The Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of N

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

§

IN RE: § CASE NO: 20-10846

§

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH § CHAPTER 11

OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW §

ORLEANS, § COMPLEX CASE

§

DEBTOR. § SECTION A

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors’ Motion To Compel

Debtor’s (1) Production of Documents, and (2) Privilege Log, to the Extent Necessary, Related to

Rule 2004 Order (the “Motion To Compel”), [ECF Doc. 804], filed by the Official Committee of

Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”); the objection to the Motion To Compel filed by The

Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans (the “Archdiocese”), the debtor in the

above-captioned bankruptcy case, [ECF Doc. 814]; and the Committee’s reply brief filed in

support of the Motion To Compel, [ECF Doc. 821]. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure 9014 and 7052, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law

related to the current contested matter and GRANTS the relief requested in the Motion To

Compel.1

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief provided for herein pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1334. The matter presently before the Court constitutes a core proceeding that this Court

1 To the extent that any of the following findings of fact are determined to be conclusions of law,

they are adopted and shall be construed and deemed conclusions of law. To the extent any of the following

conclusions of law are determined to be findings of fact, they are adopted and shall be construed and deemed

as findings of fact.

may hear and determine on a final basis under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Venue is proper pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

FINDINGS OF FACT

After more than three years, the events of this case have become more detailed and

voluminous. To avoid repetition, the Court relies upon and incorporates its findings in past

opinions to fill in the details of the case. [ECF Docs. 745, 991, 1759 & 1844].

In March 2020, two months prior to the Archdiocese filing for bankruptcy relief, Mark

Mintz, a partner in the law firm of Jones Walker LLP, the Archdiocese’s bankruptcy counsel,

engaged The Ehrhardt Group (“TEG”) on behalf of the Archdiocese to be “the sole provider of

public relations and crisis communication counsel” for the Archdiocese regarding its “potential

restructuring.” Joint Ex. 4. The Letter of Agreement for Professional Services was signed by Marc

Ehrhardt, President of TEG, and returned to Mintz on March 10, 2020. See id. Despite containing

a signature line for Mintz, neither he nor anyone else on behalf of the Archdiocese ever signed the

agreement. See id. The agreement set an initial term of six months, which could be renewed “upon

mutual agreement,” and provided that fixed monthly fees would be paid by the Archdiocese

directly to TEG. Id.

On May 1, 2020, the Archdiocese filed a petition for bankruptcy relief in the face of 34

pending lawsuits alleging sexual abuse claims. Shortly thereafter, the Office of the United States

Trustee constituted the Committee and, later, constituted a separate Official Committee of

Unsecured Commercial Creditors. [ECF Doc. 745]. The parties have conducted significant

discovery regarding both the financial structure and operations of the Archdiocese, as well as

discovery regarding sexual abuse allegations against employees and affiliates of the Archdiocese

and how such allegations have been addressed by the Archdiocese. Under a protective order issued

by this Court, the Debtor produced documents responsive to the Committee’s discovery requests

on a rolling basis and agreed to produce a log at the close of discovery that catalogued documents

it withheld from production on the basis of the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-

product doctrine.

Displeased with the pace of document production and the responsiveness of documents

produced, the Committee filed the Motion To Compel. [ECF Doc. 804]. The Court held numerous

hearings over two years, issuing discovery rulings and assisting the parties to reach consensual

resolution on many of the discovery disputes. The final remaining discovery dispute concerns the

privilege log. The Archdiocese maintains that 67 documents (52 e-mails and 15 attachments

thereto), dated between May 5, 2020, and March 18, 2021, are protected under the attorney-client

privilege and attorney work-product doctrine and thus exempt from discovery (the “Disputed

Communications”). [ECF Doc. 2261]; Joint Ex. 1. Counsel for the Archdiocese submitted

unredacted versions of the Disputed Communications to chambers prior to the evidentiary hearing

and the Court has reviewed each of the Disputed Communications in camera. [ECF Doc. 2261].

All of the Disputed Communications include Sarah McDonald, in-house Director of

Communications for the Archdiocese, and William Kearney, Senior Vice President of TEG, who

sent and received e-mails both from a TEG e-mail account and a personal Yahoo! e-mail account.

