was no

physical or forensic evidence linking him to the theft?

2. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or

about May 14, 2019, in the course committing a theft, Mr. Holmes

physically took property from the person of another by force,

impersonated a police officer, and unlawfully restrained the liberty

of another person, or agreed with another to commit such

robbery, where no witnesses positively identified him as a

participant in the alleged robbery and where there was no physical

or forensic evidence linking him to the robbery?

3. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or

about June 4, 2019, in the course committing a theft, Mr. Holmes

intentionally put someone in fear of immediate serious bodily

injury, possessed and used a firearm, and unlawfully removed

another person a substantial distance to facilitate a felony, or

agreed with another to commit such robbery and kidnapping,

where the victim failed to positively identify Mr. Holmes as a

participant in the robbery and kidnapping, where there was no

physical or forensic evidence linking him to the robbery and

kidnapping, and where the testimony of Antonio Brown, the

cooperating witness who actually participated in this robbery and

who had a strong motive to fabricate his testimony to minimize

his own criminal conduct and shift blame to Mr. Holmes, lacked

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credibility and was infected with unfair bias, factual

inconsistencies, inability to provide details and corroborating

evidence, and confusing answers?

4. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or

about August 20, 2019, in the course committing a theft, Mr.

Holmes intentionally put someone in fear of immediate serious

bodily injury and impersonated a police officer, or agreed with

another to commit such robbery, where no witnesses positively

identified him as a participant in the robbery and where there was

no physical or forensic evidence linking him to the robbery?

5. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or

about September 9, 2019, Mr. Holmes unlawfully impersonated a

police officer, where no witnesses positively identified him as a

participant in the offense and where there was no physical or

forensic evidence linking him to the offense?

6. Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove that, on or

about September 3, 2019, in the course committing a theft, Mr.

Holmes intentionally put someone in fear of immediate serious

bodily injury, or agreed with another to commit such robbery,

where the victim failed to positively identify him as a participant

in the robbery, where there was no physical or forensic evidence

linking him to the robbery, and where the testimony of Antonio

Brown, the cooperating witness who actually participated in this

robbery and who had a strong motive to fabricate his testimony

to minimize his own criminal conduct and shift blame to Mr.

Holmes, lacked credibility and was infected with unfair bias,

factual inconsistencies, inability to provide details and

corroborating evidence, and confusing answers?

7. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Holmes' Post

Sentence Motion to Dismiss for Due Process Violation Resulting

from Outrageous Government Conduct, or in the alternative, Mr.

Holmes' Post Sentence Motion for New Trial Based on Newly

Discovered Evidence, where compelling evidence was presented

at the hearing on the Post Sentence Motions showing the police

attempted to coerce a confession from Mr. Holmes by providing

him controlled substances during his custodial interrogation,

fabricated and forged his signature to an inculpatory statement

that he did not make, and provided false sworn testimony during

court proceedings concerning the circumstances of his custodial

interrogation?

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8. Whether the imposition of consecutive sentences resulting in

an aggregate term of imprisonment of 33 years to 66 years was a

manifest abuse of discretion when there were substantial

mitigating circumstances?

Appellant’s Br. at 7-10.

Appellant’s first six issues are challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856-57 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(citations omitted).

Instantly, appellant was convicted of:

three (3) counts of theft by unlawful taking, four ( 4) counts of

criminal conspiracy - engaging in theft by unlawful taking, one (1)

count of attempted theft by unlawful taking, one (1) count of

receiving stolen property, one (1) count of criminal conspiracy -

engaging in receipt of stolen property, two (2) counts of robbery

- physically take by force, two (2) counts of criminal conspiracy -

engaging in robbery to physically take by force, three (3) counts

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of robbery- fear of serious bodily injury, three (3) counts of

