PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. v. SOCIETE GENERALE PRIVATE BANKING (SUISSE) S.A. (f

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION

CORPORATION, No. 08-01789 (CGM)

Plaintiff-Applicant, SIPA LIQUIDATION

v. (Substantively Consolidated)

BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT

SECURITIES LLC,

Defendant.

In re:

BERNARD L. MADOFF,

Debtor.

IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation of

Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC,

Plaintiff, Adv. Pro. No. 12-01677 (CGM)

v.

SOCIETE GENERALE PRIVATE BANKING

(SUISSE) S.A. (f/k/a SG Private Banking Suisse

S.A.), individually and as successor in interest to

Societe Generale Private Banking (Lugano-Svizzera)

S.A., et. al.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

A P P E A R A N C E S :

Special Counsel for Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Substantively Consolidated SIPA

Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and the Chapter 7 Estate of

Bernard L. Madoff

Windells Marx Lane & Mittendorf, LLP

156 West 56th Street

New York, New York 10019

By: Howard L. Simon (on the papers)

Counsels for Defendants, SG Litigants

Allegaert Berger & Vogel LLP

111 Broadway, 20th Floor

New York, New York 10006

By: John F. Zulack (on the papers)

Mayer Brown LLP

1221 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10020

By: Christopher J. Houpt (on the papers)

CECELIA G. MORRIS

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Pending before the Court is the motion by the Defendants, Société Générale Private

Banking (Suisse) S.A. (f/k/a SG Private Banking Suisse S.A.) (“SG Suisse”), individually and as

successor in interest to Societe Generale Private Banking (Lugano-Svizzera) S.A. (“SG

Lugano”); Socgen Nominees (UK) Limited (“SG UK”); Lyxor Asset Management Inc. (f/k/a SG

Asset Management, Inc.) (“Lyxor Asset”), as General Partner of SG AM AI Premium Fund L.P.

(“SG Premium”); SG Audace Alternatif (f/k/a SGAM AI Audace Alternatif), now acting by and

through its manager, Lyxor Asset Management S.A.S. (“SG Audace”); SGAM AI Equilibrium

Fund (f/k/a SGAM Alternative Diversified Fund), now acting by and through its liquidator,

KPMG Advisory Sarl (“SG Equilibrium”); Lyxor Premium Fund (f/k/a SGAM Alternative Multi

Manager Diversified Fund), now acting by and through its trustee, Societe Generale S.A.

(“Lyxor Premium”); Societe Generale S.A. (“SG”), as Trustee for Lyxor Premium Fund and

Successor in Interest to Banque de Reescompte et de Placement a/k/a Barep and to Societe

Generale Asset Management Banque d/b/a Barep; and Societe Generale Luxembourg (f/k/a

Societe Generale Bank & Trust S.A.) (“SG Luxembourg”) (collectively, the “SG Defendants” or

“Defendants”), to dismiss the complaint of Irving Picard, the trustee (“Trustee”) for the

liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”) seeking to recover

subsequent transfers allegedly consisting of BLMIS customer property. The Defendants seek

dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to allege that the Defendants received customer

property, failure to state a claim due to the safe harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code, and

failure to plead a claim for relief under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the

reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety.

Jurisdiction

This is an adversary proceeding commenced in this Court, in which the main underlying

SIPA proceeding, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (CGM) (the “SIPA Proceeding”), is pending. The

SIPA Proceeding was originally brought in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (the “District Court”) as Securities Exchange Commission v. Bernard L.

Madoff Investment Securities LLC et al., No. 08-CV-10791, and has been referred to this Court.

This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and (e)(1),

and 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4).

This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (F), (H) and (O). This Court

has subject matter jurisdiction over these adversary proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1334(b) and 157(a), the District Court’s Standing Order of Reference, dated July 10, 1984, and

the Amended Standing Order of Reference, dated January 31, 2012. In addition, the District

Court removed the SIPA liquidation to this Court pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(4), (see Order,

Civ. 08– 01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (“Main Case”), at ¶ IX (ECF No. 1)), and this

Court has jurisdiction under the latter provision. Personal jurisdiction has been contested by the

Defendants and will be discussed infra.

Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the background of the BLMIS Ponzi scheme and its

SIPA proceeding. See Picard v. Citibank, N.A. (In re BLMIS), 12 F.4th 171, 178–83 (2d Cir.

