Opinion

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation v. Adesanya

Court
United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Jul 14, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.2%

The opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE : Chapter 7

:

ADENEKAN OLA-OLUWA :

ADESANYA & AFOLUSO :

ADERONKE ADESANYA, :

: Bankruptcy No. 18-17260-AMC

DEBTORS :

____________________________________:

:

NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS :

CORP., :

:

PLAINTIFF :

: Adv. Proc. No. 19-00124-AMC

V. :

:

ADENEKAN OLA-OLUWA :

ADESANYA & AFOLUSO :

ADERONKE ADESANYA, :

:

DEFENDANTS :

____________________________________:

Ashely M. Chan, United States Bankruptcy Judge

OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In June 2017, the plaintiff, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (“Novartis”), obtained a

prepetition judgment (“Judgment”) in the United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey (“District Court”) against the debtors, Afoluso Adesanya (“Afoluso”), a former employee

of Novartis, and her husband, Adenekan Adesanya (“Adenekan,” collectively with Afoluso,

“Debtors”), for fraud in connection with an employment application and resume submitted to

Novartis by Afoluso; breach of contract in connection with a relocation agreement between

Afoluso and Novartis (“Relocation Agreement”); Afoluso’s breach of the duty of loyalty to

Novartis inherent in her employment contract as well as Novartis’s Conflict of Interest Policy

(“Conflicts Policy”); Afoluso’s breach of contract in connection with Novartis’s annual

employee incentive program; sanctions issued against Afoluso for discovery misconduct and

pursuing baseless claims against Novartis; and sanctions issued against Adenekan for discovery

misconduct.

In this adversary proceeding, Novartis seeks to have the Judgment declared

nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), § 523(a)(2)(B), and § 523(a)(6). On summary

judgment, Novartis established many elements necessary to support its nondischargeability

claims against the Debtors. Trial proceeded on the following remaining issues: (1) whether the

portion of the Judgment attributable to fraud in connection with Afoluso’s employment

application and resume is nondischargeable; (2) in connection with Afoluso’s breach of the

Relocation Agreement, whether she knew her representation that she intended to relocate was

false at the time she made it, whether she purposely made that representation intending to

deceive Novartis, and whether it was justifiable for Novartis to rely on her representation that she

intended to relocate; (3) in connection with Afoluso’s breach of her duty of loyalty and the

Conflicts Policy, whether Afoluso knew she was creating a misleading impression by failing to

disclose external employment she held during her employment at Novartis and whether she

purposely failed to disclose her external employment intending to deceive Novartis; (4) in

connection with Afoluso’s breach of the annual employee incentive program, whether Afoluso

knew her failure to disclose certain conflicts of interest created a misleading impression that she

was eligible for the employee incentive program when she was not and whether she purposely

failed to disclose conflicts of interest in order to deceive Novartis into maintaining her incentive

pay; (5) whether the conduct upon which the District Court sanctioned Afoluso satisfies the

elements of § 523(a)(6); and (6) whether the conduct upon which the District Court sanctioned

Adenekan satisfies § 523(a)(6).

For the reasons described below, the Court concludes that Novartis has established by a

preponderance of the evidence that all except a small portion of the Judgment is

nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), § 523(a)(2)(B), and § 523(a)(6).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 2, 2010, Afoluso applied for a position with Novartis by submitting an

application and resume. Ex. 54; Trial Tr. 39:9-13, Jan. 14, 2021 (“Trial Tr.”). According to her

application and resume, at the time she applied, she was working as the “Senior Medical

Director” of Global Drug Safety and Surveillance, Inc., a/k/a LaRon Pharma, Inc. (“Global

Drug” or “LaRon”), a sub-S corporation engaged in licensing, developing, and marketing

prescription drugs of other pharmaceutical companies for four therapeutic groups, including

oncology. Ex. 54; Ex. 4 at 3. Her application and resume also reflected that she had previously

worked for Johnson & Johnson as a senior director of “Benefit Risk Management”; Teva North

America (“Teva”) as a director and “Head of Global Drug Safety and Pharmacovigilance”; and

Eli Lilly & Company (“Eli Lilly”) as a medical director in pharmacovigilance. Ex. 54. On her

application, Afoluso certified that “the information contained in this application is correct to the

best of my knowledge and [I] understand that falsification of any information is grounds for

immediate dismissal in accordance with Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation policy” and that

“I also understand that all employment offers are contingent upon the satisfactory results of the

company’s background check procedures and medical examination…” Id. However,

unbeknownst to Novartis, Afoluso had misrepresented her employment history on her job

application by inflating prior salaries, creating “phony” supervisors, and concealing that she had

been involuntarily terminated from a prior position.1 Ex. 42 at 2.

By the time Afoluso applied to work for Novartis, she and Adenekan had judgments in

mortgage foreclosure entered against two of their properties located at 2510 Peachtree Drive,

Perkasie, PA (“Perkasie Property”) and 910 West Marshall Street, Norristown, PA (“Norristown

Property”) for failure to make monthly mortgage payments. Ex. 13-17. In late October 2009, a

foreclosure judgment in the amount of $292,076.63 had been entered against the Perkasie

Property. Ex. 13, 15. By January 25, 2010, just several weeks prior to Afoluso applying for a

position at Novartis, a foreclosure judgment in the amount of $182,162.133 was entered against

the Norristown Property. Ex. 16, 17.

On March 1, 2010, Novartis sent Afoluso a letter offering her the position of Brand

Safety Leader in its Oncology Business Unit (“Offer Letter”). Ex. 4 at 2; Ex. 51. The Offer

Letter mentioned, in relevant part, that should she accept the offer, Novartis would help her

relocate closer to Novartis’s offices in New Jersey. Ex. 51. It also mentioned the potential for

Afoluso to participate in Novartis’s Annual Incentive Program (“AIP”) depending on the

company’s and Afoluso’s performances, as well as Afoluso meeting certain eligibility

requirements. Id.

1 Afoluso represented that at Global Drug, her starting salary in 2007 was $220,000 in base pay and $66,000 in

bonuses, and that her then-current salary was $240,000 in base pay and $75,000 in bonuses. Ex. 54; Trial Tr. 169:1-

10. Above the section entitled “Annual Salary” for her current position, she wrote “Target 30%.” Ex. 54. It is

unclear whether “Target 30%” refers to her starting salary, her current salary, or both. Global Drug’s tax returns for

2009 and 2010 ultimately reflect that Global Drug paid no salaries whatsoever in those years. McCusker Decl. Ex.

B, C.

2 As discussed in this Court’s opinion granting in part and denying in part Novartis’s and the Debtors’ motions for

summary judgment in this adversary proceeding, the historical facts established in the District Court Action which

Novartis already proved and which were essential to the District Court’s decision cannot be relitigated. Ex. 7 at 24.

See also J&V Developers, Inc. v. Malloy (In re Malloy), 535 B.R. 81, 94 n.21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015) (J. Frank).

Such findings of fact in the prior proceeding may in the aggregate establish any or all of the elements of a section

523(a) claim as a matter of law. In re Malloy, 535 B.R. at 94 n.21.

3 The judgment amount was later amended to $187,711.59. Ex. 16, 18.

On March 3, 2010, Afoluso signed the Offer Letter to accept the position. Id. The same

day, she signed a series of forms, including a statement that

I acknowledge that I have received and read copies of the Novartis Pharmaceuticals

Corporation Code of Conduct and the Novartis Policy on Corporate Citizenship. I

understand the obligations that these policies place upon me, and have had any questions

answered to my satisfaction. I understand that compliance with these policies, including

the obligation to report any violations, is a condition of my employment with the

Company.4 Ex. 82.

She also signed an “Employee Agreement” stating, in relevant part,

[i]n consideration of my employment or continued employment at will by Novartis

Pharmaceuticals Corporation…and the salary, benefits or other compensation to be paid

for my services during my employment with Novartis, I agree as follows: During my

employment by Novartis, I will devote my best efforts and full business loyalty to my

employment with Novartis. I will comply with its policies and practices, including,

without limitation, the Code of Conduct and Corporate Citizenship Policy as these

policies may be revised from time to time. I acknowledge that I have received copies of

the Novartis Code of Conduct and Corporate Citizenship Policy and that I have read these

policies prior to executing this agreement. I will hold no other employment or engage in

any other business which may adversely affect my ability to perform my job

responsibilities at Novartis. Ex. 52 ¶ 1.

Finally, Afoluso also signed the Relocation Agreement on March 3, 2010. Ex. 8. Afoluso’s

employment with Novartis was predicated on her relocating from her home in Pennsylvania,

located at 389 Highgate Drive, Ambler, PA (“Residence”), where she has resided since 2003, to

a location closer to Novartis’s offices in New Jersey. Ex. 4 at 4; Trial Tr. 68:18-69:1.

To help facilitate her move, Novartis gave Afoluso approximately $26,000 in relocation

funds after Afoluso executed the Relocation Agreement. Ex. 4 at 4, 20. Novartis also had a

contract with a relocation vendor, Cartus, to assist employees with relocating. Trial Tr. 43:14-19;

Ex. 9 at 1 (“Novartis…has partnered with Cartus, as well as a number of other top rated service

providers, to provide you with a program of relocation support to reduce normal move

4 After receiving the Code of Conduct and training on it upon their hire, Novartis employees are generally re-trained

on it annually. Trial Tr. 24:22-25:17, 33:19-34:2.

disruptions, and enable you to get settled in your new home and job as quickly as possible.”).

However, despite acknowledging that the Relocation Agreement required her to relocate within

twelve months of her hire, Afoluso, who at the time, had three school-aged children, never

relocated from her home and, in fact, worked almost exclusively from her Pennsylvania

Residence during the entirety of her tenure at Novartis. Ex. 4 at 4, 20; Trial Tr. 73:12-19, 143:18-

20.

Unbeknownst to Novartis, from the very start of her employment and throughout her

tenure with Novartis, Afoluso and her husband actually jointly owned Global Drug. Ex. 4 at 3.

By virtue of her 50% ownership interest in this specialty pharmaceutical company, Afoluso had

been in violation of the Employee Agreement, Novartis’s Conflicts Policy, and the AIP from the

outset of her employment and through her entire tenure at Novartis. Id.

On July 6, 2010, a few months after starting her employment with Novartis, a mortgage

foreclosure judgment in the amount of $109,380.70 was entered against one of the Debtors’

properties located at 5073 McKean Avenue, Philadelphia, PA (“Philadelphia Property”). Ex. 19,

20, 21.