criminal conspiracy - engaging in robbery causing fear of serious

bodily injury, three (3) counts of robbery - infliction of or fear of

bodily injury, three (3) counts of criminal conspiracy- engaging in

robbery causing infliction of or fear of bodily injury, two (2) counts

of possession of an instrument of crime, one ( 1) count of criminal

conspiracy - possession of an instrument of crime, two (2) counts

of false imprisonment, two (2) counts of criminal conspiracy to

commit false imprisonment, three (3) counts of impersonating a

public servant, two (2) counts of criminal conspiracy- engaging in

impersonation of a public servant, one (1) count of kidnapping,

one (1) count of criminal conspiracy to commit kidnapping, one

(1) count of unlawful restraint, one (1) count of criminal

conspiracy to commit unlawful restraint, one (1) count of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one (1) count of

criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon, three (3) counts of simple assault, three (3) counts of

conspiracy to commit simple assault, one (1) count of terroristic

threats, one (1) count of unauthorized use of an automobile, one

(1) count of criminal conspiracy – engaging in unauthorized use

of an automobile and one (1) count of possession of a concealed

weapon.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 1-2.

Initially, we note that although Appellant’s concise statement specifies

the elements for which he thinks there was insufficient evidence, the argument

section of his brief is deficient. The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure

do not permit conclusory arguments. Each distinct issue in the argument

section of a brief must, at a minimum, contain “citations of authorities as are

deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). When a party “cites no pertinent

authority to substantiate [its] claim . . . appellant’s issue is waived.”

Commonwealth v. Simmons, 56 A.3d 1280, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2012),

affirmed, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014).

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Here, Appellant raises six insufficiency claims. He was convicted of more

than forty counts stemming from six separate incidents. In the argument

section of his brief, he combines all six claims for all his convictions into one

subheading which spans only six pages total. See Appellant’s Br. at 21-27.

Aside from a citation for his standard of review, Appellant cites no caselaw or

legal authority whatsoever. See id. at 21. His argument is underdeveloped

and conclusory.

Additionally, he conflates the distinct issues of sufficiency and weight of

the evidence as to the June 4, 2019, and September 3, 2019, convictions.

See Commonwealth v. Cain, 906 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(“[A]ny uncertainty in an eyewitness’s identification of a defendant is a

question of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.”). Appellant admits

that there was testimony from his co-defendant, Antonio Brown, identifying

Appellant as having participated in the robberies, but essentially argues it

should not have been believed. Appellant devotes half of the pages of his

sufficiency argument to discussing how Brown’s testimony was inconsistent,

biased, and lacked credibility. Appellant’s Br. at 24-26. “[A] true weight of the

evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the

verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed[ and] contests the

weight that is accorded the testimonial evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Appellant originally raised a

weight of the evidence claim in his concise statement, but he abandoned it in

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his Appellate brief. Accordingly, we cannot reframe and evaluate his

sufficiency claims as weight claims in that Appellant failed to preserve the

weight issue for this Court.

In any event, Appellant’s sufficiency claims, while underdeveloped, are

specific in nature as he avers the evidence was insufficient to prove that he

was, in fact, the person who committed each of the crimes. The consistent

theme of each of his six sufficiency issues is that there was no positive

identification that Appellant committed the crimes whether by eyewitness or

by forensic evidence. As such, since we need not conduct a thorough review

of the elements of each crime, we decline to find waiver. Rather, we will focus

on the specific issue suggested by Appellant: whether the evidence was

sufficient to establish that Appellant was the perpetrator of the crimes.

This Court has recognized that “evidence of identification need not be

positive and certain to sustain a conviction.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 954

A.2d 1194, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2008). In-court testimony identifying the

defendant as the perpetrator is sufficient by itself to establish the identity

element of a crime. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 478

(Pa. Super. 2018) (one witness’s identification is sufficient for conviction and

appellant’s assertion that his own testimony contradicted the identification is

irrelevant in a sufficiency analysis). Given additional evidentiary

circumstances, “any indefiniteness and uncertainty in the identification

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testimony goes to its weight.” Commonwealth v. Minnis, 458 A.2d 231,

233, (Pa. Super. 1983).

