Charlotte Scott Forbess v. Michael E. Forbess

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 15, 2011 Session

CHARLOTTE SCOTT FORBESS v. MICHAEL E. FORBESS

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Tipton County

No. 25859 James F. Butler, Chancellor

No. W2011-01105-COA-R3-CV - Filed December 9, 2011

This case involves the valuation of assets for division of marital property and alimony. Wife

filed for divorce, seeking an equitable division of the marital assets, including Husband’s

one-half interest in a real estate partnership. At trial, each party introduced experts to testify

as to the value of Husband’s interest in the partnership. The trial court valued the partnership

at a fair market value that was between the values testified to by the experts. The court

awarded Wife one-half of the value, awarded Wife one-half of a note that was based on

property Husband owned prior to the marriage, and awarded Wife alimony. After a motion

to alter or amend, the trial court reduced Wife’s interest in the partnership and the note to

take into account Husband’s tax liability. Wife appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in

valuing the partnership and in its alimony award. Affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which A LAN E. H IGHERS, P.J.,

W.S., and D AVID R. F ARMER, J., joined.

J. Thomas Caldwell, Ripley, Tennessee, for the appellant, Charlotte Scott Forbess.

Thomas D. Forrester, Covington, Tennessee, for the appellee, Michael E. Forbess.

OPINION

I. Background

Plaintiff/Appellant Charlotte Scott Forbess (“Wife”) and Defendant/Appellee Michael

E. Forbess (“Husband”) were married in June of 1990.1 When they married, both parties had

children from previous relationships. Although the parties were married for over twenty

years, they had no children together.

Prior to and during the first several years of the marriage, Husband worked installing

insulation for commercial and industrial buildings. While working as an insulation installer,

Husband made contributions to a retirement plan, both before and during the marriage. Prior

to the parties’ marriage, Husband also entered into a partnership with his brother. The

partnership, which was established primarily to buy and sell real estate, is called Forbess

Brothers Partnership (‘the Partnership”). The only asset of the Partnership prior to the

marriage was the Smithville Mobile Home Park located in Covington, Tennessee, which was

purchased on April 1, 1985. Prior to the marriage, the brothers made several improvements

and expansions to the property. However, on January 2, 2004, the brothers sold the

Smithville Mobile Home Park for $472,712.00 in cash, along with a $275,000.00 promissory

note (“the Smithville Note”) to be paid in installments of $2,320.61 per month until January

2019. The cash proceeds of the sale were divided equally between the brothers; likewise, the

payments made under the Smithville Note are also divided between the brothers. Husband

used the cash proceeds to buy the marital home and to make improvements to it, to give gifts

to both his and Wife’s children, and to set up an annuity. After the sale of the Smithville

Mobile Home Park, Husband retired from his previous job and lived entirely off income

generated from the Partnership.

During the parties’ marriage, the Partnership acquired several other assets, including

an undeveloped portion of commercial land at the Shelby-Tipton County line, called the

Hunter property, another mobile home park, referred to as the Westside Mobile Home Park,

and two office buildings in Covington, Tennessee. Later, the brothers entered into a lease-

purchase agreement for the Westside Mobile Home Park; the agreement provided that the

lessee would pay the Partnership $46,840.64 per month until 2027, again to be divided

equally between the brothers. During, or at the end of the lease period (subject to a 3%

prepayment penalty if exercised in the first five years of the lease), the lessee has the option

to purchase the property for $5.6 million, less the amount already paid. At the time of the

trial, a balance of $5,214,615.99 remained on the lease-purchase agreement.

At the time the parties married, Wife had recently quit her job as a factory worker due

to surgery to correct her carpel tunnel syndrome. During the first half of the parties’

marriage, Wife worked, without drawing a salary, at the Smithville Mobile Home Park,

performing general maintenance and administrative tasks for the property. However, once

the Smithville Mobile Home Park was sold, neither Wife nor Husband continued to work

1

The parties cannot agree as to whether they were married on June 20, 1990 or June 28, 1990.

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outside the Partnership. Wife suffered from various illnesses throughout the marriage,

including carpel tunnel, severe back pain, tremors, and high blood pressure, which she

testified kept her from working after the sale of the Smithville Mobile Home Park. At the

time of trial, many of these afflictions had been remedied; however, Wife testified that she

could not obtain gainful employment due to her continuing back pain and the fact that she

had no marketable skills.