2021), cert. denied sub nom. Citibank, N.A. v. Picard, 142 S. Ct. 1209, 212 L. Ed. 2d 217 (2022).

This adversary proceeding was filed on May 30, 2012. Compl., ECF1 No. 1. Via the

complaint (“Complaint”) and the April 18, 2022 stipulation and order, the Trustee seeks to

recover approximately $137 million in subsequent transfers made to the Defendants. Id. ¶ 2;

Stip., ECF No. 133. The subsequent transfers were derived from investments with BLMIS made

by other funds, including Fairfield Sentry Limited (“Fairfield Sentry”), Fairfield Sigma Limited

(“Fairfield Sigma”), and Fairfield Lambda Limited (“Fairfield Lambda”) (collectively, the

“Fairfield Funds”). Id. These funds are referred to as “feeder funds” because the intention of the

fund was to invest in BLMIS. Id. ¶ 2, 4.

The Defendants SG Suisse and SG Lugano were sociétés anonyme organized under the

laws of Switzerland. Id. ¶ 8, 9. The Defendant SG UK was a limited company organized under

the laws of the United Kingdom. Id. ¶ 10. The Defendants Barep and Lyxor Premium were

sociétés anonyme organized under the laws of France. Id. ¶ 11, 19. The Defendant SG Premium

was a limited partnership organized under the laws of Delaware. Id. ¶ 14. The Defendant Lyxor

Asset, general partner of SG Premium, was a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware.

Id. ¶ 15. The Defendant SG Audace was a fonds commun de placement organized under the laws

of France. Id. ¶ 16. The Defendant SG Equilibrium was a Societe d'Investissement a Capital

Variable organized under the laws of Luxembourg. Id. ¶ 17. The Defendant SG Luxembourg

was a societe anonyme organized under the laws of Luxembourg. Id. ¶ 20.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to “ECF” are references to this Court’s electronic docket in adversary

proceeding 12-01677-cgm.

Following BLMIS’s collapse, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Fairfield

Sentry and related defendants to avoid and recover fraudulent transfers of customer property in

the amount of approximately $3 billion. Id. ¶¶ 35, 36. In 2011, the Trustee settled with Fairfield

Sentry. Id. ¶ 40. As part of the settlement, Fairfield Sentry consented to a judgment in the

amount of $3.054 billion (Consent J., 09-01239-cgm, ECF No. 109) but repaid only $70 million

to the BLMIS customer property estate. The Trustee then commenced a number of adversary

proceedings against subsequent transferees like Defendants to recover the approximately $3

billion in missing customer property.

Personal Jurisdiction

The Defendants object to the Trustee’s assertion of personal jurisdiction. The Trustee

argues in the Complaint that the Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the laws of the

United States and New York by directing funds to be invested with New York-based BLMIS

through the Fairfield Funds, wiring funds to Fairfield Sentry, Fairfield Sigma, and Fairfield

Lambda through banks in New York and maintaining bank accounts at a bank in New York

through which the Defendants deposited redemption payments. Compl. ¶¶ 4–5, 33–34, 36–37,

73–76, ECF No. 1.

To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Trustee “must make a prima facie showing that

jurisdiction exists.” SPV Osus Ltd. v. UBS AG, 882 F.3d 333, 342 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting

Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2010)). A trial court has

considerable procedural leeway when addressing a pretrial dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(2).

Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013). “‘It may

determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in aid of the

motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.’” Id. (quoting

Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also Picard v. BNP

Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same).

“Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the

motion by pleading in good faith, legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.” Dorchester Fin.,

722 F.3d at 84–85 (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d

Cir. 1990)); Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Grp. (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 627 B.R. 546, 565

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (same). In this case, the Trustee has alleged legally sufficient

allegations of jurisdiction simply by stating that Defendants “knowingly direct[ed] funds to be

invested with New York-based BLMIS.” Compl. ¶ 31, ECF No. 1. This allegation alone is

sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Defendants in the pre-discovery

stage of litigation. That being stated, this was not the only allegation made by the Trustee.

At the pre-discovery stage, the allegations need not be factually supported. See

Dorchester Fin. Securities Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 85 (2d. Cir. 2013) (an averment

of facts is necessary only after discovery). In order to be subjected to personal jurisdiction in the

United States, due process requires that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the

forum in which defendant is sued “‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re

BLMIS), 480 B.R. 501, 516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“BLI”) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The pleadings and affidavits are to be construed “‘in

the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, resolving all doubts in their favor.’” Chloé v. Queen

Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Porina v. Marward

Shipping Co., 521 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008)); Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594

B.R. 167, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).

The Supreme Court has set out three conditions for the exercise of specific

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. First, the defendant must have

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

State or have purposefully directed its conduct into the forum State. Second, the

plaintiff's claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum conduct.

Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances.

U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am. N.A., 916 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

Purposeful Availment

“[M]inimum contacts . . . exist where the defendant purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled into court there.” Charles

Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2018). “Although a defendant’s

contacts with the forum state may be intertwined with its transactions or interactions with the

plaintiff or other parties, a defendant’s relationship with a third party, standing alone, is an

insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am. N.A., 916 F.3d 143, 150

(2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “It is insufficient to rely on a defendant’s random, fortuitous, or

attenuated contacts or on the unilateral activity of a plaintiff with the forum to establish specific

jurisdiction.” Id.

A party “purposefully avail[s] itself of the benefits and protections of New York laws by

knowing, intending and contemplating that the substantial majority of funds invested in Fairfield

Sentry would be transferred to BLMIS in New York to be invested in the New York securities

market.” BLI, 480 B.R. at 517.

The Defendants argue that the Trustee has failed to allege sufficient minimum contacts

with the United States. The Complaint suggests otherwise. In the Complaint, the Trustee alleges

that the Defendants “knowingly direct[ed] funds to be invested with New York-based BLMIS

through the Fairfield Funds” and “then receiv[ed] transfers from these funds (the subsequent

transfers).” Compl. ¶ 31, ECF No. 1. The Trustee has also alleged that Fairfield Sentry invested

almost all of its assets in BLMIS. See Fairfield Compl. ¶ 89, Picard v. Fairfield Inv Fund Ltd.,

Adv. Pro. No. 09-1239 ECF No. 286 (the “Fairfield Amended Complaint”) (“Under Fairfield

Sentry’s offering memorandum, the fund’s investment manager was required to invest no less

than 95% of the fund’s assets through BLMIS.”) (adopted by reference, at paragraph 67, of this

Complaint); see, e.g. Longo Decl. Ex. 5, Fairfield Sentry Placement Mem., ECF No. 156 (“The

Split Strike Conversion strategy is implemented by Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities

LLC (‘BLM’), a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, through

accounts maintained by the Fund at that Firm. . . . The Services of BLM and its personnel are

essential to the continued operation of the Fund, and its profitability, if any.”).

The Trustee has submitted additional evidence in response to the motion to dismiss.

Attached as exhibits to the Longo Declaration, the Trustee has provided evidence that the

Defendants used bank accounts in New York to send subscription payments to and receive

redemption payments from Fairfield Sentry. Longo Decl. Exs. 8–28, ECF No. 156. Lyxor

Asset, SG Luxembourg, and SG Suisse were in frequent communication with Fairfield

Greenwich Group employees at Fairfield’s offices in New York to discuss investment with

Fairfield Sentry and Madoff. Longo Decl. Exs. 29–36, ECF No. 156. Lyxor Asset personnel

requested a meeting with Fairfield Greenwich Group in New York to review trades and regular

updates thereafter. Longo Decl. Ex. 30, ECF No. 156. An affiliate of the Defendants

participated in a conference call concerning Fairfield Sentry with New York Employees of

Fairfield Greenwich Group. Ex. 37, 38. These allegations are sufficient to constitute a prima

facie showing of jurisdiction. Dorchester Fin. Securities Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81,

85 (2d. Cir. 2013).

Arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum conduct

As to the second prong, the suit must “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts

with the forum.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1017,

1026, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021) (emphasis in original). “[P]roof that a plaintiff’s claim came

about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct” is not required. Id. at 1027. Instead, the court

need only find “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.” Goodyear

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A.

(In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 190 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Where the defendant’s contacts with

the jurisdiction that relate to the cause of action are more substantial, however, it is not

unreasonable to say that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction even though the acts

within the state are not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.”) (internal quotations

omitted).

The Trustee is asserting subsequent transfer claims against Defendants for monies they

received from the Fairfield Sentry, Fairfield Sigma, and Fairfield Lambda. Compl. ¶¶ 85–99,

ECF No. 1. These allegations are directly related to investment activities with Fairfield and

BLMIS. Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 191 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018)

(finding that the redemption and other payments the defendants received as direct investors in a

BLMIS feeder fund arose from the New York contacts such as sending subscription agreements

to New York, wiring funds in U.S. dollars to New York, sending redemption requests to New

York, and receiving redemption payments from a Bank of New York account in New York, and

were the proximate cause of the injuries that the Trustee sought to redress). The suit is affiliated

with the alleged in-state conduct. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.