In addressing Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, the trial

court discussed in detail the cumulative evidence presented for each incident.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 13-30. The trial court cites to the record demonstrating the

evidence presented to showing how Appellant was involved in each staged,

completed, or attempted robbery. In addition to witness testimony, the

Commonwealth presented cell site location data which placed Appellant at the

site of each incident at the time they occurred. DNA evidence placed appellant

at the robbery which occurred on June 4, 2019. Additionally, Brown's

testimony, Appellant’s confessions, and text messages between Appellant and

his co-defendants revealed his role in several of the incidents. Specifically, the

trial court indicated the following in its opinion:

A. DECEMBER 24, 2018 STAGED ROBBERY

. . . Defendant’s cell phone proceeded to access cell sites towards

the area of where the delivery truck was recovered by authorities

in Philadelphia and finally ended up accessing cell sites near co-

Defendant Antonio Brown’s residence. (Id.).

In the statement he provided to authorities following his

arrest on November 7, 2019, Defendant admitted that he took

part in the staged December 24, 2018 robbery. (N.T. Trial by Jury

- Volume II, 6/1/22, at 353). Specifically, Defendant indicated

that his role was “to look out for police so the other person could

drive the truck and pretend it was a robbery.” (Id.). Defendant

further stated that he followed the truck to the area near Stenton

Avenue where Mr. Fortune exited the truck and drove home with

“the other person.” (Id. at 353-54). Defendant informed

authorities that “the other person” paid him with opioid pills for

his role. (Id. at 354).

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B. MAY 14, 2019 ROBBERY

. . . During this portion of the encounter, Mr. Carter observed that

another individual had existed [sic] the sedan and was rummaging

through the pharmaceuticals contained within the delivery van.

(Id. at 22). Mr. Carter described this individual as a slender

African-American who possessed a light complexion. (Id. at 21).

. . . All three (3) cell phones were accessing cell sites in the

vicinity of Quick Courier Service at approximately 7:40 a.m.,

which is minutes before the robbery described by Mr. Carter

occurred. (Id. at 128). At the time of the robbery, all three (3)

cell phones accessed cell sites in the vicinity of where the robbery

occurred on Militia Hill Road. (Id. at 129). Following the time of

the robbery, all three (3) cellphones departed the scene and

accessed cell sites in the general direction towards Defendant's

residence. (Id.).

In his November 7, 2019 post-arrest statement to

authorities, Defendant admitted he took part in the May 14, 2019

robbery. (N.T. Trial by Jury- Volume II, 6/1/22, at 354).

Specifically, Defendant indicated his role in this robbery was “to

look out for cops and make sure the truck was there.” (Id.).

Defendant further stated that the robbery was effectuated by

utilizing a dark-colored vehicle to pull over the delivery truck. (Id.

at 355). Defendant informed authorities that several other co-

conspirators took part in this robbery and he was paid with a

"couple hundred pills" for his role. (Id. at 355-56).

Co-Defendant Antonio Brown testified that he had grown up

with Defendant and knew him for about twenty (20) years. (Id.

at 193). Mr. Brown indicated that he would typically communicate

with Defendant through contact with the 8528 Cell Phone. (Id. at

195). Mr. Brown testified that he did not take part in the May 14,

2019 robbery, but Defendant had sent him text messages shortly

afterwards to let him know that it had occurred. (Id. at 231). . . .

C. JUNE 4, 2019 ROBBERY

. . . Co-Defendant Antonio Brown testified that he participated in

this robbery with Defendant and another individual. (Id. at 196).