See Joint Ex. 1. Malcolm Ehrhardt, an employee of TEG, was included on nine of the Disputed

Communications. See id. Susan Zeringue, in-house counsel for the Archdiocese, was also

included on all but one of the Disputed Communications. See id. No outside bankruptcy counsel

for the Archdiocese were included on any of the Disputed Communications. See id. Archdiocese

employees, such as Archbishop Gregory M. Aymond, as well as individuals who appear to be

affiliated with the Archdiocese, such as financial advisor Lee Eagan or Fr. Timothy Hedrick of St.

Catherine of Siena Parish, were also included on certain Disputed Communications. See id.2

The Committee disagrees with the Archdiocese’s characterization of the Disputed

Communications as privileged. It contends that communications including TEG, an outside

public-relations firm, cannot be protected under the attorney-client privilege or attorney work-

product doctrine. [ECF Docs. 2259 & 2262]. At the evidentiary hearing on this contested matter,

the Court heard testimony from William Kearney and Sarah C. McDonald and admitted as

evidence Joint Exhibits 1 and 4, as well as Joint Exhibits 7–39 (redacted e-mails).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Standards for Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications

The federal common law of attorney-client privilege applies when federal law determines

the substantive rights of the parties. See FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017; In re Royce

Homes, LP, 449 B.R. 709, 722 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); Dynamic Fin. Corp. v. Kipperman (In re

N. Plaza, LLC), 395 B.R. 113, 122 (S.D. Cal. 2008). The party asserting the attorney-client

privilege bears the burden of proof and must show that she “(1) made a confidential

communication; (2) to a lawyer or his subordinate; (3) for the primary purpose of securing either

a legal opinion or legal services, or assistance in some legal proceeding.” United States v.

Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1997).

Application of the privilege is a fact-specific inquiry for the Court that is “to be determined

in the light of the purpose of the privilege and guided by judicial precedents.” Hodges, Grant &

2 Several of the Disputed Communications include third parties other than TEG who are not clearly

identifiable as Archdiocese employees. See Joint Ex. 1. For purposes of this ruling, the Court assumes

without deciding that each of the Disputed Communications would otherwise have been protected by the

attorney-client privilege. The Court need not reach that issue because, for the reasons outlined in Subpart

B infra, the Court finds that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to TEG.

Kaufmann v. U.S. Gov’t, Dep’t of the Treasury, I.R.S., 768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation

omitted); see also King v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.C., 645 F.3d 713, 722 (5th Cir. 2011); United

States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994). The purpose of the privilege “is to encourage

full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader

public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. United

States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Essential to a claim of privilege “is that the communication be

made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.” United States v.

El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed,

“[w]hen a corporation simultaneously sends communications to both lawyers and non-lawyers . . .

‘it usually cannot claim that the primary purpose of the communication was for legal advice or

assistance because the communication served both business and legal purposes.’” Slocum v. Int’l

Paper Co., 549 F. Supp. 3d 519, 524 (E.D. La. 2021) (quoting In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501

F. Supp. 2d 789, 805 (E.D. La. 2007)).

Because the privilege operates “to restrict or withhold relevant information from the fact-

finder, it has been interpreted narrowly by the Fifth Circuit.” Nw. Senior Hous. Corp. v. Intercity

Inv. Props., Inc. (In re Nw. Senior Hous. Corp.), No. 22-30659, 2023 WL 2938386, at *3 (Bankr.

N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2023) (citing In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001));

see also Calvin Klein Trademark Tr. v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[I]t must

not be forgotten that the attorney-client privilege, like all evidentiary privileges, stands in

derogation of the search for truth so essential to the effective operation of any system of justice:

therefore, the privilege must be narrowly construed.” (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,

710 (1974)).

B. Inclusion of TEG in Communications Which Otherwise May Have Been

Privileged Resulted in Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege.

Generally, disclosure of communications protected by the attorney-client privilege to a

third party constitutes a waiver of the privilege. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,

539 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[A] breach of confidentiality forfeits the client’s right to claim the

privilege.”). Courts have identified at least four ways, however, that the attorney-client privilege

can be extended to cover communications with third parties. First, the “common legal interest”

extension involves communications between an attorney and a third party who shares a common

legal interest with the client. See, e.g., United States v. Krug, 868 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2017); In

re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710–11 (5th Cir. 2001); Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. U.S.