After an altercation at the parties’ home in 2008, where Wife alleged that Husband

became violent toward her, dragged her throughout the marital home, and kicked her, Wife

filed for divorce on March 6, 2008, alleging inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable

differences. On March 11, 2008, Wife was granted a temporary injunction against Husband,

which restrained Husband from having any contact with Wife. Wife filed an affidavit of

income and expenses on March 28, 2008. Wife listed no income on the affidavit, but

included $2,588.00 per month in expenses, including a $658.00 per month note on the

recreational vehicle that she lived in immediately after the separation and $720.00 per month

for medical expenses not covered by her insurance and not including the estimated $75.00

per month Wife paid in co-pays.

For several months, Husband apparently remitted to Wife one-half of his income from

the Partnership, though nothing in the record indicates that he was under a court order to do

so; however, on October 6, 2008, Wife filed a Motion for Hearing on Temporary Support,

averring that she had been receiving monthly payments from Husband, but that Husband had

reduced the payments with no explanation and that it had come to her attention that Husband

was dissipating marital assets. The record does not indicate that a hearing was ever set on

Wife’s motion.

Husband filed his answer and counter-complaint for divorce on August 6, 2008,

likewise alleging inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. Because

neither party wished to retain the marital home, which Wife vacated after the March 2008

altercation, the parties filed a Motion to list that property for sale on September 10, 2009.

Husband filed his own affidavit of expenses on September 20, 2010. In the affidavit,

Husband listed a total income of $11,162 per month and expenses totaling $7,726.00 per

month, including $500.00 for health insurance, $563.00 for medical bills, $830.00 for a car

payment, and $2,100.00 for taxes.

The trial court held a hearing on the divorce on September 20–21, 2010. During the

hearing, both parties introduced experts who testified as to the fair market value of

Husband’s interest in the Forbess Brothers Partnership (although Husband claims that the

Smithville Note is his separate property, Husband did not claim that the Partnership itself,

including the assets owned by the Partnership as the time of trial, was separate property).

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Wife’s first expert, Michael T. Orman, a certified general appraiser with Statewide

Appraisal Service, testified that he valued the property owned by the Partnership using

comparable sales in the area. Under this approach, Mr. Orman testified that the Hunter

property had a fair market value of $630,000.00 and the Westside Mobile Home Park had a

fair market value of $4,485,000.00. Wife’s next expert, Joseph Babb, a certified public

accountant and certified valuation analyst with Eaton Babb Smith, then used these figures

and the asset approach2 to value Husband’s one-half interest in the Partnership as a whole

based on the fair market values of the property owned by the Partnership, including the two

Covington commercial buildings, which he appraised at $338,670.00 combined. To value

Husband’s interest in the Partnership under the asset approach, Mr. Babb added up the fair

market value of all the Partnership properties, subtracted all the Partnership’s liabilities, and

divided the resulting number by two to represent Husband’s one-half share. Taking

Husband’s interest in the property, Mr. Babb then declined to apply a discount for lack of

control,3 and only discounted the value by 10% based on lack of marketability.4 Thus, Mr.

Babb concluded that the fair market value of Husband’s interest in the Partnership is

$1,150,000.00.

Husband employed several experts—some to appraise the property owned by the

Partnership and one to value Husband’s one-half interest in the Partnership as a whole.

According to Van Emerson Boals, a certified general appraiser with Real Estate Appraisers

and Land Surveyor, the Westside Mobile Home Park has a fair market value between

$3,650,000.00 and $4,170,000. Husband’s next expert, Thomas A. Ivy, a certified public

2

Mr. Babb’s report defined the asset approach as follows:

The asset approach calculated the value of a business, business ownership, or security by

using one or more methods based on the value of the assets of that business net of liabilities.

The approach is often used for companies holding real estate or other large assets in a non-

operative environment.

3

Although Mr. Babb ultimately did not apply a discount for lack of control, he did explain the

application of the discount, stating in his report, “[t]ypically, a lack of control is applied to a minority (less

than 50%) interest to reduce the interest’s value due to the owner’s inability to exhibit control over the

entity.” Mr. Babb concluded that because Husband’s share was not a minority share, representing 50% of

the company, the lack of control discount did not apply in this case.

