Charles Johnson, Jr. v. City of Atlanta

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11359

____________________

CHARLES JOHNSON, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF ATLANTA,

GARRETT ROLFE,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01977-JPB

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11359

Before BRANCH, GRANT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

Charles Johnson, Jr., sued Officer Garrett Rolfe and the City

of Atlanta bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell v. New

York Department of Social Services, 1 and Georgia state law, for injuries

he sustained when Rolfe arrested him on the side of an interstate

highway for driving while intoxicated. This appeal requires us to

determine whether the district court properly considered video

evidence—which was not mentioned in Johnson’s complaint—

showing Johnson refusing to comply with Rolfe’s instructions and

resisting being placed in handcuffs when it granted Rolfe’s motion

for judgment on the pleadings and the City’s motion to dismiss.

After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude

that because the video evidence (1) shows the events central to

Rolfe’s claims and (2) its authenticity is not challenged, the district

court properly considered the videos under the incorporation-by-

reference doctrine. And because the videos establish that Rolfe did

not use excessive force and he did not intend to injure Johnson in

arresting him, Rolfe is entitled to qualified immunity on Johnson’s

federal claims and official immunity on his state law claims.

Accordingly, after careful review and with the benefit of oral

argument, we affirm the district court’s order.

1 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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I. Background

A. Allegations in the Complaint

Johnson filed suit in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia. His bare-boned complaint alleged

the following.

“On or about May 22, 2020, [Johnson] was driving a vehicle

while intoxicated” when Rolfe pulled him over. Johnson behaved

in a respectful manner, did not raise his voice, never used any force

against Rolfe, and did not otherwise provide Rolfe “with a legal

basis to use force against him.” However, because Johnson “did

not comply with . . . Rolfe’s command as quickly as [Rolfe] would

have liked, [Rolfe] grabbed him and after[ward] threw [Johnson] to

the ground, thoroughly breaking [Johnson’s] collar bone” which

required two surgeries to repair.

Rolfe had a “history” of citizen complaints, including for

shooting and killing a man. Johnson alleged that the City was

responsible for Rolfe’s alleged use of excessive force against him

because it “encouraged, tolerated, ratified” and was deliberately

indifferent to “policies, patterns, practices, and actions” related to

“[t]he use of force by police officers; [t]he proper exercise of police

power, including but not limited to the use of force; [and] [t]he

failure to identify and to take remedial or disciplinary actions

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11359

against police officers who were the subject of prior citizen or

internal complaints of misconduct.”

Based on these allegations, Johnson brought five counts

“under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . for the use of excessive force[] against

him” as well as under Georgia law for excessive force and battery.2

The City moved to dismiss Johnson’s complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that

Johnson’s complaint failed to state a claim against the City for

Monell liability because its threadbare allegations did not allege

sufficient facts to plausibly establish that it had an official custom

or policy, nor an unofficial custom or practice, that caused

Johnson’s injures. 3

Rolfe, on the other hand, answered the complaint and raised

several affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity on the

2 Because of the manner in which the complaint was drafted, in particular its

sparse allegations, the district court was forced to interpret what claims

Johnson was bringing. It found that Count I alleged “constitutional claims

(United States and Georgia) for unreasonable search and seizure and abuse of

arrestees plus a state law claim for battery” against Rolfe; Count II alleged a

“failure to supervise [claim] against the City;” Count III alleged a

“constitutional claim (Georgia) for unreasonable search and seizure and a

willful intent to injure” against Rolfe; Count IV alleged a “constitutional claim

(Georgia) for abuse” against Rolfe; and Count V alleged a state law battery

claim against Rolfe. No party challenges this determination on appeal. For

simplicity, this appeal will refer to Johnson’s claims as the federal claims and

the state-law claims, respectively.

3 In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local

governments may be held directly liable under § 1983 for constitutional

violations if the injury stems from the government’s enforcement of a policy

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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 5

federal claims and official immunity on the Georgia state-law

claims. Rolfe’s answer referenced his body camera and dashcam

footage, which he also filed with the court. Rolfe then moved for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the body camera and

dashcam footage established that he did not use excessive force and

he was therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Johnson’s

federal claims and official immunity on his state law claims. The

body camera and dashcam footage that Rolfe attached to his

answers tell a different story than the one Johnson alleged in his

complaint.