Gov’t, Dep’t of the Treasury, I.R.S., 768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985). Second, the “translator”

extension applies in cases where a third party is essential to improve or facilitate communication

between the attorney and the client. See El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 541 (citing United States v.

Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) and explaining that “the privilege does not attach to tax work

prepared by accountants unless the accountant is translating complex tax terms into a form

intelligible to a lawyer at the lawyer’s behest”). Next, the “functional equivalent” extension

involves cases where a third party is deemed the “functional equivalent” of a corporate client’s

employee or principal and, thus, essentially becomes the client. See Viacom, Inc. v. Sumitomo

Corp. (In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig.), 200 F.R.D. 213, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that a

public relations firm “was the functional equivalent of an in-house public relations department

with respect to . . . media relations, having authority to make decisions and statements on [the

client’s] behalf, and seeking and receiving legal advice from [the client’s] counsel with respect to

the performance of its duties”). Lastly, the “consultant” extension involves narrow situations

where a third party is retained by counsel to “assist[] the lawyer in the rendition of legal services”

and “advance the client’s legal position.” In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 24, 2003

Directed to (A) Grand Jury Witness Firm & (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324–

31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Here, the Archdiocese bears the burden of proof to show that the attorney-client privilege

applies to each of the Disputed Communications. Based upon the pleadings, testimony, and

arguments made at the evidentiary hearing, the Court infers that the Archdiocese asserts that each

of the Disputed Communications is privileged under either the “translator” extension or the

“functional equivalent” extension.3

1. The “translator” exception does not apply to protect the Disputed

Communications from disclosure.

As explained above, the “translator” extension applies in cases where a third party is

essential to improve or facilitate communication between the attorney and the client. See El Paso

3 The Court agrees that neither the “common legal interest” extension nor the “consultant” extension

applies to any of the Disputed Communications. The “common legal interest” extension applies only to

co-defendants and their shared counsel in current litigation or potential co-defendants and their shared

counsel in anticipated litigation. See, e.g., Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann, 768 F.2d at 721. TEG is not a co-

defendant or co-debtor with the Archdiocese in the bankruptcy case; therefore, that extension is

inapplicable.

The “consultant” extension would protect the Disputed Communications under the attorney-client

privilege if this Court were to find that those communications were

(1) confidential . . . (2) between lawyers and public relations consultants (3) hired by the

lawyers to assist them in dealing with the media . . . (4) that are made for the purpose of

giving or receiving advice [and] (5) directed at handling the client’s legal problems. . . .

In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331. The evidence presented at trial shows that the Jones

Walker firm retained TEG on behalf of the Archdiocese to perform public relations services and answer

inquiries to the Archdiocese in anticipation of and after the bankruptcy filing, but not to assist Jones Walker

in representing the legal interests of Archdiocese vis-à-vis the bankruptcy and advancing the Archdiocese’s

legal position. See Joint Ex. 4; Hr’g Tr. 16:3–30:2 (June 26, 2023) [ECF Doc. 2358]; see also McNamee

v. Clemens, No. 09-1647, 2013 WL 6572899, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013) (“[T]he development of a

public relations campaign and media strategy primarily aimed at protecting [the client’s] public image and

reputation in the face of allegations . . . is decidedly different from the use of the public relations firm in In

re Grand Jury Subpoenas, where the firm was hired by plaintiff’s counsel with the specific aim of reducing

public pressure on prosecutors and regulators to bring charges.”). Thus the “consultant” extension likewise

does not apply here.

Co., 682 F.2d at 541. In essence, the third party must operate as a translator between the client

and counsel so as to assist counsel in providing legal services to the client. Although the term

“translator” is used somewhat loosely to refer to an individual who operates as an intermediary

between the client and counsel, the extension has been largely limited to actual translators or

accountants who are “necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between

the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit.” Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922. “For

this rule to apply, the party asserting the privilege must show (1) . . . a reasonable expectation of

confidentiality under the circumstances, and (2) [that] disclosure to the third party was necessary

for the client to obtain informed legal advice.” Cohen v. Cohen, No. 09-10230, 2015 WL 745712,

at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The third party must be present to improve the attorney-client communications being made

for the ultimate purpose of obtaining legal advice from the attorney: “If the advice sought is the

[third-party’s] rather than the lawyer’s, no privilege exists.” Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922. Key to

remember in applying this extension is that “the possibility that communications between [a third

party] and [counsel] may help the latter to formulate legal advice is not in itself sufficient to

implicate the privilege: ‘the privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney,

not communications that prove important to an attorney’s legal advice to a client.’” Calvin Klein

Trademark Tr. v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Ackert,

169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)).