In August 2011, unbeknownst to Novartis, Afoluso obtained a position as a drug safety

consultant with Biomedical Consulting International, Inc. (“Biomedical”). Ex. 4 at 4. While

working for Biomedical, she provided drug safety services to Auxilium Pharmaceuticals

(“Auxilium”). Id. Through her work with Auxilium, Afoluso provided drug safety services to

direct competitors of Novartis. Id. Auxilium required an average weekly commitment of ten

hours from Afoluso, although, at times, she billed over one hundred hours a month to that

company. Id. Between 2011 and 2012, Afoluso received $59,189.00 on account of her work for

Biomedical and Auxilium. Id.

On December 29, 2011, the Bank of New York Mellon (“Mellon”), the holder of a

mortgage against the Residence, filed a complaint in mortgage foreclosure against the Residence

alleging unpaid monthly mortgage payments. Ex. 22, 23. Only weeks later, in January 2012,

Afoluso, using the alias Ron Nuga, M.D., began providing drug safety services to Astellas

Pharma Global Development, Inc. (“Astellas”) without informing Novartis. Ex. 4 at 4. Around

the same time, on January 27, 2012, Afoluso completed the 2011 Code of Conduct training for

non-sales associates. Ex. 55. The 2011 Code of Conduct states, in relevant part,

[e]ach employee must observe a duty of undivided loyalty to the Company, free

from any potential personal or private business interests that might adversely

influence his or her judgment. Employees are expected to avoid situations even

where there may be only an appearance of a conflict of interest. Any time an

employee wants to engage in an activity that could possibly be construed as a

conflict of interest, he or she must disclose it in writing in accordance with the

Company’s Conflict of Interest Policy and obtain the Company’s consent and

abide by any conditions required by the Company. Employees are expected to

familiarize themselves with all details of the Company’s Conflict of Interest

Policy. Ex. 83 at 2-3.

The Code of Conduct then went on to summarize “some of the salient provisions” of the

Conflicts Policy, including:

[e]mployees may not have a second job with or provide services to a competitor

of the Company, nor own any interest in any company which competes or does

business, with the Company. This prohibition applies whether the ownership is

direct or indirect, or is maintained by the employee, a spouse or other family

member…Neither an employee nor his or her family member may act in any

capacity for any supplier, contractor, subcontractor, customer, consultant or other

entity that does or seeks to do business with the Company, is a competitor of the

company, has a significant relationship with the Company or with the Company’s

competitors, suppliers or customers…Employees may not engage in any outside

employment or other activity which encroaches on the time or attention that

should be devoted to the Company’s affairs or detracts from their ability to

perform their responsibilities with full loyalty to the Company. Id. at 3.

The Code of Conduct also imposes an obligation on its employees to “report to the Company any

actual or apparent violations of law or ethical standards so that they can be investigated and dealt

with appropriately.” Id. at 5. In fact, it specifically states that “anyone aware of a violation owes

a duty to the Company…to disclose it.” Id. The Code of Conduct similarly makes clear that

[a]dherence to our Code of Conduct is a condition of employment. Any violation

of your obligations under the Code of Conduct may subject you to disciplinary

measures, including possible termination of your employment. Additionally, your

employment with the Company and the Company’s payment of any incentive

and/or bonus compensation are conditioned on your compliance with applicable

laws and with associated Company policies. Accordingly, if you are found by the

Company to have violated the law or any material provision of any Company

Policy…you will not earn or receive any incentive bonus compensation for any

period in which such violation(s) occurred or were discovered. In addition to any

other remedy that the Company may have for damages, if you fail to repay any

such incentive or bonus compensation paid to you, the Company may file a

lawsuit against you for recovery of the amount of such incentive or bonus

compensation plus costs and fees incurred in pursuing the lawsuit. Id. at 7.

From January 2012 through February 2013, during litigation of Mellon’s foreclosure

complaint against the Residence, Afoluso worked approximately forty hours per week for

Astellas, earning approximately $500,000 total, and traveled to Astellas’s Illinois headquarters

on at least five occasions. Ex. 4 at 4. See Ex. 25 (foreclosure judgment entered against the

Residence in the amount of $1,652,217.88 in April 2016). In April 2012, Novartis’s human

resources business partner instructed Afoluso that she would have to come into the office more

frequently. Ex. 4 at 5. Her performance reviews reflected that her limited time in Novartis’s

offices was negatively impacting her team. Id. at 4. Around the same time that Novartis was

attempting to have Afoluso come into the office more frequently, Afoluso was billing hundreds

of hours to her other consulting jobs. Id. at 5. In June 2012, while still engaged in external

employment, Afoluso completed the 2012 Code of Conduct training. Id. at 4; Ex. 55.

Ultimately, Afoluso failed to satisfactorily adjust her schedule, and continued to work

from the Residence. Ex. 4 at 5. As a result, in March 2013, Afoluso was warned that her

absences were unacceptable. Id. Subsequently, Afoluso’s employment with Novartis was

terminated effective September 2013. Id. The reason given for her termination was “performance

based, predominantly driven about not coming into the office three days a week, which impacted

her interactions and collaboration with her close functional team members.” Id. During her

tenure at Novartis, Afoluso earned a total of $1,205,720 in cash compensation, including

$210,403 in bonuses under the AIP. Id. at 5-6.

Shortly thereafter, on September 19, 2013, Afoluso initiated an action in the District

Court against Novartis alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under state and federal

law (“District Court Action”). Id. at 6. On May 27, 2015, Novartis filed several counterclaims

against Afoluso, including fraud on Afoluso’s employment application and resume (“Count I”),

fraud in connection with the Relocation Agreement (“Count II”), breach of the Relocation

Agreement (“Count III”), breach of Novartis’s AIP (“Count IV”), breach of the duty of good

faith and fair dealing (“Count V”), and breach of the duty of loyalty and Novartis’s Conflicts

Policy (“Count VIII”) (collectively, “Counterclaims”).5 Id.

After a discovery period which the District Court described as “contentious” and “marked

by delay,” Novartis filed an omnibus motion for sanctions and summary judgment, seeking, in

relevant part, judgment in favor of Novartis on the Counterclaims; dismissal of Afoluso’s claims

as a sanction for discovery obstruction, deceit, fraud, and the pursuit of baseless litigation; and

sanctions against Adenekan on account of his discovery misconduct. Id. at 1, 6, 9, 13, 15.

Afoluso filed an opposition, which contained an opposition brief from Adenekan, as well as her

own cross motion for summary judgment on the Counterclaims. Id. at 1, 9.

In an opinion issued on August 15, 2016 (“First District Court Opinion”), the District

Court, in relevant part, granted Novartis’s summary judgment motion in connection with Counts

5 Novartis had also brought counterclaims for unjust enrichment and misappropriation of confidential proprietary

information, which are not relevant to this proceeding. Ex. 4 at 6.

I, III,6 IV, V, and VIII; sanctioned Afoluso by dismissing her claims; and sanctioned Adenekan.

Id. at 2.

In connection with Count I for fraud related to Afoluso’s employment application and

resume, the District Court concluded that, when applying for a position with Novartis, Afoluso

made misrepresentations on her application and resume regarding her last job, her supervisor,

and prior salaries; that she must have known that she was misstating material aspects of her

employment history since she knows her own employment history; that she intended Novartis

would rely on her misrepresentations in determining whether to hire her; and because she was

required to certify the application was correct and acknowledge that falsification would be a

ground for immediate dismissal, it was reasonable for Novartis to rely on the accuracy of the

information provided by Afoluso. Id. at 19. In fact, the District Court specifically found that

Novartis had relied on misrepresentations in her employment application and resume when

determining whether to hire her and what compensation to offer. Id. It further found that

Afoluso’s misrepresentations damaged Novartis by causing it to hire a candidate it otherwise

would not have hired and to pay her more than her experience warranted. Id.

Therefore, the District Court concluded that the foregoing findings satisfied all the

elements for New Jersey common law fraud, which requires “(1) a material misrepresentation of

presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an

intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and

(5) resulting damages.” Id.

6 Because the District Court found that “Counts Two and Three share the same core essential facts,” the District

Court deemed “Count Two to be part of Count Three” and, accordingly, dismissed as moot Novartis’s motion for

summary judgment and Afoluso’s cross motion for summary judgment as to Count Two. Ex. 4 at 19 n.18.

In connection with Count III for breach of the Relocation Agreement, the District Court

concluded that Afoluso had represented to Novartis that she intended to relocate, accepted

approximately $26,000 in relocation funds, and never relocated. Id. at 20. Novartis lost the

money it gave Afoluso to move and never received the benefit of having her move closer to the

office. Id.

In connection with Count IV for breach of the AIP, the District Court concluded that

Novartis and Afoluso entered into an employment contract on March 3, 2010 when she signed

Novartis’s employment offer; that the terms of her employment were governed by Novartis’s

Code of Conduct, Conflicts Policy, and the AIP; and that the bonuses she received through the

AIP were conditioned upon her compliance with Novartis’s policies, including the Conflicts

Policy. Id. Additionally, the District Court found that, by accepting employment with

Biomedical, Auxilium, and Astellas, Afoluso violated the Conflicts Policy and breached her

obligations under the AIP, requiring her to return funds paid pursuant to that program. Id. at 20-

21.

In connection with Count VIII for breach of the duty of loyalty and Conflicts Policy, the

District Court concluded that Afoluso had violated her common law duty of loyalty and the

Conflicts Policy by soliciting and accepting consulting positions with Novartis competitors and

by billing hundreds of hours to them without disclosure to Novartis, resulting in her

impermissibly competing with her employer and dividing the loyalty she owed Novartis. Id. at

23. Ultimately, the District Court determined that Novartis was harmed because it had paid

Afoluso for a full-time position while she “siphoned off time she owed Novartis to other

activities. As such Defendant [Novartis] lost the money it paid her for time she did not commit to

the company.” Id.

In ruling on Novartis’s motion for sanctions, the First District Court Opinion also made

certain findings regarding Afoluso’s and Adenekan’s conduct during the District Court Action.

Id. at 6-8. Specifically, with regard to Afoluso, the District Court found that

[p]laintiff provided false and misleading written responses to discovery requests

and deposition testimony, such as: 1) claiming that her ‘sole compensation and

income during her employment with Defendant [Novartis] came from Defendant;’

2) denying that she worked for other entities while working for Novartis; and 3)

claiming that her interest in LaRon ended in 2009. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).

