Opinion

Spizz v. Eluz

Court
United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
Filed
Sep 1, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.2%

“A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for making new arguments that could have been previously advanced, nor is it a substitute for appeal.”

How later courts described this case

  • “A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for making new arguments that could have been previously advanced, nor is it a substitute for appeal.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------------X

In re: :

:

AMPAL-AMERICAN ISRAEL CORP., : Chapter 7

: Case No. 12-13689 (SMB)

Debtor. :

--------------------------------------------------------X

ALEX SPIZZ, as Chapter 7 Trustee for :

Ampal-American Israel Corp., :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

―against― : Adv. Proc. No. 14-02110 (SMB)

:

IRIT ELUZ, :

:

Defendant. :

--------------------------------------------------------X

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION

AND GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED EXPERT REPORT

A P P E A R A N C E S:

AKERMAN LLP

520 Madison Avenue, 20th Floor

New York, New York 10022

John P. Campo, Esq.

Darryl R. Graham, Esq.

Of Counsel

Attorneys for Plaintiff

COLE SCHOTZ P.C.

1325 Avenue of the Americas, 19th Floor

New York, New York 10019

Steven L. Klepper, Esq.

David S. Gold, Esq.

Of Counsel

Attorneys for Defendant

STUART M. BERNSTEIN

United States Bankruptcy Judge:

In Spizz v. Eluz (In re Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp.), Adv. Proc. No. 14-02110 (SMB),

2020 WL 2529337 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2020) (“Ampal II”), the Court granted the

defendant Irit Eluz’s motion in limine to exclude the report (the “Report”) and

testimony of the plaintiff chapter 7 trustee’s (“Trustee”) corporate governance expert,

Steven D. Solomon. The Trustee now moves for reconsideration. Alternatively, he seeks

leave to file an amended report. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the

motion for reconsideration but grants the Trustee leave to file an amended report.

BACKGROUND

The background is set out in Spizz v. Eluz (In re Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp.), 543 B.R.

464 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Ampal I”), Ampal II and Spizz v. Eluz (In re Ampal-Am.

Isr. Corp.), Adv. Proc. No. 14-02110, 2020 WL 5075992 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2020)

(“Ampal III”). I assume familiarity with those decisions and limit the discussion to the

facts relevant to the pending motion.

At all relevant times, Ampal-American Israel Corporation (“Ampal”) was a New

York holding company whose operating subsidiaries did business primarily in the state

of Israel and the Middle East. At all relevant times, Yosef Maiman was directly or

indirectly the majority shareholder, a director and chairman of the Ampal Board. At the

same time, he was also conducting business through an Israeli corporation, Merhav

(M.N.F.) Ltd. (“MNF”). Eluz was hired by Maiman and served as Ampal’s Chief

Financial Officer, Senior Vice President, and Treasurer, and she concedes that Maiman

determined her annual compensation. She also became a director of Ampal in May

2010, but the Trustee is suing her only in her capacity as an officer.

In or around 2004, the Ampal Board of Directors established a special committee

of independent directors (“Special Committee”) to review and approve transactions with

any related party, which included Maiman and MNF. In February 2009, the Special

Committee approved a management services agreement (“2009 Agreement”) with MNF

to compensate it for managing several of Ampal’s projects. Ampal agreed to pay MNF

10 million New Israeli Shekels (“NIS”) per year in quarterly installments. MNF agreed

to render quarterly reports, or otherwise reasonably requested by Ampal, that detailed

the scope and nature of its services for the quarter. Although not mentioned in the 2009

Agreement, Eluz informed the Special Committee at the time it was considering the

approval of the 2009 Agreement that Ampal’s management would monitor MNF’s

remuneration based on MNF’s detailed reports of its services, and if need be, its

remuneration might be altered.

Almost two years later, at a December 19, 2010 Special Committee meeting, Eluz

stated that the compensation paid to MNF under the 2009 Agreement was

“inadequate.” The Special Committee approved a new agreement (the “Superseding

Agreement”) in principle that would replace the 2009 Agreement and pay MNF 50% of

its Ampal-related expenses. Per the Special Committee’s direction, Eluz submitted the

report of MNF’s services in 2010. Her report also included a summary of MNF’s

expenses totaling 48,314,000 NIS and Ampal’s 50% share totaling 24,157,000 NIS.

