AMR Corporation

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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In re:

Chapter 11

AMR CORPORATION, et al.,

Case No. 11-15463 (SHL)

Reorganized Debtors. Confirmed

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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

Before the Court are two motions filed by Lawrence M. Meadows in the above-captioned

cases of American Airlines, Inc. (“American”) and its related debtor entities (collectively, the

“Reorganized Debtors”). The first is a request by Mr. Meadows to temporarily stay this Court’s

Order Granting Reorganized Debtors’ Motion to Estimate Maximum Amount of Proof of Claim

No. 9676 Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 502(c) [ECF No. 13361]1 (the

“Estimation Order”) for a period of no less than 14 days. See Creditor Lawrence M. Meadows

Motion to Stay Entry of Order Granting Reorganized Debtors’ Motion to Estimate Maximum

Amount of Proof of Claim No. 9676 Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 502(c) [ECF

No. 13362] (the “Stay Motion”). The second motion is a request for reconsideration of the

Estimation Order and also includes an additional request for a stay of the Estimation Order

pending appeal. See Creditor Lawrence M. Meadows’ Motion for Reconsideration of Order

Signed on 9/8/2021, Granting Debtor’s Motion to Estimate Maximum Amount of Proof of Claim

No. 9676 Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105 (A) and 502 (C) (Doc 13361) Filed Pursuant to

Fed. R. Bnkr. [sic] P. Rule 9023, Seeking a New Trial or to Amend Judgement [sic] of Court’s

Order; and Motion to Stay any Subsequent Orders Approving a Final Distribution or Final

1 Unless otherwise indicated, references to the Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) docket are

to Case No. 11-15463.

Decree Closing These Proceedings, Pending Full Resolution of This Motion and Any Associated

Appeals [ECF No. 13365] (the “Reconsideration Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, the

Estimation Motion and the Stay Motion are both denied.

DISCUSSION

Familiarity with the underlying facts of this matter is presumed, including with this

Court’s prior Memorandum of Decision granting the Reorganized Debtors’ request for

estimation. See In re AMR Corp., 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1867 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2021) (the

“Estimation Decision”). But some background is necessary for today’s ruling.

On March 2, 2021, the Reorganized Debtors filed a motion under Section 502(c) of the

Bankruptcy Code to estimate the amount of Claim No. 9676, which was filed by the U.S. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) in the Reorganized Debtors’ bankruptcy

cases. See Reorganized Debtors’ Motion to Estimate Maximum Amount of Proof of Claim No.

9676 Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 502(c) [ECF No. 13289] (the “Estimation

Motion”). The Estimation Motion requested that the Court estimate the maximum amount of the

EEOC claim at $9.95 million, which matched the settlement amount (the “Consent Decree”)

agreed to by the parties in an action brought by the EEOC against American in the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona (the “EEOC Lawsuit”). See In re AMR, 2021 Bankr.

LEXIS 1867, at *1-4. The Arizona District Court had previously approved the Consent Decree

in November 2017. See id. Mr. Meadows, a former pilot for American, filed an appeal in the

EEOC Lawsuit but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Arizona District

Court. See id.

After approval of the Consent Decree by the Arizona District Court, the Reorganized

Debtors sought approval of the same settlement in this Court under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy

Procedure 9019(a). See Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P.

9019(a) Approving Settlement Agreement Resolving Certain Pending EEOC Litigation [ECF No.

12861] (the “Settlement Motion”). This Court granted the Settlement Motion and entered an

order approving the Consent Decree in May 2018. See Agreed Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr.

P.9019(a) Approving Settlement Agreement Resolving Certain Pending EEOC Litigation [ECF

No. 12898] (the “Settlement Order”). Mr. Meadows filed an appeal of the Settlement Order,

which is currently pending in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. See

Notice of Appeal of Creditor Lawrence M. Meadows [ECF No. 12912]; Meadows v. AMR Corp.

(In re AMR Corp.), No. 18-06149 (RA) (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2018). Because the Settlement Order

is still on appeal in the Southern District of New York, the Consent Decree has not yet become

effective.2 As a result, there has been no distribution by the Reorganized Debtors for the benefit

of the potential claimants under the Consent Decree. In addition, the delay in the Consent

Decree becoming effective has prevented any further distributions in the Reorganized Debtors’

bankruptcy proceeding due to the need to hold monies in reserve with respect to the EEOC’s

claim. See Hr’g Tr. 30:14-20 (June 7, 2021) [ECF No. 13335] (the “Estimation Hearing”)

(noting that other claimants, primarily old equity, have been waiting for a distribution).