B. Body Camera and Dashcam Footage

On a rainy night, Rolfe pulled Johnson over for going 85

miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone on Interstate 85 in

Atlanta, Georgia. Their vehicles were stopped on a bridge or

overpass that was higher than the streetlights on the ground below,

and only a waist-height wall separated Rolfe from the drop to his

right. Rolfe approached Johnson’s vehicle and spoke with him and

his passenger. The officer asked Johnson if he had consumed any

alcohol that night, and Johnson said no. Rolfe then noticed an open

can of beer underneath Johnson’s seat and instructed Johnson to

or custom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must

allege facts showing: “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that

the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate

indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom

caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11359

step out of the vehicle. Rolfe began questioning Johnson regarding

the open container, and Johnson initially denied drinking and

driving. Johnson eventually admitted to drinking one beer during

the course of the evening and after asking Johnson additional

questions, Rolfe told Johnson he was going to conduct a field

sobriety test. Johnson responded by saying he “just wanted to go

home” and that he was safe to drive.

For approximately ten minutes, Rolfe attempted to conduct

various field sobriety tests but after completing the first, Johnson

continuously refused to complete any other tests. An at times

emotional Johnson stated that he did not know if he would pass the

tests, and he did not want to fail the tests because he did not want

to lose his CDL license, which he had just reacquired. He also

refused to perform a breathalyzer test. Throughout the encounter,

Johnson continued to request that Rolfe give him a “break” and

please let him leave and just let Johnson’s passenger—who had also

been drinking—drive. Eventually Rolfe informed Johnson that he

was placing him under arrest based on the facts Rolfe knew:

Johnson (1) was speeding in unsafe conditions (the roads were

wet); (2) had an open container of alcohol in the vehicle; (3) initially

lied to Rolfe about drinking; (4) was exhibiting signs of impairment;

and (5) was refusing to perform any sobriety tests. Accordingly,

Rolfe instructed Johnson to place his hands behind his back so that

he could handcuff him.

As Rolfe attempted to handcuff Johnson, Johnson repeatedly

refused to put both hands behind his back and pulled his hands

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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 7

away multiple times. Rolfe told Johnson to put his hands behind

his back four times in a row, told him not to pull away, and then

told him again to put his hands behind his back. Johnson jerked his

right arm away. Rolfe said: “Hey, hey, hey: Put your hand behind

your back. Put your hand behind—don’t pull away from—”. Rolfe

then tackled Johnson by wrapping his right arm around Johnson’s

torso and taking him to the ground. Rolfe landed partially on

Johnson, with his upper body on Johnson’s back and his legs and

hips on the pavement to the side of Johnson. Once on the ground,

Johnson continued to refuse Rolfe’s instructions to place his hands

behind his back until Johnson’s passenger told him to “calm down”

multiple times. After finally handcuffing Johnson, Rolfe helped

Johnson to his feet and told him he was under arrest for DUI. Rolfe

placed Johnson in the back of Rolfe’s patrol vehicle, and Johnson

told Rolfe that he dislocated his shoulder. Rolfe asked Johnson

multiple times if he needed an ambulance, and Johnson said he

would just “deal with it.” Aside from Johnson’s statements that he

had dislocated his shoulder, there was no indication in the videos

that Johnson was in pain or injured in any way.

C. District Court’s Ruling on the City’s Motion to Dismiss and Rolfe’s

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Johnson opposed both the City’s 12(b)(6) motion and Rolfe’s

12(c) motion, arguing that the district court could not consider the

footage in deciding Rolfe’s Rule 12(c) motion because his

complaint did not attach the videos as exhibits or otherwise refer

to the videos. He also argued that the videos were not central to

his claims and asserted that the body camera footage was not

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conclusive because it did not show Rolfe take Johnson to the

ground.4 At bottom, Johnson argued that based solely on the

allegations in the complaint as well as Rolfe’s answer, Rolfe was

not entitled to judgment on the pleadings and Johnson had stated

a viable claim for Monell liability against the City.