In granting Novartis’s motion for sanctions against Afoluso, the District Court invoked its

inherent power to sanction litigation abuses, finding that “[a] court may sanction a responsible

party when it finds that ‘fraud has been practiced upon it’” and that ‘“[f]raud on the court occurs

where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion

some unconscionable scheme’ that interferes with the court’s ability ‘to impartially adjudicate a

matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing

party’s claim or defense.’” Id. at 9. The District Court noted that before dismissing a case as a

sanction, the court must consider:

(1) the existence of certain extraordinary circumstances, (2) the presence of

willfulness, bad faith, or fault by the offending party, (3) the consideration of

lesser sanctions to rectify the wrong and to deter similar conduct in the future,

(4) the relationship or nexus between the misconduct drawing the dismissal

sanction and the matters in controversy in the case, (5) prejudice and the public

interest, and (6) the degree of the wrongdoer’s culpability. Id. at 10.

In justifying its decision to dismiss Afoluso’s discrimination and retaliation claims, the District

Court found:

Plaintiff’s [Afoluso] suit is extraordinary in that it is predicated on a willful,

determined effort by Plaintiff to deceive Defendant [Novartis] and this Court.

Plaintiff misstated her employment history, outside consulting, sources of income,

business interests and even her name when it suited her purpose. This Court also

finds that Plaintiff’s conduct was willful and in bad faith. Her deposition

testimony and written responses to discovery requests were false and contradict

the information uncovered by defense counsel. This is not a case of forgetfulness

or confusion. This is perjury. There is a clear connection between Plaintiff’s

obfuscation and the matters in controversy in this case – namely Plaintiff’s

contractual obligations to Defendant and the basis for her termination. Further,

Defendant has been prejudiced by Plaintiff’s interference in the discovery

process. By giving false answers and refusing to turn over documents, Plaintiff

forced Defendants to issue and defend third-party subpoenas and incur additional

effort and expense to obtain information that Plaintiff possessed and should have

provided. Plaintiff is entirely culpable in this matter. She had every opportunity to

tell the truth and cooperate in discovery and chose not to. Id. at 13-14.

Ultimately, the District Court determined that “[g]iven the brazen manner in which

Plaintiff attempted to mislead defense counsel and manipulate the judicial process, this Court

does not believe that a lesser sanction [than dismissal of her claims] will deter Plaintiff from

future improper conduct.” Id. at 14.

With regard to Adenekan, the District Court noted that during discovery, Adenekan

refused to provide documents demanded by subpoena, forcing Novartis to file a motion to

compel, which the District Court granted on October 6, 2015, ordering Adenekan to produce the

documents by October 21, 2015. Id. at 7. He failed to do so. Id. Subsequently, on October 30,

2015, the District Court again instructed Adenekan to produce the documents, and “granted

Defendant [Novartis] leave to file for sanctions for fees if Mr. Adesanya did not do so.” Id. As of

the date the First District Court Opinion was issued, Adenekan still had not complied with

Novartis’s document demands or the District Court’s orders compelling production of the

documents Novartis had requested. Id. at 7, 15-16. Furthermore, at his deposition, Adenekan

gave false testimony, representing that (1) Afoluso had no affiliation with any efforts of LaRon

while she worked for Novartis despite tax returns identifying her as a half-owner of LaRon and

(2) that Astellas had hired him and not Afoluso despite proof from Astellas that it had hired

Afoluso. Id. at 8, 16.

In deciding to sanction Adenekan, the District Court noted that it has inherent power to

sanction non-parties who have a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation and who

substantially participated in the proceedings in which they interfered, finding that sanctionable

conduct by a non-party could include failure to appear, destruction of evidence, or giving false,

misleading, and materially incomplete testimony. Id. at 10-11. Because Adenekan had “refused

both defense requests and three separate court orders to turn over documents relevant to the

issues in this case” and gave false testimony, the District Court found that sanctions against

Adenekan were warranted. Id. at 15, 16. In fact, the District Court noted that “[w]hen asked for

relevant documents regarding LaRon or Ron Nuga LLC, Mr. Adesanya certified that he and his

wife did not possess any, even though there were thousands located in their home.” Id. at 7 n.11.

Subsequently, Novartis filed an application for an award of damages for the

Counterclaims as well as for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in

connection with dismissal of Afoluso’s claims and Adenekan’s discovery misconduct

(“Application”). Ex. 5 at 1. The Debtors filed an opposition in response. Id.

On June 5, 2017, the District Court issued an opinion granting the Application with

reductions (“Second District Court Opinion,” collectively with First District Court Opinion,

“District Court Opinions”). Id. at 1. The District Court noted, “[a]fter finding that Plaintiff

[Afoluso] willfully deceived Novartis and this Court in bad faith and manipulated the judicial

process, this Court dismissed the Complaint…and awarded sanctions against the Adesanyas.” Id.

at 2.

After conducting a comprehensive review of the reasonableness of the requested

attorneys’ fees and costs, the District Court determined that a total award of $480,754.22 on

account of services performed in connection with the dismissal of Afoluso’s claims and the

motion for sanctions against Adenekan was reasonable. Id. at 3, 4-17, 26. In making this

determination, the District Court stated “one exception to this general rule [that fees and costs

incurred in litigation are usually not recoverable] is when ‘a party has acted in bad faith,

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’ ‘In this regard, if a court finds that fraud has

been practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been defiled, it may assess

attorney’s fees against the responsible party.’” Id. at 7.

With respect to Afoluso, the District Court noted that “Plaintiff’s dogged pursuit of

baseless claims and fraud led to the dismissal of the Complaint.” Id. at 8. Thus, Novartis was

entitled to be compensated for fees and costs incurred as a result of that and Afoluso’s

obfuscation of discovery. Id. at 8, 11. With respect to Adenekan, the District Court noted “[t]his

Opinion focuses on the fees and costs incurred in relation to Mr. Adesanya’s false testimony and

his failure to comply with Defendant’s document demands.” Id. at 8. The District Court allocated

$457,040.22 of the attorneys’ fee award against Afoluso and $23,714 of the attorneys’ fee award

against Adenekan “for the fees and costs incurred regarding the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims

and sanctions against Mr. Adesanya.” Id. at 17, 26.

In determining damages for Count I, the District Court awarded $658,788.96 to

compensate Novartis for hiring and paying Afoluso more than her experience warranted based

upon its calculation of the benefit Novartis would have realized had the representations which

induced it to hire Afoluso been true. Id. at 19-22, 26.

In determining damages for Count III, the District Court awarded $26,818.71, the amount

Afoluso received under the Relocation Agreement. Id. at 22, 26.

In determining damages for Count IV, the District Court awarded $210,403, representing

full repayment of all bonuses Afoluso received during her employment with Novartis under the

AIP, constituting $57,605 received in 2011; $70,343 received in 2012; and $82,455 received in

2013. Id. at 22-23, 26. The District Court reasoned that “Plaintiff’s bonuses were conditioned

upon her compliance with Novartis’s internal rules and policies, including the Conflicts Policy,

and she was in violation of these policies at the outset of her employment,” and that “[t]his Court

previously found that Plaintiff was in violation of these policies from the very start of her

employment and breached the AIP by accepting outside employment positions with

Biomedical/Auxilium and Astellas.” Id. at 22-23.

Finally, in determining damages for Count VIII, the District Court awarded $497,907.56,

representing the “wrongful” profits Afoluso had obtained working for Biomedical, Auxilium,

and Astellas. Id. at 24, 26.

Accordingly, in an order dated June 21, 2017, consistent with the Second District Court

Opinion, the District Court entered judgment (1) against Afoluso in the total amount of

$1,850,958.45, consisting of $457,040.22 attributable to attorneys’ fees and costs, plus

applicable post-judgment interest, and $1,393,918.23 in damages, plus applicable post-judgment

interest, and (2) against Adenekan in the amount of $23,714, plus applicable post-judgment

interest.7 Ex. 6.

On November 2, 2018, Afoluso and Adenekan filed a joint chapter 13 bankruptcy

petition. Case No. 18-17260 ECF No. (“ECF”) 1. Their case was subsequently converted to a

chapter 7 case on February 26, 2019. Id. at ECF 34. On June 7, 2019, Novartis filed the instant

adversary complaint seeking to have the Judgment declared nondischargeable pursuant to

§523(a)(2)(A) (“Adversary Complaint”). Case No. 19-00124 ECF 1 Compl. ¶ 38. On December

7 Later, the Judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and Novartis successfully

moved the Judgment to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (“CCP”). See Ex. 80; Ex.

78. The CCP’s denial of Afoluso and Adenekan’s challenge to the transfer of the Judgment was affirmed on appeal

by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Ex. 79.

12, 2019, Novartis filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting brief. Case No. 19-

00124 ECF 20-21. After the Court granted the Debtors’ request for additional time to respond,

the Debtors filed a response in opposition to Novartis’s motion for summary judgment and their

own cross motion for summary judgment on January 22, 2020. Id. at ECF 26, 29, 30.

On March 24, 2020, the Court entered an order granting in part and denying in part

Novartis’s motion for summary judgment and granting in part and denying in part the Debtors’

cross motion for summary judgment (“Adversary Summary Judgment Order”). Id. at ECF 54,

55. The Court incorporates the opinion it issued in connection with the Adversary Summary

Judgment Order explaining the basis for its decision and the remaining issues for trial by

reference (“Adversary Summary Judgment Opinion”). See id. at ECF 54; Ex. 7 (hereinafter

referred to as “Adv. Summ. J. Op.”). Ultimately, the Court concluded that:

[b]ecause there remains a genuine dispute regarding whether, in connection with Counts

III, IV, and VIII [for breach of the Relocation Agreement, the AIP, and duty of loyalty

and Conflicts Policy, respectively], Afoluso knowingly advanced a misleading

understanding of her employment status through her representations and omissions and

whether she made those representations and omissions with the intent and purpose of

deceiving Novartis, summary judgment will be denied as to both those elements in favor

of further exploration at trial. Furthermore, a genuine dispute of material fact remains

over Novartis’s reliance on Afoluso’s representations in the Relocation Agreement for

Count III. Adv. Summ J. Op. 20.

