Opinion

Garcia v. Bermea

Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Jul 8, 2024
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
Civil Rights
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.3%

The opinion

Case: 23-50871 Document: 46-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/08/2024

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 23-50871

____________ FILED

July 8, 2024

Ricardo Garcia, Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Reyes Bermea; Martin Cantu; Cristian Campirano,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:21-CV-4

______________________________

Before Haynes, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Haynes, Circuit Judge: *

Ricardo Garcia claims that Maverick County Sheriff’s Department

Deputies Reyes Bermea and Cristian Campirano, and Corporal Martin Cantu

(collectively, “Defendants”) violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We

AFFIRM.

The incident at issue in this case arose while Defendants were

responding to a call about a suspicious vehicle. After encountering Garcia,

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

Case: 23-50871 Document: 46-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/08/2024

No. 23-50871

who refused to follow orders and showed signs of intoxication, Defendants

pulled him out of his vehicle, arrested him, and searched his vehicle. 1 Garcia,

stating that all charges were dropped, subsequently initiated this pro se suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants (1) unlawfully seized him;

(2) unlawfully arrested him; (3) used excessive force; (4) unlawfully

searched his vehicle; (5) failed to intervene in others’ unconstitutional acts;

and (6) submitted a false probable cause affidavit. The district court

concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims

and granted their motion for summary judgment. Still proceeding pro se,

Garcia now appeals.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, private citizens may sue state and local

officials for violations of their constitutional rights. However, “[q]ualified

immunity shields from liability ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.’” Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 176

(5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). To

overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must show that (1) “the

official’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “the right was

clearly established.” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190–91 (5th Cir.

2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In reviewing whether

qualified immunity is proper, we may limit our analysis to the “clearly

established” prong if it is dispositive. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

236–37 (2009).

Here, the district court concluded that Defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity on all of Garcia’s claims because Garcia had not shown a

violation of his constitutional rights.2 We need not address that issue because

_____________________

1

Garcia alleges Cantu participated only in the vehicle search.

2

The district court also construed Garcia’s complaint as asserting several state-

law claims but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. Because

2

Case: 23-50871 Document: 46-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/08/2024

No. 23-50871

even if Garcia could show a constitutional violation, his claim would still fail

because he has not shown that “it was clearly established that the Fourth

Amendment prohibited the officer[s’] conduct in the situation [they]

confronted.” See Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“[W]e liberally construe the briefs of pro se appellants.” Bourne v.

Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). However, even

liberally construed, Garcia’s brief does not meet the heavy burden of

establishing that “relevant precedent ‘has placed the constitutional question

beyond debate.’” See Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019)

(alterations adopted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

Garcia instead focuses on the first prong of qualified immunity and makes

only passing references to the fact that Defendants “should have known”

they were committing constitutional violations. He fails to cite cases that

“squarely govern[] the specific facts at issue here.” See Kisela v. Hughes, 584

U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Thus, he has not shown that “the violative nature of particular

conduct is clearly established.” See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (citation

omitted). Nor has Garcia argued or shown that this is one of the rare cases

in which the constitutional violation is so obvious that analogous case law is

not needed. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (citing Hope

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)).

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and we

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 3

_____________________

Garcia’s brief does not mention his state claims or supplemental jurisdiction, we need not

address the issue here.

3

Judge Willett concurs in the judgment only, stating the following: I would

not skip to qualified immunity’s simpler second prong at the expense of resolving the

3

Case: 23-50871 Document: 46-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/08/2024

_____________________

constitutional inquiry on prong one, a maneuver that, at least in published cases,

perpetuates one of qualified immunity’s core hypocrisies: that plaintiffs must cite

precedent “clearly establishing” the law even as courts refuse to make any. See Reed v.

Taylor, 923 F.3d 411, 418 n.48 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J.); Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483,

498–99 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante), opinion withdrawn on reh’g, 928

F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019); Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 143 S. Ct. 2419, 2421 (2023)

(Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (citing Zadeh, 902 F.3d at 499

(Willett, J., concurring dubitante)). Although a prong-one holding in this unpublished case

would not clearly establish the law, see Marks v. Hudson, 933 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2019),

Judge Willett would nonetheless affirm the district court’s judgment on Garcia’s

failure to show a constitutional violation.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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