The opinion
FILED
JEANNE A. NAUGHTON, CLERK
FEB 28 2020
STE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COUR
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
In Re: Case No.: 19-19206-JKS
Chapter 7
ROBERT BROWNING, Hon. John K. Sherwood, U.S.B.J.
Debtor.
ARMANDO F. FLORES and Adversary No.: 19-02074-JKS
MELINDA FLORES,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
ROBERT BROWNING,
Defendant.
DECISION REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The relief set forth on the following pages, numbered two (2) through ten (10), is hereby
ORDERED.
wont JOHN K. SHERWOOD
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Dated: February 28, 2020
Caption of Order: Decision Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
APPEARANCES:
MITCHELL PERLMUTTER, ESQ.
26 Journal Square
Suite 1102
Jersey City, New Jersey 07306
Counsel for Plaintiffs
ROBERT BROWNING
205 Bowers Street
Jersey City, New Jersey 07307
Pro Se Debtor-Defendant
Caption of Order: Decision Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this matter, the Court must decide whether a State Court judgment against Robert
Browning (the “Debtor”) in favor of Armando and Melinda Flores (the “Plaintiffs”) can be
discharged in bankruptcy. The judgment was entered after a multi-day jury trial in the State Court
where the jury found that the Debtor had committed assault and battery upon Mr. Flores and
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The key question is whether the findings of
fact by the State Court are binding on the Debtor in this case. The Plaintiffs argue that they are,
and thus it is not necessary to have another trial in this case over the nondischargeability of their
judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs because the State Court has already determined that the Debtor has committed a willful
and malicious injury upon the Plaintiffs which is not dischargeable in bankruptcy under
§ 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334
and 157(a). This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A) and (I). This is the proper
venue for this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1408.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. On May 6, 2019, the Debtor filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 On
August 1, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed this adversary proceeding seeking to have a debt owed by
the Debtor declared nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Plaintiffs argue
that the debt is nondischargeable because it arose from a willful and malicious injury caused
1 Case No. 19-19206.
Caption of Order: Decision Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
by the Debtor. The debt was reduced to judgment in civil litigation between the parties (the
“State Court Litigation”) that resulted in a unanimous jury verdict awarding the Plaintiffs
compensatory and punitive damages against the Debtor based on a “brutal attack” on Mr.
Flores.2
2. In the State Court Litigation, the jury was instructed as follows regarding the charges of assault
and battery:
“A person is subject to liability for an assault if he acts intending to
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the other person, or to
cause an . . . imminent apprehension of such . . . contact. And, if the
person thereby is put into such imminent apprehension, a battery
necessarily includes a preceding assault, and . . . extends to actual
non-[consensual] contact.”3
The jury was also instructed on the claim by the Debtor that he was acting in self-defense of
an attack by Mr. Flores as follows:
“Fundamentally, ladies and gentlemen, no person has a lawful right
to lay hostile and menacing hands on another. However, the law
does not require anyone to submit weakly to the unlawful infliction
of violence upon him. He may resist the use or threatened use of
force upon him. He may meet force with force, but he must use only
such force as reasonably appears to him to be necessary under all
the circumstances for the purpose of self protection.
Accordingly, if you find that the defendant in this case has
succeeded in proving that he was under attack by the plaintiff, and
that the injury sustained by the plaintiff was inflicted by the
defendant’s having used only such force as, under all the
circumstances, was necessary or reasonably appeared to have been
necessary for his own protection, then the defense of self defense
has been proven, and you must find in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff.”4
2 ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 10. The record reflects that the Debtor bit Mr. Flores’s nose off – the attack was brutal.
3 ECF No. 10-8, Ex. M at 62-63.
4 Id. at 64.
Caption of Order: Decision Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
The jury returned a unanimous decision that the Debtor committed assault and battery and that
Mr. Flores did not assault the Debtor.5 Then, the jury was instructed that to award punitive
damages it must find:
“that the injury, loss, or harm suffered by plaintiff was the result of
defendant’s acts or omissions, and that either, one, the defendant’s
conduct was malicious; or, two that the defendant acted in wanton
and willful disregard of plaintiff’s rights.”
The trial court defined malicious conduct as “intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil-
minded act.” Willful or wanton conduct was defined as “a deliberate act or omission with
knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to another who foreseeably might be harmed
by that act or omission and reckless indifference to the consequence of the act or omission.”6
Upon these instructions, the jury awarded punitive damages to the Plaintiffs.
3. The judgment in the State Court Litigation breaks down as follows:
A. $1,160,000.00 for pain, suffering, disability, impairment and loss of enjoyment of life
to Armando Flores;
B. $65,583.61 for past medical expenses to Armando Flores;
C. $35,352.52 for future medical expenses to Armando Flores;
D. $580,000.00 for the loss of her spouse’s services, society and consortium to Melinda
Flores; and
E. $500,000.00 in punitive damages to the Plaintiffs, plus statutory interest for pre- and
post-judgment.7
5 Id. at 106-08.
6 Id. at 123-24.
7 ECF No. 10-4, Ex. B at 2.
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4. On August 2, 2019, the Debtor, who is proceeding pro se, filed a two-page answer to the
complaint in which he alleged that the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel are perpetrating a fraud
upon the Court and that the Debtor was assaulted by Mr. Flores.8
5. On December 6, 2019, the Debtor filed a motion to dismiss.9 On January 7, 2020, the Court
held a hearing and denied the Debtor’s motion to dismiss this adversary proceeding.
6. On December 26, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment. They argue
that the debt cannot be discharged because the Debtor’s actions were willful and malicious and
therefore fall within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Plaintiffs also argue that this
matter is ripe for summary judgment because the parties already litigated the issues in this case
in the State Court Litigation and a jury returned a verdict in their favor.10
7. On January 2, 2020, the Debtor filed a response to the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
again asserting that he was the victim of an attack.11 On January 9, 2020, the Debtor filed a
second response in which he disputed a number of factual allegations made by the Plaintiffs.12
In both pleadings, the Debtor attacks the State Court judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiffs
offered false testimony at trial and contends that he was the victim of an attack. On January 22,
2020, the Plaintiffs filed a response.13
8. On February 4, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment. For the
reasons set forth below, the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted.
8 ECF No. 3.
9 ECF No. 9.
10 ECF No. 10-2.
11 ECF No. 12.
12 ECF No. 13.
13 ECF No. 17.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, made applicable to this adversary proceeding by
Bankruptcy Rule 7056, provides for entry of summary judgment where the “movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”14 A fact is considered material where its determination will have a direct impact
on the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law. An issue of material fact is considered
genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. The Court must construe facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party.15
Here, the Debtor disputes that he has caused a “willful and malicious” injury to the
Plaintiffs by arguing that he was the victim of an assault by Mr. Flores and his son. But this claim
was raised by the Debtor in the State Court Litigation and the jury unanimously held that Mr.
Flores did not assault the Debtor. Essentially, the Debtor is seeking a second trial of facts that
were decided against him in the State Court Litigation. As set forth below, this Court is not
required to revisit factual findings that have been made by a State Court. To the extent that such
findings establish a nondischargeability claim under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, the case
can be decided on summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
The Chapter 7 discharge is a key feature of the Bankruptcy Code and works to provide the
honest but unfortunate debtor with a “fresh start” upon the conclusion of a debtor’s bankruptcy
case. Although the discharge is intended to free a debtor of all pre-petition debts, § 523 provides
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056.
15 Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015).
Caption of Order: Decision Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
that certain debts are excepted from discharge. The exception at issue in this case depends on
whether the debt owed by the Debtor arose from a willful and malicious injury he caused.
A. Collateral Estoppel Bars The Debtor From Relitigating Facts.
Collateral estoppel is a preclusive doctrine that prevents a party from relitigating issues
that were adjudicated in a prior lawsuit.16 New Jersey’s collateral estoppel standard applies
because the Court “must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be
given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment is rendered.”17 The doctrine
of collateral estoppel is part “of the broader law of res judicata which bars re-litigation of any issue
which was actually determined in a prior action, generally between the same parties, involving a
different claim or cause of action.”18 In New Jersey, collateral estoppel applies when: (1) the issue
in question is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding, (2) the issue was actually
litigated in the prior proceeding, (3) the court in the prior proceeding entered a final judgment on
the merits, (4) the court’s determination on the issue in question was essential to the prior
judgment, and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with
a party to the earlier proceeding.19 In this case, elements (2) – (5) are satisfied. The issue of
whether the jury’s findings in the State Court Litigation establish that the Debtor caused a willful
and malicious injury to the Plaintiffs requires some additional analysis.
16In re Docteroff, 133 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 1997).
17 Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).
18Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 189 N.J. 497, 520 (2007) (citations omitted).
19 In re Hawkins, 231 B.R. 222, 231 (D.N.J. 1999).
Caption of Order: Decision Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
B. The Findings Of The Jury In The State Court Litigation Establish That The Debt
Arose From The Willful And Malicious Conduct Of The Debtor.
Under § 523(a)(6), a debt is nondischargeable if the “debt [is] for willful and malicious
injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.” Courts have found that an
injury fits within this definition “when an actor purposefully inflicts the injury or acts in such a
manner that he is substantially certain that injury will result.”20 Put another way, “[S]ection
523(a)(6) requires the plaintiffs to prove that the debt arose from willful harm done with the intent
to cause injury.”21
In considering whether collateral estoppel applies, the Court has reviewed the jury
instructions and jury verdict in the State Court Litigation. In the context of § 523(a)(6), courts
have granted summary judgment based on a jury verdict for compensatory and punitive damages
arising from an intentional tort by a debtor. This is because “assertions by [a debtor] are
insufficient to rebut issues conclusively decided by a jury.”22
In this case, the judgment and transcript from the State Court Litigation provide the
necessary details to make a nondischargeability determination. The jury’s findings regarding the
assault and battery charge and punitive damages award can be summarized as follows: (1) the
Debtor was liable for assault and battery because he intentionally made offensive contact with Mr.
Flores, (2) the Debtor’s claim that he was under assault by Mr. Flores and his son and was acting
in self-defense was considered by the jury and rejected, and (3) punitive damages were awarded
because the jury found that the Debtor’s acts were malicious or committed with wanton and willful
disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. These findings and the brutality of the Debtor’s assault upon Mr.
20 In re Viola, 2013 WL 4273494, *2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2013) (citations omitted).
21 In re Beale, 253 B.R. 644, 648 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000).
22 In re Beale, 253 B.R. at 649-50.
Caption of Order: Decision Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Flores establish the elements of the Plaintiffs’ claim under § 523(a)(6). Plaintiffs’ claims against
the Debtor have been adjudicated and the Court can conclude from the findings in the State Court
Litigation that the Debtor intended to and did cause serious injury to Mr. Flores.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted. Plaintiffs’ judgment against the Debtor dated November 16, 2015 in the amount of
$2,351,931.76 plus post-judgment interest is non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).