Mr. Brown indicated that Defendant had formulated the plan for

this robbery and had informed Mr. Brown that he successfully

performed other robberies of Quick Courier Service trucks in the

past. (Id. at 198). On the morning of this robbery, Mr. Brown met

up with Defendant and another individual at Defendant's residence

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and all three (3) made their way to the Quick Courier Service

facility. (Id. at 199-200). Upon their arrival, Mr. Brown blocked

Mr. Mirzoev’s delivery truck with the Buick and Defendant and the

other individual exited the vehicle to approach the truck. (Id. at

200). Defendant and the other individual gained control of the

truck and Mr. Brown drove behind the truck in the Buick. (Id. at

202). Mr. Brown stated that he followed behind the delivery truck

for approximately ten (10) minutes and eventually parked behind

the truck when it pulled over. (Id.). Defendant, Mr. Brown and

the other individual subsequently removed contents from the

truck, placed them into the Buick and drove away. (Id. at 202-

03).

. . . Defendant’s cell phone accessed cell sites in the vicinity of the

Quick Courier Service headquarters at the same time that the

robbery occurred and subsequently accessed cell sites in the

vicinity of where Mr. Mirzoev was let out of the delivery truck. (Id.

at 132, Commonwealth Exhibit C-38 at 35).

In his November 7, 2019 post-arrest statement to

authorities, Defendant admitted he took part in the June 4, 2019

robbery. (N.T. Trial by Jury- Volume II, 6/1/22, at 356). . . . Beth

Ann Holsopple, a forensic DNA analyst with the Pennsylvania State

Police, . . . indicated that her analysis of the gloves revealed that

the DNA on the gloves matched either Defendant's DNA profile or

the DNA profile of any of his paternal relatives. (Id. at 285-86).

D. AUGUST 20, 2019 ATTEMPTED ROBBERY

. . . Defendant and Mr. McLaughlin's cell phones accessed cell sites

in the vicinity of the Quick Courier Service headquarters around

2:09 a.m. (Id.). Mr. McLaughlin’s cell phone subsequently

accessed cell sites in the immediate vicinity of the attempted

robbery at the time the incident occurred. (Id. at 136). Following

the incident, between approximately 4:08 a.m. and 4:36 a.m.,

Defendant and Mr. McLaughlin's cell phones accessed cell sites in

a general direction from the vicinity of the attempted robbery to

Defendant's residence. (Id. at 137).

In his November 7, 2019 post-arrest statement to

authorities, Defendant admitted he took part in the August 20,

2019 attempted robbery with Mr. McLaughlin. (N.T. Trial by Jury-

Volume II, 6/1/22, at 358). Text messages retrieved from Mr.

McLaughlin and Defendant’s cell phones for the period preceding

August 20, 2019 revealed that both men engaged in a text

conversation in which Mr. McLaughlin stated, “I got both of them

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they [t]aking the truck and we going to be in my car” and

Defendant responded, “Bet, I'm with it bro.” (N.T. Trial by Jury-

Volume III, 6/2/22, at 63, Commonwealth Exhibit C-34 at 15). . .

.

E. SEPTEMBER 3, 2019 ATTEMPTED ROBBERY

. . . Co-Defendant Antonio Brown testified that he participated in

this attempted robbery with Defendant and three (3) other

individuals. (N.T. Trial by Jury- Volume II, 6/1/22, at 216, 218).

Mr. Brown indicated that Defendant had formulated the plan for

this robbery based on information he had obtained regarding a

courier service which had a similar setup to Quick Delivery

Service. . . . Defendant’s cell phone subsequently accessed cell

sites in the immediate vicinity of the attempted robbery on

Theater Drive at the time the incident occurred. (Id. at 142-43).

Following the incident, between approximately 5:19 a.m. and 9:

15 a.m., all three (3) cell phones accessed cell sites in a general

easterly direction across the state from the vicinity of the

attempted robbery towards Defendant's residence. (Id. at 143-

45).

F. SEPTEMBER 9, 2019 ATTEMPTED ROBBERY

. . . Lieutenant Mitchell's cell site analysis and review of the call

detail records of Defendant's cell phone indicated that beginning

at approximately 2:30 a.m. on September 9, 2019, Defendant's

cell phone accessed cell sites in a general direction from

Defendant's residence towards the location of the attempted

robbery. (Id. at 146). Defendant's cell phone proceeded accessed

cell sites in the immediate vicinity of the attempted robbery at the

same time the incident occurred. (Id. at 146-47).