4

Defining lack of marketability, Mr. Babb’s report explained:

A discount for lack of marketability/liquidity is commonly appropriate to reflect that an

interest in a closely-held entity is less attractive and more difficult to sell than an interest in

a publicly traded entity. Accordingly, an interest in a closely held entity lacking

marketability/liquidity will generally sell for less than an identical interest in a defined and

active market.

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accountant and accredited business valuator used the appraisals of other experts, as well as

tax assessment appraisals, to determine the value of Husband’s interest in the Partnership.

Mr. Ivy concluded that the Westside Mobile Home Park has a fair market value of

$3,985,000.00, that the Hunter property has a fair market value of $475,000.00, and that the

Covington commercial properties have a total fair market value of $287,584.00. Based on

these values, Mr. Ivy valued Husband’s interest in the Partnership at $610,000.00 using both

an income approach5 and an asset approach, and discounting 35% for lack of marketability,

lack of control, as well as deferred tax issues that will affect Husband’s income from the

Partnership.

Wife testified about the night in early March 2008 when Husband allegedly kicked

her and dragged her from the marital home. She also testified that she worked for fourteen

years at the Smithville Mobile Home Park, generally running the park, without pay, but that

she did not return to work after the sale of the park due to her various medical issues. Wife

also testified that, although she suffers from severe back pain, she had not sought medical

help because of the high cost of her insurance deductible. Wife never completed high school

and, when asked whether she could be rehabilitated and seek employment, Wife answered

in the negative.

Husband admitted that there was an altercation on March 8, 2008, though he denied

that he kicked or dragged Wife. Further, Husband testified that his income had decreased

over the period of separation due to the fact that a portion of his income came from payments

for mobile homes that he had sold separate from the Partnership, which debt had been

satisfied during the pendency of the divorce. Husband testified that the income listed on his

affidavit of income and expenses was not accurate and that his actual income was

$11,662.00. Husband also clarified that his expenses included insurance premiums for Wife

that he would no longer be required to pay after the divorce, insurance premiums for himself

that were actually paid by the Partnership, and a car payment which may have been paid by

5

Husband’s expert did not define the income approach in his report; however, in concluding that the

income approach was not applicable because the Partnership mainly consisted of real property, Mr. Babb

did define the income approach:

The income approach determines the value indication of a business, business ownership

interest, security or intangible asset using one or more methods that convert anticipated

benefits into a present single amount. . . . The income approach, which is most often used

to value operating companies, uses a risk-based approach to evaluate the impact of various

factors on earnings and/or cash flow.

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the Partnership.6 According to Husband, his income came from both the lease-purchase of

the Westside Mobile Home Park ($10,500.00 per month, which would continue for

approximately seventeen years) and from the Smithville Mobile Home Park ($1,162.00 per

month, continuing for approximately seventeen years), which was paid separately from

Partnership distributions, though Husband argued that the Smithville Note was his separate

property because he owned the Smithville Mobile Home Park prior to the divorce. Husband

further testified that he had begun receiving social security benefits. Husband also testified

as to the value of the marital home, the annuity purchased with the Smithville sale proceeds,

and various cars and motorcycles owned by the parties.

At the conclusion of proof, the trial judge declared the parties divorced, but reserved

ruling on other issues until he had time to consider the testimony and exhibits. The trial judge

issued his written Decree of Absolute Divorce, including findings of fact and conclusions of

law on October 8, 2010. The court declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code

Annotated Section 36-4-1297 and awarded Wife a portion of Husband’s retirement benefits

based on the court’s conclusion that Husband was employed for 7.5 years during the parties’

marriage. Because neither party wished to retain the marital home, the judge ordered that the

home be sold and the proceeds divided equally. The judge also divided the various vehicles

and accounts owned by the parties.

The court further ruled that the Smithville Note was marital property, stating that the

“property has been transmuted over the period of years they have been receiving it and

utilizing it’s funds for marital purposes.” The court then ordered that Husband transmit 50%

of the Smithville Note to Wife each month, noting that this payment is a division of marital

property, rather than alimony.

6

It is difficult to discern from Husband’s testimony whether the car payment was additional

compensation from the Partnership or whether the car payment came from Husband’s draw from the

Partnership but was remitted to the loan company directly from the Partnership.