The district court granted Rolfe’s Rule 12(c) motion and the

City’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, it determined that even though

Johnson did not refer to the body camera and dashcam footage in

his complaint, it could nevertheless consider videos under the

incorporation-by-reference doctrine because they were central to

Johnson’s claims and Johnson did not challenge their authenticity.

Then, based on the videos’ contents, it determined that (1) Rolfe’s

use of force was objectively reasonable and he was therefore

entitled to qualified immunity on Johnson’s federal claims; 5 (2)

Rolfe was entitled to official immunity on Johnson’s state-law

claims because Rolfe did not intend to hurt Johnson; and (3) the

Monell claim against the City was due to be dismissed because there

was no underlying violation of excessive force. The district court

also determined that the Monell claim against the City was due to

be dismissed “for the independent reason that the threadbare

allegations in the Complaint [did] not sufficiently allege that the

4 Johnson did not discuss the dashcam footage, which shows a clear view of

the tackle in question.

5 The district court also determined that even if Rolfe had used excessive force,

he would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity on the independent

basis that the law was not clearly established that Rolfe’s use of force was

excessive at the time of Johnson’s arrest.

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City had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference

to Johnson’s constitutional rights and that such policy or custom

caused Rolfe’s alleged violations.”

Johnson timely appealed the district court’s order.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c)

motions de novo. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Winder Lab’ys, LLC, 73 F.4th 934,

940 (11th Cir. 2023); Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1294

(11th Cir. 2023). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when

there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cont’l Cas. Co., 73 F.4th

at 940. For both 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions we accept the facts

alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1294; Cannon v. City

of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).

III. Discussion

Johnson raises three primary arguments on appeal. First, he

argues that the district court improperly considered the body

camera and dashcam footage in ruling on Rolfe’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings. Second, he argues that the district

court erred in determining that Rolfe was entitled to qualified

immunity on Johnson’s federal claims and official immunity on his

state-law claims. And third, he argues that because the district

court incorrectly found that Rolfe did not use excessive force while

arresting him, it likewise erred in granting the City’s motion to

dismiss on his Monell claim. We address the first two arguments

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11359

and reject them in turn. And because no constitutional violation

occurred, Rolfe cannot succeed on his Monell claim against the City.

A. Rolfe’s body camera and dashcam footage.

Johnson argues on appeal that the district court erred in

considering the body camera and dashcam footage under the

incorporation-by-reference doctrine because (1) the footage is not

a written instrument and therefore cannot be incorporated under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c); and (2) his complaint did not

reference the footage. His first argument is foreclosed by our

precedent. In Horsley v. Feldt, we extended the applicability of the

incorporation-by-reference doctrine from 12(b)(6) motions to 12(c)

motions and in doing so explained that the “written instrument”

provision of Rule 10(c) had no bearing “insofar as the incorporation

by reference doctrine is concerned.” 304 F.3d 1125, 1134–35 (11th

Cir. 2002). And in Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, in an excessive

force case, we applied the incorporation-by-reference doctrine to

police body camera footage. 67 F.4th 1268, 1276–77 (11th Cir.

2023). His second argument, however, requires us to closely

examine our circuit’s precedent regarding the incorporation-by-

reference doctrine to determine whether a court may consider

evidence not referred to in the complaint in deciding a motion for

judgment on the pleadings.

Pursuant to Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, a court

generally may not consider matters outside of the pleadings

without treating the motion as a motion for summary judgment,

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and if it treats the motion as one for summary judgment, the court

must give a reasonable opportunity for the parties to present all

evidence that is relevant to the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

However, “[t]here are two exceptions to this conversion rule: (1)

the incorporation-by-reference doctrine and (2) judicial notice.”

Baker, 67 F.4th at 1276. At issue here is the incorporation-by-

reference doctrine.