After receiving Eluz’s report, the Special Committee approved the Superseding

Agreement on December 30, 2010 and the payment of 24,157,000 NIS to MNF for 2010.

Going forward, the Special Committee would decide the appropriate fee at or near the

end of the fiscal year based on a presentation by MNF of expenses incurred in providing

services to Ampal during the current year. In 2011, Ampal paid MNF the same amount

that it had paid in 2010 (the “2011 Fee”). According to the Trustee, the Special

Committee never approved the 2011 Fee.

The Report

The Trustee brought this adversary proceeding against the members of the

Special Committee and Eluz, but the Court dismissed the claims against the members of

the Special Committee in Ampal I. Following that dismissal, two claims remained

against Eluz, the sole defendant. Count I charged her with breaching her fiduciary

duties in connection with the Special Committee’s approval of the Superseding

Agreement and her alleged failure to monitor and report to the Special Committee

regarding MNF’s services and expenses during 2010. Count II charged her with

breaching her fiduciary duties by paying the 2011 Fee without the approval of the 2011

Fee by the Special Committee.

The Trustee retained Solomon ostensibly to opine on corporate governance

procedures, but he did not stop there; Solomon adjudicated the factual disputes and

legal issues in the case. He rendered three primary opinions, but “[a]s a predicate

matter,” he opined that “Eluz was both fundamentally conflicted in these transactions as

well as a sophisticated actor with knowledge of customs and practices by parties in

conflict of interest transactions.” (Report ¶ 36.) He then proffered three primary

opinions:

Opinion 1: The [Special Committee] relied primarily on Eluz in agreeing

to the [2009 Agreement] and Superseding Management Agreement and

payment of remuneration to [MNF];

Opinion 2: Eluz failed to, in accord with custom and practice,

appropriately monitor and report in writing to the [Special Committee] of

[MNF’s] activity; and

Opinion 3: Eluz failed, in accord with custom and practice, to obtain

[Special Committee] authorization and substantiation of [MNF’s] fees.

(Report ¶ 4 (emphasis added).) Each opinion included an analysis of the evidence he

reviewed and, in many instances, discussed the law supporting his conclusions.

The Court granted Eluz’s motion in limine to preclude the Report and Solomon’s

testimony in its entirety. The Report usurped the role of the jury – the jury did not need

expert testimony, particularly from someone lacking personal knowledge, to decide any

factual issues regarding Eluz’s conflict, her sophistication or knowledge, what the

Special Committee relied on in approving the Superseding Agreement, whether she

failed to monitor and report on MNF’s activities and whether she failed to obtain the

Special Committee’s authorization to pay MNF. Furthermore, the Report devoted its

principal discussion regarding corporate governance to what the Special Committee

should have done, and there was a danger that the jury might attribute the Special

Committee’s alleged failings to Eluz, who was an officer. The Court summarized its

concerns with the Report as follows:

The Report . . . is patently improper expert testimony. It includes a factual

narrative, despite Solomon’s lack of personal knowledge, which is, at best,

based on a selective reading of the entire record, it makes “factual

findings” based on this selective reading which usurps the role of the jury

(as noted, this is a jury case), it declares the law that this Court should

apply essentially charging the jury, and renders a decision on the

appropriate outcome based on the facts and the law. The Report also

describes matters for which any probative value is substantially

outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues and misleading the jury.

Ampal II, 2020 WL 2529337, at *4 (footnote omitted). The Trustee now seeks

reconsideration or leave to file an amended report.

DISCUSSION

A motion for reargument or reconsideration is governed by Local Bankruptcy

Rule 9023-1,1 which provides that the “motion must set forth concisely the matters or

controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has not considered.” The movant

must show that the court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that might

have materially influenced its earlier decision. In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 332

B.R. 520, 524 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). Alternatively, the movant must demonstrate the

need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Perez v. Progenics Pharm.,

Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); accord In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.,

332 B.R. at 524. A manifest injustice exists when a “verdict is wholly without legal

support,” ING Glob. v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.