Given the delay in distributions in the bankruptcy cases caused by the appeal of the

Settlement Order, the Reorganized Debtors decided to seek Court approval to estimate the EEOC

claim using the number that the parties had reached in their settlement. As he had with the

Settlement Order, Mr. Meadows opposed the Estimation Motion. See Creditor Lawrence M.

Meadows Response and Objection to Reorganized Debtors’ Motion to Estimate Maximum

2 Under the terms of the parties’ settlement, Consent Decree does not become effective—and thus, the

EEOC’s claim will remain pending on the claims register in an unliquidated amount—until the Settlement Order is

final and non-appealable. See In re AMR, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1867, at *5. The final and non-appealable

requirement applies to both the proceedings before the Arizona District Court and the proceedings before this Court.

Amount of Proof of Claim No. 9676 Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) & 502(c) [ECF No.

13297]. An evidentiary hearing on the Estimation Motion was held before this Court on June 7,

2021. See generally Estimation Hearing Tr. On July 14, 2021, this Court issued the Estimation

Decision, which denied Mr. Meadows’ objection and approved the Estimation Motion. See

generally In re AMR Corp., 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1867.

A. Reconsideration

The Reconsideration Motion seeks relief under Rule 9023 of the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure, which makes Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

applicable to cases under the Bankruptcy Code. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023. Rule 59(e)

authorizes the filing of a “motion to alter or amend a judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

Reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality

and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” In re Health Management Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig.,

113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Nu–Cape

Construction, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 680, 685 (M.D. Fla. 1996)). The burden rests with the movant.

See In re Crozier Bros., Inc., 60 B.R. 683, 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). The standard for

granting a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule 59(e) is “strict, and

reconsideration will generally be denied. . . .” Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P.,

684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.

1995)). “A motion to amend the judgment will be granted only if the movant presents matters or

controlling decisions which the court overlooked that might have materially influenced its earlier

decision.” In Design v. Lauren Knitwear Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2203, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

Feb. 24, 1992) (citing Morser v. AT & T Information Systems, 715 F. Supp. 516, 517 (S.D.N.Y.

1989); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Buffalo Reinsurance Co., 739 F. Supp. 209, 211 (S.D.N.Y.

1990)).

A motion under Rule 59(e) “must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to

discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly

considered by the court.” Kim v. Bryant, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165018, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.

27, 2021) (quoting Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92

(S.D.N.Y. 2000)). Such a request for relief “is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting

the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second

bite at the apple.’” Tonga Partners, 684 F.3d at 52 (quoting Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d

136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)). Nor is it “an opportunity for a party to ‘plug[ ] the gaps of a lost

motion with additional matters.’” Cruz v. Barnhart, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8368, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2006) (quoting Carolco Pictures Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170

(S.D.N.Y. 1988)). “Arguments raised for the first time on a motion for reconsideration are

therefore untimely.” Cruz, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8368, at *4 (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.

of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 265 F.3d 97, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2001)). “[I]t is improper for

the movant to present new material ‘because[,] by definition[,] material that has not been

previously presented cannot have been previously ‘overlooked’ by the court.’” In Design, 1992

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2203, at *3 (quoting Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp. of

South Africa Ltd., 713 F. Supp. 1457, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

Mr. Meadows has not met the burden necessary for reconsideration of either the

Estimation Order or the Court’s underlying Estimation Decision. Mr. Meadows argues that the

Estimation Order is “neither in accordance with the Code nor SDNY practices and precedent, for

it fails to provide sufficient evidence that the estimate is reasonable, and completely ignores the

very real probability that Meadows Appeal(s) will prevail on the merits. . . .” Reconsideration

Motion at 5; see also id. at 18-19. But the Estimation Decision addresses both issues. See In re

AMR, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1867, at *19–27. The Reconsideration Motion raises neither matters

nor controlling decisions that the Court overlooked that would have materially influenced the

Reconsideration Decision, and it is therefore denied.