1. The proper test for the incorporation-by-reference doctrine.

We have issued seemingly conflicting opinions about what

is required for a court to consider a document not attached to a

complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. In some

of our opinions, we have stated that the incorporation-by-reference

doctrine only has two requirements: that the document be “(1)

central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (2) undisputed.” Horsley, 304

F.3d at 1134; see also Julmist v. Prime Ins. Co., 92 F.4th 1008, 1016 (11th

Cir. 2024) (determining the district court appropriately considered

an insurance policy attached to the motion to dismiss because it

was central to the plaintiff’s claims and undisputed); Boyle v. City of

Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1286 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he district

court was permitted to consider [an agreement and a

memorandum about that agreement that were not attached to the

operative complaint] because they were central to [the plaintiff’s]

claims and neither party disputed their authenticity.”); Perez v. Wells

Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1340 n.12 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[O]n a motion

for judgment on the pleadings, documents that are not part of the

pleadings may be considered, as long as they are central to the

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claim at issue and their authenticity is undisputed.”); Maxcess, Inc.

v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005)

(explaining that even where the complaint does not mention a

document, “a document outside the four corners of the complaint

may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff’s claims and is

undisputed in terms of its authenticity.”); Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d

1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court may consider a document

attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into

one for summary judgment if the attached document is (1) central

to the plaintiff’s claims and (2) undisputed.”).

We have stated in other opinions, however, that three

requirements must be met: (1) the plaintiff must refer to the

documents in the complaint; (2) those documents must be central

to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) the documents’ contents must not

be disputed, meaning the documents’ authenticity are not

challenged. Baker, 67 F.4th at 1276; see also Hi-Tech Pharms., Inc. v.

HBS Int’l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Under the

doctrine of incorporation by reference, we may also consider

documents attached to the motion to dismiss if they are referred to

in the complaint, central to the plaintiff’s claim, and of undisputed

authenticity.”); Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d

1225, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2014) (declining to consider a contract at

the motion-to-dismiss stage partially because the contract was not

attached to the complaint nor was it referred to in the complaint);

Smith v. Casey, 741 F.3d 1236, 1239 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (determining

that we could consider a contract not attached to the complaint

because it was nevertheless “referred to in the complaint, [was]

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undisputed, and [was] central to the [plaintiff’s] claims.”); Starship

Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, 1252 n.13

(11th Cir. 2013) (“Although analysis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is

limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments

thereto, a court may consider documents attached to the motion

to dismiss if they are referred to in the complaint and are central to

the plaintiff’s claim.”); Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey, 312 F.3d 1222, 1225

(11th Cir. 2002) (noting that a book “was properly before the court

on the motion to dismiss because [the plaintiff] referred to it in her

complaint and it [was] central to her claims”).

Thus, some of our cases have stated that a complaint must

refer to the documents for the incorporation-by-reference doctrine

to apply whereas other cases have not articulated such a

requirement. Because this issue is dispositive as to whether the

district court properly considered the body camera and dashcam

footage in this case, we address which standard is the correct

formulation under our precedent.

To do so, we turn to the prior panel precedent rule, which

provides that “each succeeding panel is bound by the holding of the

first panel to address an issue of law, unless and until that holding

is overruled en banc, or by the Supreme Court.” Breslow v. Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A, 755 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations

omitted). The holding of a case “is comprised both of the result of

the case and those portions of the opinion necessary to that result.”

Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011)

(quotations omitted). Dicta, on the other hand “is defined as those

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portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case

then before us.” Id. “When we have conflicting case law, we

follow our oldest precedent.” Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr. v.

Advance Loc. Media, LLC, 918 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quotations omitted). Thus, in the instant matter, we must identify

the first case in this circuit to consider the incorporation-by-

reference doctrine where the complaint neither referred to the

document at issue nor included the document as an attachment to

the complaint. Only in that factual circumstance would it have

been necessary for us to determine if the incorporation-by-

reference doctrine requires the complaint to refer to the document

at issue or attach it. The first case in this circuit to deal with this

factual scenario is Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d

1337 (11th Cir. 2005).

