Patterson v. Florida Department of Children and Families

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BRENDA A. PATTERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 21-1427 (RDM)

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN

AND FAMILIES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Brenda A. Patterson, proceeding pro se, filed this action on May 26, 2021,

against two Florida counties, a Florida state agency, the Clerk of the United States Supreme

Court, and two private corporations. Dkt. 1 at 1 (Compl. ¶ 1). As this Court has previously

described, see Patterson v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 2021 WL 6196991, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec.

30, 2021) (hereinafter “Patterson I”), Plaintiff’s claims arise from the arrest and incarceration of

her son; allegations of forced medication during his time at a psychiatric facility; and subsequent

efforts by Plaintiff and her son to vindicate alleged violations of their rights, see Dkt. 3 (Am.

Compl.).

This Court previously dismissed five of the Defendants against whom Plaintiff initially

brought suit: Miami-Dade County, Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc. (“Hilton”), Wellpath

Recovery Solutions, LLC (“Wellpath”), the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court, Scott S. Harris,

and Orange County. See Patterson I, 2021 WL 6196991, at *1 (granting motions to dismiss filed

by Miami-Dade County, Hilton, Wellpath, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court); Patterson v.

Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 2023 WL 2784873, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2023) (hereinafter

“Patterson II”) (granting motion to dismiss filed by Orange County). For the reasons that

follow, the Court will sua sponte dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as to the sole remaining Defendant, the

Florida Department of Children and Families (“the Department”).1 See Fontaine v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A., 42 F. Supp. 3d 102, 109 n.3 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that sua sponte dismissal is

appropriate where “it is patently obvious that the complaint fails to state a claim”). Complaints

by pro se litigants are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But even a pro se litigant must comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). In this

case, it is clear from the face of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, even when considered liberally

and in light of Plaintiff’s responsive filings, see Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., 789 F.3d 146,

152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam), that no “set of facts consistent with the allegations” could

entitle her to relief from the remaining Defendant, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

563 (2007).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that the Department violated the Ninth

Amendment (Count I); negligently and intentionally inflicted emotional distress (Counts II and

V); intruded upon seclusion (Count III); and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count IV). Dkt. 3 at

15–19 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92–128). The Court will address each count in turn, beginning with the

federal claims alleged in Count I and Count IV.

1

The Department has not appeared in this matter. The Court previously declined, however, to

enter default against the Department. Dkt. 55 at 3. At that time, the Court explained that it could

not properly enter default without first satisfying itself that it had personal jurisdiction over the

Department, and the Court was not so satisfied. Id. at 2–3. The Court did not dismiss the

complaint on the basis that it lacked personal jurisdiction because personal jurisdiction is an

affirmative defense subject to waiver. See id. at 3 (citing Kapar v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 845

F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

2

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that the Department violated rights guaranteed to her under

the Ninth Amendment, including a right to personal dignity, rights to social and economic

wellbeing, a right to personal autonomy, and a “right to be left alone.” Dkt. 3 at 15–16 (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 92–102). As this Court observed in a related case brought by Patterson, however,

courts in this District have repeatedly concluded that the Ninth Amendment “is a rule of

construction, not a substantive basis for a civil rights claim.” Patterson v. Harris, 2023 WL

346096, at *10 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2023) (quoting Rynn v. Jaffe, 457 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D.C.

2006)); see also Robinson v. Pilgram, 2021 WL 5987016, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2021);

Marshall v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 426, 428 (D.D.C. 1996) (rejecting a Ninth Amendment Bivens

claim because “the Ninth Amendment does not set forth any particular guarantees, but is merely

a rule of construction”). Furthermore, even if the Ninth Amendment might be read to affirm the

existence of certain “other[]” substantive rights, U.S. Const. amend. IX, Patterson offers no basis

to conclude that the rights asserted in her complaint are among those “retained by the people”

within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490

(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (observing that statements made by “[James] Madison and

[Joseph] Story make clear that the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be

construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the

people”). The Court, accordingly, concludes that Patterson has failed to state a claim in Count I.

In Count IV, Patterson alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Dkt. 3 at 18 (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 114–122). More specifically, she alleges that the Department “has conspired with

Miami-Dade County and Wellpath to deprive the Plaintiff of her right to privacy.” Id. at 18

(Am. Compl. ¶ 115). To state a claim under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege in a non-

conclusory fashion “an agreement between two or more persons . . . to participate in an unlawful

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act,” as well as “an injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the

agreement . . . in furtherance of the common scheme.” Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477

(D.C. Cir. 1983). Where, as here, a complaint makes no more than “conclusory allegations of an

agreement” without alleging “the existence of any events, conversations, or documents

indicating that there was ever an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds,’” the complaint fails to

satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). McCreary v. Heath, 2005

WL 3276257, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2005); see also Graves v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 314,

321 (D.D.C. 1997) (dismissing claim where plaintiff merely alleged that his former employer

“colluded” with the Department of Education but did not put forth “any facts showing the

existence or establishment of an agreement”). Because Plaintiff states only that “Defendant has

conspired with Miami-Dade County and Wellpath to deprive the Plaintiff of her right to

privacy,” Dkt. 3 at 18 (Am. Compl. ¶ 115), without alleging any facts to support the existence of

an agreement between those officials, she has failed to allege a conspiracy under § 1985, see also

Patterson, 2023 WL 346096, at *11 (finding that similarly conclusory allegations of a

conspiracy under § 1985 failed to allege sufficient facts to support the existence of an agreement

and sustain a claim).

Turning to Plaintiff’s non-federal claims, Count II and Count V allege negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Count III alleges intrusion upon seclusion. The

Court arguably has supplemental jurisdiction over these claims to the extent that they derive

from “a common nucleus of operative fact,” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725

(1966), as Plaintiff’s federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Now that the Court is dismissing

Plaintiff’s federal claims, however, the Court “has the discretion to exercise—or decline to

exercise—supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims that remain.” Deppner v.

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Spectrum Health Care Res., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 176, 190 (D.D.C. 2018) (emphasis omitted);

see also Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 1088, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Whether to retain

jurisdiction over pendent . . . claims after the dismissal of the federal claims is a matter left to the

sound discretion of the district court . . . . ”) (quoting Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 423

(D.C. Cir. 2005)). Guiding that discretion are “[g]eneral equitable factors . . . including judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Pollard v. District of Columbia, 191 F. Supp. 3d

58, 82 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Kyle v. Bedlion, 177 F. Supp. 3d 380, 400 (D.D.C. 2016); see also

Deppner, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 190–91. In the mine run of cases, however, “the balance of

factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Here, given the

numerous deficiencies in the operative complaint and the absence of any connection between

Plaintiff’s non-federal claims and this venue, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) over Patterson’s non-federal claims asserted in

Counts II, III, and V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will sua sponte dismiss the complaint as to the sole

remaining Defendant, the Florida Department of Children and Families. Because no defendant

remains in this action, the Court will dismiss the case.

A separate order will issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss

RANDOLPH D. MOSS

United States District Judge

Date: July 11, 2024

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