Tr. Ct. Op. at 18, 20-30.

We agree with the trial court’s sound analysis, which is supported by the

record. As indicated supra, in-court testimony identifying the defendant as

the perpetrator is sufficient by itself to establish the identity element of a

crime. Our Supreme Court has also held that “circumstantial evidence is

sufficient to sustain a conviction so long as the combination of the evidence

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth

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v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 635 (1991) (quotation and

quotation marks omitted).

In the case sub judice, the jury, as the finder of fact, heard the

testimony of all witnesses, was free to make credibility determinations, and

determined the evidence linked Appellant to the crimes beyond a reasonable

doubt. Given our standard of review, we find no error in this regard and

conclude there is no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. See

Brooks, supra (setting forth this Court’s standard of review for sufficiency of

the evidence claims).

Appellant’s seventh issue is that the trial court should have dismissed

all charges because of his claim of outrageous government conduct, or in the

alternative, that the trial court should have ordered a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence. Both claims fail.

Appellant first claims that there was outrageous government conduct

during his custodial interrogation. Specifically, he claims in his brief that

Detective Stephen Kerns retrieved Appellant’s prescription Oxycodone pills

from Appellant’s wife to which the detective knew Appellant was addicted, had

Appellant ingest five pills totaling 150 milligrams, and made Appellant sign

two blank pieces of paper. Appellant’s Br. at 31-33. Appellant claims in his

brief that he never provided a written confession. Id. at 33. In Appellant’s

concise statement, he claimed that the detectives attempted to coerce an

involuntary confession. See 1925(b) Statement at 3. In his brief, he claims

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“the police fabricated and forged Appellant’s signature onto an inculpatory

written statement that the Appellant did not make.” Appellant’s Br. at 40.

The defense of outrageous government conduct “is based on the theory

that ‘police involvement in criminal activity may be so outrageous that a

prosecution will be barred on due process grounds.’” Commonwealth v. Sun

Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 786-87 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth

v. Mance, 652 A.2d 299, 303 (Pa. 1995)). In order to prevail on a claim of

outrageous government conduct, “it must be shown that police conduct was

so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of

justice.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Benchino, 582 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Pa.

Super. 1990)). This generally requires “proof of government overinvolvement

in the charged crime and proof of the defendant’s mere passive connection to

the government orchestrated and implemented criminal activity.”

Commonwealth v. Boyle, 733 A.2d 633, 639 (Pa. Super. 1999) (emphasis

in original).

“Moreover, for due process to bar a conviction, the government’s

involvement in the commission of the crime ‘must be malum in se or amount

to the engineering and direction of the criminal enterprise from beginning to

end.’” Commonwealth v. Nelson, 666 A.2d 714, 718 (Pa. Super. 1995).

“The judiciary is extremely hesitant to find law enforcement conduct so

offensive that it violates the Due Process Clause.” Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d

at 786-87. As this Court held in Commonwealth v. Lindenmuth, 554 A.2d

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62 (Pa. Super. 1989), a determination of whether police involvement in

criminal activity is outrageous is a “legal question to be determined by the

court.” Id. at 64; see also Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d at 786-87.

We note that Appellant has told multiple versions of the story, raising

an inconsistent defense as pointed out by the trial court:

Defendant’s argument concerning what happened at the time he

gave his statement continued to change throughout the course of

these proceedings. Specifically, Defendant first asserted that his

confession was involuntary because he was suffering from

withdrawal symptoms. Next, Defendant asserted the detectives

forced him to take the medication in an attempt to coerce him to

provide a confession. Defendant eventually claimed that he did

not actually provide a confession and the detectives fabricated a

false statement and forged his signature. This inability to come to

a consensus as to what occurred when Defendant provided his

confession would be fatal to any type of defense.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 39. Additionally, this claim was not raised before or during trial.