In Maxcess, the plaintiff brought nine different tort claims

regarding alleged misrepresentations that the defendant made in

committing fraud against the plaintiff. Id. at 1339–40. Despite the

complaint not mentioning any contract, the district court relied on

a Purchase Agreement between the parties, which included a

24-month limitation on the parties’ ability to sue one another, to

dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Id. at 1340 & n.3. The

plaintiff argued on appeal “that the district court was barred from

considering the Purchase Agreement when considering [the

defendant’s] motion to dismiss because it was not mentioned in,

nor attached to, [the] complaint.” Id. at 1340 n.3. We rejected this

argument, determining that “a document outside the four corners

of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the

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plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity.” Id.

(citing Horsley, 304 F.3d at 1135). And because neither party

disputed the authenticity of the Agreement and it was central to

the plaintiff’s claim, we concluded that “the district court properly

considered the Purchase Agreement when ruling on [the

defendant’s] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Id.

Because Maxcess was the first case to resolve the issue before

us, we must follow it in accordance with the prior panel precedent

rule. Accordingly, when resolving a motion to dismiss or a motion

for judgment on the pleadings, a court may properly consider a

document not referred to or attached to a complaint under the

incorporation-by-reference doctrine if the document is (1) central

to the plaintiff’s claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning that its

authenticity is not challenged. 6 With the proper test in mind, we

now apply this test to the facts at hand.

6 Many of our opinions that have articulated the additional requirement that

the complaint must refer to the document at issue have cited to Brooks v. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997), in

support of this requirement. See, e.g., Baker, 67 F.4th at 1276; Hi-Tech Pharms.,

Inc., 910 F.3d at 1189; Starship Enters., 708 F.3d at 1252 n.13. But the portion

of Brooks that those cases have relied upon is not Eleventh Circuit precedent.

In Brooks, we summarily affirmed “[t]he district court’s grant of summary

judgment . . . based upon the holdings and rationale contained in Part III.A of

the district court’s . . . order,” a copy of which we attached as an appendix to

our opinion. Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1365. We explicitly stated that “[w]e ha[d] no

occasion to reach the remaining issues addressed in other parts of that order

and impl[ied] no view concerning any of them.” Id. The portion of Brooks

that many of our opinions have relied upon for the additional requirement

that the complaint must reference the document at issue for the incorporation-

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2. Application of the incorporation-by-reference doctrine.

Here, the requirements of the incorporation-by-reference

doctrine are easily satisfied. The body camera and dashcam

footage clearly depict the events that are central to Johnson’s

claims. The bodycam footage shows Rolfe’s interaction with

Johnson from the time he pulled Johnson over through him placing

Johnson in the back of his patrol vehicle. And although the

bodycam footage does not show the technique or force Rolfe used

in taking Johnson to the ground because Johnson’s body blocks the

lens during this timeframe, Rolfe’s dashcam footage fills in this gap

and provides a clear view of the force and technique that Rolfe used

in restraining Johnson. And Johnson does not argue that the videos

were altered in any way or do not depict what actually happened;

thus, he has not challenged their authenticity. Accordingly, we

determine that the district court properly considered the body

camera and dashcam videos in ruling on Rolfe’s Rule 12(c) motion

for judgment on the pleadings.

B. Qualified immunity on the federal claims

With it established that the district court properly

considered Rolfe’s body camera and dashcam footage, we now

turn to whether the videos established that Rolfe was entitled to

qualified immunity on Johnson’s federal excessive force claim. See

by-reference doctrine to apply appears in Part II.A of the district court’s order,

a portion we explicitly did not adopt. See id. at 1368–69.

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Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277–78 (“[W]here [the] video is clear and

obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, we accept the

video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account, and [we] view

the facts in the light depicted by the video.”) As explained below,

we affirm the district court’s determination that Rolfe is entitled to

qualified immunity because no constitutional violation occurred.

“Qualified immunity shields government employees from

suit in their individual capacities for discretionary actions they

perform [in carrying out] their duties.” Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th

1267, 1279 (11th Cir. 2023). “To determine whether qualified

immunity applies, we engage in a burden-shifting analysis.” Id. at

1280. The first step requires a defendant to show that he was acting

within the scope of his discretionary authority when committing

the challenged act. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.

