T.D. King v. The Philadelphia Parking Auth.

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tony Dphax King, :

:

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 301 C.D. 2023

: Submitted: June 4, 2024

The Philadelphia Parking Authority :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge (P.)

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: July 17, 2024

Tony Dphax King (Driver), proceeding pro se, appeals from an order

of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) that granted the

Philadelphia Parking Authority, Steven C. Boc (Boc), and Dennis G. Weldon Jr.’s

(Weldon)1 (collectively, the Authority) motion for summary judgment (Motion) and

dismissed Driver’s claims with prejudice. Driver contends that the trial court erred

or abused its discretion by granting the Authority’s Motion. We affirm.

Driver commenced this action by filing a civil action in municipal court

against the Authority on March 19, 2021, to dispute collection notices for one

parking ticket (No. 726845431 – alleged offense date April 18, 2016) and one red-

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Boc and Weldon are attorneys for the Authority.

light camera violation (No. RL160219237 - alleged offense date December 28,

2016) (collectively, the Violations). On June 24, 2021, after argument, the

municipal court entered judgment for the Authority on the basis that it lacked

jurisdiction over Driver’s Violations.

On July 10, 2021, Driver appealed this judgment to the trial court. On

August 10, 2021, Driver also filed a complaint and requested a jury trial. In response

to the Authority’s preliminary objections (POs), Driver amended his complaint

twice. In the second amended complaint, Driver asserted that the Authority is not

legally permitted to collect unpaid fines stemming from the Violations issued to him.

Driver asked the trial court to dismiss the Violations. He requested an award of

damages in the amount of $652.95 to compensate him for his alleged “loss of work,

service fees, [and] time invested” incurred in connection with his litigation of the

Violations. Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 11 at 14. Driver also demanded

damages “up to $12,000 to pay the filing fee of $581.17 (which was waived) and

future economic injury (loss of future business opportunity) due to the

PROSECUTION of this matter.” Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).

The Authority filed an answer with new matter to Driver’s second

amended complaint. Following the close of discovery, the Authority filed the

Motion seeking summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support. O.R.,

Item No. 18. In the Motion, the Authority asserted that Driver failed to produce

evidence in support of his claims. The Authority also contended that it was entitled

to judgment as a matter of law for several reasons. First, the Authority asserted that

the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Driver did not first dispute

the underlying Violations with the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (BAA)

and the Office of Administrative Review (OAR) as required by the Local Agency

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Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §§551-555, 751-754, and Chapter 12 of The Philadelphia Code

(Traffic Code) before seeking judicial review. Second, the Authority asserted that

the Authority itself is shielded by governmental immunity under Sections 8541-8542

of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§8541-8542 (commonly referred to as the Political

Subdivision Tort Claims Act). Third, the Authority argued that Driver’s claims for

civil damages against the Authority’s attorneys, Boc and Weldon, were barred by

the doctrine of qualified immunity, which shields government officials and

employees acting within the scope of their duties from liability for civil damages.

Driver filed a response in opposition. By order dated March 2, 2023, the trial court

granted the Authority’s Motion and dismissed Driver’s claims with prejudice

without opinion.

On March 26, 2023, Driver filed a notice of appeal in this Court.2 On

March 29, 2023, the trial court directed Driver to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal (Statement), pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b)),

within 21 days. On April 16, 2023, Driver filed a 6-page Statement containing 23

lettered paragraphs, each containing a purported issue on appeal.

On June 20, 2023, the trial court issued a written opinion pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion) requesting this Court to dismiss Driver’s

appeal on the basis that he “waived review by filing an improperly lengthy and

expansive” Statement. Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/23, at 1. Should this Court reach the

merits of the appeal, the trial court opined that it did not err or abuse its discretion

by granting summary judgment to the Authority and dismissing Driver’s claims with

2

“Our review of a trial court’s order granting summary judgment is de novo, and our scope

of review is plenary; this Court applies the same standard for summary judgment as the trial court.”

Lancaster County Agriculture Preserve Board v. Fryberger, 257 A.3d 192, 199 n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2021). “Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact,

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

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prejudice. The trial court explained that the Authority demonstrated in its Motion

that Driver failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not challenging the

underlying Violations, did not plead an exception to governmental immunity, and

did not present any claims against individual defendants Boc and Weldon that would

overcome the bar of qualified immunity. Id. at 4. The trial court added that Driver’s

response did not overcome the Authority’s arguments. Id.

We must first examine whether Driver preserved any issues for

appellate review pursuant to Rule 1925(b). Rule 1925(b) provides that, “[i]f the

judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal (‘judge’) desires

clarification of the errors complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order

directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a

concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal (‘Statement’).” Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b). “Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon

those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Dowling,

778 A.2d 683, 686-87 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Rule 1925(b) is not satisfied by simply filing a timely statement.

Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2016). “The Statement

shall set forth only those errors that the appellant intends to assert.” Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(i). The Statement must “concisely identify each error that the appellant

intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.”