On April 23, 2020, Novartis filed a motion seeking to amend the Adversary Complaint

primarily to assert causes of action based on § 523(a)(2)(B) for the portion of the Judgment

attributable to fraud on Afoluso’s employment application and resume and § 523(a)(6) for the

portion of the Judgment attributable to the sanctions awards against Afoluso and Adenekan. Case

No. 19-00124 ECF 62 Mot. to Am. Ex. A ¶¶ 58, 67, 105, 108, 110, 119. On May 13, 2020, the

Court granted Novartis’s motion to amend the complaint. Case No. 19-00124 ECF 70. On May

15, 2020, Novartis filed its amended complaint (“Amended Adversary Complaint”), which the

Debtors answered on May 29, 2020. Id. at ECF 71, 80.

On January 14, 2021, trial was held over Zoom. Id. at ECF 152; Trial Tr. 1. Based upon

her conduct at trial, the Court finds Afoluso severely lacking in credibility as a witness. For

instance, due to the virtual format, which allowed Adenekan and Afoluso to sit next to each other

throughout the trial, Afoluso appeared to receive coaching from Adenekan as he whispered to

Afoluso during her testimony multiple times, forcing the Court to admonish Adenekan that he

was not permitted to give Afoluso answers or correct her during her testimony. See Trial Tr.

74:22-75:5, 124:23-125:11, 153:5-18. Furthermore, even when not being coached, Afoluso came

across as evasive, argumentative, and defensive. She repeatedly refused to answer Novartis’s

questions until admonished by the Court to do so and, even then, claimed lack of recall for

substantially all of Novartis’s questions, behavior consistent with her conduct during discovery

in the District Court Action. See e.g., Trial Tr. 68:2-13, 70:24-71:25, 74:2-7, 74:17-21, 76:4-

77:25, 78:12-79:10, 85:1-86:24, 90:2-92:10, 93:24-94:5, 94:12-25, 95:1-18; Ex. 80 at 3 (“Both

[Afoluso and Adenekan] were extremely evasive during their depositions and refused to answer

questions or claimed a lack of recall.”). Rather than providing straightforward answers to

Novartis’s questions, she repeatedly opted to confront Novartis over the point of its questions

instead. See e.g., Trial Tr. 68:2-7, 74:8-11, 78:12-16, 85:1-86:24, 94:8-24. Overall, her testimony

was incredibly self-serving and, at times, even contradictory. See e.g., Trial Tr. 177:7-15,

178:22-179:14, 179:20-180:13, 185:2-8. She even admitted that certain discovery responses she

had given in the District Court Action were not true. See e.g., Trial Tr. 99:22-104:7, 104:13-

105:13.

At the conclusion of the trial, both parties requested the opportunity to submit

supplemental post-trial briefing. Trial Tr. 219:10-220:24. Accordingly, the Court set a schedule

for the parties to file their submissions. Id. at 222:3-23. On February 12, 2021, the Debtors

submitted their post-trial brief. Case No. 19-00124 ECF 160. On February 16, 2021, Novartis

submitted its post-trial brief. Id. at ECF 158.

III. DISCUSSION

Ultimately, the Court concludes that the portion of the Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s

fraud on the application and resume she submitted to Novartis is nondischargeable pursuant to

§523(a)(2)(B) because the First District Court Opinion already established substantially all

elements required for a debt to be declared nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(B), and the

evidence at trial supports the remaining elements.

The Court also finds that the portion of the Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s breach of

the Relocation Agreement is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) because, despite never

having any intention of relocating, Afoluso falsely represented that she did with the purpose of

deceiving Novartis into distributing additional funds to her. Furthermore, Novartis’s reliance on

her representation that she would move was justifiable.

Additionally, the portion of the Judgement attributable to Afoluso’s breach of the

Conflicts Policy and duty of loyalty is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) because

Afoluso knew from the outset of her employment with Novartis that her employment was

conditioned on her not holding other jobs which would interfere with her employment at

Novartis, allowing the Court to infer that she failed to disclose her other outside consulting jobs

with the intent and purpose of deceiving Novartis so that she could keep her job with Novartis

and her other pharmaceutical positions in order to maximize her compensation.

Similarly, the portion of the Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s breaches of the AIP

occurring subsequent to 2011 is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) because she was

aware after 2011 that her external employment and undisclosed ownership interest in Global

Drug rendered her ineligible to receive incentive pay but she, nevertheless, failed to disclose her

outside consulting positions or her ownership interest in Global Drug with the intent and purpose

of deceiving Novartis into maximizing her compensation. However, the $57,605 portion of the

Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s 2011 breaches of the AIP are dischargeable due to lack of

evidence at trial that Afoluso knew prior to 2012 that she was creating a misleading impression

that she was eligible for the AIP when she was not.

Finally, the Court concludes that § 523(a)(6) renders the portions of the Judgment

attributable to the sanctions awards against Afoluso and Adenekan nondischargeable because the

District Court Opinions established that Afoluso and Adenekan willfully and maliciously

committed fraud on the District Court and obstructed discovery by giving false testimony and

withholding requested documents without excuse.

A. The Portion of the Judgment Attributable to Fraud on Afoluso’s

Employment Application and Resume Is Nondischargeable Pursuant to

§523(a)(2)(B).

Novartis avers that the portion of the Judgment attributable to the fraud on Afoluso’s job

application and resume is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). Section

523(a)(2)(B) provides that a debtor is not discharged from a debt

for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit to

the extent obtained by…use of a statement in writing - (i) that is materially false;

(ii) respecting a debtor’s…financial condition; (iii) on which the creditor to whom

the debtor is liable for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied;

and (iv) the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive. See

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-58.

Exceptions to discharge are strictly construed against creditors and liberally construed in favor of

debtors. Law Offices of William C. Courtney, LLC v. Williams (In re Williams), Case No. 15-

33283 (MBK), Adv. Pro. No. 16-01200 (MBK), 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 3246, at *16 (Bankr. D.

N.J. Oct. 12, 2018). To succeed on a § 523(a)(2)(B) claim, the plaintiff must show by a

preponderance of the evidence (1) a materially false writing; (2) respecting the debtor’s financial

condition; (3) which was reasonably relied on; and (4) was made with intent to deceive. Id.

The reasonableness of a creditor’s reliance under § 523(a)(2)(B) is judged by an objective

standard based upon the degree of care which would be exercised by a reasonably cautious

person in the same business transaction under similar circumstances. In re Piazza, 605 B.R. 332,

339 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1117-

18 (3d Cir. 1995)). Additionally, because a debtor will rarely, if ever, admit that deception was

his purpose, intent to deceive may be inferred from the totality of the surrounding facts and

circumstances. Fulton, N.A. v. Robbins (In re Robbins), 562 BR. 83, 109 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016);

Giansante & Cobb, LLC v. Singh (In re Singh), 433 BR. 139, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010). In

fact, "a creditor can establish intent to deceive by proving reckless indifference to, or reckless

disregard of, the accuracy of the information in the financial statement of the debtor when the

totality of the circumstances supports such an inference." In re Williams, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS

2039, at *39.

In the Adversary Summary Judgment Opinion, this Court already determined that “the

false statements that Afoluso made on her employment application regarding her salaries and

employment history relate to her financial condition, even though they do not relate to her

overall financial status.” Adv. Summ. J. Op. 28. Additionally, the First District Court Opinion’s

finding that Afoluso committed New Jersey common law fraud in connection with her

employment application and resume establishes substantially all of the other elements necessary

for a § 523(a)(2)(B) claim. See Ex. 4 at 18-19. As this Court discussed in the Adversary

Summary Judgment Opinion,

[i]t is well established that preclusion principles apply in bankruptcy proceedings.

Murphy v. Snyder (In re Snyder), 939 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2019). Because the

Judgment was rendered in a federal court, the Court must apply federal principles

of collateral estoppel to determine the Judgment’s preclusive effect in this

proceeding. In re Snyder, 939 F.3d at 100; Wolstein v. Docteroff (In re Docteroff),

133 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 1997). Under federal law, collateral estoppel precludes

the re-litigation of an issue of fact or law determined in a prior action if the

following conditions are satisfied: (1) an identical issue was raised in a prior

proceeding; (2) the issue sought to be precluded was actually litigated and decided

in the prior action; (3) the determination of the issue sought to be precluded was

essential to supporting a valid and final judgment on the merits in the prior

proceeding; and (4) the party against whom preclusion is asserted had a full and

fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. In re Snyder, 939 F.3d

at 100; United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol. PC, 923 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir.

2019); Heine v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 337 F. Supp. 3d 469, 482

(D. NJ. 2018).

In the context of dischargeability proceedings, collateral estoppel permits the

court to accept facts established by previous judgment as evidence of

nondischargeability. In re Docteroff, 133 F.3d at 215 (citing In re Halpern, 810

F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1987)). Upon application of collateral estoppel in a

nondischargeability action, the Court must determine whether a judgment entered

in a prior proceeding and the accompanying underlying findings are sufficient to

render a debt nondischargeable. Aiello v. Aiello (In re Aiello), 533 BR. 489, 494-

95 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015). Adv. Summ. J. Op. 23-24.

According to the First District Court Opinion, New Jersey common law fraud requires “(1) a

material misrepresentation of presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the

defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance

thereon by the other person;8 and (5) resulting damages.”9 Ex. 4 at 19 (citing Farris v. County of

Camden, 61 F. Supp. 2d 307, 340 (D. N.J. 1999)).

The First District Court Opinion determined that Afoluso’s written employment

application and resume (1) contained statements about her employment and salary history that

were materially false; (2) Novartis relied on these representations in determining whether to hire

her and in preparing a compensation package; (3) Afoluso knew her own employment history

and would have known she was misstating material aspects of it on her written application; and

(4) Afoluso intended Novartis to rely on her misrepresentations since she was trying to obtain

employment. Id.

The foregoing findings are identical to the findings this Court would need to make to

support a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(B), were actually litigated and

decided, were essential to supporting the Judgment, and Afoluso had a full and fair opportunity

to litigate them in the District Court Action. As a result, as the Court recognized in the Adversary

Summary Judgment Opinion, collateral estoppel binds this Court to accept those findings.10 See

Adv. Summ. J. Op. 28.

8 Under New Jersey common law, a party will generally be said “to have reasonably relied on a misrepresentation

where ‘the facts to the contrary were not obvious or did not provide a warning, or where the relying party

[reasonably] did [] not pursue further investigation that would have revealed the falsity of the representation.’”

Discover Growth Fund, LLC v. Fiorino, Civ. Act. No. 20-00351, 2021 WL 236595, at *4 (D. N.J. Jan. 25, 2021).