2002). “Once the defendant does that, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff, who must show that qualified immunity is not

appropriate.” Miller, 78 F.4th at 1280. To show that qualified

immunity is not appropriate, “the plaintiff must establish two

things: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) that

constitutional right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the

defendant’s actions.” Id. (quoting Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920

(11th Cir. 2022)). “Courts have ‘discretion to decide which of the

two prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.’” Id.

(alteration adopted) (quoting Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735

(2011)).

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Johnson does not dispute that Rolfe was operating within

the scope of his discretionary authority when he placed Johnson

under arrest. And for good reason. It is well established that an

arrest of someone suspected of violating the law is within the

discretionary authority of a police officer. See Wood v. Kesler, 323

F.3d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting it was clear that an officer

“was acting within the course and scope of his discretionary

authority when he charged and arrested [a suspect]”). Accordingly,

the burden is on Johnson to establish that Rolfe violated a

constitutional right in arresting him and that the right was clearly

established at the time of Johnson’s arrest. We begin and end our

qualified immunity analysis by addressing the first requirement.

The Fourth Amendment provides a “right of the people to

be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. This right “encompasses the plain right to

be free from the use of excessive force.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197. The

Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard governs

the excessive force inquiry. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388

(1989). “With respect to a claim of excessive force . . . [n]ot every

push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace

of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 396

(quotations and internal citation omitted).

“In determining the reasonableness of the force applied, we

look at the fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer

on the scene with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and

facts, and balance the risk of bodily harm to the suspect against the

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gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate.” McCullough v.

Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must look at

the “totality of the circumstances” in making this assessment.

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). The Supreme Court has

identified a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider under the

totality of the circumstances, including “the severity of the crime

at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest for flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at

396. We have said that “[o]ther considerations are the need for the

application of force, the relationship between the need and the

amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and

whether the force was applied in good faith or maliciously and

sadistically.” Baker, 67 F.4th at 1279. “The calculus of

reasonableness must embody the allowance for the fact that police

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—

about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular

situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.

“Determining whether an officer’s use of force is

unconstitutionally excessive involves two steps.” Charles v. Johnson,

18 F.4th 686, 699 (11th Cir. 2021). First, we must determine

“whether the specific kind of force is categorically

unconstitutional.” Id. “Second, if the kind of force is not

categorically unconstitutional,” we must weigh the Graham factors

to determine if the amount of force used was excessive. Id.

Because “[w]e have never held that a tackle is a categorically

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unconstitutional kind of force,” we must therefore proceed to the

second step and determine if Rolfe’s tackle was objectively

reasonable. Id.

Johnson argues that the district court erred in determining

that Rolfe’s use of force was objectively reasonable. He asserts that

the district court incorrectly determined that his injuries were de

minimis and that a proper weighing of the totality of the

circumstances would have resulted in a finding that Rolfe’s tackle

was not objectively reasonable. We disagree.

For starters, the district court never determined that

Johnson’s injuries were de minimis. Instead, the district court found

that “the level of force Rolfe used was de minimis” based on the

totality of the circumstances. We agree.

While it is true that Johnson’s underlying offense of driving

under the influence of alcohol is a misdemeanor, see O.C.G.A. § 40-

6-391(c), the remaining Graham factors all weigh in favor of finding

that Rolfe’s tackle was reasonable.

Rolfe pulled Johnson over late on a rainy night on I-85—a

major highway—and attempted to get Johnson to perform various

sobriety tests after discovering an open container under Johnson’s

seat. After Johnson was continuously noncompliant, Rolfe

informed Johnson that he would have to place him under arrest

based on the facts that Johnson (1) was clocked going 30 miles per

hour over the speed limit in unsafe road conditions, (2) had an open

container of alcohol in his car, and (3) was exhibiting signs of

impairment. Rolfe then attempted to handcuff Johnson and

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repeatedly told him to place his hands behind his back and not to