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “The Statement should not be redundant or provide

lengthy explanations as to any error. Where non-redundant, non-frivolous issues are

set forth in an appropriately concise manner, the number of errors raised will not

alone be grounds for finding waiver.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv). “Issues not

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included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this

paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

The “statement must be sufficiently ‘concise’ and ‘coherent’ such that

the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues to be raised on appeal . . . .”

Ray, 134 A.3d at 1114 (quoting Jiricko v. Geico Insurance Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210

(Pa. Super. 2008)). Rule 1925(b) Statements “must be detailed enough so that the

judge can write a Rule 1925(a) opinion, but not so lengthy that it does not meet the

goal of narrowing down the issues previously raised to the few that are likely to be

presented to the appellate court without giving the trial judge volumes to plow

through.” Arnoldy v. Forklift L.P., 927 A.2d 257, 261 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2007).

“[W]hen appellants raise an ‘outrageous’ number of issues in their

1925(b) [S]tatement, the appellants have ‘deliberately circumvented the meaning

and purpose of Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate

review of the issues [they] now seek to raise.’” Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343,

346 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff’d, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Kanter v. Epstein,

866 A.2d 394, 401 (Pa. Super. 2004)); accord Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d

1, 2 (Pa. Super. 2006); Lineberger v.Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Waiver of the issues is the appropriate remedy for an appellant’s failure to comply

with Rule 1925(b). See, e.g., Brandywine Hospital, LLC v. County of Chester Board

of Assessment Appeals, 291 A.3d 467, 476 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 308 A.3d

779 (Pa. 2023) (appellant waived all issues on appeal by filing a 19-page statement

that contained 90 issues and sub-issues replete with redundancies); Commonwealth

v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2018) (53-page “defamatory rant

against everything and everyone involved in this case show[ed] complete defiance

toward the purpose of appellate review” and merited dismissal of the appeal);

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Jiricko, 947 A.2d at 210, 213 (waiver found where five-page “virtually

incomprehensible” statement was “an incoherent, confusing, redundant, defamatory

rant”). Cf. Donoughe v. Lincoln Electric Co., 936 A.2d 52, 59-60 (Pa. Super. 2007),

overruled in part on other grounds by Nelson v. Airco Welders Supply, 107 A.3d

146 (Pa. Super. 2014) (issues not waived where 12 allegations of error in a four-page

statement were “fairly straightforward,” were “not vague,” and could be “stripped

of sub-arguments or other extraneous verbiage”); Caln Nether Co., L.P. v. Board of

Supervisors, Thornbury Township, 840 A.2d 484, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)

(statement raising 23 issues, while problematic, did not serve as grounds for

dismissal).

Here, Driver, who represented himself throughout the proceedings,

filed a six-page Statement containing 23 allegations of error. Although Driver’s

Statement was lengthy, it was not so incoherent or vague that it was impossible to

discern the issues Driver intended to raise. Despite the multiplicity of issues raised,

in essence, Driver contends that the trial court erred in granting the Authority’s

Motion upon determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Driver’s collection

challenge because Driver did not exhaust his administrative remedies to challenge

the underlying Violations and the Authority, and the individual defendants were

immune from suit. Driver sufficiently developed these arguments in his brief. We,

therefore, decline to find waiver, and we address these three central issues.

1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

First, Driver contends that the Authority was not authorized to collect

fees for traffic violations. He claims that the collection action is barred by the three-

year statute of limitations under Section 5553 of the Judicial Code,

42 Pa. C.S. §5553. The Authority violated Section 5553 by instituting collection

6

proceedings four years after the Violations’ offense dates. The Authority has never

referenced nor provided a defense to Section 5553 in any of its pleadings.

Section 5553(a) of the Judicial Code provides that “proceedings for

summary offenses” involving vehicles “must be commenced within 30 days after

the commission of the alleged offense or within 30 days after the discovery of the

commission of the offense or the identity of the offender, whichever is later, and not

thereafter.” 42 Pa. C.S. §5553. Section 5553(e) provides: “No proceedings shall be

held, or action taken pursuant to a summary offense under Title 75 [(relating to motor

vehicles)] subsequent to three years after the commission of the offense.”

42 Pa. C.S. §5553(e).

Here, the alleged offense date for the parking ticket was April 18, 2016,

and for the red-light camera violation was December 28, 2016. On April 26, 2020,

the Authority attempted to collect the unpaid fines associated with the Violations.

On this basis, Driver claims that the Authority had no legal right to collect fines for

the Violations as the collection proceeding or action was time barred by the statute

of limitations under Section 5553 of the Judicial Code.

Driver’s reasoning rests on the false presumption that the collection of

fines is a “proceeding” or “action taken” as used in Section 5553. However, “fine

collection is neither a proceeding nor an action” as defined so as to be barred by the

statute of limitations for motor vehicle summary offenses. Commonwealth v. Marr,

627 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. Super. 1993).3 Therefore, Section 5553 was not implicated

or violated by the fee collection.