Similarly, “reliance on a misrepresentation is not reasonable or justifiable if the recipient ‘knows that it is false or its

falsity is obvious to him.’” Square Two, LLC v. JJJ Solutions, LLC, Case No. A-3065-18, 2021 WL 851091, at *7

(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. March 8, 2021). New Jersey does not impose upon a party to an arm’s length transaction a

general duty of inquiry. Id. at *8. A party that elects to make an independent investigation will be accountable for

“everything such party could have discerned by employing reasonable diligence.” Id.

9 Common law fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Square Two, LLC, 2021 WL 851091, at

*7.

10 To the extent the District Court’s finding that Afoluso intended Novartis to rely on her misrepresentations in her

application and resume is not considered identical to the element of a § 523(a)(2)(B) claim requiring that the

statement have been made with intent to deceive, this Court easily infers from the surrounding circumstances that

Afoluso intended to deceive Novartis into hiring her and enhancing her compensation when she made statements

about her employment and salary history which she knew were false on a job application and resume.

Additionally, the Court concludes that Novartis exercised the degree of care which a

reasonably cautious entity in the same position would have when it relied on representations

which Afoluso had certified were correct with awareness that falsification of information would

result in immediate dismissal and that employment was contingent on the completion of a

satisfactory background check.11

11 The inquiry regarding whether a creditor exercised the degree of care a reasonably cautious person in the

same business transaction under similar circumstances would have is typically informed by consideration of three

factors set forth in, Insurance Company of North America v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108 (3d Cir. 1995), by the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals (“Third Circuit”):

(1) the creditor's standard practices in evaluating credit-worthiness (absent other factors, there is

reasonable reliance where the creditor follows its normal business practices); (2) the standards or

customs of the creditor's industry in evaluating credit-worthiness (what is considered a

commercially reasonable investigation of the information supplied by debtor); and (3) the

surrounding circumstances existing at the time of the debtor's application for credit (whether there

existed a ‘red flag’ that would have alerted an ordinarily prudent lender to the possibility that the

information is inaccurate, whether there existed previous business dealings that gave rise to a

relationship of trust, or whether even minimal investigation would have revealed the inaccuracy of

the debtor's representations). Cohn, 54 F.3d at 1117.

Cohn does not dictate how the factors are to be weighed nor mandate that all factors be present to determine that an

entity’s reliance was reasonable. See id. Although the plain language of Cohn appears to limit consideration of the

foregoing factors to situations involving an extension of credit rather than an employment relationship, the Court

will nevertheless consider them in an abundance of caution to the extent Cohn could be construed to so require.

With regard to the first factor, Novartis’s policy was that all employment offers were contingent upon the

completion of satisfactory checks of the applicant’s educational credentials, work history, references, and

background. See Ex. 51 (“As with all employment tenders, this offer is contingent upon the successful fulfillment of

certain company requirements including Novartis being able to verify educational credentials, work history

information, and reference and criminal history checks.”); Ex. 48 Dep. Tr. 91:1-92:18. Novartis utilizes a third party

provider to perform background checks of employment candidates. Ex. 48 Dep. Tr. 91:1-11. In accordance with its

practice, Novartis had a background check performed on Afoluso. Ex. 48 Dep. Tr. 91:22-92:8; Ex. B. There is no

basis to conclude that Novartis veered from its standard practices in having that background check performed or that

not contacting the current employer was not part of Novartis’s standard practice. With regard to the second factor,

neither party introduced expert testimony regarding industry practices in conducting background checks associated

with hiring in the pharmaceutical industry.

With regard to the third factor, the surrounding facts and circumstances of the application would not have

suggested Afoluso had made multiple false representations on her application and resume. First, there is no evidence

of any previous relationship between Afoluso and Novartis which Novartis would have relied upon in hiring her or

setting her compensation. Second, in terms of red flags, in finding that Novartis’s reliance on the accuracy of the

information provided in the application was reasonable, the District Court necessarily determined that the falsities in

the application were not obvious. See Square Two, LLC v. JJJ Solutions, LLC, Case No. A-3065-18, 2021 WL

851091, at *7 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. March 8, 2021). In any event, although Afoluso’s inclusion of “Target 30%”

above the salary information for her then-current position may have been odd, that single reference alone would not

have alerted Novartis to the multiple misrepresentations throughout her application, including those about phony

supervisors, any other salaries which may have been inflated, or the fact that Global Drug had paid no salaries at all

in at least 2009 and 2010, and had made almost no revenue for the entirety of its existence. Ex. 4 at 2; McCusker

Decl. Ex. B, C; Ex. 49 Dep. Tr. 72:1-6, 91:18-20, 190:21-24. Furthermore, a minimal investigation would not have

and did not reveal the inaccuracies on the employment application. Novartis did conduct a background check into

Afoluso using a third party provider and it did not reveal any of the false information Afoluso had supplied.

Furthermore, based upon the Court’s assessment of Afoluso’s credibility and her husband’s obvious interest in his

Based on the foregoing, Novartis has established that Afoluso made materially false

written statements respecting her financial condition intending to deceive Novartis upon which

Novartis reasonably relied.12 Therefore, all elements of a section § 523(a)(2)(B) claim are

satisfied and the portion of the Judgment attributable to fraud on Afoluso’s employment

application and resume is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(B).13

wife’s employment and his own obstructive conduct in the District Court Action, even had Novartis as part of the

background check contacted Global Drug, which had no employees, to verify her employment, the Court infers that

Afoluso and Adenekan, the two sole co-owners of the business, would have verified her employment information

falsely and not been forthcoming regarding the company’s financial situation; the fact that it had not paid Afoluso a

salary in at least 2009 or 2010; the fact that her “supervisor” was not actually an employee of the company; or any

other salaries which may have been inflated. Ex. 4 at 2, 3; Ex. 49 at 53:3-6. Additionally, considering that Afoluso

contradicted herself during the trial when attempting to explain to the Court what she meant when she wrote “Target

30%” on the application, as described infra note 12, the Court infers that even had Novartis questioned her about it,

a truthful answer would not have been forthcoming.

Based upon consideration of the foregoing factors, the Court still concludes that Novartis’s reliance on

Afoluso’s representations in her employment application was reasonable and that it acted as a reasonable entity in its

same situation would have.

12 The Court found Afoluso’s testimony regarding her intent in filling out the employment application incredibly

confusing and completely lacking in any credibility. She contradicted herself on multiple occasions and could not

provide a satisfactory explanation reconciling her testimony. At first, she testified that solely the “current” salary

from Global Drug which she disclosed on the application was merely aspirational, despite Novartis’s very clear

request for current salary information, not aspirational salary information. Trial Tr. 138:6-139:25. Later, when

confronted and pressed at trial about Global Drug having made no revenue in 2007 when she started working there,

she insisted that she had been paid $220,000 as her starting salary and had paystubs reflecting that amount. Id. at

166:3-167:12, 170:12-23. However, she then changed her mind and claimed that the starting salary she had

disclosed on her application was merely aspirational as well, despite just testifying that she had paystubs reflecting

she had been paid $220,000 as her starting salary and testifying previously that only her current salary had been

aspirational. Id. at 176:9-180:14. Adding to the confusion was her testimony that Global Drug, a company owned

solely by Afoluso and her husband, had promised to pay her when it had money, and that she eventually did get

paid, despite the company essentially making no money aside from investments made by Afoluso and her husband

in an unknown amount somewhere in the “ballpark” of over $100,000, but that she had no idea how much Global

Drug had paid her. Id. at 174:14-175:25, 178:10-21, 179:9-180:19. Accordingly, in light of the rampant

inconsistencies in her testimony, the Court simply cannot credit her attempted explanation that all salary information

relating to Global Drug was intended to be aspirational. In any event, she offered no explanation for the other false

statements relating to her employment history which the District Court noted.

13 To the extent that the false statements contained in Afoluso’s employment application and resume do not relate to

Afoluso’s financial condition, the Court has no problem concluding that the findings made by the District Court

relating to the fraud on Afoluso’s employment application and resume satisfy the elements of § 523(a)(2)(A), which

renders nondischargeable any debt for money obtained by a false representation. See Mungo v. Casale, Civ. Act. No.

96-6228, No. 96-6229, 1997 Dist. LEXIS 3867, at *14-15 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 1997) (a court may modify its

interlocutory order at any time before the final decree). Succeeding on a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim based on a false

representation requires proof that (1) the debtor made a false representation; (2) which at the time of the

representation, the debtor knew or believed was false; (3) the false representation was made with the intent and

purpose of deceiving the creditor; (4) the creditor justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation; and (5) the creditor

sustained damages as a proximate result of the misrepresentation. Green v. Didio, 607 B.R. 804, 816 (Bankr. E.D.

Pa. 2019); Jou v. Adalian (In re Adalian), 474 B.R. 150, 160 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012). Justifiable reliance is a less

demanding standard than the reasonable reliance required under § 523(a)(2)(B). Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70-72,

77 (1995). Under the justifiable reliance standard, a person may still be justified in relying on a representation even

B. The Portion of the Judgment Attributable to Afoluso’s Breach of the

Relocation Agreement Is Nondischargeable Pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A).

Novartis avers that the portion of the Judgment attributable to the breach of the

Relocation Agreement is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A).14 Am. Compl. ¶ 84. A

§523(a)(2)(A) claim based on a false representation requires proof that the debtor made a false or

misleading affirmative misrepresentation with the intention and purpose of deceiving the

creditor. Green v. Didio, 607 B.R. 804, 816 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2019). There are five elements

comprising a false representation claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) which must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence: (1) the debtor made a false representation; (2) which at the time

of the representation, the debtor knew, or believed, was false; (3) the false representation was

made with the intent and purpose of deceiving the creditor; (4) the creditor justifiably relied upon

the representation; and (5) the creditor sustained damages as a proximate result of the

misrepresentation. Green, 607 BR. at 816; Jou v. Adalian (In re Adalian), 474 BR. 150, 160

(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012).

though he might have ascertained its falsity had he made an investigation. Id. at 70. As discussed supra, the District

Court specifically found in the First District Court Opinion that Afoluso’s employment application and resume

contained materially false representations about her employment and salary history; that she would have known

those representations were false at the time she made them; that she intended Novartis to rely on those statements

since she was trying to obtain employment; and that Novartis reasonably relied on her representations in light of the

certification she signed on the application. Ex. 4 at 19. Those findings are essentially identical to the findings this

Court would need to make to support a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A), were actually

litigated and decided, were essential to supporting the Judgment, and Afoluso had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate them in the District Court Action. Accordingly, they are established by collateral estoppel. To the extent the

finding relating to her intent is not identical to the finding this Court must make regarding her intent, the Court

easily infers for the reasons discussed supra that she made those representations intending to deceive Novartis into

hiring her and offering her an attractive compensation package.