An in camera review of every Disputed Communication reveals that the communications

were made to craft responses to media inquiries, but not to assist Jones Walker in providing legal

advice to the Archdiocese. Indeed, no Jones Walker attorney is included in any of the e-mails.

William Kearney testified that the ultimate purpose of TEG’s public-relations advice to the

Archdiocese was to benefit the Archdiocese’s reputational and business/mission goals. See Hr’g

Tr. 28:23–29:10 (June 26, 2023) [ECF Doc. 2358]; see also Nw. Senior Hous. Corp. v. Intercity

Inv. Props., Inc. (In re Nw. Senior Hous. Corp.), No. 22-30659, 2023 WL 2938386, at *4 (Bankr.

N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2023). The Court’s in camera review of the Disputed Communications reveals

that any requests for TEG’s advice made by in-house professionals of the Archdiocese were solely

related to public-relations concerns, not to devise a legal strategy with bankruptcy counsel.

Moreover, none of the Disputed Communications flowed through TEG as an intermediary

or “translator.” Rather, the Disputed Communications generally occurred among various

employees of the Archdiocese and TEG. Like the public relations firm in Calvin Klein, TEG

provided ordinary public relations advice including reviewing press coverage and preparing

various responses to the media. See 198 F.R.D. at 54–55. Such “advice simply serves to assist

counsel in assessing the probable public reaction to various strategic alternatives, as opposed to

enabling counsel to understand aspects of the client’s own communications that could not

otherwise be appreciated in the rendering of legal advice.” Id. at 55. Thus, the Court finds that

the attorney-client privilege cannot be extended to include TEG as a “translator.”

2. The “functional equivalent” extension also fails to protect the Disputed

Communications from disclosure.

The fundamental purpose of the attorney-client privilege

is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients

and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and

administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or

advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the

lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). But “a corporation cannot act on its own;

it can act only if authorized by appropriate agents.” Franchise Servs. of N. Am. v. United States

Trustee (In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am.), 891 F.3d 198, 206 (5th Cir. 2018). When it comes to

formulating sound legal advice on behalf of a corporation, in addition to senior management

directly responsible for directing a corporation’s action in response to legal advice, often low-level

employees and mid-level managers will possess the information needed by counsel to defend or

prosecute litigation. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390–91. Acknowledging that reality, courts

have held that a client does not waive attorney-client privilege if privileged communications are

disclosed to a third party deemed to be the “functional equivalent” of the client’s employee. See,

e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935–38 (8th Cir. 1994); Universal Standard Inc. v. Target

Corp., 331 F.R.D. 80, 88–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. at

220; Joyner v. Liprie (In re Liprie), 480 B.R. 658, 661, 664–65 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2012). To

determine whether the “functional equivalent” extension applies to otherwise privileged

communications, courts ask whether the third party (i) exercised independent decision-making on

the company’s behalf; (ii) possessed information held by no one else at the company; (iii) served

as a company representative to third parties; (iv) maintained an office at the company or otherwise

spent a substantial amount of time working for it; and (v) sought legal advice from corporate

counsel to guide his or her work for the company. See Universal Standard Inc., 331 F.R.D. at 89

(citing In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 3d 207,

213 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. at 219 (analyzing the degree

to which outside public relations firm was incorporated into client’s staff and the degree to which

third party had independent authority to speak or act on behalf of client).