2014), and the error is obvious to all who view it. Green Goblin, Inc. v. Simons (In re

Green Goblin, Inc.), Adversary No. 09-067, 2012 WL 1971143, at *1 n. 2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.

May 31, 2012), aff’d, Civil Action No. 12-4076, 2014 WL 5800601 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6,

2014). “These criteria are strictly construed against the moving party so as to avoid

repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the court,” Griffin

1 Local Bankruptcy Rule 9023-1(a) states:

A motion for reargument of a court order determining a motion must be served within

fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Court's order determining the original motion, or

in the case of a court order resulting in a judgment, within fourteen (14) days after the

entry of the judgment, and, unless the Court orders otherwise, shall be made returnable

within the same amount of time as required for the original motion. The motion must set

forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has

not considered. No oral argument shall be heard unless the Court grants the motion and

specifically orders that the matter be re-argued orally.

The Trustee’s motion also invokes Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Rules 9023 and 9024 of the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure, but the standards are the same as the local reargument rule. Cf. Lowinger

v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC (In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig.), 43 F. Supp. 3d

369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Sweet, J.) (discussing the analogous Local District Court Rule 6.3),

aff’d, 841 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2016).

Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); accord Liberty

Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 861 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), and a

motion for reargument is not an opportunity to present the case under new theories,

secure a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise take a “second bite at the apple.” Sequa

Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Liberty Media Corp., 861

F. Supp. 2d at 265 (“A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for making new

arguments that could have been previously advanced, nor is it a substitute for appeal.”)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Trustee argues that Eluz’s noncompliance with corporate governance norms

is the central issue in the case and that “exclusion of expert testimony on a ‘central issue

of the case’ is ‘manifest error’ requiring reversal.” (Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration and Memorandum of Law Regarding Order Granting Motion in

Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and Testimony of Steven D. Solomon, dated May

28, 2020 (“Trustee’s Brief”), at 2 (quoting Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d

449, 459-60 (2d Cir. 1975)) (ECF Doc. # 111).) The Trustee “fully admits” that Solomon

lacks firsthand knowledge of the facts and contends that Solomon’s “sole purpose is to

provide the jury with an understanding of the relevant customs and norms applicable to

an officer confronted with a situation involving a conflict of interest, which is an

objective opinion from a qualified individual to a jury who needs to decide whether

Defendant Eluz acted appropriately or not under the circumstances.” (Id. at 3-4.)

The only “objective opinion” in the Report relates to practices a Board (in this

case, a Special Committee) should follow when faced with a conflicted transaction. (See

Report ¶ 33, discussed below.) The Report does not opine on what the CFO of a public

corporation is supposed to do when the Special Committee is considering a transaction

with another corporation owned by Ampal’s chairman, Maiman. Rather, the Report

concludes that Eluz breached her fiduciary duties for the reasons stated in the three

opinions. The Trustee implies that the Court was hypocritical because while criticizing

Solomon for making factual determinations that usurped the role of the jury, it made its

own factual findings in rejecting the Report. (Trustee’s Brief at 3 (“The Court charges

Solomon with making factual assumptions of which he lacks actual knowledge and of a

selective review of the record. In doing so, the Court is reviewing the record pretrial on

its own and making its own factual determinations, even going as far as using the same

factual predicate in Solomon’s report to find exculpatory ‘evidence’ in favor of

Defendant Eluz.”).)

In the part of Ampal II to which the Trustee refers, the Court was commenting on

Solomon’s conclusion that Eluz was conflicted and her recommendation to increase

MNF’s management fee was evidence of a “quid pro quo.” Ampal II, 2020 WL 2529337,

at *4. The Court observed that there was evidence that Solomon had not considered

supporting the opposite conclusion. The Court was not making a factual finding, but

rather, emphasizing that Solomon’s conclusions were based on a selective reading of

evidence instead of the entire body of evidence that the jury would consider on an issue

it would decide. Ampal II, 2020 WL 2529337, at *4 (“Based on those findings, Solomon

opines that Eluz’s facilitation of favorable management fees to MNF was ‘indicial

evidence of ... a quid pro quo.’ (¶ 41.) But this is precisely what the jury must decide

after hearing all of the evidence and that determination is not beyond the jury’s ken.”)