14 The Amended Complaint also asserted § 523(a)(2)(B) as an alternative basis for nondischargeability of the portion

of the Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s breach of the Relocation Agreement. Am. Compl. ¶ 84. However, this

Court already determined in its Adversary Summary Judgment Opinion that “[t]he false representation at issue

relates to Afoluso’s intention to relocate rather than her financial condition. Therefore, the debt for money obtained

by this false representation – the portion of the Judgment attributable to Count III – is within the scope of

§523(a)(2)(A) as opposed to § 523(a)(2)(B).” Adv. Summ. J. Op. 30 n.13.

This Court already determined on summary judgment that Afoluso represented to

Novartis that she intended to relocate closer to Novartis’s offices in New Jersey; her

representation that she would relocate turned out to be false; and based on her representation that

she would relocate, Novartis extended Afoluso approximately $26,000 to its detriment, leaving

for resolution at trial the following issues: (1) whether Afoluso knew her representation

regarding her intention to relocate was false at the time she made it; (2) whether she purposely

made that representation intending to deceive Novartis; and (3) whether it was justifiable for

Novartis to rely on her representation that she intended to relocate. Adv. Summ. J. Op. 30-31. As

mentioned supra, because a debtor will rarely, if ever, admit that deception was his purpose,

intent to deceive and knowledge may be inferred from the totality of the surrounding facts and

circumstances. In re Robbins, 562 BR. at 109; In re Singh, 433 BR. at 161.

The Court easily infers that Afoluso knew that she had no intention of moving at the time

she signed the Relocation Agreement. Afoluso failed to identify a single meaningful action she

took to initiate the relocation at any point during her tenure with Novartis. She had no

recollection of researching schools for her children to attend; consulting a realtor to assist with

selling or leasing the Residence or with finding a new home closer to New Jersey; visiting or

researching potential towns or cities to relocate to; or consulting with Novartis’s relocation

vendor. Trial Tr. 74:2-16, 76:4-9, 76:19-25, 77:8-12, 77:23-78:1, 79:19-23. In fact, she did not

even recognize the name of Novartis’s relocation vendor when first asked about Cartus at trial.

Id. at 77:13-19. The Court concludes that Afoluso did not recall taking any of the

aforementioned basic steps because she, in fact, did not take any steps to move in accordance

with the Relocation Agreement, a conclusion which her responses to Novartis’s discovery

requests further support.15 See Ex. 12 at p. 2 ¶¶ 4-5, p. 5 ¶¶ 2-3.

Ultimately, in the absence of any steps taken to attempt to move at any time during

Afoluso’s tenure with Novartis, there is simply no basis for this Court to conclude that she ever

intended to move when she signed the Relocation Agreement.16 Her lack of action is completely

inconsistent with an intention to move and the Court concludes Afoluso knew she had no

intention of moving at the time she signed the Relocation Agreement.

The Court also easily infers that Afoluso signed the Relocation Agreement intending to

deceive Novartis in order to obtain additional compensation. Despite Afoluso’s belief that she

had twelve months to move pursuant to the Relocation Agreement, when the deadline came and

went, she took no action to notify Novartis that she had not moved17 and needed more time. Trial

15 When asked to produce copies of any real estate listing agreements entered into between 2010 and 2017 for her

Residence or copies of any offers to purchase or lease the Residence for 2010 through 2018, Afoluso responded

“there are no listing agreements entered into by defendants…[and] there are no offers to purchase…” Ex. 12 at p. 2

¶¶ 4-5. When asked to identify all realtors or real estate professionals contacted from 2010 through 2014 with regard

to listing the Residence for purposes of selling or leasing it, Afoluso responded “none.” Id. at p. 5 ¶ 2. When asked

to identify all properties in New Jersey for which Afoluso had placed an offer to purchase or lease in the time period

of 2010 through 2014, Afoluso responded “none.” Id. at p. 5 ¶ 3.

16 The Court does not credit Afoluso’s testimony that she always intended to relocate within twelve months of

starting her job at Novartis but became too busy at work. See Trial Tr. 143:18-144:4. The Court would expect

someone who had a genuine intention to move but became too busy to do so to reach out to the company’s

relocation vendor for assistance, to ask the company for more time to complete the move, to possibly have a family

member or partner start the moving process, or start working towards moving after the work load reduced. It makes

no sense that Afoluso would have intended to relocate, but found no time at all at any point during her three and a

half years with Novartis to take even basic steps towards moving, especially when Novartis had a relocation vendor

available to help her. Accordingly, her testimony does not convince the Court in the absence of evidence of any

steps taken towards moving that she ever intended to relocate closer to Novartis. Moreover, Afoluso’s self-serving

attempt to justify an increase in Novartis’s offer by referencing the increased cost of living the job would require in

an email to her recruiter does not convince the Court otherwise in light of the totality of the circumstances, including

the many misrepresentations she made on her application in order to get hired in the first place and obtain inflated

compensation, and failure to take any steps to move closer to Novartis over several years with the company. See Ex.

D. In any event, the Court already granted Novartis’s pre-trial motion to strike that argument as an affirmative

defense. See Am. Ans. ¶ 127; Case No. 19-00124 ECF 101.

17 In April 2012, two years after Afoluso had accepted a job with Novartis, when human resources began requiring

Afoluso to be present in the office more frequently, Afoluso informed Novartis that medical problems made it too

difficult for her to commute to New Jersey. Ex. 4 at 5. In response, Novartis offered to provide her with additional

relocation assistance to reduce Afoluso’s commute. Id. That Novartis generously attempted to work with Afoluso to

afford her additional relocation assistance so that she could be present in the office more frequently is not at all

probative of Afoluso’s intent in entering the Relocation Agreement.

Tr. 143:18-20, 144:11-17. Instead, she kept the approximately $26,000 that Novartis had given

her for the purpose of moving without actually making any efforts towards moving. Id. at 146:4-

14. The Court infers from her silence in the face of the relocation deadline and the fact that she

kept all of the relocation money without attempting to move that she entered the Relocation

Agreement for the purpose of obtaining additional funds for herself rather than for the purpose of

moving.18 The Debtors’ significant financial difficulties leading up to Afoluso applying for and

accepting a position at Novartis further supports this inference.

Finally, the Court finds Novartis’s reliance on Afoluso’s representation that she would

relocate completely justifiable given that her employment was predicated on her relocating, an

expectation clearly set forth even in her Offer Letter. Ex. 4 at 4; Ex. 51. Accordingly, based on

the foregoing, because Novartis has demonstrated all the elements necessary for a § 523(a)(2)(A)

claim, the Court finds the portion of the Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s breach of the

Relocation Agreement nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A).

C. The Portion of the Judgment Attributable to Afoluso’s Breach of the Duty of

Loyalty and Conflicts Policy Is Nondischargeable Pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A).

Novartis avers that the portion of the Judgment attributable to the breach of the duty of

loyalty and Conflicts Policy is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A).19 Am. Compl. ¶103.

This portion of the Judgment is based upon Afoluso’s failure to disclose external employment

she obtained and held with other pharmaceutical companies during her tenure with Novartis in

18 Although Afoluso claimed to not remember what she spent the relocation funds on, it is clear based on her

inability to identify a single step she took to attempt to move that she did not spend it on relocation efforts. See Trial

Tr. 146:4-14.

19 The Amended Complaint also asserted § 523(a)(2)(B) as an alternative basis for nondischargeability of the portion

of the Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s breach of the duty of loyalty and Conflicts Policy. Am. Compl. ¶ 103.

However, this Court already determined in the Adversary Summary Judgment Opinion that “[t]hese

omissions/implied representations relate to conflicts of interest and Afoluso’s work performance rather than her

financial condition. Therefore, debt for money obtained by these omissions/implied representations – the portion of

the Judgment attributable to Count VIII – does not implicate § 523(a)(2)(B) and is within the scope of

§523(a)(2)(A).” Adv. Summ. J. Op. 35 n.28.

violation of her common law duty of loyalty to Novartis and Novartis’s Conflicts Policy. Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 93-103.

A § 523(a)(2)(A) claim based on false pretenses requires proof of an implied

misrepresentation promoted knowingly and willingly that creates a misleading understanding of

the transaction with the plaintiff which wrongfully damaged plaintiff by inducing plaintiff to

advance money, property, or services to the debtor. Carto v. Oakley, 503 BR. 407, 432 (Bankr.

E.D. Pa. 2013); LL Lifestyle, Inc. v. Vidal (In re Vidal), Bankr. No. 10-14071, Adv. No. 10-0335,

2012 WL 3907847 at *16 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2012); Oppenheimer & Co. Inc. v. Ricker (In

re Ricker), 475 B.R. 445, 456-57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012). As mentioned, because a debtor will

rarely, if ever, admit that deception was his purpose, intent to deceive, as well as knowledge,

may be inferred from the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances. In re Robbins, 562

BR. at 109; In re Singh, 433 BR. at 161.

Certain elements of a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim based upon false pretenses have already been

established at the summary judgment stage by collateral estoppel, including: (1) Afoluso created

a misleading impression that she was performing full time work for Novartis by failing to

disclose her external employment for other pharmaceutical companies and (2) Novartis was

harmed by paying her for more than her services warranted. Adv. Summ. J. Op. 35. The only

issues left for resolution at trial were (1) whether Afoluso knew she was creating a misleading

impression by failing to disclose her external employment and (2) whether she purposely failed

to disclose her external employment intending to deceive Novartis. Id. at 36.

The Court easily infers that Afoluso knew she was creating a misleading impression by

failing to disclose her external employment to Novartis. On March 3, 2010, Afoluso

acknowledged by signing her Employee Agreement that during her employment with Novartis

she would devote her best efforts and full business loyalty to her employment with Novartis and

that she would hold no other employment or engage in any other business which would

adversely affect her ability to perform her job responsibilities. Ex. 52. Accordingly, she was

aware from the very outset of her employment that she was prohibited from holding external

employment of that nature. Despite this awareness, she still obtained and held external

employment with other pharmaceutical companies throughout her tenure with Novartis without

informing Novartis, for whom she was supposed to be working full time.