7

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-4-129 states:

(a) In all actions for divorce from the bonds of matrimony or legal separation the parties may

stipulate as to grounds and/or defenses.

(b) The court may, upon stipulation to or proof of any ground of divorce pursuant to §

36-4-101, grant a divorce to the party who was less at fault or, if either or both parties are

entitled to a divorce or if a divorce is to be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable

differences, declare the parties to be divorced, rather than awarding a divorce to either party

alone.

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After considering the expert testimony, the trial court concluded that the fair market

value of Husband’s 50% interest in the Forbess Brothers Partnership was $750,000. The

court specifically noted that the valuation method employed by Wife’s expert was more

subjective than the method employed by Husband’s expert, although the court reduced Mr.

Ivy’s discount from 35% to 20%, finding that the expert’s discount was too conservative

given “the risk factors associated with the properties owned by the partnership” and the fact

that the Partnership is on “sound footing financially.” The court awarded Wife 50% of the

Partnership, or $375,000. In order to pay this award, the trial court ordered Husband to

transmit to Wife one-half of his distributions from the Partnership each month, until the

balance of $375,000 has been paid, though the court noted that this remained a marital

property division, rather than an award of alimony.

The court then awarded Wife $250.00 per month in alimony in futuro until Wife’s

death, remarriage, Husband’s death, or a substantial change in circumstances. In making this

award, the court specifically noted that Husband already received his social security benefits,

while Wife worked without salary for fourteen years at the Smithville Mobile Home Park,

which would affect her social security benefits when she became eligible; the court also

considered Wife’s need and Husband’s ability to pay. The court further imposed a judicial

lien on Forbess Brothers Partnership to secure the payment of alimony in the event of

Husband’s untimely death.

Finally, the court denied Wife’s request for attorney fees, noting that Wife was

awarded substantial assets in the divorce, some of which were cash assets and others ongoing

payments.

Husband filed a motion to alter or amend on November 29, 2010, arguing that the trial

court miscalculated the number of years Husband was employed while married, that the

Smithville Note was separate property, and that the court’s valuation and division of the

Partnership and the Smithville Note failed to take into account Husband’s estimated 20% tax

liability per year on the income. Wife filed a response on February 24, 2011, denying the

material allegations contained therein. After a hearing on February 2, 2011, the trial court

entered an order on April 12, 2011, altering the portion of Husband’s retirement benefits

awarded to Wife to reflect the actual 5.75 (rather than 7.5) years Husband had worked during

the marriage.8 The court also denied Husband’s request to alter the court’s ruling that the

Smithville Note was marital property. Finally, the court reduced Wife’s portion of Husband’s

interest in the Forbess Brothers Partnership and the Smithville Note by 20% to take into

account the 20% tax liability that would be paid by Husband. Wife appeals.

8

Wife does not take issue with this ruling on appeal.

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II. Issues

Wife raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in the division of marital property?

a. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Wife $375,000.00 in lieu of a

property interest in the Forbess Brothers Partnership?

b. Whether the trial court erred in ordering Wife’s marital property award to be

paid from periodic disbursement of income from the Partnership?

c. Whether the trial court erred in ordering income taxes be deducted from

Wife’s cash award in lieu of interest in the Partnership?

d. Whether the cash award to Wife representing discounted cash value of interest

in the Partnership is subject to income tax?

e. Whether the trial court considered all partnership property ownership in the

division of property?

2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Wife $250.000 per month to Wife as

alimony in futuro?

3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Wife her attorney’s fees?

III. Division of Marital Property

The division of marital property, including its classification and valuation are findings

of fact. Woodward v. Woodward, 240 SW3d 825, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Trial courts

have “wide latitude in fashioning an equitable division of marital property.” Altman v.

Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, the trial court’s decisions

regarding classification, valuation and division of property are reviewed de novo with a

presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Farrar v. Farrar,

553 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tenn. 1977).

As a preliminary matter, we note that Tennessee Rules of the Appellate Court Rule

7 requires that, in all cases where a party takes issue with the classification and division of

marital property, the party must include in its brief a chart displaying the property values

proposed by both parties, the value assigned by the trial court, and the party to whom the trial

court awarded the property. Tenn. Ct. App. R. 7. Rule 7 also requires that “[e]ach entry in

the table must include a citation to the record where each party's evidence regarding the

classification or valuation of the property or debt can be found . . . .” In the recent case of

Harden v. Harden, No. M2009–01302–COA–R3–CV, 2010 WL 2612688 (Tenn. Ct. App.