The Archdiocese has not shown that TEG is the “functional equivalent” of the Archdiocese

for purposes of extending the attorney-client privilege. The evidence before the Court reveals that

TEG exercised no independent decision-making authority on behalf of the Archdiocese, and did

not serve as the Archdiocese’s sole representative to the media. See Hr’g Tr. 11:1–14:1 (June 26,

2023); Joint Ex. 4. Similar to the consultants in Restasis, TEG was retained to provide “specialized

public relations and communications services for the Archdiocese” in spite of the fact that the

Archdiocese already had its own in-house media consultant and that TEG possessed no special

information or expertise that was not already held by others at the Archdiocese. See Hr’g Tr. 16:3–

29:25 (June 26, 2023); see also 352 F. Supp. 3d at 214–15. TEG did not maintain an office within

the Archdiocese’s facilities and no evidence exists that TEG spent a substantial amount of time

completing work for the Archdiocese; rather, the Archdiocese was but one of many of TEG’s

clients. See Joint Ex. 4 (“You are aware that [TEG] represents many other entities. We confirm

that you do not object to our undertaking to represent clients in other matters, even if the interests

of such clients in those other matters are adverse to you, provided that they are unrelated to our

representation of you.”). Lastly, the Court’s in camera review of the Disputed Communications

reveals that, although in-house counsel for the Archdiocese was copied on all but one of the

Disputed Communications, TEG did not seek or receive legal advice via those communications

from in-house counsel to guide its work for the Archdiocese. Instead, the Disputed

Communications focus on developing the right public messaging in response to media inquiries.

For the foregoing reasons and given that this Court is required to apply the attorney-client

privilege narrowly, the Court finds that the Archdiocese has failed to carry its burden to show that

the attorney-client privilege extends to TEG. Thus, the Archdiocese must produce all Disputed

Communications in the form of e-mails identified on the privilege log to the Committee, with the

reminder to all parties that the Protective Order as amended, [ECF Doc. 1120], remains in place

and governs discovery between the Archdiocese and the Committee.

C. The Documents Attached to E-mails Are Not Protected by the Attorney Work-

Product Doctrine.

In addition to 52 e-mails, the Disputed Communications are also comprised of 15

documents attached to those e-mails, which the Archdiocese asserts are shielded from production

under the attorney work-product doctrine.

The work-product privilege “is ‘distinct from and broader than the attorney-client

privilege.’” Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am. Inc., No. 02-7955, 2003 WL 21998674, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975)).

“Federal law governs the applicability of the work product doctrine.” Universal Standard Inc. v.

Target Corp., 331 F.R.D. 80, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citations omitted). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(b)(3) codifies the work-product doctrine and provides that a party is not entitled to

obtain discovery of “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation

or for trial by or for another party or its representative” unless the party makes a showing of

substantial need “and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other

means.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). Rule 26 expressly provides heightened protection against

disclosure of “the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney

or other representative concerning the litigation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B). “Attorney work

product can thus conceptually be divided into two classes: that which recites factual matters and

that which reflects the attorney’s opinions, conclusions, mental impressions or legal theories.”

Haugh, 2003 WL 21998674, at *5; see also United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th

Cir. 1982) (quoting Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238).

But “[t]he work product doctrine is not an umbrella that shades all materials prepared by a

lawyer.” El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 542. “The burden of establishing that a document is work

product is on the party who asserts the claim, but the burden of showing that the materials that

constitute work product should nonetheless be disclosed is on the party who seeks their

production.” Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. U.S. Gov’t, Dept. of the Treasury, I.R.S., 768 F.2d

719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Here, to protect any of the e-mail attachments from

production under the work-product doctrine, the Archdiocese must show that the attachments (1)

are documents or tangible things; (2) were prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; (3)

were prepared by an attorney or an attorney’s representative; and (4) contain mental impressions,

conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of the party. Osherow

v. Vann (In re Hardwood P-G, Inc.), 403 B.R. 445, 463 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2009) (citations

omitted).

“The work product doctrine focuses only on materials assembled and brought into being in

anticipation of litigation.” El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 542. For that reason, “it is not enough to show

merely that the material was prepared at the behest of a lawyer or was provided to a lawyer.”

Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). “Rather, the materials must result

from the conduct of ‘investigative or analytical tasks to aid counsel in preparing for litigation.’”

Id. Whether materials were created in anticipation of litigation is a highly fact-specific inquiry.