Mr. Meadows states that he was denied the right to put on expert and witness testimony

at the hearing. See Estimation Motion at 5. But Mr. Meadows had previously submitted a

description of the witness testimony that he intended to provide and was permitted to make a

proffer of that testimony at the hearing, all of which was considered by the Court. See Notice of:

Notice of Creditor Lawrence M. Meadows Witness List for Evidentiary Hearing on June 7th,

2021 at 11:00 a.m. [ECF No. 13330]; Estimation Hearing Tr. 36:20-39:8; see also Notice of

Service: Notice to Compel Witness Testimony of Brian Ostrom During U.S. Bankruptcy Court

Evidentiary Hearing on June 7th, 2021 at 11:00 a.m. [ECF No. 13330]; Notice of Service:

Notice to Compel Witness Testimony of Herman J. Straub During U.S. Bankruptcy Court

Evidentiary Hearing on June 7th, 2021 at 11:00 a.m. [ECF No. 13330]; Notice of Service:

Notice to Compel Witness Testimony of Edward Sicher During U.S. Bankruptcy Court

Evidentiary Hearing on June 7th, 2021 at 11:00 a.m. [ECF No. 13330]. In addition to this

proffer and the Court hearing extensively from Mr. Meadows himself, the Court also heard from

Mr. Straub during the hearing on the Estimation Motion. See Estimation Hearing Tr. 63:5-67:8.

Moreover, as noted by the Court at the hearing, the merits of the Consent Decree are not directly

at issue in the Estimation Motion; this Court’s approval of the Consent Decree is already on

appeal, and that record on appeal already includes Mr. Meadows’ arguments about the merits of

the Consent Decree. See Statement of Issues on Appeal and Designation of Items to be Included

in the Record of Lawrence M. Meadows [ECF No. 12923]; Debtors’ Statement of Issue

Presented on Appeal and Counterdesignation of Additional Items to be Included in Record on

Appeal [ECF No. 12929].

B. Stay Pending Appeal

The Stay Motion requests a stay of 14 days to allow for the filing of further pleadings,

while the Reconsideration Motion requests a stay pending appeal. A party seeking a stay

pending appeal must show that (1) it would sustain irreparable injury if a stay were denied; (2)

other parties would not suffer a substantial injury if a stay were granted; (3) the public interest

favors a stay; and (4) there is a substantial possibility of success on the merits of the appeal. See

Hirschfeld v. Bd. of Elections, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Adelphia Communs. Corp.,

333 B.R. 649, 658-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The moving party faces a heavy burden. See Adelphia,

333 B.R. at 659; see also United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc.,

44 F.3d 1082, 1084 (2d Cir. 1995). To obtain a stay, the party must "show satisfactory evidence

on all four criteria.” In re Turner, 207 B.R. 373, 375 (2d Cir. B.A.P. 1997); see also Adelphia,

333 B.R. at 659. In the past, courts have held that “[f]ailure to satisfy one prong of this standard

for granting a stay will doom the motion.” In re Turner, 207 B.R. at 375; ePlus, Inc. v. Katz (In

re Metiom, Inc.), 318 B.R. 263, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). However, recent cases have “engaged in a

balancing process with respect to the four factors, as opposed to adopting a rigid rule.” In re

Chemtura Corp., 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3988 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010). The decision of

whether to grant the stay lies in the discretion of the court. See In re Overmyer, 53 B.R. 952, 955

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).

The Court finds that the balance of the factors weigh against granting a stay pending

appeal. To start, the Court does not find that Mr. Meadows would sustain irreparable injury if

his request for a stay is denied. “A showing of probable irreparable harm is the principal

prerequisite for the issuance of a stay . . . and such harm must be neither remote nor speculative,

but actual and imminent.” In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 548 B.R. 674, 681 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Mr. Meadows has failed to make such a

showing. As noted in the Estimation Decision, Mr. Meadows does not have any pending claims

in these bankruptcy cases; all proofs of claim that he previously filed have been disallowed by

this Court. See In re AMR, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1867, at *16-17.3 Moreover, the Reorganized

Debtors previously acknowledged that pilots may participate under the terms of the settlement

between the Reorganized Debtors and the EEOC. See id. at *25-27. Nor does approval of the

Estimation Motion deprive Mr. Meadows of any rights that he may have with the EEOC for any

alleged ongoing discrimination. See id. at *19 n.8.

