The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DONYEAL C. BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 1023 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 22, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0004290-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED: JULY 8, 2024
Donyeal C. Brown appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, following his conviction of one
count of sexual assault.1 After review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:
Kierstyn Walker-Davis, the [c]omplainant, met [Brown] in the
[f]all of 2015. Walker-Davis was a member of Shiloh Church of
God in Christ in Harrisburg and was heavily involved in its music
ministry. [Brown] was the Minister of Music for another church in
the same community, and he and Walker-Davis came to know
each other through their shared interest in the church music
community.
Although they never entered a formal relationship, the parties
were intimate by mutual consent on two [] occasions. They were
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1.
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never consensually intimate again but maintained friendly contact
over the next couple of years through their churches and various
music programs.
In 2017, [Brown] joined Walker-Davis’ church as its Minister of
Music. Walker-Davis’ participation in the church choir and the
Praise Team caused her to have frequent interactions with
[Brown]. They never discussed their prior brief relationship and
kept their interactions professional.
On January 10, 2018, both parties attended choir and Praise Team
rehearsals at the church. [Brown] told Walker-Davis he would
come to her apartment on Hamilton Street after rehearsal for a
visit. Walker-Davis found nothing unusual or inappropriate about
[Brown] visiting her, and he arrived at her apartment sometime
after 9:00 p.m.
They watched television and discussed the church music
department and other general topics. The discussion never
broached their past intimacy or anything sexual in nature.
However, [Brown] eventually leaned towards Walker-Davis for a
kiss and began pulling at her clothes. She declined the kiss and
told [Brown] to stop. Initially, [Brown] stopped when instructed
to do so, but resumed his efforts until rebuffed again. This pattern
repeated itself several times.
Eventually, [Brown] stood up from the couch on which the parties
were sitting and pulled Walker-Davis up by her clothes. When he
had her on her feet, he used his body to push her towards her
bedroom, trying to pull her clothes off as he pushed. Walker-
Davis said no approximately five [] to six [] more times but
[Brown] neither responded, acknowledged her refusals, nor
ceased his assaultive behavior.
[Brown] pushed Walker-Davis into her bedroom, onto her bed,
and laid on top of her with all his weight. At some point, Walker-
Davis stopped trying to fight back because she feared what would
happen if she became more aggressive in her resistance due to
[Brown]’s size and persistence. [Brown] proceeded to engage in
vaginal intercourse with Walker-Davis without her consent.
Walker-Davis did not call the police when [Brown] left her
apartment very early the following morning. She feared if she
brought the issue to the police, to the public eye, she would be
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viewed negatively by the church community and would no longer
be able to serve the church in her various capacities. This fear
was exacerbated by [Brown]’s stature in the church community
for such a long period of time.
A few weeks later, Walker-Davis delivered a letter to her [p]astor
advising him that she was stepping down from her positions in the
music department but did not explain her reasons for doing so.
Shortly thereafter, Walker-Davis met with her [p]astor and told
him exactly what had transpired between [her] and [Brown].
***
[] Pastor Scott told Walker-Davis that she should not be
entertaining people in her home at night. He agreed that it was
appropriate for her to “sit down” from her roles in the music
ministry and said that he would speak to [Brown] about her
allegations. Walker-Davis continued attending church for
approximately the next two [] months but did not understand why
[Brown] was being allowed to continue in his official capacities at
the church and it was only she who had to “sit down.”
Disillusioned, Walker-Davis stopped attending church after Easter
in 2018.
On May 5, 2018, after receiving encouragement from a friend,
Walker-Davis reported [Brown]’s sexual abuse to the police.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/23, at 2-4 (citations omitted).
Brown was charged with sexual assault and rape.2 From March 13-15,
2023, Brown was tried by a jury, after which he was acquitted of rape, but
convicted of sexual assault. The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered
the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report. On March 21, 2023,
the trial court entered an order directing the Sexual Offender Assessment
Board (SOAB) to determine whether Brown was a sexually violent predator
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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(1).
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(SVP) as defined in the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA).3
Ultimately, the SOAB concluded that Brown was not an SVP. On June
22, 2023, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Brown
to 2½ to 5 years’ incarceration for his conviction. Brown did not file post-
sentence motions.
Brown filed a timely notice of appeal4 and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Brown now
raises the following claims for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing impermissible hearsay
[testimony] from the complainant regarding what her pastor said,
allowing admission of information that should not have been
provided to the jury and which served only to prejudice the jury
against [] Brown.
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3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.
4 Brown filed a timely notice of appeal, in which he indicated that “the above-
named defendant John Pandelios” appeals to this Court. See Notice of Appeal,
7/19/23, at 1. On August 1, 2023, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause
directing Brown to explain why his appeal should not be quashed as John
Pandelios is not an aggrieved party. See Rule to Show Cause, 8/1/23, at 1
(citing Pa.R.A.P. 501). Brown filed a response, in which he indicated that the
reference to “John Pandelios” in the body of the appeal was the result of a
typographical error, and Brown requested leave to file an amended notice of
appeal correcting his error. See Response, 8/3/23, at 1. On August 7, 2023,
Brown filed an amended notice of appeal with the appropriate correction. See
Amended Notice of Appeal, 8/7/23, at 1; see also Pa.R.A.P. 902(b)(1) (timely
appeal is “subject to such action as the appellate court deems appropriate”).