June 30, 2010), this Court discussed the Rule 7 Table:

This Court has previously held where an appellant fails to comply with this

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rule, that appellant waives all such issues relating to the rule's requirements.

This Court is under no duty to search a trial court record in order to discern the

valuation of the couple's property. This Court has previously found issues

involving the valuation and division of property waived for failure to comply

with Rule 7.

Id. at *8 (citations omitted). In explaining the necessity of the Rule 7 Table, we further

stated:

[I]t is essential that the parties comply with Rule 7 in order to aid this Court in

reviewing the trial court's decision. The table required by Rule 7, allows this

Court to easily and correctly determine the valuation and distribution of the

marital estate as ordered by the trial court. Further, the Rule 7 table, allows this

Court to ascertain the contentions of each party as to the correct valuations and

proper distribution, as well as the evidence in the record which the party

believes supports its contention. Consequently, a table, in full compliance with

Rule 7, is vital as this Court must consider the entire distribution of property

in order to determine whether the trial court erred. Moreover, this Court is

under no duty to minutely search the record for evidence that the trial court's

valuations may be incorrect or that the distribution may be improper.

Id.

While we may excuse Wife’s failure to include a chart in her appellate brief, see Tenn.

R. App. P. 2, we cannot overlook Wife’s failure to cite any applicable law in her brief

supporting her arguments regarding the division of marital property, other than the

distribution of marital property statute, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-4-121. This

court has repeatedly held that a party’s failure to cite authority for its arguments or to argue

the issues in the body of its brief constitute a waiver on appeal. Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222

S.W.3d 368, 401 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (failure “to cite to any authority or to construct an

argument regarding [a] position on appeal” constitutes a waiver of the issue); Bean v. Bean,

40 S.W.3d 52, 55-56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“Courts have routinely held that the failure to

make appropriate references to the record and to cite relevant authority in the argument

section of the brief as required by Rule 27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of the issue.”).

Specifically, Wife cites no authority for her assertion that she should have been awarded a

property interest in Forbess Brothers Partnership,9 that the court’s order that Wife’s property

9

Even if this issue had been properly briefed, it is without merit. Tennessee Code Annotated Section

61-1-501 states that an interest in a partnership cannot be transferred to a non-partner, voluntarily or

(continued...)

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division be paid through periodic disbursement was in error,10 that Husband’s income tax

liability should not have been considered in the division of property,11 or that the trial court

failed to consider all of the real estate owned by the Partnership in valuing Husband’s interest

in the Partnership.12

Because of Wife’s failure to include a chart regarding the valuation of the marital

asset at issue and her failure to cite any applicable law or argument for the issues presented

in her brief, we conclude that all issues with regard to marital property are waived.

9

(...continued)

involuntarily. Tenn. Code Ann.§ 61-1-501 (“Partnership property is owned by the partnership as an entity.

A partner is not a co-owner of partnership property and has no interest in partnership property which can be

transferred, either voluntarily or involuntarily.”).

10

The distribution of marital property statute specifically contemplates that, when making an

equitable distribution of a business entity, such as this partnership, the court may order one party to make

a distributive award of money to the other party in lieu of a property interest:

(1) If, in making equitable distribution of marital property, the court determines that the

distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law,

the court may make a distributive award of money or other property in order to achieve

equity between the parties. The court, in its discretion, may also make a distributive award

of money or other property to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital

property.

(2) The court may provide that any distributive award payable over a period of time be

secured by a lien on specific property.

Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(f). A distributive award is especially appropriate when a partnership is deemed

marital property, as the non-partner spouse may not take an interest in the partnership, as discussed supra,

but only in the income generated from the partnership. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-1-501. In fact, the Revised

Uniform Partnership Act specifically states that the income received from a partnership is personal property

of the partner, which is transferrable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-1-502 (“The only transferable interest of a

partner in the partnership is the partner's share of the profits and losses of the partnership and the partner's

right to receive distributions. This interest is personal property.”).