See Tr. Ct. Op. at 35 (stating “Defendant did not raise this claim once in

advance of trial and arguably waives the claim”).

Even if Appellant’s version of events were consistent and Detective

Kerns’ decision making could be challenged for its appropriateness under the

circumstances, his conduct does not rise to the level of outrageous

government conduct. As this Court held in Commonwealth v. Benchino,

582 A.2d 1067 (Pa. Super. 1990), “[t]he few appellate decisions in which

government conduct has been found to violate due process have generally

involved long term police involvement in the establishment and operation of

ongoing criminal enterprises.” Id. at 1071.

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For example, in Commonwealth v. Mathews, 500 A.2d 853 (Pa.

Super. 1985), this Court found outrageous government conduct when the

police encouraged and supplied the defendants with the necessary money to

purchase chemicals and to rent a residence to set up a methamphetamine lab.

Id. at 856-57. The police further provided step-by-step instructions in the

manufacturing process and aided in the transportation of the equipment. Id.

This Court held that the conduct of the police violated due process because

the police were principal players in the defendants’ criminal act. Id. at 857.

Conversely, in cases where the police did not exhibit a pervasive involvement

in the crime at issue, this Court has “generally refused to find due process

violations, even where the government’s conduct was unseemly.” Benchino,

582 A.2d at 1071.

Here, there is no evidence that the police or government orchestrated

the robberies or had any involvement, let alone “overinvolvement,” in

Appellant’s criminal enterprise. Boyle, supra (emphasis in original).

Appellant’s inconsistent claims simply do not meet the standard of outrageous

government misconduct as outlined by this Court and our Supreme Court.

Accordingly, his claim fails.

Appellant next argues that his after-discovered evidence in the form of

medical documentation warrants a new trial. Specifically, Appellant asserts

that he received documentation after the trial indicating that he was processed

into the correctional facility with his pills in his possession which were then

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forwarded to medical personnel. Appellant’s Br. at 39. He claims that the only

reason he could have had the pills at that time was if the police gave them to

him during his interrogation consistent with his version of events, i.e., in order

to feed his addiction and overcome his free will. Thus, he claims, had he

received this document before the suppression hearing, he would have

challenged the credibility of the detectives. Id. at 40-41.

To be granted a new trial based on the basis of after-discovered

evidence:

[Defendant] must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) could not

have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the

exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative

or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility

of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a

new trial were granted.

Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 2008), (quoting

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1283 (Pa. 2005)). The test is

conjunctive; the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence

that each of these factors has been met in order for a new trial to be

warranted. See Pagan, supra; Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355,

359 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 2008).

Before a court grants a new trial on the basis of after-discovered

evidence, the defendant must also show the alleged after-discovered evidence

is not just corroborative or cumulative of the evidence already presented at

trial. See Pagan, supra. Whether new evidence is corroborative or

cumulative in this context depends on the strength of the other evidence

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supporting the conviction. Commonwealth v. McCracken, 659 A.2d 541,

545 (Pa. 1995). Further, a defendant seeking a new trial must demonstrate

he will not use the alleged after-discovered evidence solely to impeach the

credibility of a witness. See Pagan, supra. “Whenever a party offers a

witness to provide evidence that contradicts other evidence previously given

by another witness, it constitutes impeachment….” Commonwealth v. Weis,

611 A.2d 1218, 1229 (Pa. Super. 1992).

The trial court meticulously analyzed each of the four factors in its

1925(a) opinion and concluded that Appellant’s claim of after-discovered

evidence fails. We agree. Relevantly, the trial court stated:

To the extent the documentation regarding Defendant's

admission to MCCF with prescription medication constitutes after-

discovered evidence, Defendant fails to demonstrate how this

evidence would satisfy any of the factors related to the type of

after-discovered evidence which would result in a new trial.