But other parties would suffer a substantial injury if a stay were granted. As noted in the

Estimation Decision, three years of delay necessitated by the appeals of Mr. Meadows have

prevented further distributions in the Reorganized Debtors’ bankruptcy proceeding given the

need to hold monies in reserve for an EEOC claim that would otherwise be undetermined in

amount, absent the settlement. See In re AMR, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1867, at *7-8. Numerous

parties have informed the Court that they have been waiting for this distribution to take place.

See In re AMR, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1867, at *14-15.4 Moreover, the EEOC claim subject to

3 Not only have Mr. Meadows’ claims been disallowed, but this Court was forced to take the extraordinary

step of issuing an order to enforce the discharge injunction under the Reorganized Debtors’ plan against Mr.

Meadows and to direct Mr. Meadows to withdraw various pending actions that violated that discharge injunction;

the same order enjoined him from filing additional litigation against American related to the termination of his

employment with American and his long-term disability benefits. This order was affirmed by both the District

Court for the Southern District of New York and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See In

re AMR Corp., 2016 WL 1559294 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 14, 2016); aff’d sub nom., Meadows v. AMR Corp. (In re

AMR Corp.), 764 F. App’x 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2019).

4 Mr. Meadows also objects to the consideration of Mr. Fu’s letter in the Estimation Decision, arguing that it

was extrinsic evidence submitted by a non-party. See Reconsideration Motion at 4. But the Court is permitted to

take judicial notice of public filings on its own docket in a bankruptcy case. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Teamsters Nat'l

estimation is among the few that remain to be resolved before the Reorganized Debtors can close

out these bankruptcy cases. See id. at *8; see also In re Sabine, 548 B.R. at 683 (in denying a

stay pending appeal, noting that “the Debtors’ ability to prosecute a plan and emerge from

bankruptcy would be completely constrained and the Debtors would be forced to incur the

expense and bear the uncertainty of maintaining their chapter 11 cases while waiting in appellate

limbo.”). Estimating the EEOC claim puts the Reorganized Debtors in a position to make

distributions to creditors and close out the bankruptcy cases, which would result in a significant

savings on future U.S. Trustee fees. See id.; see also In re Sabine, 548 B.R. at 683 (“[C]ourts

have recognized numerous harms resulting from the postponement of reorganization

proceedings, including . . . incurrence of administrative and professional expenses; . . . placing

plan settlements in jeopardy; and . . . exposing the equity to be granted to non-moving creditors

to market volatility and other risks.”) (citing In re Tribune Co., 477 B.R. 465, 478-80 (Bankr. D.

Del. 2012); ACC Bondholder Grp. V. Adelphia Communs. Corp. (In re Adelphia Communs.

Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).

The public interest also does not favor a stay of the Estimation Order in these

circumstances. “The public interest favors compliance with court orders and timely resolution of

litigation.” In re Brown, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1537, at *30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020). As

noted in the Estimation Decision, claims estimation is meant to provide “a means for a

Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. et al. v. Howard's Express, Inc. (In re Howard's Express, Inc.), 151 F. Appx. 46,

48 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that courts are empowered to take judicial notice of public filings, including

a court's docket); American Tissue, Inc. v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 79, 95 n.

17 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The Court can take judicial notice of matters of public record . . . including filings in related

lawsuits. . . .”) (citing Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2000)); Katzenstein v. VII SV5556 Lender, LLC

(In re St. Vincent's Catholic Medical Centers of New York), 440 B.R. 587, 599 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).

In any case, Mr. Fu’s letter (along with letters filed by other creditors) had a direct bearing on the issue of

delay in distributions from the Reorganized Debtors’ estate, which was a consideration in the Court’s approval of

the Estimation Motion. See In re AMR, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1867, at *14-15.

bankruptcy court to achieve reorganization, and/or distributions on claims, without awaiting the

results of legal proceedings that could take a very long time to determine.” In re Adelphia Bus.

Sols., Inc., 341 B.R. 415, 422 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also In re Continental Airlines, Inc.,

981 F.2d 1450, 1461 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that two purposes of Section 502(c)(1) are to “avoid

the need to await the resolution of outside lawsuits to determine issues of liability or amount

owed by means of anticipating and estimating the likely outcome of these actions,” and to

“promote a fair distribution to creditors through a realistic assessment of uncertain claims”).