3

An “action” is defined as “any action at equity or law.” 42 Pa. C.S. §102; see Marr, 627

A.2d at 758. “Proceeding” is defined as including “every declaration, petition or other application

which may be made to a court under law or usage or under special statutory authority, but the term

does not include an action or an appeal.” 42 Pa. C.S. §102; see Marr, 627 A.2d at 759.

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Insofar as Driver is attempting to dispute the underlying Violations

themselves, which led to the fines being placed into collection, Driver did not

exhaust the administrative remedies available. Under Section 752 of the Local

Agency Law, “[a] person aggrieved by an adjudication of a local agency who has a

direct interest in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the

court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals” under the Judicial Code.

2 Pa. C.S. §752. The Traffic Code details the administrative process for disputing

parking and red-light camera violations. See Phila. Code §§12-2807(3), 12-3010,

12-3011. A person who has received a parking ticket from Philadelphia Traffic

Court may contest the violation. Phila. Code §12-2807(8). If a person fails to

answer or fails to appear at a hearing when required to do so or fails to timely contest

the parking violation by mail or electronic submission, the Parking Hearing

Examiner shall fix the appropriate fine and assess appropriate costs and fees, if any.

Phila. Code §12-2807(3). Similarly, a person who has received a red-light violation

may request a hearing within 30 days to contest the liability of the alleged notice and

has the right to appeal the decision. Phila. Code §§12-3009(1), 12-3011. A person

aggrieved by a parking ticket or red-light camera violation may contest final orders

to the trial court within 30 days. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 902, 903; 42 Pa. C.S. §§933, 5571.

However, Driver never contested the Violations. Consequently, the

Authority began collection on the unpaid fines related to those Violations. Critically,

having failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review

regarding the collection of the fines, the trial court lacked jurisdiction. See Badio v.

Philadelphia Parking Authority (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1065 C.D. 2014, filed February

26, 2015) (holding trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the

appellant’s failure to properly appeal parking tickets and contest auction-related

8

court orders);4 see also Jonnet v. Bodick, 244 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. 1968) (holding

plaintiff was not permitted to recoup losses he might have avoided by taking an

available administrative appeal). Thus, the trial court properly entered summary

judgment in favor of the Authority.

2. Governmental Immunity

Next, Driver contends that the Authority is not immune from suit under

the Judicial Code. We disagree.

Section 8541 of the Judicial Code provides governmental immunity for

local agencies, such as the Authority. 42 Pa. C.S. §8541. Specifically, under Section

8541, “no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a

person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or

any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S. §8541. Section 8542 lists exceptions to immunity

that apply if certain conditions are met. 42 Pa. C.S. §8542. Section 8542(a)

provides:

(a) Liability imposed.--A local agency shall be liable for

damages on account of an injury to a person or property

within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of the

following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as

a result of one of the acts set forth in subsection (b):

(1) The damages would be recoverable under

common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the

injury were caused by a person not having available a

defense under section 8541 (relating to governmental

immunity generally) or section 8546 (relating to defense

of official immunity); and

4

Unreported memorandum opinions of this Court filed after January 15, 2008, may be

cited for their persuasive value pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 126(b), and Section 414(a) of the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures,

210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).

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(2) The injury was caused by the negligent acts of

the local agency or an employee thereof acting within the

scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the

categories listed in subsection (b). As used in this

paragraph, “negligent acts” shall not include acts or

conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual

malice, or willful misconduct.

42 Pa. C.S. §8542(a). The exceptions must relate to vehicle liability; the care,

custody, or control of personal property; real property; trees; traffic controls and

street lighting; utility service facilities; streets; sidewalks; care, custody, or control

of animals; and sexual abuse. 42 Pa. C.S. §8542(b)(1)-(9). Driver failed to plead

any of those exceptions. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the Authority

was immune from suit.

3. Qualified Immunity

Third, Driver contends that qualified immunity defense does not protect

official conduct that violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Because individual defendants Boc and Weldon violated Section 5553 of the Judicial

Code, Driver contends that they are not immune from suit. We disagree.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials and

public servants “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal

citation and quotations omitted). It provides immunity “so long as those officials

did not violate individual rights which were clearly established at the time, and about

which a reasonable government official would have known.” Johnson v. Wetzel,

238 A.3d 1172, 1178 (Pa. 2020). It protects a public servant who has not engaged

in actionable conduct from the possibility of suit not just as a mere defense to

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liability. DuBree v. Commonwealth, 393 A.2d 293, 295 (Pa. 1978); see Dorsey v.

Redman, 96 A.3d 332, 344 (Pa. 2014).

Here, Driver contends that Boc and Weldon are not entitled to

immunity based solely on his position that they violated his statutory rights arising

under Section 5553 of the Judicial Code in collecting fines for the Violations and

defending this action. Having concluded above that Section 5553 was not violated,

we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Boc and Weldon are

immune from suit.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tony Dphax King, :

:

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 301 C.D. 2023

:

The Philadelphia Parking Authority :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of July, 2024, the order of the Philadelphia

County Court of Common Pleas dated March 2, 2023, is AFFIRMED.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge