asserting that a “a constructive trust can be imposed where property has been transferred by a wrongful act including fraud, mistake or undue influence or where property has not been wrongfully acquired but retention would result in unjust enrichment.”
How later courts described this case
- asserting that a “a constructive trust can be imposed where property has been transferred by a wrongful act including fraud, mistake or undue influence or where property has not been wrongfully acquired but retention would result in unjust enrichment.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Caption in Compliance with D.N.J. LBR 9004-2(c)
Case No. 20-14367 (MBK)
IN RE: XEUHAI LI,
Debtor. Adv. No. 20-1389 (MBK)
Chapter 11
GIANTSEA NEW ENERGY
TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
Plaintiff, Hearing Date: 9/10/2020
vs. Judge: Michael B. Kaplan
LI et a l.,
Defendants.
Andrea Dobin Nicole M. Nigrelli
Michael A. Siravo IV Ciardi & Ciardi & Astin, P.C.
McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC One Commerce Square
427 Riverview Plaza 2005 Market Street, Ste. 3500
Trenton, NJ 08611 Philadelphia, PA 19103
Chapter 11 Trustee, Attorney for Debtor, Xeuhai Li
Attorneys for Andrea Dobin
Seth D. Josephson
Andreas D. Milliaressis 196 Princeton-Hightstown Road,
Leonard P. Goldberger Princeton Junction, NJ 08550
Stevens & Lee, P.C. Attorney for Yun Zhang
Princeton Pike Corporate Center
100 Lenox Drive, Suite 200
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648
Attorneys for Giantsea New Energy
Technology Co., Ltd.
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE’S MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF AN ORDER SEEKING DISMISSAL OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
This matter comes before the Court on a motion (ECF No. 10) filed by the Chapter 11
Trustee, Andrea Dobin (“Trustee”) in the above-captioned adversary proceeding, seeking
dismissal of the amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”), filed by Giantsea New Energy
Technology Co., Ltd. (“Plaintiff”), and the imposition of a constructive trust as to property located
at 485 Princeton-Kingston Road, Princeton, NJ 08540 and 487 Princeton-Kingston Road,
Princeton, NJ 08540 (collectively, the “Property,” or “Princeton Property”), or in the alternative,
a declaration that Plaintiff should be deemed to hold a first priority lien and security interest
superior to the interests of all named defendants. (ECF No. 4) Plaintiff filed opposition (ECF No.
12), and Yun Zhang, a creditor and the former spouse (“Ex-spouse”) of the Debtor, filed a response
to Trustee’s motion (ECF No. 14). Trustee filed a response. (ECF No. 15)
The Court has reviewed all the submissions, considered the arguments made during the
hearing on September 10, 2020, and has reviewed the supplemental letters submitted by Counsel
on September 14, 2020 through September 16, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, Trustee’s
motion for dismissal is GRANTED, with prejudice.
I. Background
The facts of this case are well known to the parties and the Court, and therefore need not
be repeated in great detail here. Defendant, Xuehai Li (“Debtor”), filed a voluntary petition for
relief under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on March 13, 2020 (No. 20-14367-
MBK). On July 15, 2020, Andrea Dobin was appointed as the Chapter 11 Trustee for Debtor’s
bankruptcy case. On July 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint (the “Amended
Complaint”), adding Trustee as a defendant.
The Amended Complaint asserts that pursuant to a loan agreement dated December 4, 2013
(“Loan Agreement”), Plaintiff loaned Debtor a total of $2,235,000 (“Loan”). Plaintiff, Giantsea,
is a privately-owned company in the People’s Republic of China. Giantsea’s majority shareholder
is Qunbo Li, the father of Debtor. Qunbo Li holds more than two-thirds of Giantsea’s outstanding
shares and is the chairman of the board. Debtor is a minority shareholder and an executive of
Giantsea. Pursuant to the Loan Agreement, Plaintiff was to be secured by a recorded mortgage
against any real estate collateral purchased with the proceeds of the Loan, and the Loan was to be
repaid on or before January 2, 2017. (ECF No. 96-2, Case No. 20-14367) On January 6, 2014,
Debtor allegedly1 used the funds from the Loan to purchase the Princeton Property, which was
then titled in Debtor’s name and the Ex-spouse’s name. A mortgage in favor of Plaintiff against
the Property was not recorded at this time.
Debtor allegedly failed to timely repay the Loan to Plaintiff, and consequently, Plaintiff
initiated an action for Breach of the Loan Agreement and Unjust Enrichment in New Jersey
Superior Court for Mercer County in August of 2015 captioned Giantsea Instrument and
Equipment Company, Limited v. Xuehai Li, Docket No. MER-L-1855-15 (the “State Court
Action”). On March 15, 2016, the state court entered a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the
amount of $2,268,065.76, plus interest and other charges. On December 22, 2016, Plaintiff and
Debtor entered into an agreement to extend the loan repayment, extending the due date for
repayment to January 2, 2019. On May 29, 2018, Debtor executed a mortgage (“Mortgage”)
against the Property in favor of Plaintiff and back-dated the mortgage to December 4, 2013. The
Ex-spouse asserts that she did not execute the Mortgage. The Debtor recorded the mortgage the
1 While a disputed issue of fact remains as to whether such funds were used for the purchase of the Property, resolution
of this dispute has no bearing on the Court’s determination of this motion.
following day. Debtor failed to make any payments towards the Loan, and thereafter, on March
13, 2020, filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On July 1, 2020, post-petition, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Debtor, the Ex-Spouse,
and others. The complaint was subsequently amended on July 24, 2020 to add the Trustee as a
defendant. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff wishes to determine its interest in the Property for
purposes of classification and treatment of creditors for any proposed plan of reorganization.
Plaintiff asserts that because the Property was purchased with Plaintiff’s funds, it is held in a
constructive trust for Plaintiff’s benefit, notwithstanding the fact that title is in the names of Debtor
and his Ex-spouse. In the alternative, Plaintiff asserts it is entitled to a first priority lien and security
interest that is superior to all named defendants in the Amended Complaint.
II. Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss
As set forth above, Trustee has filed a motion seeking dismissal of the Amended Complaint
in its entirety as authorized by FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012. Pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), made applicable to this proceeding by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b), a party
may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the reviewing court must accept all of the factual allegations contained within the complaint as
true. U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991). In addition, all
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Gary v. Air Group, Inc., 397 F.3d
183, 186 (3d Cir.2005). As the Supreme Court of the United States explained in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly:
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ While a complaint attacked by a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....
550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
Ultimately, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 1974.
In a ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court is very limited in terms of what
may be considered from an evidentiary standpoint. Under Rule 12(b)(6), “pleading standards have
seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a
plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2009).Given this narrow scope, a court hearing a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion will “generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint,
exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Industries, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). In addition, “a document integral to
or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to
dismiss into one for summary judgment.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1426 (3d Cir.1997).
III. Entire Controversy Doctrine
This Court is concerned primarily about the applicability of the entire controversy doctrine
to the claims of the Adversary Complaint. Although the parties have not raised this argument, the
Court finds an analysis of the doctrine’s applicability to be critical for its ruling and has requested
the parties to brief whether the entire controversy doctrine bears on this present dispute.
“The entire controversy doctrine is a creature of New Jersey case law, which states that ‘a
party cannot withhold part of a controversy for separate later litigation[,] even when the withheld
component is a separate and independently cognizable cause of action.’” In re Popular Club Plan,
Inc., 395 B.R. 587, 593 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2008) (quoting Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178
F.3d 132, 137 (3rd Cir.1999)). As described in Ricketti v. Barry, the entire controversy doctrine is
New Jersey’s application of res judicata, and is considered an affirmative defense to be applied in
federal courts “when there was a previous state-court action involving the same transaction.” See
Ricketti v. Barry, 775 F.3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941
F.2d 154, 163 (3d Cir.1991)). When considering the reasoning for such a policy, the Court looks
to the New Jersey Supreme Court for clarity—
Judicial economy and efficiency—the avoidance of waste and delay—remain constants in
the application of the entire controversy doctrine. Fragmented and multiple litigation takes
its toll on not only the parties but the judicial institution and the public. This, if anything,
is a more pressing concern today than it was in the past. The litigation explosion stretches
judicial capabilities enormously and places extraordinary demands on the courts. These
concerns have impelled the Court to pursue novel and creative measures to cope with the
increase in caseloads. We are importuned to conserve judicial resources; judicial energy is
not inexhaustible or endlessly renewable. Thus, a rule that can control litigational
extravagance and reduce piecemeal litigation is a necessity.
Cogdell by Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 23–24, 560 A.2d 1169, 1177 (1989).
“The entire controversy doctrine stems directly from the principles underlying the doctrine
of res judicata or claim preclusion. However, [t]he doctrine is a broad one, more preclusive than
both res judicata and the Restatement [(Second) of Judgments].” Bank Leumi USA, v. Kloss, 243
N.J. 218, 227, 233 A.3d 536, 540–41 (2020) (internal citations and quotations omitted); (quoting
Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180, 187, 678 A.2d 243 (1996); Kozyra v. Allen, 973 F.2d 1110, 1111
(3d Cir. 1992)). The Codgell decision was codified by New Jersey Rule of Court 4:30A, which
was later amended in September 1998 after review by the Civil Practice Committee at the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s direction. Ricketti 775 F.3d at 614; see also Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v.
Reynolds & Reynolds, Co., 207 N.J. 428, 25 A.3d 1027, 1035–36 (2011); Paramount Aviation
Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 135 n. 1 (3d Cir.1999). As a result of the further review, all language
concerning party joinder was dropped, and moved to Rule 4:5-1(b)(2), which provides:
[E]ach party shall disclose ... the names of any non-party who should be joined in the action
... because of potential liability to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts....
If a party fails to comply with its obligations under this rule, the court may impose an
appropriate sanction including dismissal of a successive action against a party whose
existence was not disclosed or the imposition on the noncomplying party of litigation
expenses that could have been avoided by compliance with this rule. A successive action
shall not, however, be dismissed for failure of compliance with this rule unless the failure
of compliance was inexcusable and the right of the undisclosed party to defend the
successive action has been substantially prejudiced by not having been identified in the
prior action.
N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-1(b)(2). See Ricketti 775 F.3d at 614. Today, when considering applicability of the
entire controversy doctrine, the Court must be guided by Rule 4:30A when claim joinder has been
invoked, and Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) when discussing party joinder.
A. Party Joinder
This Court will first consider an analysis of party joinder under Rule 4:5-1(b)(2), which
provides the following—
[E]ach party shall disclose ... the names of any non-party who should be joined in the action ...
because of potential liability to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts.... If a
party fails to comply with its obligations under this rule, the court may impose an appropriate
sanction including dismissal of a successive action against a party whose existence was not
disclosed or the imposition on the noncomplying party of litigation expenses that could have
been avoided by compliance with this rule. A successive action shall not, however, be
dismissed for failure of compliance with this rule unless the failure of compliance was
inexcusable and the right of the undisclosed party to defend the successive action has been
substantially prejudiced by not having been identified in the prior action.
N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-1(b)(2).
The State Court Action was brought in 2015 and focused on two counts, including Breach of
Contract and Unjust Enrichment. Plaintiff only joined Debtor as a defendant, despite the Ex-spouse
having a clear marital interest in the Princeton property. Giantsea was successful in obtaining a default
judgment against the Debtor in 2016, and then refused to take action until the matrimonial matter was
finalized because it wanted the Ex-spouse’s interest to be determined first. It is palpably clear that
Debtor and Giantsea were aware that any claims against the Ex-spouse were fully known and had
accrued when the State Court Action was filed in 2015. Plaintiff attempts to bring these same claims
against the Ex-spouse by contending that she (1) will be unjustly enriched if she were permitted to
not pay back the Loan, (2) agreed that the Princeton Property would be security for the alleged
loan, and (3) under quantum meruit, received the benefit of the alleged Loan and because of this,
the Property should be placed in a constructive trust held by Plaintiff. This Courts finds that there
is no justification for not bringing in the Ex-spouse as a party when all claims under the Loan
Agreement were to be litigated in the State Court Action.
B. Joinder of Claims
This Court now turns its attention to claim preclusion, as it is applied through the entire
controversy doctrine. Rule 4:30(A) provides in relevant part that “[n]on-joinder of claims required
to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to
the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine.” N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A. While Rule 4:30A fails to
provide guidance as to which claims must be necessarily joined under the entire controversy
doctrine, it does suggest that such claims must arise from related facts or transaction(s), but they
need not necessarily be bound by the same legal theories. See Bank Leumi USA 243 N.J. at 233.
In determining whether Plaintiff’s claims should be precluded, this Court looks to New
Jersey preclusion law, as the state court judgment was entered in New Jersey. See Watkins v.
Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 411, 591 A.2d 592, 598 (1991) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 95 cmt. e (1971)). Claim preclusion will act as a bar
to suit if the following apply—
(1) the judgment in the first action is valid, final and on the merits; (2) the parties in both
actions are the same or are in privity with each other; and (3) the claims in the second action
must arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the claims in the first one. In addition,
res judicata bars not only claims that were brought in the first action, but also claims that
should have been brought as well.
Sibert v. Phelan, 901 F. Supp. 183, 186 (D.N.J. 1995) (internal citations omitted). This logic
applies to default judgments as well. A default judgment is a final judgment that would bar all
further litigation of the action. In re Crispino, 160 B.R. 749, 755 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993); See e.g.,
Evangel Baptist Church v. Chambers, 96 N.J.Super. 367, 370–71, 233 A.2d 82 (Ch.Div.1967) (“I
have found no authority indicating that a default judgment, properly entered, has any less binding
effect upon possible future interests in land than a judgment entered in a contested matter.”). This
is assuming that the issues were fairly litigated in the previous proceeding. Id.
Debtor was the primary defendant in the State Court Action with Plaintiff, and presently,
the Debtor (as well as the bankruptcy estate) is the primary defendant in this adversary proceeding.
The Amended Complaint is comprised of claims that arise from the same facts and relate to the
same Loan Agreement that was litigated in the State Court Action. After Debtor’s failure to answer
the complaint in the State Court Action, Plaintiff was awarded a default money judgment, which
this Court considers final. Presently, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Property was held in
constructive trust for its benefit, or in the alternative, that Plaintiff is entitled to a first priority lien
and security interest that is superior to all named defendants.
The Court sees these requests for equitable relief as state law constructs that could have
been brought in the State Court Action. The Court need not rely on extrinsic evidence to come to
this determination. As there is a final judgment entered in the State Court Action arising from the
same facts and issues related to the Loan Agreement that is bottomed on the same facts and
transaction of issue in this adversary proceeding, and because Plaintiff failed to assert any rights
to equitable remedies in the state court, this Court finds that Plaintiff is barred by claim preclusion,
and the entire controversy doctrine, from further litigating these claims in this bankruptcy.
This dispute, however, does raise several additional interesting issues upon which this
Court feels compelled to comment.
IV. Constructive Trusts and Debtor’s Right to Redemption
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the Princeton Property is held in constructive
trust for the benefit of Plaintiff in consideration of the Loan. This Court must first determine
whether such an equitable remedy is appropriate.
In Flanigan v. Munson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey discusses the purpose of
constructive trusts in the acquisition of property, and clarifies that “the wrongful act must result in
a transfer or diversion of property that unjustly enriches the recipient.” Flanigan v. Munson, 175
N.J. 597, 608 A.2d 1275, 1281 (2003). Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether the
implementation of a constructive trust is warranted. Flanigan 175 N.J. 597 at 608. First, a court
must find that a “wrongful act” was committed by a party. Specifically, the act need not be
fraudulent, but may be an innocent mistake, to result in a constructive trust. Second, “the wrongful
act must result in a transfer or diversion of property that unjustly enriches the recipient.” Flanigan
175 N.J. 597 at 608 (citing D'Ippolito v. Castoro, 51 N.J. 584, 589, 242 A.2d 617 (1968)); see also
In re Giberson, 260 B.R. 78, 81 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2001) (asserting that a “a constructive trust can be
imposed where property has been transferred by a wrongful act including fraud, mistake or undue
influence or where property has not been wrongfully acquired but retention would result in unjust
enrichment.”) Bankruptcy courts are reluctant to impose constructive trusts, however, as they may
substantially alter the priority system. See In re Haber Oil., 12 F.3d 426, 436 (5th Cir.1994).
Should a claimant be granted a constructive trust, that claimant is essentially given priority over
other unsecured creditors.
This Court has concerns that the imposition of a constructive trust would impair the
Debtor’s right to redemption. “The right of redemption arises by statute N.J.S.A. 2A:50–16 et seq.,
by rule 4:65–5,6 and by equity.” In re Mocco, 176 B.R. 335, 345 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995).
Under New Jersey law every mortgagor is possessed of an “Equity of Redemption” which
stems from the mortgage itself and the common law. Pursuant to the right aforesaid, the
mortgagor is cloaked with the authority, subsequent to default, but prior to a judgment of
foreclosure, to perform his obligation under the mortgage and have title to his property
restored free and clear of the mortgage obligation.
Matter of Martinez, 73 B.R. 300, 302 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987) (citing G. Nelson and D. Whitman,
Real Estate Finance Law § 7.1 (2d ed. 1985)). There is extensive history in New Jersey stating
that the equity of redemption is a right that cannot so easily be extinguished. “The right to redeem
is a favorite equity and will not be taken away except upon a strict compliance with the steps
necessary to divest it.” Mansfield v. Hammond, 117 N.J. Eq. 509, 510, 176 A. 354, 354 (1935).