“Estimation is effective . . for enabling bankruptcy cases, and chapter 11 cases in particular, to

move forward and to get recoveries into the pockets of creditors without delaying the whole

process as a consequence of a limited number of very complex claims.” In re Adelphia, 341

B.R. at 423. Granting a stay pending appeal now will prolong the same delay that granting the

Estimation Motion was meant to avoid. See In re AMR, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1867, at *17

(noting that Mr. Meadows has one appeal pending and that his papers discuss the possibility of a

second appeal; thus without the relief requested in the Estimation Motion, distributions in the

Reorganized Debtors’ cases would be delayed for a significant amount of time into the future);

see also In re Sabine, 548 B.R. at 685 (finding that “the goals of promoting the restructuring of

the Debtors’ obligations, the preservation of the Debtors’ business, and the Debtors’ emergence

from chapter 11 are issues of significant public interest that are best met by denying the stay

requested here.”) (internal citations omitted).

Nor is there a substantial possibility of success on the merits of an appeal. “The

‘substantial possibility of success’ test is considered an intermediate level between ‘possible’ and

‘probable’ and is ‘intended to eliminate frivolous appeals.’” In re Sabine, 548 B.R. at 683-84

(quoting In re 473 West End Realty Corp., 507 B.R. 496, 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)). This

Court’s Reconsideration Decision thoroughly analyzed the probability of success of Mr.

Meadows’ pending appeal in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York, see In re AMR, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1867, at *20-26, and for those same reasons the Court

believes that there is not a substantial possibility of success on the merits for an appeal of the

Reconsideration Order.

As for the Stay Motion, Mr. Meadows requests additional time to file further pleadings,

asserting that his right to due process has been denied because he was not served with a copy of

the Estimation Order. See Reconsideration Motion at 2, 15-17. The Estimation Order was

entered on September 8, 2021, and the Court notes that Mr. Meadows had actual notice of the

Estimation Order by no later than September 16, 2021, the date that the Stay Motion was dated.

See Stay Motion at 2 (stating that Mr. Meadows had reviewed the docket via amrcaseinfo.com

and learned that the Court had entered the Estimation Order). Indeed, Mr. Meadows was able to

file both the Stay Motion and the Reconsideration Motion within 14 days of entry of the

Estimation Order.

Bankruptcy Rule 9022(a) provides that “[l]ack of notice of the entry does not affect the

time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the

time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 8002.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9022. Thus, “while notice is

often provided for the convenience of the litigants, lack of notice of the entry of the order

appealed from does not affect the time to appeal. In re Spiegel, Inc., 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1279,

at *11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007), aff’d, 385 B.R. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Twins Roller

Corp. v. Roxy Roller Rink Joint Venture, 70 B.R. 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Hirsch v. London

S.S. Owners’ Mut. Ins. Ass’n (In re Seatrain Lines ), 184 B.R. 660, 662 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)).

“[T]o ensure timely appeal, a party must monitor the docket for the entry of an order it wishes to

appeal. Id. (citing Miyao v. Kuntz (In re Sweet Transfer & Storage, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1189, 1193

(9th Cir. 1990)). “As a party has this independent duty, ‘a third party's failure to inform a party

of entry of final judgment is not grounds for excusable neglect.’” Id. (citing In re Hess, 209

B.R. at 82; In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 184 B.R. at 662). But in any event, Mr. Meadows’ time to

appeal the Estimation Order was automatically tolled by his timely filing of the Reconsideration

Motion. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b)(1).5 Mr. Meadows therefore has the time period

permitted by Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b)(1) to file any appeal of the Estimation Order, making a

temporary stay of that Order unnecessary.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Reconsideration Motion and the Stay Motion are

denied. The Debtors shall serve a copy of this Memorandum of Decision and Order on Mr.

Meadows by overnight mail and file proof of such service on the Case Management/Electronic

Case Filing Docket. Additionally, the Court requests that all future service by the Reorganized

Debtors upon Mr. Meadows in these bankruptcy cases be made by overnight mail.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: New York, New York

October 28, 2021

/s/ Sean H. Lane

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

5 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b)(1) provides in relevant part:

If a party files in the bankruptcy court any of the following motions and does so within the time

allowed by these rules, the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order

disposing of the last such remaining motion . . . (C) to alter or amend the judgement under Rule

9023. . . .”

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b)(1)(C).

COPIES TO:

By U.S. Mail:

Lawrence M. Meadows

P.O. Box 4344

Park City, UT 84060

By Electronic Mail:

lawrencemeadows@yahoo.com