Furthermore, on January 27, 2012, the same month she secured employment with

Astellas and under a year after securing employment with Biomedical and Auxilium, Afoluso

received training on the 2011 Code of Conduct. The 2011 Code of Conduct clearly recites the

portion of the Conflicts Policy prohibiting employees from having a second job with or

providing services to a competitor of Novartis and from engaging in outside employment or

other activities which encroach on time or attention which should be devoted to Novartis or

detracts from the employee’s ability to perform his or her responsibilities with undivided loyalty

to Novartis. Ex. 83 at 3.20 The Code of Conduct further imposes an obligation on employees to

disclose any conflicts of interest and report any violations, and details the consequences of

violating the Code of Conduct, including termination. Id. at 3, 5.

Based on the foregoing, Afoluso would have been well aware that her external

employment violated the Code of Conduct, the Conflicts Policy, and her Employee Agreement,

20 In post-trial briefing submitted by the Debtors, they seek to have exhibit 83 stricken from the record. They

objected to this document at trial, and the Court determined that the document was relevant as one of the Codes of

Conduct setting forth the Conflicts Policy and prohibition on certain external employment which Afoluso received

training on during her time at Novartis while she was working external consulting positions. Trial Tr. 205:22-207:3.

The document was authenticated by Novartis’s human resources business partner, Megan Burley, based on her

personal knowledge. Id. at 23:17-25:17. Accordingly, the Court sees no basis for striking this document from the

record. Truthfully, the Debtors’ post-trial brief is so confusing and rambling as to be virtually incomprehensible, and

the Court genuinely does not understand on what other basis besides those expressed at trial the Debtors seek to

have this document stricken. Finding no basis, the Court denies that request.

and that by failing to disclose her external employment, which she knew she was obligated to do

under the Code of Conduct,21 she was creating a misleading impression that she was in full

compliance with the Conflicts Policy, Code of Conduct, and Employee Agreement and devoting

her full efforts to Novartis when she was not. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Afoluso

knowingly created a misleading impression to Novartis by failing to disclose her external

employment with Biomedical, Auxilium, and Astellas.

The Court also easily infers that Afoluso purposely failed to disclose her external

employment intending to deceive Novartis. Afoluso acknowledged by signing the Employee

Agreement that not holding certain external employment was a condition of her employment

with Novartis. Ex. 52. Additionally, the Code of Conduct which she received training on in

January 2012 as outlined supra very clearly states that violations of the Code of Conduct and

Conflicts Policy, such as holding certain outside employment, could subject the employee to

termination and/or elimination of bonus and incentive pay. Ex. 83. Accordingly, the Court infers

from the foregoing that Afoluso failed to disclose her external employment intending to deceive

Novartis in order to avoid termination of her employment from Novartis or having to resign from

her external employment. In fact, her insistence on working from home so frequently during a

period in which she billed hundreds of hours to other companies further supports the Court’s

inference that she purposely hid her employment from Novartis, as working from home allowed

her to work for the other companies undetected.

21 Afoluso’s testimony that she did not realize until a 2013 conflicts training that Novartis would expect her not to

seek employment with other pharmaceutical companies is self-serving and simply not credible, especially given her

extensive experience working for other major pharmaceutical companies which almost certainly would have had

comprehensive conflicts of interest policies, and the overwhelming evidence that she read and understood the

Employee Agreement and was trained on the Code of Conduct, both of which referenced the most salient aspects of

the Conflicts Policy and prohibition on obtaining certain outside employment, prior to 2013. Ex. 52, 55, 83; Trial Tr.

121:5-19. Given the overwhelming evidence in Novartis’s favor, Afoluso’s conclusory, self-serving testimony that

she did not remember seeing restrictions on external employment in the Code of Conduct until the 2013 training on

the Conflicts Policy is not credible. See Trial Tr. 130:7-11.

Other circumstantial evidence reflecting Afoluso’s financial difficulties, such as the

commencement of a foreclosure action on her Residence during her employment with

Biomedical and Auxilium and shortly before she obtained employment with Astellas, as well as

the existence of several foreclosure judgments against the Debtors’ properties which were

entered prior to and during her employment with Novartis and before she obtained her external

consulting positions, further supports the inference that Afoluso intended to deceive Novartis by

hiding her other positions. Her financial difficulties would have incentivized her to maximize her

compensation by keeping her external employment from Novartis so she could hold multiple

jobs simultaneously.

Based on the foregoing, the Court infers that Afoluso knowingly created a misleading

impression that she was in compliance with the Conflicts Policy intending to deceive Novartis by

failing to disclose her external employment. Therefore, Novartis has satisfied all elements

necessary to sustain a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim and the portion of the Judgment attributable to

Afoluso’s breach of the duty of loyalty and the Conflicts Policy is nondischargeable for false

pretenses.

D. All Except a Small Portion of the Judgment Attributable to Afoluso’s Breach

of the Annual Incentive Program Is Nondischargeable Pursuant to

§523(a)(2)(A).

Novartis avers that the portion of the Judgment attributable to the breach of the AIP is

nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A).22 Am. Compl. ¶ 92. This portion of the Judgment

is based upon Afoluso receiving bonuses through Novartis’s AIP for which she was ineligible on

22 The Amended Complaint also asserts § 523(a)(2)(B) as an alternative basis for nondischargeability of the portion

of the Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s breach of the AIP. Am. Compl. ¶ 92. However, this Court already

determined in the Adversary Summary Judgment Opinion that “[t]hese omissions/implied representations relate to

violations of company policy and conflicts of interest rather than Afoluso’s financial condition. Therefore, debt for

money obtained by these omissions/implied representations – the portion of the Judgment attributable to Count IV –

does not implicate § 523(a)(2)(B) and is within the scope of § 523(a)(2)(A).” Adv. Summ. J. Op. 33 n.22.

account of ongoing violations of the Conflicts Policy and Employee Agreement. Am. Compl.

¶¶85-92. Specifically, Afoluso’s undisclosed ownership interest in Global Drug/LaRon rendered

her in violation of the Conflicts Policy and Employee Agreement from the outset of her

employment. Ex. 4 at 3, 20; Ex. 5 at 22-23. Additionally, Afoluso continued to violate these

policies when she obtained external employment with other pharmaceutical companies during

her tenure at Novartis. Ex. 4 at 20; Ex. 5 at 22.

As discussed supra, a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim based on false pretenses requires proof of an

implied misrepresentation promoted knowingly and willingly that creates a misleading

understanding of the transaction with the plaintiff which wrongfully damaged plaintiff by

inducing plaintiff to advance money, property, or services to the debtor. Carto, 503 BR. at 432;

In re Vidal, 2012 WL 3907847 at *16; In re Ricker, 475 B.R. at 456-57. As mentioned, because a

debtor will rarely, if ever, admit that deception was his purpose, intent to deceive, as well as

knowledge, may be inferred from the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances. In re

Robbins, 562 BR. at 109; In re Singh, 433 BR. at 161.

Certain elements of a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim based upon false pretenses have already been

established on summary judgment by collateral estoppel, including: (1) Afoluso made

omissions/implied misrepresentations regarding her conflicts of interest and compliance with

Novartis policies by failing to disclose her ownership of another pharmaceutical company and

external employment for other pharmaceutical companies in violation of her Employee

Agreement and Novartis’s Conflicts Policy; (2) due to these conflicts, Afoluso was not eligible

for bonuses under the AIP at any point during her employment; (3) her failure to disclose these

conflicts created the misleading impression that she was eligible for bonuses under the AIP when

she was not; and (4) Novartis was harmed when it paid Afoluso bonuses she was not entitled to

receive. Adv. Summ. J. Op. 32-33. The following issues remained for resolution at trial: (1)

whether Afoluso knew her failure to disclose her conflicts of interest created a misleading

impression that she was eligible for the AIP when she was not and (2) whether she purposely

failed to disclose her conflicts intending to deceive Novartis into giving her incentive pay. Id. at

34.

With respect to the portion of the Judgment for breach of the AIP attributable to the

incentive pay Afoluso earned in 2011, the Court cannot conclude that she knew her failure to

disclose her conflicts of interest created the impression she was eligible for the AIP when she

was not or that she intended at that point to deceive Novartis into giving her incentive pay.

Novartis simply did not produce evidence at trial demonstrating that Afoluso was aware in 2010

or 2011, when she initially started working for Biomedical and Auxilium, that she could

specifically lose incentive pay by obtaining external employment or by holding other undisclosed

conflicts of interest, even if she knew that she was prohibited from obtaining external

employment or having other undisclosed conflicts of interest. As discussed supra, Novartis

certainly produced evidence that Afoluso was aware from the outset of her employment that she

was prohibited from holding external employment and that she read and understood the Code of

Conduct in effect at the start of her employment. But, Novartis simply did not produce evidence

at trial of the contents of that Code of Conduct and whether it referenced the implications to her

incentive pay of obtaining external employment or not disclosing other conflicts.23 Nor does her

23 When the Court invited Novartis to submit the version of the Code of Conduct in effect at the time Afoluso

commenced her employment, the Court envisioned that Novartis would authenticate the document with the affidavit

of someone from Novartis with personal knowledge of that version of the Code of Conduct rather than an affidavit

of counsel for Novartis. Without proper authentication, the Court cannot consider the supplemental submission of

the Code of Conduct purportedly in effect at the time Afoluso commenced her employment with Novartis. See Fed.

R. Ev. 901. Had Afoluso produced the supplemental exhibit in discovery in the District Court Action, the Court

could have considered it. See e.g., Shell Trademark Mgmt. BV v. Ray Thomas Petroleum Co., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d

493, 510 (W.D. N.C. 2009). But that does not appear to be the case.

training record reflect that Afoluso received training on the 2011 version of the Code of Conduct

introduced at trial prior to 2012. See Ex. 55. Accordingly, the Court has no basis to conclude that

Afoluso failed to disclose her external employment or other conflicts in 2010 or 2011 with

knowledge that her employment and conflicts would disqualify her from receiving incentive pay,

or intending to deceive Novartis into giving her incentive pay for which she did not qualify.

However, the Court easily infers that as of January 2012, after Afoluso received training

on the 2011 Code of Conduct, Afoluso knowingly created a misleading impression that she was

eligible for the AIP when she was not with the intent and purpose of deceiving Novartis into

continuing to give her incentive pay when she failed to disclose the multiple external positions

she held at that time, as well as the conflict of interest she and Adenekan had as owners of

another pharmaceutical company. In addition to the prohibitions on external employment

mentioned supra, the 2011 Code of Conduct also recites the portion of the Conflicts Policy

prohibiting employees or their spouses from owning an interest in any company which competes

with Novartis. It also states that employees must disclose any known violations of the Code of

Conduct or Conflicts Policy and that violating these policies could result in the employee losing

incentive pay. Ex. 83 at 5, 7.

Accordingly, at the very latest, after the January 2012 training on the 2011 Code of

Conduct, Afoluso, who held three external pharmaceutical positions and an ownership interest in

another pharmaceutical company at the time, was affirmatively aware that she had certain

conflicts which violated the Code of Conduct and Conflicts Policy and which would disqualify

her from receiving incentive pay like that she would receive under the AIP. Despite at that point

knowing that she had an obligation under the Code of Conduct to disclose these conflicts to

Novartis, she still hid them. See Ex. 83 at 3, 5. Based on the foregoing, the Court infers that as of

January 2012 after her training on the 2011 Code of Conduct, Afoluso knew she was creating a

misleading impression when she failed to disclose her conflicts of interest and did so, at least in

part with the intent and purpose of maximizing her compensation by maintaining her incentive

pay through Novartis, her ownership interest in her business, and her consulting positions.24 The

foregoing inference is further supported by the financial difficulties discussed supra which

Afoluso was experiencing during her employment with Novartis, which would have incentivized

her to maximize her compensation as much as possible.

Having concluded that Novartis established by a preponderance of the evidence that from

January 2012, Afoluso knowingly concealed her conflicts of interest with the intent and purpose

of deceiving Novartis, the Court finds the portion of the Judgment attributable to Afoluso’s

breaches of the AIP occurring subsequent to 2011 nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A)

for false pretenses.

E. The Portion of the Judgment Attributable to the Sanctions Against Afoluso

Is Nondischargeable Pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Novartis avers the portion of the Judgment attributable to the sanctions against Afoluso is

nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104-08. This portion is based upon the

District Court’s decision to sanction Afoluso in connection with false misrepresentations made

throughout discovery and her concerted effort to impede discovery. Ex. 4 at 6-7, 13-15. The

District Court sanctioned Afoluso pursuant to its inherent powers, which permits sanctions to be

issued when the Court finds that fraud has been practiced upon it. Id. at 9. As the District Court

24 The Court finds Afoluso’s conclusory, self-serving testimony that she did not know she was creating a misleading

impression by failing to disclose her conflicts and did not intend to mislead Novartis is simply not credible. Trial Tr.

160:2-21. Similarly, the Court finds her self-serving testimony that she was not even aware of the AIP program at all

to be completely not credible in light of the explicit reference to the AIP in her Offer Letter, which she signed on

March 3, 2010, and the fact that she received substantial bonus payments once a year pursuant to the program. Ex.

51; Trial Tr. 159:4-7. See Ex. 5 at 23 (reciting that she had received $57,605 in 2011, $70,343 in 2012, and $82,455

in 2013 from the AIP). It would defy logic to believe that Afoluso would have had no idea of the source of such

substantial payments or that she had received these annual bonuses through the Annual Incentive Program.

noted, fraud on the court occurs where it can be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence

that ‘“a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme’ that interferes with the

court’s ability ‘impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly

hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense.’” Id.

Pursuant to § 523(a)(6), a debt for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another

entity or to the property of another entity will not be discharged. To succeed on a § 523(a)(6)

claim, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury to the plaintiff

was both willful and malicious. Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates (In re Kates), 485 B.R. 86, 100

(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012). “The term ‘willful’ refers to a deliberate or intentional injury, not just a

deliberate or intentional act that leads to an injury.” Id. “Actions taken for the specific purpose of

causing an injury as well as actions that have a substantial certainty of producing injury are

‘willful’ within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).” Id. “‘Malice’ refers to actions that are wrongful and

without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will.” Id. at 101.

A debtor may act with malice without bearing any subjective ill will toward the creditor or any

specific intent to injure the same. Id.

Afoluso’s conduct upon which the District Court based its award of sanctions satisfies the

elements of § 523(a)(6).25 First, the injury attributable to Afoluso’s discovery misconduct in the

District Court Action was willful. The District Court found Afoluso “entirely culpable” for her

25 As mentioned, supra, in the context of dischargeability proceedings, collateral estoppel permits the court to accept

facts established by previous judgment as evidence of nondischargeability. Wolstein v. Docteroff (In re Docteroff),

133 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1987)). Upon application of

collateral estoppel in a nondischargeability action, the Court must determine whether a judgment entered in a prior

proceeding and the accompanying underlying findings are sufficient to render a debt nondischargeable. Aiello v.

Aiello (In re Aiello), 533 BR. 489, 494-95 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015). The findings supporting the sanctions award

discussed infra are identical to issues this Court would be required to determine, were actually litigated and decided

in the District Court Action, were essential to supporting the Judgment, and were issues Afoluso had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate in the District Court Action. See United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Solution, PC, 923 F.3d

308, 316 (3d Cir. 2019); Heine v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 337 F. Supp. 3d 469, 482 (D. NJ. 2018).

“willful, determined effort…to deceive” Novartis and the District Court by committing perjury

multiple times, “brazenly” misleading Novartis counsel, and manipulating the judicial process

“in bad faith.” Ex. 4 at 13, 14. In fact, the District Court determined Afoluso’s false deposition

testimony and written discovery responses were not the result of forgetfulness or confusion. Id.

at 13-14. Rather, the District Court found “[s]he had every opportunity to tell the truth and

cooperate in discovery and chose not to.” Id. at 14. Ultimately, The District Court found a clear

connection between Afoluso’s discovery “obfuscation” and the very matters in controversy in the

District Court Action. Id. The District Court findings regarding Afoluso’s conduct during

discovery in the District Court Action demonstrate that Afoluso’s fraudulent scheme to mislead

and manipulate Novartis and the District Court was undertaken intentionally to injure Novartis in

its ability to prosecute its Counterclaims and defend against Afoluso’s claims in the District

Court Action. Accordingly, based on the foregoing description of Afoluso’s conduct, the Court

easily concludes that she acted deliberately and willfully with the specific purpose and intent of

injuring Novartis by manipulating the judicial process. The portion of the Judgment attributable

to the sanctions award against Afoluso is a debt for a willful injury.

Similarly, with regard to the second element, the injury attributable to Afoluso’s

discovery misconduct in the District Court Action was malicious. Committing fraud, repeatedly

lying about matters in controversy during discovery, and withholding relevant evidence in a

“willful,” “bad faith” effort to mislead the opposing party and manipulate the judicial process are

objectively wrongful and without just cause or excuse. See Ex. 4 at 13; J & V Developers, Inc. v.

Malloy (In re Malloy), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63015, at *29 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2016) (defending

an action without any underlying legal or factual support for the claims constitutes a malicious

injury.). Accordingly, the Court concludes that based upon the District Court’s findings

underlying the sanctions award against Afoluso that the portion of the Judgment attributable to

that award is a debt for a malicious injury. Therefore, that portion of the Judgment is

nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

F. The Portion of the Judgment Attributable to the Sanctions Against

Adenekan Is Nondischargeable Pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

Novartis avers that the portion of the Judgment attributable to the sanctions award against

Adenekan for his false deposition testimony and discovery obstruction in the District Court

Action is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6) which, as discussed supra, provides that a

discharge will not discharge an individual debtor from any debt for willful and malicious injury

by the debtor to another entity or property of another entity. Am. Compl. ¶ 119. An injury

cognizable under § 523(a)(6) is “forcing another person to expend unnecessary money and time”

such as by “engaging in deliberate and needlessly prolonged litigation.” Purser v. Scarbrough

(In re Scarbrough), 516 B.R. 897, 914-15 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2014). Furthermore, abusing the

judicial process to cause unnecessary delay or harassment can serve as the basis for a finding of

willful and malicious behavior. Id.

Adenekan’s actions in obstructing and interfering with discovery in the District Court

Action were indeed willful and malicious. There is no doubt based upon the District Court’s

findings that Adenekan acted deliberately in withholding subpoenaed documents from Novartis

as demonstrated by his blatant attempt at hiding and concealing documents about LaRon by

falsely certifying he had none when, in fact, he had thousands located in his home. Doing so was

substantially certain to harm Novartis by either forcing it to spend more money and time

needlessly on other third party discovery or making it impossible to defend against Afoluso’s

claims or present its own Counterclaims. Further demonstrating the intentional and deliberate

nature of Adenekan’s obstructive conduct throughout discovery was his continued refusal to

produce the requested documents in the face of two court orders compelling him to do so,

knowing that if he did not, he could be subject to sanctions. See Ex. 4 at 7 (“On October 30,

2015, Mr. Adesanya was again instructed to comply, and this Court granted Defendant

[Novartis] leave to file for sanctions for fees if Mr. Adesanya did not do so.”) (emphasis added);

In re Malloy, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63015, at *28. Even through the date the First District

Court Opinion was issued, he still never produced the documents despite being given multiple

opportunities to comply. Ex. 4 at 7. His false deposition testimony only further reflects

Adenekan’s intent to injure Novartis by making it substantially more difficult for Novartis to try

its case and gain needed, relevant discovery.

As the District Court mentioned in both District Court Opinions, sanctions may be

assessed against a responsible person when the very temple of justice has been defiled or fraud

has been practiced upon the court by setting in motion an unconscionable scheme to unfairly

hamper the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense. Ex. 4 at 9; Ex. 5 at 7. Based on

the totality of the foregoing conduct, it is clear that Adenekan by submitting false certifications,

giving false testimony, and refusing to produce documents requested by subpoena even after

being ordered twice by the District Court to do so engaged in a deliberate and intentional scheme

to prevent Novartis from obtaining discovery it needed to present its case, conduct which was

substantially certain to cause injury to Novartis, rendering that conduct willful for purposes of

§523(a)(6). Furthermore, there is no just cause or excuse for intentionally undertaking an

“unconscionable scheme” to defraud the Court and Novartis by obstructing Novartis’s discovery

through a false certification regarding requested documents, false testimony, and repeated

defiance of multiple court orders, rendering the conduct and scheme “malicious” for purposes of

§ 523(a)(6). Accordingly, the portion of the Judgment attributable to the sanctions against

Adenekan is nondischargeable for willful and malicious injury.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon all the foregoing, the Judgment is nondischargeable pursuant to

§§523(a)(2)(A), 523(a)(2)(B), and 523(a)(6), except for the $57,605 attributable to Afoluso’s

2011 breaches of the AIP.

Date: July 14, 2021 __________________________________

Honorable Ashely M. Chan

United States Bankruptcy Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.