(emphasis in original).

As a fallback, the Trustee next argues that the Court should not have excluded

Solomon’s testimony in toto, and instead, should have simply limited it to more general

testimony regarding corporate governance norms in conflicted transactions. (Trustee’s

Brief at 6 (“The potential prejudice to Defendant Eluz regarding the factual predicate in

Solomon’s report, if ultimately not proven through admissible evidence at trial, could be

cured by limiting Solomon’s testimony strictly to his expert opinion regarding corporate

governance norms in the conflict of interest transaction context. This less harsh remedy

addresses the Court’s concerns, while allowing the Plaintiff to introduce expert

testimony on what is a critical issue in the case.”).) The Trustee implies that the Court is

guilty of a manifest injustice because it did not undertake the burden of culling out, as

the Trustee is now attempting to do, allegedly unobjectionable parts of the Report.

(Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum of Law

Regarding Order Granting Motion In Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and

Testimony of Steven D. Solomon, dated July 2, 2020 (“Reply”), at 3 (“Further, by

limiting Solomon’s testimony to only these general concepts of corporate governance

norms and customs, Solomon’s opinion testimony will embody the type and quality of

relevant expert testimony that is both appropriate and critical to this dispute.”) (ECF

Doc. # 117).)

The Trustee, in this regard, singles out paragraphs 30-35 of the Report as critical

and non-prejudicial. (Reply at 4.) Paragraph 30 introduces paragraphs 31-35, stating

that they detail best practices in conflict of interest transactions. Paragraph 31 quotes

excerpts from section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law, which deals with

transactions between a corporation and one of its directors directly or indirectly through

another corporation. Paragraph 32 paraphrases the requirements of § 713. These

paragraphs are innocuous but not particularly helpful and Solomon will not be

permitted to testify about the requirements of section 713. The Court will charge the

jury on the relevant law.

Paragraph 33 sets out the practices the corporation should follow to satisfy these

requirements. The first is to appoint an independent committee to oversee the

transaction. The independent committee should then retain independent advisors,

obtain disclosure of material facts, receive necessary financial information and advice,

and if the matter relates to financial compensation, the information should show “(i)

the rationale for the compensation, (ii) comparable compensation cases, (iii) costs and

expenses, and (iv) the aggregate potential compensation payable.” (Footnote omitted.)

Finally, the actions of the directors and officers should be fully documented in writing

both in agreements and board meeting minutes. Paragraph 34 explains that these

procedures “ensure comportment with fiduciary duties,” and that “robust procedural

protections mimicking an arm’s length approval process are created.” (Footnote

omitted.)

Thus far, the Report deals with what the Board and the Special Committee are

supposed to do. Paragraph 35, however, sweeps in officers suggesting that they should

follow the same practices as the Special Committee, apparently without regard to their

responsibilities:

Similarly, while these procedures customarily apply for directors and

officer compliance with the duty of loyalty, the duty of care has similar

practices. These require that the subject matter be duly deliberated upon

and documented. To the extent officers and directors rely on advisors in

terms of decision-making, the advisor should be properly vetted for a lack

of conflict. Additionally officers or directors should undertake an

information process through advisors or otherwise that produces all of the

available material information. This is particularly true when a

compensation-related decision is being made. The Committee, together

with its advisers and officers, should implement procedures to have all the

material information reasonably available to it and in a format which

presents the compensation transparently and clearly.

(Footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The Report concludes that Eluz breached a

fiduciary duty by failing to advise the Special Committee to retain independent advisors,

and the Special Committee and Eluz failed to “follow this practice and procedure which

would have more ably supported an arms-length, market-based renumeration of

[MNF].” (Report ¶ 44.)

The Court addressed these paragraphs at length in Ampal II. After summarizing

their contents and Solomon’s conclusion, the Court ruled that the relevance of what the

Special Committee should have done was questionable but more important, was

prejudicial to Eluz:

What the Special Committee should have done is irrelevant but even if it is

relevant, it is highly prejudicial to Eluz. Eluz was not member of the Board

or the Special Committee. To permit Solomon to suggest that Eluz

breached her fiduciary duty because the Board or the Special Committee

did not follow these best practices creates the risk that a jury will attribute

the Board’s or the Special Committee’s purported failure to Eluz – the sole

remaining defendant in this action.

