setting forth standard of review; “A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
How later courts described this case
- setting forth standard of review; “A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
- explaining that the accepted standard of care “must generally be established through expert testimony”
- “[P]laintiffs alleging deliberate indifference must also demonstrate that the defendants’ actions were both an actual and proximate cause of their injuries.”
- explaining that a pretrial scheduling order may be altered only “upon a showing of ‘good cause’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 5 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES VINCENT REED, No. 22-35616
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05580-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SARAH KARIKO, Chief Medical Officer,
Dept of Corrections; RYAN
HERRINGTON, Medical Director, Stafford
Creek; JEANETTE NEIBERT, Registered
Health Information Technician, Stafford
Creek CC; LARA STRICK, Infectious
Disease Specialist, Dept of Corrections;
ELIZABETH ESCHBACH; JOHN
TAYLOR, Health Service Manager 1,
Stafford Creek CC; JOHN D. KENNY,
Medical Provider, Stafford Creek CC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 5, 2024**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: FERNANDEZ, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Former Washington state prisoner Charles Vincent Reed, proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s summary judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and state law alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs and retaliated against him for filing a grievance. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Sampson v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 974 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2020) (decision on qualified immunity);
Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013)
(summary judgment). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Reed’s claim alleging
that defendants inadequately diagnosed and treated medical conditions because
Reed failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether they acted with deliberate
indifference to any serious medical need. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757,
785-86 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate
medical care requires the plaintiff to show that an official acted with deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, that is, that “the course of treatment the
official chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the
official chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the
plaintiff’s health” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Reed’s claim alleging
that defendants discontinued or delayed renewing prescriptions and a Health Status
Report (“HSR”) because Reed failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether Dr.
Herrington and Taylor’s actions were a cause of any claimed injury, and whether
Dr. Kenney acted with deliberate indifference to any serious medical need. See
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 785-86; Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074 (“[P]laintiffs alleging
deliberate indifference must also demonstrate that the defendants’ actions were
both an actual and proximate cause of their injuries.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Reed’s claim alleging
that defendants kept inadequate medical records because Reed failed to raise a
triable dispute as to whether the alleged injury rose to the level of a constitutional
violation. See Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074 (“For an inmate to bring a valid § 1983
claim against a prison official for a violation of the Eighth Amendment, he must
first ‘objectively show that he was deprived of something sufficiently serious,’”
that is, that “the prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” (citation omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Reed’s retaliation
claim because he failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether defendants kept
allegedly inadequate medical records in retaliation for any protected conduct, or
whether their actions chilled the exercise of any protected right. See Rhodes v.
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Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the prison context, a
viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An
assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because
of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the
inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not
reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”).
Because Reed failed to establish a constitutional violation, the district court
properly concluded that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the
individual-capacity claims for damages. See Sampson, 974 F.3d at 1018
(“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Reed’s state-law
claims because he failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether defendants were
negligent or were the proximate cause of any injury. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 7.70.040 (medical negligence claim requires the plaintiff to show that (1) the
provider failed to exercise the accepted standard of care, and (2) this failure was
the proximate cause of the injury); Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 419 P.3d 819,
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823 (Wash. 2018) (explaining that the accepted standard of care “must generally be
established through expert testimony”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reed’s untimely
request for additional discovery because he failed to show good cause for
extending the deadline or prejudice resulting from the denial of his request. See
Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[B]road discretion is vested
in the trial court to permit or deny discovery, and its decision to deny discovery
will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that denial of discovery
results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975
F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a pretrial scheduling order may
be altered only “upon a showing of ‘good cause’”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider
inadmissible portions of Reed’s supplemental declaration. See Orr v. Bank of Am.,
NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review; “A
trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.”).
We reject as meritless Reed’s contention that the district court erred in
overruling his objections to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation,
and his objections, raised in his reply brief, to the supplemental excerpts of record
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filed by appellees.
AFFIRMED.
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