915, 919 (2011).

Reasonableness

Having found sufficient minimum contacts, the Court must determine if exercising

personal jurisdiction over the Defendants is reasonable and “comport[s] with fair play and

substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (internal

quotations omitted). Factors the Court may consider include the burden on the defendant, the

forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient

and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient

resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental

substantive social policies. Id.

The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. The Defendants are not burdened by this

litigation. Defendants have actively participated in this Court’s litigation for over ten years.

They are represented by highly competent U.S. counsel, filed claims in this SIPA litigation, and

submitted to the jurisdiction of New York courts’ when they signed subscription agreements

with Fairfield Sentry. The forum and the Trustee both have a strong interest in litigating BLMIS

adversary proceedings in this Court. Picard v. Maxam Absolute Return Fund, L.P. (In re

BLMIS), 460 B.R. 106, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 474 B.R. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Picard

v. Chais (In re BLMIS), 440 B.R. 274, 278 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); Picard v. Cohmad Sec.

Corp. (In re BLMIS), 418 B.R. 75, 82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich

Grp., (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 627 B.R. 546, 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021); see also In re

Picard, 917 F.3d 85, 103 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The United States has a compelling interest in

allowing domestic estates to recover fraudulently transferred property.”).

By alleging that Defendants intentionally invested in BLMIS, the Trustee has met his

burden of alleging jurisdiction as to each subsequent transfer that originated with BLMIS. The

Trustee has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction with respect to the subsequent

transfers at issue in this Case.

12(b)(6) Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). The claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads facts that

allow the Court to draw a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does

not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise

a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”). In deciding

a motion to dismiss, the Court should assume the factual allegations are true and determine

whether, when read together, they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 679. “And, of course, a well-pl[ed] complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge

that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In deciding the motion, “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as

other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in

particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007). A complaint is “deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit[,] .

. . documents incorporated in it by reference[,]” and other documents “integral” to the complaint.

Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). A

document is “integral” to a complaint when the plaintiff has “actual notice” of the extraneous

information and relied on it in framing the complaint. DeLuca v. AccessIT Grp., Inc., 695 F.

Supp. 2d 54, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153).

The Trustee is seeking to recover the subsequent transfer of approximately $137 million

in subsequent transfers made to the Defendants by the Fairfield Funds.

Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided

under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may

recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so

orders, the value of such property, from--

(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer

was made; or

(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.

“To plead a subsequent transfer claim, the Trustee must plead that the initial transfer is

avoidable, and the defendant is a subsequent transferee of that initial transferee, that is, that the

funds at issue originated with the debtor.” Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R.

167, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on

11 U.S.C. § 546(e)), No. 12 MC 115(JSR), 2013 WL 1609154, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013)

(consolidated proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)). “Federal Civil Rule 9(b) governs the portion

of a claim to avoid an initial intentional fraudulent transfer and Rule 8(a) governs the portion of a

claim to recover the subsequent transfer. Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R.

167, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Sharp Int’l Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., (In re

Sharp Int’l Corp.), 403 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) and Picard v. Legacy Capital Ltd. (In re

BLMIS), 548 B.R. 13, 36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, Picard v. Citibank,

N.A. (In re BLMIS), 12 F.4th 171 (2d Cir. 2021)).

To properly plead a subsequent transfer claim, the Trustee need only provide “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). “The plaintiff must allege the necessary vital statistics—the who, when, and how much–

of the purported transfers to establish an entity as a subsequent transferee of the funds. However,

the plaintiff’s burden at the pleading stage does not require dollar-for-dollar accounting of the

exact funds at issue.” Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 195 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 2018). While the Trustee must allege that the initial transfer from BLMIS to Fairfield

Sentry is avoidable, he is not required to avoid the transfer received by the initial transferee

before asserting an action against subsequent transferees. The Trustee is free to pursue any of

the immediate or mediate transferees, and nothing in the statute requires a different result. IBT

Int’l, Inc. v. Northern (In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc.), 408 F.3d 689, 706-07 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Trustee pleaded the avoidability of the initial transfers (from BLMIS to Fairfield

Sentry, Fairfield Sigma, and Fairfield Lambda) by adopting by reference the entirety of the

Fairfield Amended Complaint filed against Fairfield Sentry in adversary proceeding 09-01239.

Compl. ¶ 67, ECF No. 1 (“The Trustee incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the

Fairfield Amended Complaint as if fully set forth in this Complaint.”). Whether the Fairfield

Amended Complaint properly pleads the avoidability of the initial transfer, is governed by Rule

9(b). Rule 9(b) states: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a

person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “Where the actual fraudulent

transfer claim is asserted by a bankruptcy trustee, applicable Second Circuit precedent instructs

courts to adopt a more liberal view since a trustee is an outsider to the transaction who must

plead fraud from second-hand knowledge. Moreover, in a case such as this one, where the

Trustee’s lack of personal knowledge is compounded with complicated issues and transactions

that extend over lengthy periods of time, the trustee’s handicap increases, and even greater

latitude should be afforded.” Picard v. Cohmad Secs. Corp., (In re BLMIS), 454 B.R. 317, 329

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (cleaned up).

Adoption by Reference

Adoption by reference is governed by Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Rule 10(c) states: “A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference

elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.” The district court has

already found that adoption by reference of the entire Fairfield Amended Complaint is proper.

See SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)), 501 B.R. 26, 36

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The Trustee’s complaint against Standard Chartered Financial Services

incorporates by reference the complaints against Kingate and Fairfield, including the allegations

concerning the avoidability of the initial transfers, and further alleges the avoidability of these

transfers outright. Thus, the avoidability of the transfers from Madoff Securities to Kingate and

Fairfield is sufficiently pleaded for purposes of section 550(a).”) (cleaned up).

The Court will follow the district court’s instruction. As was explained in In re Geiger,

pleadings filed in the “same action” may be properly adopted by reference in other pleadings in

that action. 446 B.R. 670, 679 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010). The Fairfield Amended Complaint was

filed in the “same action” as this adversary proceeding for purposes of Rule 10(c). Id. Cases

within this SIPA proceeding are filed in the same “proceeding”—the SIPA proceeding. In re

Terrestar Corp., No. 16 CIV. 1421 (ER), 2017 WL 1040448, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2017)

(“Adversary proceedings filed in the same bankruptcy case do not constitute different cases.”);

see also Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 610 B.R. 197, 237 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The prior decisions within this SIPA proceeding constitute law of the case . . .

. “); Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 603 B.R. 682, 700 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 2019), (citing In re Motors Liquidation Co., 590 B.R. 39, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (law of

the case doctrine applies across adversary proceedings within the same main case), aff’d, 943

F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2019)); Perez v. Terrastar Corp. (In re Terrestar Corp.), No. 16 Civ. 1421

(ER), 2017 WL 1040448, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2017) (“Adversary proceedings filed in the

same bankruptcy case do not constitute different cases.”), appeal dismissed, No. 17-1117 (2d

Cir. June 29, 2017); Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Montagne (In re Montagne), No. 08-1024 (CAB),

2010 WL 271347, at *6 (Bankr. D. Vt. Jan. 22, 2010) (“[D]ifferent adversary proceedings in the

same main case do not constitute different ‘cases.’”).

Some courts have worried that wholesale incorporation of a pleading can lead to

“confusing and inconvenient” results. Hinton v. Trans Union, LLC, 654 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446–47

(E.D. Va. 2009) (footnote omitted), aff’d, 382 F. App’x 256 (4th Cir. 2010). That is not a

concern in these proceedings. The Defendants, like many other subsequent transfer defendants

in this SIPA proceeding, are aware of what has been filed in the other adversary proceeding in

this SIPA liquidation. They routinely follow what is happening on a proceeding-wide basis.

See Stip., ECF No. 117 (dismissing adversary proceeding based on consolidated

extraterritoriality ruling).

Allowing the Trustee to incorporate the Fairfield Amended Complaint by reference, does

not prejudice the Defendants. On the other hand, dismissing this Complaint and permitting the

Trustee to amend his Complaint to include all of the allegations that are already contained in the

Fairfield Amended Complaint, would prejudice all parties by delaying the already overly

prolonged proceedings. See Picard v. Fairfield Inv. Fund (In re BLMIS), No. 08-01789 (CGM),

Adv. No. 09-01239 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021) (“Rule 15

places no time bar on making motions to amend pleadings and permits the amending of

pleadings “when justice so requires.”).

Through the adoption of the Fairfield Amended Complaint, the Trustee has adequately

pleaded, with particularity, the avoidability of the initial transfers due to the Fairfield Funds’

knowledge of BLMIS’ fraud. (Fairfield Compl. ¶¶ 314–18, 09-01239, ECF No. 286); see also

SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)), 501 B.R. 26, 36

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he Court directs that the following adversary proceedings be returned to

the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order . . . .”).

BLMIS Customer Property

The Trustee has pleaded that, based on its investigations to date, “$128,678,138 of the

money transferred from BLMIS to Fairfield Sentry was subsequently transferred by Fairfield

Sentry to, or for the benefit of, the SG Sentry Defendants,” “$752,273,917 of the money

transferred from BLMIS to Fairfield Sentry was subsequently transferred by Fairfield Sentry to

Fairfield Sigma,” which “in turn, transferred the equivalent of $2,090,254 of the money it

received from Fairfield Sentry to, or for the benefit of, the SG Sigma Defendants,” and

“$52,935,000 of the money transferred from BLMIS to Fairfield Sentry was subsequently

transferred by Fairfield Sentry to Fairfield Lambda,” which “in turn, transferred the equivalent of

$6,287,866 of the money it received from Fairfield Sentry to, or for the benefit of, Defendant SG

Suisse.” Compl. ¶ 73–75, ECF No. 1.

The exhibits attached to the Complaint provide the Defendants with the “who, when, and

how much” of each transfer. Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 195

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); Compl. Exs. E–I, ECF No. 1 (indicating the dates and amounts of the

transfers in question); cf. Picard v. Shapiro (In re BLMIS), 542 B.R. 100, 119 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2015) (dismissing for failure to plausibly imply that the initial transferee made any subsequent

transfers.). The Fairfield Amended Complaint, which is incorporated by reference into this,

alleges that the Fairfield Fund was required to invest 95% of its assets in BLMIS. Fairfield

Compl. ¶ 89; see also Fairfield Compl. ¶ 91 (“From the beginning, to comport with Madoff’s

requirement for BLMIS feeder funds, Fairfield Sentry ceded control of not only its investment

decisions, but also the custody of its assets, to BLMIS.”). The Trustee need not prove the path

that each transfer took from BLMIS to Fairfield Sentry and subsequently to each redeeming

shareholder. The Complaint plausibly alleges that Fairfield Sentry did not have any assets that

were not customer property.

Taking all allegations as true and reading them in a light most favorable to the Trustee,

the Complaint plausibly pleads that the Defendants received customer property because Fairfield

Sentry did not have other property to give. The calculation of Fairfield Sentry’s customer

property and what funds it used to make redemption payments are issues of fact better resolved

at a later stage of litigation.

Section 546(e) Does Not Bar the Trustee’s Claim to Recover Subsequent Transfers

Defendants have raised the “safe harbor” defense, found in 11 USC § 546(e), to the

Trustee’s allegations. Section 546(e) is referred to as the safe harbor because it protects a

transfer that is a “settlement payment ... made by or to (or for the benefit of) a ... financial

institution [or] financial participant,” or that is “made by or to (or for the benefit of) a ... financial

institution [or] financial participant ... in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. §

546(e). “By its terms, the safe harbor is a defense to the avoidance of the initial transfer. Picard

v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167, 197 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (emphasis

added). However, where the initial transferee fails to raise a § 546(e) defense against the

Trustee’s avoidance of certain transfers, as is the case here, the subsequent transferee is entitled

to raise a § 546(e) defense against recovery of those funds. Picard v. Fairfield Inv. Fund (In re

BLMIS), No. 08-01789 (CGM), Adv. No. 09-01239 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at *3 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021).

In light of the safe harbor granted under 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), the Trustee may only avoid

and recover intentional fraudulent transfers under § 548(a)(1)(A) made within two years of the

filing date, unless the transferee had actual knowledge of BLMIS’s Ponzi scheme, or more

generally, “actual knowledge that there were no actual securities transactions being conducted.”

SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)), No. 12 MC 115(JSR),

2013 WL 1609154, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013). “The safe harbor was intended, among other

things, to promote the reasonable expectations of legitimate investors. If an investor knew that

BLMIS was not actually trading securities, he had no reasonable expectation that he was signing

a contract with BLMIS for the purpose of trading securities for his account. In that event, the

Trustee can avoid and recover preferences and actual and constructive fraudulent transfers to the

full extent permitted under state and federal law.” Picard v. Legacy Capital Ltd. (In re BLMIS),

548 B.R. 13, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal citations omitted), vacated and remanded on

other grounds, Picard v. Citibank, N.A. (In re BLMIS), 12 F.4th 171 (2d Cir. 2021)). “In sum, if

the Trustee sufficiently alleges that the [initial] transferee from whom he seeks to recover a

fraudulent transfer knew of [BLMIS ]’[s] fraud, that transferee cannot claim the protections of

Section 546(e)’s safe harbor.” Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 08-

01789 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021).

This Court has already determined that the Fairfield Amended Complaint contains

sufficient allegations of Fairfield Sentry’s actual knowledge to defeat the safe harbor defense on

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Picard v. Fairfield Inv. Fund (In re BLMIS), No. 08-01789 (CGM),

Adv. No. 09-01239 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021) (“[T]he

Trustee has alleged that the agents and principals of the Fairfield Funds had actual knowledge of

Madoff's fraud”). In that adversary proceeding, the Court held that “[t]he Trustee has pled

[actual] knowledge in two ways: 1) that certain individuals had actual knowledge of Madoff's

fraud, which is imputed to the Fairfield Funds; and 2) that actual knowledge is imputed to the

Fairfield Funds through ‘FGG,’ an alleged ‘de facto’ partnership.” Id. at *4; see also Fairfield

Compl. ¶ 320 (“Fairfield Sentry had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl.

¶ 321 (“Greenwich Sentry and Greenwich Sentry Partners had actual knowledge of the fraud at

BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 322 (“FIFL had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”);

Fairfield Compl. ¶ 323 (“Stable Fund had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield

Compl. ¶ 324 (“FG Limited had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶

325 (“FG Bermuda had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); ¶ 326 (“FG Advisors had

actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 327 (“Fairfield International

Managers had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 328 (“FG Capital

had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 329 (“Share Management had

actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 9 (“It is inescapable that FGG

partners knew BLMIS was not trading securities. They knew BLMIS’s returns could not be the

result of the split strike conversion strategy (the ‘SSC Strategy’). They knew BLMIS’s equities

and options trading volumes were impossible. They knew that BLMIS reported impossible, out-

of-range trades, which almost always were in Madoff’s favor. They knew Madoff’s auditor was

not certified and lacked the ability to audit BLMIS. They knew BLMIS did not use an

independent broker or custodian. They knew Madoff refused to identify any of BLMIS’s options

counterparties. They knew their clients and potential clients raised numerous due diligence

questions they would not and could not satisfactorily answer. They knew Madoff would refuse to

provide them with honest answers to due diligence questions because it would confirm the

details of his fraud. They knew Madoff lied about whether he traded options over the counter or

through the exchange. They knew they lied to clients about BLMIS’s practices in order to keep

the money flowing and their fees growing. And they knowingly misled the SEC at Madoff’s

direction.”).

This Court determined that the Fairfield Amended Complaint is replete with allegations

demonstrating that Fairfield Sentry had actual knowledge that BLMIS was not trading securities.

See Picard v. Fairfield Inv. Fund (In re BLMIS), No. 08-01789(CGM), Adv. No. 09-01239

(CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at *3–*7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021). The district court

determined that “those defendants who claim the protections of Section 546(e) through a Madoff

Securities account agreement but who actually knew that Madoff Securities was a Ponzi scheme

are not entitled to the protections of the Section 546(e) safe harbor, and their motions to dismiss

the Trustee’s claims on this ground must be denied.” SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated

Proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)), No. 12-MC-115(JSR), 2013 WL 1609154, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.

Apr. 15, 2013) (“Cohmad”). And, “to the extent that a defendant claims protection under

Section 546(e) under a separate securities contract,” this Court was directed to “adjudicate those

claims in the first instance consistent with [the district court’s] opinion.” Id.

This Court is powerless to reconsider this issue, agrees with the district court’s reasoning,

and finds its holding consistent with dicta set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit. See Picard v. Ida Fishman Revocable Trust (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC),

773 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The clawback defendants, having every reason to believe that

BLMIS was actually engaged in the business of effecting securities transactions, have every right

to avail themselves of all the protections afforded to the clients of stockbrokers, including the

protection offered by § 546(e).”). The Trustee’s allegations in the Fairfield Amended Complaint

are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on this issue.

The Safe Harbor Cannot be Used to Defeat a Subsequent Transfer

The Defendants argue that the safe harbor prevents the Trustee from avoiding the

subsequent transfers between Fairfield Sentry and the Defendants on account of the securities

contract between Fairfield and the Defendants.

The safe harbor is not applicable to subsequent transfers. “By its terms, the safe harbor is

a defense to the avoidance of the initial transfer.” Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS),

594 B.R. 167, 197 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (emphasis in original); see also 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)

(failing to include § 550 in its protections). Since there must be an initial transfer in order for the

Trustee to collect against a subsequent transferee, a subsequent transferee may raise the safe

harbor as a defense—but only in so far as the avoidance of the initial transfer is concerned. The

safe harbor cannot be used as a defense by the subsequent transferee because the Trustee is not

“avoiding” a subsequent transfer, “he recovers the value of the avoided initial transfer from the

subsequent transferee under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a), and the safe harbor does not refer to the

recovery claims under section 550.” Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS), 594 B.R. 167,

197 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).

The Defendants’ reliance on SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on 11

U.S.C. § 546(e)), No. 12 MC 115(JSR), 2013 WL 1609154, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013)

(“Cohmad”), is unavailing. In Cohmad, Judge Rakoff laid out the requirement for recovery of a

fraudulent transfer from a subsequent transferee: “the Trustee must first show that the initial

transfer of that property by the debtor is subject to avoidance under one of the Bankruptcy

Code's avoidance provisions (e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547 & 548).” Id. This requirement is

subject to a rule allowing a subsequent transferee to raise a Section 546(e) defense “even if the

initial (or mediate) transferee fails to raise a Section 546(e) defense.” Id. Judge Rakoff

identified “one caveat” to this rule: “to the extent that an innocent customer transferred funds to a

subsequent transferee who had actual knowledge of Madoff Securities' fraud, that subsequent

transferee cannot prevail on a motion to dismiss on the basis of Section 546(e)'s safe harbor.” Id.

as Judge Rakoff explained, this caveat follows from the general principles of recovery: “[a]

defendant cannot be permitted to in effect launder what he or she knows to be fraudulently

transferred funds through a nominal third party and still obtain the protections of Section

546(e).” Id. (citing In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 707 (11th Cir.2005)). This “one

caveat” does not alter the fact that the district court determined that “those defendants who claim

the protections of Section 546(e) through a Madoff Securities account agreement but who

actually knew that Madoff Securities was a Ponzi scheme are not entitled to the protections of

the Section 546(e) safe harbor, and their motions to dismiss the Trustee’s claims on this ground

must be denied.” Cohmad, 2013 WL 1609154, at *10.

The Defendants argue that this Court applied the safe harbor to redemption payments

made by Fairfield Sentry in In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2020 WL 7345988, at *5 (Dec. 14, 2020)

(“Fairfield III”). Reliance on this case is misplaced. While many facts overlap between this

SIPA liquidation of BLMIS and the foreign liquidation of BLMIS’s largest feeder fund, Fairfield

Sentry, the legal holdings in these liquidations are not interchangeable. In this case, the Court is

analyzing subsequent transfers; in Fairfield III the Court was analyzing initial transfers. The

safe harbor is not available to be raised as defense to subsequent transfer claims.

In Fairfield II, this Court analyzed whether the safe harbor applied to avoidance claims

under BVI law” to recover “unfair preferences,” “undervalue transactions,” and constructive trust

claims against a defendant who allegedly “knew or willfully blinded itself to the fact that the

[Fairfield Sentry’s] BLMIS investments were worthless or virtually worthless.” In re Fairfield

Sentry Ltd., No. 10-13164 (SMB), 2020 WL 7345988, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2020),

reconsideration denied, No. 10-13164 (SMB), 2021 WL 771677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,

2021). The Court was not considering the safe harbor’s effect on subsequent transfer claims

brought under § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. Fairfield III is not applicable here.

Defendants are not permitted to raise the safe harbor defense on their own behalf as

subsequent transferees.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. The Trustee shall

submit a proposed order within fourteen days of the issuance of this decision, directly to

chambers (via E-Orders), upon not less than two days’ notice to all parties, as required by Local

Bankruptcy Rule 9074-1(a).

/s/ Cecelia G. Morris

SIRO ha eer the laws of the Bif cs Nstands CHY¥ii) @édeH@Gr Matis 15 case is

g brought in the B mn U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

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