Ampal II, 2020 WL 2529337, at *6.

Seeking to deflect the Court’s concern that paragraphs 30-35 might lead a jury to

conclude that Eluz breached her fiduciary duties because the Special Committee did not

follow these best practices, the Trustee emphasizes on six occasions in his Reply that

Eluz was also a director of Ampal. (Reply at 1 (“This is a fiduciary duty, conflict of

interest, corporate governance dispute, and Eluz, at all relevant times, was an officer

and director of the Debtor.” ) (emphasis in original); 4 (“Solomon’s specific opinions –

Report, ¶¶ 30-35 – are clear as to the customs and norms that exist with respect to

conflict of interests transactions, as well as the obligations of officers and directors (of

which Eluz was both), and those of the special committee.”); 5 (“Because Eluz was an

officer and director at all times relevant to the claims in 2010 and 2011 . . ., the relevant

obligations of officers and directors is [sic] relevant to this dispute.”); 5 (“[P]aragraphs

30-35 . . . do not conflate any obligations nor suggest that Eluz ‘breached her fiduciary

duty because the Board [that she was on] or the Special Committee did not follow these

best practices’ such that a jury could confuse the obligations of the committee with

obligations of Defendant as an officer.”); 5 (“[P]utting aside the issue of Eluz’s

directorship, Plaintiff submits that by limiting Solomon’s opinions to the nature of those

set forth in Paragraphs 30-35, the potential conflict created by, as the Court identified,

paragraph 44 is resolved.”); 5-6 (Paragraphs 30-35 do “not describe the duties of a

committee, such that they could then be confused with the duties of an officer or

director, but rather this section describes the procedures a corporation – exercised

through its officers and directors (Eluz being both) is required to implement . . . .”).)

Eluz was not a member of the Special Committee, and the Trustee sued her solely

in her capacity as an officer. Continual references in the Reply to the fact that Eluz was

also an Ampal director, a role that has nothing to do with this case, suggest that the

Trustee is attempting to conflate Eluz’s distinct and separate duties and responsibilities

as an officer and as a director, and illustrate how Solomon’s testimony might confuse

rather than educate the jury. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is denied, and

the Trustee’s suggestion that Solomon be permitted to testify consistent with paragraphs

30-35 of his Report is rejected.

Request for Additional Time

The Trustee requests that if the Court denies his motion for reconsideration, he

be granted additional time to prepare a revised report consistent with the Court’s ruling

or be granted leave to file an interlocutory appeal. (Trustee Brief at 7.) Eluz objects

arguing that any attempt to make the report non-objectionable through a redraft would

be futile. (Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration and Memorandum of Law Regarding Order Granting Motion in

Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and Testimony of Steven D. Solomon, dated June

18, 2020, at 10-11 (ECF Doc. # 114).)

I disagree that it would necessarily be futile. Solomon could presumably draft a

report that delineates and distinguishes between the duties of the Special Committee

and Eluz to avoid the possibility that Eluz will bear responsibility in the jury’s eyes for

the Special Committee’s failure to follow best practices. That said, I question the

continuing need for the type of amended report that the Trustee is contemplating. After

the Trustee moved for reconsideration, the Court dismissed Count I in Ampal III. Thus,

the claims against Eluz concerning the entry into the Superseding Agreement, the focus

of paragraphs 30-35, have been dismissed. The remaining claim against Eluz centers on

the fact that Ampal continued to pay MNF the same amount during 2011 even though

the Special Committee allegedly never approved that amount.

This appears to the Court to be a straightforward claim that does not require

expert testimony. However, particularly in light of the changed legal landscape and

there being no suggestion of prejudice, the Trustee is granted leave to submit an

amended report if he so chooses within sixty days from the date of this order that is

consistent with Ampal II and this order and limited to the remaining issues in the case.

So ordered.

Dated: New York, New York

September 1, 2020

/s/ Stuart M. Bernstein

STUART M. BERNSTEIN

United States Bankruptcy Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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