See In re Hardwood P-G, Inc., 403 B.R. at 463. Although litigation need not be imminent, “the

primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document [must be] to aid in possible future

litigation.” United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981); accord In re Kaiser

Aluminum & Chem. Co., 214 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2000); Houston Cas. Co. v. Supreme Towing

Co., No. 10-3367, 2012 WL 13055045, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2012) (“Courts consider the

primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document, more so than the timing of

production of that document.”). That analysis “requires a determination, based upon evidence and

not mere argument, that the principal factor motivating the creation of the document was

anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial, as opposed to ordinary business practice.” La.

Corral Mgmt., LLC v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co., No. 22-2398, 2023 WL 156876, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan.

11, 2023). Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business are excluded from the work

product doctrine. See El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 542.

“As a general matter, public relations activities, even if they bear on anticipated litigation,

fall outside the ambit of the work product doctrine.” Chan v. Big Geyser, Inc., No. 17-06473, 2018

WL 6075066, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2018) (citation omitted); see also Egiazaryan, 290 F.R.D.

at 435 (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58, 78–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Calvin Klein

Trademark Tr. v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). Moreover,

the work product doctrine does not extend to public relations activities even if they

bear on the litigation strategy because the purpose of the rule is to provide a zone

of privacy for strategizing about the conduct of litigation itself, not for strategizing

about the effects of the litigation on the client’s customers, the media, or on the

public generally.

Egiazaryan, 290 F.R.D. at 435 (citations omitted). As a result, courts have consistently rejected

claims of work-product protection over communications with public relations firms. See id. (citing

cases).

The Court has reviewed in camera the 15 documents in the context of the e-mail to which

each is attached. All of the documents are draft, voluntary responses to media requests made to

the Archdiocese through its public relations professionals; the draft responses were circulated for

the purpose of discussion and simultaneous review by both non-legal and legal personnel. All of

the draft responses dealt with allegations of sexual abuse by individual priests or settlements

reached with claimants, but none addressed the Archdiocese’s bankruptcy case or pending lawsuits

directly. The vast majority of the documents were created by the Archdiocese’s in-house public

relations professional. Those few that were created or edited by in-house counsel appear to recite

only factual matters; they did not reflect any investigative or analytical tasks that would aid counsel

in preparing for litigation which would be subject to heightened protection under Rule 26(b)(3)(B).

Very little of the evidence presented by the Archdiocese at the hearing dealt squarely with

the elements required to apply the work-product doctrine to the 15 documents attached to e-mails.

Thus, based on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude that the primary purpose motivating

the creation of any of the documents was anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial. Rather,

the Court finds that each of the documents was created in furtherance of public relations, an

ordinary business practice and, therefore, none of the documents qualify as privileged under the

attorney work-product doctrine. See Slocum v. Int’l Paper Co., 549 F. Supp. 3d 519, 524–25 (E.D.

La. 2021); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 805 (E.D. La. 2007).

Recites factual matters Primary purpose

Work

or reflects legal of doc to aid in

Product

Privilege Log No. Author/Editor opinions, conclusions, possible current

Doctrine

mental impressions or or future

applies?

legal theories? litigation?

ANO ESI (20- In-house public

Neither No No

10846)_PRIV_00000011 relations

ANO ESI (20-

In-house counsel Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000013

ANO ESI (20- In-house public

Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000015 relations and counsel

ANO ESI (20- In-house public

Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000018 relations

ANO ESI (20-

In-house counsel Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000020

ANO ESI (20- In-house public

Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000022 relations

ANO ESI (20-

In-house counsel Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000024

ANO ESI (20-

In-house counsel Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000026

ANO ESI (20- In-house public

Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000030 relations

ANO ESI (20- In-house public

Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000034 relations and counsel

ANO ESI (20- In-house public

Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000037 relations

ANO ESI (20- In-house public

Recites factual matters No No

10846)_PRIV_00000049 relations

For those reasons, the Court finds that the Archdiocese has failed to carry its burden to

show that the work-product doctrine applies to the Disputed Communications comprised of 15

attachments to e-mails listed on the privilege log. Thus, the Archdiocese must also produce those

15 documents to the Committee, with the reminder to all parties that the Protective Order remains

in place and governs discovery between the Archdiocese and the Committee.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the remaining relief requested in the Motion To Compel is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Archdiocese must produce all e-mails and

documents identified on the privilege log in unredacted form to the Committee within fourteen

days of this Order becoming a final Order.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of January, 2024.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

16