Such a favored right “may not be released in the mortgage itself or in a contemporaneous
agreement.” Hardyston Nat. Bank of Hamburg, N. J. v. Tartamella, 56 N.J. 508, 513, 267 A.2d
495, 497–98 (1970); see also Dorman v. Fisher, 31 N.J. 13, 15, 155 A.2d 11 (1959). Under current
New Jersey law, a mortgagor is permitted to redeem within a ten-day period after a foreclosure
auction, as provided in Rule 4:65-5. Until the equity of redemption is extinguished, a debtor still
retains interest in the property. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:65-5.
Ultimately, this Court is not in favor of applying a constructive trust to the facts herein.
Constructive trusts primarily deal with the transfer or diversion of property, and the only
“property” a trust could possibly attach to in the case at bar is the transferred money between
Plaintiff and Debtor. Although Debtor’s failure to file a valid mortgage in favor of Giantsea
pursuant to the Loan Agreement may translate to a wrongful act, resulting in the Debtor being
unjustly enriched, this Court is more concerned about the impact a constructive trust would have
on Debtor’s right to redemption. In granting the relief sought by Plaintiff, a constructive trust over
the Property, the Court would be denying the Debtor (and the bankruptcy estate) the right to
redeem the Property. New Jersey’s extensive history suggests that this favored equitable right
cannot be eliminated through the imposition of a constructive trust.
V. Express Contracts and Plaintiff’s Requests for Equitable Relief
Plaintiff posits that Debtor and the Ex-spouse were unjustly enriched at the time the
Property was acquired because (1) Debtor and the Ex-Spouse used no other funds to secure the
Property, (2) no other valuable consideration was provided in connection with the obligation to
repay the loan, and (3) the mortgage in favor of Plaintiff was not recorded at the time of purchase.
Therefore, Plaintiff asserts it is entitled to a first priority lien and security interest against the
Property. Yet, authorities are clear that a claim for unjust enrichment will be dismissed if the
complaint alleges an express, enforceable contract that controls the parties' relationship. See Van
Orman v. Am. Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 310 (3d Cir.1982) (applying New Jersey law); Rossdeutscher
v. Viacom, Inc., 768 A.2d 8, 23–24 (Del.2001) (applying New York law); ID Biomedical Corp. v.
TM Tech., Inc., 1995 WL 130743, at *15 (Del.Ch. Mar.16, 1995) (applying Delaware law). This
is because unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy that is generally used to fill a gap that the law
of contract would otherwise address, if there were a contract. See Freedman v. Beneficial Corp.,
406 F.Supp. 917, 923 (D.Del.1975). Should the moving party look to recover under an unjust
enrichment theory, notwithstanding the existence of an express contract, including a lending
agreement, the court will consider whether the agreement and underlying enforceability of the
express contract is being challenged in the complaint. See In re Fedders N. Am., Inc., 405 B.R.
527, 552 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). In New Jersey, “there must be a rescission of an express contract
before the parties will be permitted to proceed with a claim for [q]uantum meruit. The only conflict
between pleading and proving an express contract and [q]uantum meruit simultaneously occurs in
the absence of a rescission.” Power—Matics, Inc. v. Ligotti, 79 N.J.Super. 294, 305, 191 A.2d 483
(App.Div.1963) (citing Moser v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 6 N.J. 278, 280-281, 78 A.2d 393 (1951);
C.B. Snyder Realty Co. v. Nat., Inc., Banking Co., 14 N.J. 146, 162-163, 101 A.2d 544 (1952)).
This Court rules that Plaintiff's claims for equitable relief cannot be enforced since an
express contract, the Loan Agreement, exists. Equitable remedies must take a backseat to the
contract. As discussed, Plaintiff previously opted to pursue a judgment for breach of the Loan
Agreement, and indeed secured a default judgment. There is no reason to afford equitable relief at
this juncture.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the entire controversy doctrine applies to
Plaintiff's claims for equitable relief in the Amended Complaint. The Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 10) shall be granted. The Court will enter an Order granting the Trustee’s motion and
terminating the adversary proceeding.
W be b Fefp—
Michael B. Kaplan, Chief Judge
U.S. Bankruptcy Court
District of New Jersey
Dated: October 2, 2020
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