We accept Brown’s amended notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 902(b)(1) and
address the merits of his appeal.
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2. Whether the imposition of SORNA registration without the jury’s
finding of future dangerousness constitutes an illegal sentence in
violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey[, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)].
3. Whether the imposition of SORNA registration constitutes a
punishment cognizable under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Brief for Appellant, at 5.
In his first claim, Brown argues that the trial court erred in permitting
Walker-Davis to testify as to the hearsay statements of Pastor Scott that put
blame onto Walker-Davis. See id. at 13-23. Brown argues that the
Commonwealth elicited Pastor Scott’s statement from Walker-Davis in an
attempt to explain why Walker-Davis did not timely report. See id. at 18-19.
Brown asserts that the timeliness of a sexual assault report is not an element
of the offense, but a tool of the defense to rebut a complainant’s credibility.
See id. at 19. Additionally, Brown contends that the state of mind hearsay
exception is not applicable to the statement because Pastor Scott’s statements
do “not constitute motive, intent, plan[,] or any emotional or physical
condition.” Id. at 20.
We adhere to the following standard of review:
The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there
is a clear abuse of discretion. . . . Evidence is admissible if it is
relevant—that is, if it tends to establish a material fact, makes a
fact at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable
inference supporting a material fact—and its probative value
outweighs the likelihood of unfair prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 475 (Pa. 2019) (citations
omitted).
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“Hearsay is a statement the declarant does not make while testifying at
the current trial or hearing [and] is offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.” Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 471
(Pa. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Generally, hearsay
statements are inadmissible unless they satisfy an exception set forth in
Pa.R.E. 803, pertaining to hearsay exceptions. See Pa.R.E. 802.
First, we must determine whether the statements Brown objected to
constitute hearsay. Brown objected to the following exchange between
Walker-Davis and the prosecutor at trial:
Q: And you told Pastor Scott what had happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Is it fair to say that [Pastor Scott] put some of the blame on
you?
A: Yes.
N.T. Jury Trial (Day 1), 3/13/23, at 77.
We conclude that this exchange does not constitute hearsay. As stated
above, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. See Fitzpatrick, supra. Rather, the above excerpt from Brown’s
trial is more akin to Walker-Davis testifying as to her personal impressions
of her conversation with Pastor Scott. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 1), 3/13/23,
at 77. Indeed, Walker-Davis did not point to any specific statements made
by Pastor Scott, but rather generalized that she had a conversation with Pastor
Scott and that the conversation left Walker-Davis with the impression that she
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was partly to blame for the assault. See id. Consequently, we cannot
conclude that these statements constitute hearsay in the first place. Thus,
Brown’s argument is misplaced, and we afford him no relief on this claim.
Next, in light of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, --- A.3d --- 2024 WL 2789201 (Pa. filed May
31, 2024) (“Torsilieri II”),5 we address Brown’s second and third claims
together.
Brown argues that his registration under SORNA is illegal because it
violates Apprendi. See Brief for Appellant, at 24-29. Additionally, Brown
argues that SORNA subchapter H is punitive in nature and, therefore, is
unconstitutional. See id. Similarly to Torsilieri I, Brown requests that we
remand for an evidentiary hearing at which he would be permitted to present
expert testimony regarding his claims. See Brief for Appellant, at 24-29.
Brown asserts that his arguments are based upon Torsilieri I and Torsilieri
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5 In 2020, our Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232
A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020) (“Torsilieri I”). In Torsilieri I, the Supreme Court
vacated the trial court’s determinations that SORNA subchapter H were
unconstitutional and remanded for further evidentiary hearings regarding the
alleged irrebuttable presumption and punitive nature of SORNA. See id. at
581, 83-84, 94. Upon remand, the trial court conducted hearings at which
various experts testified and, again, the trial court concluded that SORNA
subchapter H was unconstitutional in violation of the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine and that subchapter H was punitive. See Torsilieri II, at *3-5. The
Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court and our High Court reversed
the trial court. See id. at *6, *26. In particular, the Court concluded that
SORNA subchapter H did not violate the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and
was not punitive. See id. at *26.
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II.6 See Brief for Appellant, at 26-29. Further, Brown’s arguments rely upon
the claim that SORNA subchapter H has created an unconstitutional
irrebuttable presumption. See id. at 27-28.
However, as indicated supra, our Supreme Court recently issued its
decision in Torsilieri II, in which it held that SORNA subchapter H does not
violate the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and is not punitive. See
Torsilieri II, supra. Thus, Browns arguments, predicated upon claims that
SORNA subchapter H is punitive and violated the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine, must fail. Accordingly, we conclude that we are bound by our
Supreme Court’s decision and affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/8/2024
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6 At the time Brown filed his Brief in this Court, Torsilieri II was still pending.
However, Brown referenced Torsilieri II for the proposition that the
constitutionality of SORNA subchapter H was still “open.” See Brief for
Appellant, at 26-27.
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