Although the actual documentation was not available prior to the

trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence, Defendant had the

ability to testify at the suppression hearing regarding how the

detectives provided him with the medication in the pill bottle in

advance of his confession, but he chose not to do so. Having been

present for these alleged actions, Defendant would have had first-

hand knowledge that this event allegedly occurred and could have

informed the court of the circumstances surrounding his

statement. Defendant did not require knowledge or possession of

these documents to know whether or not the detectives forced the

prescription medication upon him or fabricated his confession

under a forged signature. Thus, the documentation is merely

corroborative of what Defendant's testimony would have been had

he testified at the suppression hearing.

The crux of Defendant’s argument regarding this

documentation is that it serves to impeach the credibility of the

detectives who were present when Defendant provided his

statement. Specifically, Defendant asserts that it contradicts the

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testimony of the detectives stating that they did not remember a

pill bottle being delivered to Defendant in advance of his

statement and this impeachment could have resulted in a different

outcome at the suppression hearing or at trial. Considering, by

Defendant's own admission, that this evidence would be used

solely to impeach the detectives’ testimony, this evidence fails the

third factor under the after-discovered evidence test and cannot

serve as a basis for granting a new trial.

With respect to the fourth factor, there is no indication that

this evidence would result in a different verdict if a new trial were

granted. There was no evidence beyond Defendant’s self-serving

testimony at the January 2023 Evidentiary Hearing that the

detectives forced him to take the prescription medication in

advance of his confession. The only piece of evidence involving

these drugs was documentation indicating he was admitted to the

prison with these medications. There were entirely innocuous

reasons for these pills being brought into the prison with

Defendant upon his admission, including the likelihood that Ms.

Holmes was afraid of Defendant possibly suffering withdrawal

symptoms without access to the medication and the detectives’

acceptance of the medication as a courtesy.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 38-39.

Because Appellant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence

that each of the factors have been met, the trial court did not err in denying

Appellant’s post sentence motion for a new trial.

Finally, Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. We apply the following standard of review:

The right to appeal the discretionary aspects of the sentence is

not absolute. Two requirements must be met before a challenge

to the discretionary aspects of a sentence will be heard on the

merits. First, the appellant must set forth in his brief a concise

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with

respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Pa.R.A.P.

2119(f). Second, he must show that there is a substantial question

that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). The determination of

whether a particular issue raises a substantial question is to be

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evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In order to establish a

substantial question, the appellant must show actions by the

sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing

process.

Commonwealth v. Bishop, 831 A.2d 656, 660 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal

citations omitted).

Appellant has complied with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) by including a concise

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. In his 2119(f)

statement, Appellant claims that the trial court’s sentence excessively focused

on the offense and disregarded Appellant’s mitigating circumstances.

Appellant's Brief at 16.

Next, we must determine whether Appellant's arguments raise a

substantial question. Bishop, supra. “An appellant making an excessiveness

claim raises a substantial question when he sufficiently articulates the manner

in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing

scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm

underlying the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d

1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014)

(internal citations omitted). A bald allegation of excessiveness will not suffice.

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2001).

In the instant matter, Appellant’s claim is premised in part on his belief

that the consecutive nature of the sentences is unreasonable. Appellant’s Br.

at 45. We have stated that the imposition of consecutive rather than

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concurrent sentences lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court.

Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 878 A.2d 867, 873 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal

denied, 887 A.2d 1240 (Pa. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d

1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995)). Appellant further asserts that in crafting his

sentence, the trial court did not consider any factors other than the crimes of

which Appellant was convicted and his prior criminal history. Appellant’s Br.

at 45. “[O]rdinarily, a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider or

accord proper weight to a specific sentencing factor does not raise a

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994, 996-97 (Pa.