11

The distribution of marital property statute directs trial courts to consider “[t]he tax consequences

to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably

foreseeable expenses associated with the asset” in making a marital property division.” Tenn. Code Ann. §

36-4-121(c)(5)(A)(9).

12

Unlike Wife, the trial court did include a chart of the marital property in its final order. The chart

shows Wife’s valuation of the Partnership, including the Westside Mobile Home Park, the Hunter property,

and the two Covington, Tennessee office buildings. No law is cited for Wife’s argument that the trial court

failed to include all the property in its valuation, nor is there any indication in the record that the trial court

failed to consider all of the Partnership property in valuing the asset.

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In the body of Husband’s brief, he also takes issue with the trial court’s determination

that the Smithfield Note was marital property subject to division upon divorce. In addition,

he asks that Wife be required to reimburse him for the additional 20% of the Partnership

income and the Smithville Note that were paid to Wife in 2010, prior to the trial court’s order

on the motion to alter or amend. However, Husband failed to include these issues in his

statement of the issues on appeal. We may consider an issue waived where it is argued in the

brief but not designated as an issue. Childress v. Union Realty Co., 97 S.W.3d 573, 578

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 27(b) (requiring that an appellee who

requests affirmative relief must include “the issues and arguments involved in his [or her]

request for relief” in the appellee brief ). Accordingly, we likewise conclude that Husband’s

arguments with regard to the classification of the Smithville Note and the remittance of 20%

of funds paid in 2010 are waived.

IV. Alimony

Wife takes issue with the $250.00 award of alimony in futuro, arguing that the

statutory factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-121(i) favor a larger

alimony award. Specifically Wife argues that: (1) Husband’s earning capacity far exceeds

Wife’s; (2) Wife is older and has little education that would allow her to seek gainful

employment in the future, while Husband has an ongoing business that will continue to be

lucrative; (3) this was a long-term marriage; (4) Wife has several health problems, while

Husband is in good physical condition: (5) the parties enjoyed a high standard of living

during the marriage: (6) Wife worked in the home and Husband’s business during the

marriage; (7) Wife will lack health insurance after the divorce. In addition Wife argues that

“Wife received little property [in the divorce] other than cash obtained from sale of marital

assets.”

The trial court’s decisions regarding alimony are reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105, 112 (Tenn. 2011).

Alimony determinations are inherently factual in nature and require the trial court to balance

many factors. Id. at 105. Our role is only “to determine whether the trial court applied the

correct legal standard and reached a decision that is not clearly unreasonable.” Id. We are to

presume the correctness of the trial court's decision and review the evidence “in the light

most favorable to the decision.” Id. An abuse of discretion review must reflect “an awareness

that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among several acceptable alternatives.”

Id. Thus, the fact that the reviewing court would not have made the same ruling is not

relevant as long as the trial court's decision falls within the range of acceptable options. Id.

With these principles in mind, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's

alimony award. The court considered the statutory factors and made specific findings. In

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addition, Wife’s assertion that she received little property pursuant to the divorce is

completely without support in the record; in addition to her portion of the marital home, a

car, a motorcycle, a recreational vehicle, and half of the annuity owned by the parties, Wife

received a distribution of $300,000 for her portion of Husband’s interest in the Partnership,

to be paid in installments of $5,250.00 per month for approximately six years, as well as

$581.00 per month for the Smithville Note, which was to be paid until 2019. Reviewing the

evidence in “the light most favorable to the trial court's decision,” Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d

at 112, we see no indication that the trial court applied an erroneous standard or reached a

patently unreasonable result.13

V. Attorney Fees

Wife asserts that the trial court erred in failing to award her attorney fees at trial.

However, Wife does not argue this point in the body of her brief, nor does she cite any

authority to support her assertion. Accordingly, this issue is waived. See Newcomb v. Kohler

Co., 222 S.W.3d 368, 401 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

VI. Conclusion

The judgment of the Chancery Court of Tipton County is affirmed. Costs of this

appeal are taxed one-half to Appellant, Charlotte Scott Forbess, and her surety and one-half

to Appellee Michael E. Forbess, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

13

In Husband’s brief, he states that the trial court’s award of alimony was in error and argues that

Wife should be awarded no alimony; however, Husband did not state this issue in his statement of issues.

This issue is waived. See Childress v. Union Realty Co., 97 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

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