pull away. After continuing not to comply, Johnson resisted by

jerking his right arm away from Rolfe, at which point Rolfe tackled

Johnson to the ground. Given Johnson’s inebriated state, the

proximity to cars speeding by on a major interstate at night in wet

conditions, and the risk of a multi-story fall off the ledge of the

highway, Johnson’s actions placed the lives of himself, Rolfe, his

passenger, and other drivers on the highway in danger. There is

no indication that Rolfe acted maliciously in tackling Johnson—

indeed, Rolfe asked Johnson if he needed an ambulance when

Johnson told Rolfe that his shoulder was dislocated. And while

Johnson now alleges that his collarbone was broken in the tackle,

he admits that his “injuries were not severe.” Based on these facts,

we find Rolfe did not use excessive force in detaining Johnson. See

Charles, 18 F.4th at 699–700 (finding that an officer did not use

excessive force when he made an arrest by tackling a suspect who

ignored commands to place his hands behind his back and pulled

away from the officer’s grip to prevent handcuffing); Durruthy v.

Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1093–1095 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining that

two arresting police officers did not use excessive force when they

pulled an arrestee to the ground in an attempt to handcuff him).

Because we conclude that Rolfe did not use excessive force

in tackling Johnson, there was no constitutional violation. We

therefore conclude at the first step of our analysis that Rolfe was

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entitled to qualified immunity, and we do not address the second

prong—whether the law was clearly established. 7

C. Official Immunity on State-Law Claims

Johnson argues that the district court erred in granting

Rolfe’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on his state-law

claims after determining that Rolfe was entitled to official

immunity under Georgia law. He makes this argument because in

his view, the videos show that Rolfe deliberately intended to injure

Johnson. We again disagree.

Under Georgia law, “[t]he doctrine of official immunity . . .

offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in

their personal capacit[ies].” Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344

(Ga. 2001). Official immunity is a matter of the state constitution

and establishes that officers carrying out their discretionary duties

are “only subject to suit when performed with actual malice or

intent to cause injury.” Barnett v. Caldwell, 809 S.E.2d 813, 816 (Ga.

2018) (citing Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, para. IX(d)). “In the context of

Georgia’s official immunity doctrine, ‘actual malice’ requires a

deliberate intention to do wrong.” Wyno v. Lowndes Cnty., 824

S.E.2d 297, 304 (Ga. 2019) (quotations omitted). “A ‘deliberate

intention to do wrong’ such as to constitute the actual malice

7 Because we find that no underlying constitutional violation occurred, we

likewise determine that the district court properly dismissed Johnson’s Monell

claim against the City. See Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)

(“Because [the plaintiff] has failed to establish that his constitutional rights

were violated, he has necessarily failed to establish the City’s liability.”).

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necessary to overcome official immunity must be the intent to

cause the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.” Williams v. DeKalb Cnty.,

840 S.E.2d 423, 434 (Ga. 2020) (quotations omitted).

It is clear from the video that Rolfe’s tackle of Johnson was

not done with the intent of injuring Johnson. Instead, Rolfe was

attempting to arrest a noncompliant and resisting Johnson. As

discussed above, immediately after securing Johnson, Rolfe helped

him to his feet; and when Johnson expressed concerns regarding

his shoulder, Rolfe asked him if he wanted Rolfe to call an

ambulance. Nothing in this interaction indicates that Rolfe

intended to injure Johnson when he tackled him. Accordingly,

Rolfe is entitled to official immunity on Johnson’s state-law claims.

See Tittle v. Corso, 569 S.E.2d 873, 876–78 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)

(concluding that an officer was entitled to official immunity where

his use of profanity, his threat to hurt the plaintiff if the plaintiff

moved, and his act of “slamming” the plaintiff against his patrol

care were insufficient to establish “actual malice”).

IV. Conclusion

Based on the prior panel precedent rule, we conclude that

the incorporation-by-reference doctrine allows a court to consider

documents outside the complaint so long as the documents are

central to the plaintiff’s claims and the authenticity of the

documents are undisputed. Because both of these requirements

were met for Rolfe’s body camera and dashcam footage, the district

court properly considered their contents in ruling on Rolfe’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings. Furthermore, the contents

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of the videos establish that no constitutional violation occurred

because Rolfe did not use excessive force in tackling Johnson to the

ground and that Rolfe was entitled to official immunity on

Johnson’s state-law claims. And, because there was no

constitutional violation, Johnson’s related Monell claim necessarily

failed. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.

AFFIRMED.