Super. 2001) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Specifically,

[t]here is ample precedent to support a determination that [a

claim that the trial court failed to consider an appellant's

rehabilitative needs] fails to raise a substantial

question.... See Commonwealth v. Cannon, 2008 PA Super

178, 954 A.2d 1222, 1228-29 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied,

600 Pa. 743, 964 A.2d 893) (claim that the trial court failed to

consider the defendant's rehabilitative needs, age, and

educational background did not present a substantial

question); Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 2001 PA Super 77,

770 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa.Super.2001) (citing Commonwealth v.

Mobley, 581 A.2d 949, 952 ([Pa.Super.]1990)) (claim that

sentence failed to take into consideration the defendant's

rehabilitative needs and was manifestly excessive did not raise a

substantial question where sentence was within statutory

guidelines and within sentencing guidelines); Commonwealth v.

Coss, 695 A.2d 831, 833 (Pa.Super.1997) (when the sentence

imposed falls within the statutory limits, an appellant's claim that

a sentence is manifestly excessive fails to raise a substantial

question); Commonwealth v. Bershad, 693 A.2d 1303, 1309

(Pa.Super.1997) (a claim that a trial court failed to appropriately

consider an appellant's rehabilitative needs does not present a

substantial question); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 650 A.2d

876, 881 ([Pa.Super.]1994) (claim of error for failing to consider

rehabilitative needs does not present substantial question).

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Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 936-37 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal

denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa.2013).

We note that Appellant does not allege that the trial court was unaware

of his educational background, community support, substance abuse issues,

or rehabilitative needs, nor does Appellant contend that the sentencing court

relied on inadequate or incorrect information. Indeed, the trial court in this

matter considered a pre-sentence report, therefore, it is presumed that the

court adequately considered relevant mitigating and aggravating factors.

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 766 (Pa. Super. 2006). The record

indicates that the trial court additionally reviewed the sentencing guidelines,

sentencing memorandums prepared by counsel for the Commonwealth and

the defense, letters in support of Appellant written by friends and family, and

the testimony of Appellant’s wife regarding his familial responsibilities and

drug addiction. Tr. Ct. Op. at 43. The trial court specifically stated on the

record during sentencing:

I did take into account the information you provided to me in

advance of today and the information that was provided today.

But for that evidence, I would have sentenced you in the

aggravated range. I am not.

N.T., 10/3/22, at 108. Thus, not only did Appellant’s mitigating factors receive

consideration, they had an actual impact on lowering his final sentence.

Appellant would have us reconsider the weight given to various sentencing

factors and as such, Appellant is effectively asking this Court to substitute our

judgment for that of the lower court. Since that is a task beyond our scope,

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he has failed to present us with a substantial question. See Commonwealth

v. Rivera, 637 A.2d 1015, 1017 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing Commonwealth

v. Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Pa. Super 1989) (en banc)).

Even if we were to address the merits of the contention, we would find

that the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. The trial court

noted:

Defendant is a violent offender who committed multiple brazen

robberies upon delivery drivers who were simply trying to do their

jobs. The level of sophistication inherent in these robberies

demonstrated a significant amount of planning and premeditation.

During the robberies, several of the victims were either subjected

to pistol whipping or had their hands restrained. Several of the

victims had firearms pointed at their bodies, including one firearm

which illuminated a laser scope on its potential target. The victims

experienced incalculable terror as a result of these actions. One of

the victims, Mr. Mirzoev, indicated that during one of these

robberies he begged the perpetrators to spare his life out of fear

that he would never see his pregnant wife again. Quick Courier

Service also suffered significant financial losses from these

robberies in the form of the monetary value of the drugs stolen

and the termination of contracts by vendors who no longer trusted

Quick Courier Service to deliver their pharmaceutical products.

(N.T. Sentencing, 10/3/22, at 49). The court referenced these

details and other factors in its reasoning for the sentence it

imposed[.]

Tr. Ct. Op. at 43.

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant failed to raise a substantial

question for our review. To the extent that the sentencing claim before us

presents a “substantial question” for our review, we conclude that the

sentencing court did not abuse its sentencing discretion in fashioning

Appellant's sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 7/18/2024

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