Opinion

Webber Commercial Properties LLC v. Jeffries

Court
United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Jun 26, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.0%

The opinion

ORDERED.

Dated: June 26, 2023

Caryl E. bein

Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

www.flmb.uscourts.gov

In re: Case No. 2:20-bk-01595-FMD

Chapter 7

John Steven Jeffries,

Debtor.

—/

Webber Commercial Properties LLC,

Plaintiff,

Adv. Pro. No. 2:20-ap-655-FMD

John Steven Jeffries,

Defendant.

—/

FINDINGS OF FACT,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

For more than a decade, Webber Commercial Properties LLC (“Plaintiff”) has

attempted to recover from John Steven Jeffries (“Debtor”) on his guaranty of a lease.

Plaintiff, the landlord under the lease, began its collection efforts after a purchaser of

Debtor’s business defaulted on the lease. When Plaintiff obtained a judgment against

Debtor on his guaranty, he filed this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.

In Debtor’s main bankruptcy case, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Debtor’s Claim

of Exemption (the “Objection to Exemption”),1 and in this adversary proceeding,

Plaintiff filed a Complaint Objecting to Discharge of Debtor Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727

(the “Complaint”).2

On March 28, 2023, the Court held a combined trial on the Objection to

Exemption and the Complaint. After carefully considering the exhibits, the

testimony, and the parties’ written closing arguments,3 the Court concludes that

Plaintiff did not meet its burden of proving that Debtor’s exemption was not properly

claimed or that Debtor’s discharge should be denied under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2),

(a)(3), or (a)(4).4

I. FACTS

Debtor is a 73-year-old individual with no formal business training.5 He and

his wife, Barbara, have been married for 25 years.6 Debtor’s bank accounts at

1 Main Case, Doc. No. 100.

2 Doc. No. 1.

3 Doc. Nos. 148, 149.

4 Unless otherwise stated, statutory references are to the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

§ 101, et seq.

5 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 208-09.

6 Id. at 118.

SunTrust Bank, Synovus Bank, and Achieva Credit Union are joint accounts with

Barbara. Debtor testified that other than the joint accounts, he does not own any bank

accounts.7

Between 2009 and 2011, Debtor owned and operated a barbecue and sports bar

known as “Porky’s” in commercial space that Porky’s leased from Plaintiff. In April

2011, Debtor sold his interest in Porky’s to an unrelated third party. To obtain

Plaintiff’s consent to the assignment of the lease, Debtor and Porky’s signed a lease

amendment in which they agreed to remain liable for the rent and related

obligations.8 In February 2012, after the purchaser defaulted under the lease, Plaintiff

sued Porky’s and Debtor in the Circuit Court for Lee County, Florida (the “Porky’s

Lawsuit”).9

Since at least 2014, Debtor has owned a residential property in Cape Coral,

Florida (the “Cape Coral Property”). The Cape Coral Property is encumbered by a

mortgage held by Synovus Bank in the original amount of $75,000.00. In March 2015,

Debtor and Barbara signed an Additional Advance Mortgage Modification Agreement to

borrow an additional $35,000.00 from Synovus Bank under the mortgage (the

“Synovus Funds”).10 Debtor initially asserted that he and Barbara gave the Synovus

7 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 40, 120-21.

8 Doc. No. 129-4, Def’s Ex. 4, ¶ 6; Doc. No. 131-9, Pl’s Ex. 19, ¶ 6.

9 Doc. No. 129-4, Def’s Ex. 4, ¶ 10; Doc. No. 131-9, Pl’s Ex. 19, ¶ 10.

10 Doc. No. 131-10, Pl’s Ex. 20, pp. 36-38.

Funds to Debtor’s son, Chad Jeffries (“Chad”),11 but he testified at trial that he was

remodeling his home at the time and did not know whether he gave any of the

Synovus Funds to Chad.12

In December 2015, Debtor and Barbara purchased a home located on Narwhal

Lane in Punta Gorda, Florida (the “Narwhal Home”).13 On March 29, 2016, they

signed a Mortgage for Use with Secured Revolving Credit Agreement with SunTrust

Bank.14 Under the mortgage, which was secured by the Narwhal Home, the

maximum amount of debt that Debtor could owe to SunTrust at any time was

$100,000.00.15

In November 2016, Debtor and Barbara signed a Modification of Mortgage with

SunTrust to increase the maximum debt secured by the Narwhal Home from

$100,000.00 to $120,000.00 (the “SunTrust Funds”).16 Debtor testified that he

deposited the SunTrust Funds into a joint checking account with Barbara, and that

they were used both to remodel the Narwhal Home and to give to Chad for his pool

project.17

11 Doc. No. 131-10, Pl’s Ex. 20, p. 10.

12 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 52-53.

13 Doc. No. 129-17, Def’s Ex. 17. Debtor and Barbara lived at the Narwhal Home from 2016 to October

2019 (Doc. No. 130-1, Pl’s Ex. 1, p. 35).

14 Doc. No. 129-18, Def’s Ex. 18.

15 Doc. No. 129-18, Def’s Ex. 18, p. 7.

16 Doc. No. 129-19, Def’s Ex. 19.

17 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, p. 119. Although Debtor testified that the SunTrust Funds “went to

the checking account and it went from the checking account to Chad,” he did not produce copies of

any checks evidencing the transfer to Chad. (Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, p. 55.)

In October or November 2016, Debtor gave or loaned $48,000.00 to Chad to

enable Chad to install a swimming pool at Chad’s home (the “Pool Funds”).18 Chad’s

record of disbursements for his “pool project” reflects “48k given” and “last money

given 5k,” so Debtor may have given him $53,000.00.19 Debtor and Chad did not

document the terms of the arrangement in writing.20

Although Debtor testified at his deposition that he loaned the Pool Funds to

Chad,21 he testified at trial that he and Barbara gave Chad the Pool Funds from their

joint funds and that he did not consider them a loan.22 Chad testified at trial that the

Pool Funds were a gift from his mother and father, although he previously testified

in deposition that he borrowed the funds from his father because he did not have the

money to build the pool.23

According to Chad’s record of disbursements for his pool project, the

installation of the pool took more than eight months, and Chad made payments to

contractors and suppliers until at least May 2017.24

18 Debtor attested in an affidavit dated January 7, 2022, that he and Barbara gave Chad $48,000.00

“on or about October 5, 2016.” (Doc. No. 129-4, Def’s Ex. 4, ¶ 20; Doc. No. 131-9, Pl’s Ex. 19, ¶ 20.) At

trial, Chad was asked when he received the Pool Funds and he answered, “Not all at once. So I got

the first one would have been covered 11/3/16 for sure with – with the money.” (Doc. No. 144, Trial

transcript, p. 163.) Chad’s testimony is consistent with his record of disbursements for the pool

project showing his first significant expenditures on November 3, 2016, November 29, 2016, and

November 30, 2016. (Doc. No. 131-6, Pl’s Ex. 16, p. 65.)

19 Doc. No. 131-6, Pl’s Ex. 16, p. 65.

20 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 121-22, 183-84.

21 Doc. No. 131-2, Pl’s Ex. 12, pp. 6-7.

22 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 36, 40, 43.

23 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 157-60.

24 Doc. No. 131-6, Pl’s Ex. 16, p. 65.

Starting in September 2017, and continuing for the next two and a half years,

Chad gave checks to Debtor every month to repay the Pool Funds. The 30 checks

were made payable solely to Debtor—not jointly to Debtor and Barbara.25 Generally,

Chad wrote each check in the amount of $610.00 and hand-wrote the words “pool

loan” on the memo line. Debtor testified that he deposited the checks into a joint

checking account owned with Barbara at SunTrust Bank (“Joint Account 5597”).26

The bank statements for Joint Account 5597 reflect a series of $610.00 deposits in 2018

and 2019.27

In early 2018, Debtor and Chad began working for Bear Coast Construction

(“BCC”), a company that Chad’s friend, Barry Berger, owns and operates.28 Shortly

after Debtor and Chad started work with BCC, Chad began operating Bear Coast

Remodeling (“BCR”) as a “division” of BCC, using BCC’s construction license.29 Mr.

Berger testified that BCC had an inactive bank account (“BCC Account 9029”) that

he allowed Chad to use for BCR’s business.30 During the time that BCR operated as

25 Doc. No. 131-6, Pl’s Ex. 16, pp. 69-98.

26 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, p. 57.

27 Doc. No. 129-6, Def’s Ex. 6; Doc. No. 129-7, Def’s Ex. 7.

28 Doc. No. 129-4, Def’s Ex. 4, ¶¶ 13-14; Doc. No. 131-9, Pl’s Ex. 19, ¶¶ 13-14.

29 Doc. No. 129-4, Def’s Ex. 4; Doc. No. 131-9, Pl’s Ex. 19. See also Doc. No. 129-3, Def’s Ex. 3,

Deposition transcript of Barry Berger, pp. 7-10.

30 Doc. No. 129-3, Def’s Ex. 3, Deposition transcript of Barry Berger, pp. 8-9. See also Doc. No. 129-2,

Def’s Ex. 2, Deposition transcript of Chad Jeffries, p. 32 (“[W]e had two accounts. I had one for BCC,

and Barry had one for BCC.”).

a division of BCC, Debtor’s duties included purchasing construction materials from

suppliers and delivering the materials to BCR’s job sites.31

Between January and April 2018, Debtor made 20 cash deposits of varying

amounts into Joint Account 5597, totaling $12,984.55.32 At trial, Debtor testified that

he only earned small amounts from his “side jobs,” and he does not know the source

of the cash.33

Between April 2018 and May 2019, in addition to his paychecks, Debtor

received 19 checks written on BCC Account 9029. The checks, in varying amounts,

totaled $20,492.28.34 Chad signed each of the checks and included the notation

“reimbursement” on the checks’ memo line. Debtor testified that the checks were to

reimburse him for materials he purchased for BCC or BCR using his personal credit

card.35 Debtor also testified that he gave the purchase receipts to BCR “to get

payment” and that he did not have any receipts to produce to Plaintiff in discovery.36

Chad testified that he kept the receipts in a filing cabinet and that he had produced

copies of all receipts in his possession to Plaintiff in discovery.37 However, Plaintiff

31 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 125-26.

32 Doc. No. 132-6, Pl’s Ex. 29.

33 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, p. 94.

34 Doc. No. 132-8, Pl’s Ex. 31.

35 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 82-83.

36 Id., pp. 91, 126.

37 Id., pp. 174-75.

contends that Chad did not produce any receipts or back-up documents for the

reimbursement checks in response to its subpoena.38

On August 10, 2018, Chad paid Debtor $17,000.00 to purchase Debtor’s 2012

Dodge Ram pickup truck (the “Truck”), using a check he signed on BCC Account

9029 with the notation “Ram purchase.”39 Debtor testified that he sold the Truck

because he could not afford the payments and that he established the sale price by

looking at the value of comparable trucks.40 Chad also testified that he determined

the value of the Truck by reviewing NADA (a recognized compilation of used vehicle

values), and that Debtor’s outstanding loan on the Truck as of the purchase date was

“near $17,000.00.”41 Plaintiff did not dispute the outstanding balance of the loan

against the Truck or establish that the purchase price was unreasonable.

Debtor testified that Chad purchased the Truck on BCR’s behalf because Chad

had not yet formed BCR as a separate company, and that Chad, as BCR’s sole owner,

is “one in the same” as BCR.42 Debtor and Chad both testified that after the sale of

the Truck, Debtor drove it solely “for the company business”43 and that other

employees of BCC or BCR also drove the Truck.44

38 Doc. No. 148, p. 11.

39 Doc. No. 129-4, Def’s Ex. 4, ¶ 16; Doc. No. 131-9, Pl’s Ex. 19, ¶ 16; Doc. No. 130-5, Pl’s Ex. 5.

40 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 113-14.

41 Id., p. 176.

42 Id., pp. 81, 113-14.

43 Doc. No. 131-2, Pl’s Ex. 12, Deposition of Debtor, p. 10.

44 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 114, 176.

In April 2019, Chad formed BCR as a separate corporation, with Chad as its

owner and manager.45 After its formation, BCR continued to employ Debtor to

purchase materials for its remodeling business.46

On April 21, 2019, Chad wrote a check to Debtor on BCC Account 9029 in the

amount of $3,000.00 with the words “loan payment” handwritten on the memo line.47

Debtor and Chad both testified that they did not know why the check was written,

but that Debtor had never loaned any money to BCC or BCR.48

On May 1, 2019, Debtor transferred the Truck’s title to BCR.49 Chad testified

that he waited to have the title transferred until BCR had been formed as a separate

entity from BCC and had its own operating bank account.50

On his 2018 federal income tax return, Debtor claimed $26,560.00 in income

from his salary or wages and $9,262.00 in net profit from his business of “construction

remodeling, home remodeling.”51 However, Debtor testified at trial that he has not

owned a business since he sold Porky’s in 2011, that his only employment in 2018

was with BCC or BCR, and that the business income on the 2018 return “probably

would have been rental [from the Cape Coral Property].”52

45 Doc. No. 129-4, Def’s Ex. 4, ¶ 13; Doc. No. 131-9, Pl’s Ex. 19, ¶ 13.

46 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 125-26.

47 Doc. No. 132-5, Pl’s Ex. 28.

48 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 59-60, 184.

49 Doc. No. 130-6, Pl’s Ex. 6.

50 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 179-80.

51 Doc. No. 130-3, Pl’s Ex. 3, pp. 23-31.

52 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 124, 142.

On his 2019 federal income tax return, Debtor claimed $32,640.00 in income

from his wages or salary, and $4,000.00 in net profit from his business of

“construction remodeling, home remodeling.”53 Debtor testified that the “net profit”

actually represented his Christmas bonus from BCR.54

On February 25, 2020, Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Debtor for

$159,944.20 in the Porky’s Lawsuit.55 On the same day, Debtor filed a Chapter 7

bankruptcy petition—his third Chapter 7 case over the course of 25 years.56

On his original petition, schedule of assets, and Statement of Financial Affairs

(“SOFA”), Debtor made the following representations:

A. He was not a sole proprietor of any full- or part-time business.57

B. He was not owed any amount of money by anyone, such as on an

unpaid loan.58

C. Within two years before his bankruptcy petition, he did not sell or

transfer any property to anyone, other than in the ordinary course of business.59

D. Within four years before his bankruptcy petition, he did not own a

business or have any connection to a business as a sole proprietor, a member of a

53 Doc. No. 130-3, Pl’s Ex. 3, pp. 6-19.

54 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, p. 141.

55 Doc. No. 132-10, Pl’s Ex. 33, pp. 5-6.

56 Debtor’s first Chapter 7 case was filed in 1996, Case No. 2:96-bk-17212, and his second Chapter 7

case was filed in 2004, Case No. 2:04-bk-01108.

57 Doc. No. 130-1, Pl’s Ex. 1, p. 5.

58 Id., p. 16.

59 Id., p. 39.

limited liability company, a partner in a partnership, an officer or director of a

corporation, or an owner of at least 5% of a corporation.60

At the outset of Debtor’s bankruptcy case, Plaintiff represented to the Court its

belief that Debtor was the actual owner of BCC and/or BCR, or that Debtor had

transferred property to BCC and/or BCR and was “receiving a portion of those assets

back in the form of income.”61 Plaintiff embarked on an aggressive course of

discovery to investigate its claims, issuing 14 non-party subpoenas in Debtor’s main

case under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 200462 and 10 non-party subpoenas

in this adversary proceeding under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7034.63

Some of the subpoenas were directed to Chad, BCC, BCR, and Barry Berger.

On August 18, 2020, Debtor filed an amended SOFA in which he stated that he

sold the Truck to Chad in August 2018 for “$17,000; net proceeds after payoff of loan

approximately $500.”64

60 Id., pp. 40-41.

61 See Main Case, Doc. No. 17, ¶ 6; Doc. No. 64, ¶¶ 6 and 7; Doc. No. 82, ¶ 4.

62 Main Case, Doc. No. 24 (Chad Jeffries); Doc. No. 25 (Barry Berger); Doc. No. 36 (Wells Fargo Bank);

Doc. No. 37 (SunTrust Bank); Doc. No. 38 (American Express Company); Doc. No. 39 (Capital One

Bank N.A.); Doc. No. 40 (Capital One N.A.); Doc. No. 41 (Suncoast Credit Union); Doc. No. 42 (Bank

of America Corporation); Doc. No. 43 (Synovus Bank); Doc. No. 44 (USAA Bank); Doc. No. 45

(Achieva Credit Union); Doc. No. 47 (AAA Life Insurance); and Doc. No. 61 (USAA Life Insurance

Company).

63 Doc. Nos. 16 and 19 (BCR); Doc. Nos. 17, 20, 37, and 50 (BCC); Doc. Nos. 18 and 22 (Chad Jeffries);

Doc. Nos. 28, 34, and 47 (Hansen Screen Enclosures, Inc.); Doc. Nos. 30, 36, and 43 (Synovus

Bank/FCB); Doc. Nos. 31, 33, and 46 (First Horizon Bank); Doc. Nos. 32, 38, and 44 (SunTrust Bank);

Doc. Nos. 35 and 45 (Land Trust Service Corp.); Doc. Nos. 39 and 48 (Achieva Credit Union); and

Doc. Nos. 40 and 49 (Bank of America Corporation).

64 Doc. No. 130-4, Pl’s Ex. 4, p. 5; Main Case, Doc. No. 33, p. 5.

On June 16, 2022, Debtor filed an amended schedule of assets to list the balance

of the Pool Funds as an outstanding loan owed to him from Chad. Debtor described

the Pool Funds as a “potential loan receivable owed from Debtor’s son (claim is most

likely unenforceable)” and valued the receivable at $30,000.00 after crediting the

payments received from Chad. At the same time, Debtor filed an amended schedule

of exemptions in which he claimed the Pool Funds as exempt tenancy by the

entireties property under § 522(b)(3)(B).65 The Chapter 7 trustee, who is charged with

collecting assets of the bankruptcy estate and investigating the debtor’s financial

affairs, did not object to Debtor’s claim of exemption.66

On March 28, 2023, after the Court had narrowed the issues for trial in its ruling

on the parties’ motions for summary judgment,67 the Court conducted a trial on

Plaintiff’s Objection to Exemption and outstanding factual disputes in Plaintiff’s

Complaint.68 At trial, the Court heard the testimony of Debtor and Chad, and

admitted into evidence 32 exhibits submitted by Plaintiff and 23 exhibits submitted

by Debtor. Following trial, Plaintiff and Debtor filed their written closing

arguments.69

65 Doc. No. 131-8, Pl’s Ex. 18, pp. 7-8, 11; Main Case, Doc. No. 99, pp. 7-8, 11.

66 11 U.S.C. § 704(a). Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b)(1), a party in interest may object to a claim of

exemption within 30 days after the filing of an amendment claiming the exemption.

67 Amended Order (1) Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and (2) Granting in Part and

Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 118).

68 Doc. Nos. 139 and 144.

69 Doc. Nos. 148 and 149.

II. ANALYSIS

The two issues before the Court are whether the Pool Funds are exempt

entireties property and whether Debtor’s discharge should be barred under § 727(a).

A. The Pool Funds are exempt entireties property.

Plaintiff objects to Debtor’s claim that the Pool Funds are exempt entireties

property on two grounds. First, Plaintiff contends that Debtor is not entitled to the

exemption because he did not schedule the Pool Funds as an asset and claim them

exempt until nearly two years after he filed his bankruptcy case— and after Plaintiff

discovered the transaction. Second, Plaintiff contends that the Pool Funds are not

entireties property because they were not jointly owned by Debtor and Barbara.

Debtor asserts that he did not initially list the Pool Funds on his bankruptcy

schedules and claim them as exempt because he did not think they were an asset.

Rather, he considered the Pool Funds to be a gift to Chad made more than three years

before his bankruptcy case.

Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(c), a party objecting to an

exemption claimed in a bankruptcy case bears the burden of proof to show that the

exemption is not properly claimed.70

70 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c).

1. Debtor may amend his schedules to claim the Pool Funds as exempt

entireties property.

Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a), a debtor may amend a

schedule at any time before his case is closed.71 As the bankruptcy court held in In re

Kauffman, an amendment generally should not be disallowed unless an objecting

party clearly shows bad faith on the part of the debtor or prejudice to creditors.72 And

an objecting party does not show prejudice simply by showing that allowance of an

amendment will result in allowance of an exemption.73

The Court finds that Debtor’s belated amendment to his schedules was not in

bad faith. As discussed below, the evidence sufficiently establishes that the source of

the Pool Funds was exempt entireties property, and there is at least some evidence—

Debtor’s and Chad’s testimony that the transaction was not documented as a loan

and that Chad’s payments were purely voluntary—to support Debtor’s original

belief that the Pool Funds were a gift that he was not required to list on his

bankruptcy schedules. Therefore, the Court will not disallow Debtor’s exemption

solely because of his delay in filing the amendment and will next consider whether

the Pool Funds are exempt entireties property.

71 Fed. R. Bank. P. 1009(a).

72 In re Kauffman, 299 B.R. 641, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).

73 Id. at 644.

2. Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that the Pool Funds are not

exempt entireties property.

To qualify as exempt entireties property in Florida, the property must satisfy

the unities of marriage, possession, interest, title, and time, with a right of

survivorship.74 Florida common law establishes a “presumption in favor of a tenancy

by the entireties when a married couple jointly owns personal property.”75

Here, Debtor asserts that he holds the Pool Funds with Barbara as tenants by

the entireties and properly claimed them as exempt because (a) he and Barbara have

been married for 25 years; (b) he and Barbara jointly purchased the Narwhal Home

during their marriage; (d) the source of the Pool Funds was the SunTrust Funds; (d)

the SunTrust Funds were deposited into a joint bank account with Barbara and then

provided to Chad; (e) Debtor deposited Chad’s checks in “repayment” of the Pool

Funds into Joint Account 5597; and (f) Debtor doesn’t have any bank accounts other

than the joint accounts with Barbara.76

Plaintiff contends that the exemption should be disallowed because (a) Debtor

and Chad originally testified that Debtor—not Debtor and Barbara—provided the

Pool Funds to Chad; (b) Debtor has not produced any evidence, such as a check or

wire transfer, showing that the Pool Funds were transferred to Chad from a joint

74 In re Ingole, 2023 WL 2729665, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2023); In re Collins, 600 B.R. 108, 113

(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2019).

75 In re Collins, 600 B.R. at 114 (quoting Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Associates, 780 So.2d 45, 57 (Fla.

2001)).

76 Doc. No. 149, p. 10.

bank account; and (c) Chad repaid the Pool Funds with checks written only to

Debtor, not to Debtor and Barbara.77

In other words, Plaintiff contends that without checks or other documents

showing the transfer of the Pool Funds to Chad, there is no direct evidence that

Debtor provided the Pool Funds to Chad from a joint bank account with Barbara. But

Plaintiff does not dispute that (a) Debtor and Barbara jointly own the Narwhal Home,

and (b) they jointly obtained the Synovus Funds and the SunTrust Funds about the

time that they provided the Pool Funds to Chad.

The record does not clearly show whether the source of the Pool Funds was

the Synovus Funds or the SunTrust Funds, or both. And the Court recognizes that

Debtor and Chad did not initially testify in their depositions that the Pool Funds were

a joint gift from Debtor and Barbara. However, Debtor and Chad were credible

witnesses at trial, and Plaintiff did not present any evidence (a) to show that the Pool

Funds originated from any asset that was owned solely by Debtor, or (b) to contradict

Debtor’s testimony that all of his bank accounts are joint accounts with Barbara. In

addition, the Court finds that Debtor’s deposit of Chad’s repayment checks into a

joint account with Barbara—as corroborated by the SunTrust bank statements for

77 Doc. No. 148, pp. 6-7, 23-24.

Joint Account 559778—is persuasive on the issue of the character of the Pool Funds as

entireties property.

After weighing the evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not satisfy its

burden of proving that the Pool Funds were not properly claimed as exempt

entireties property.

B. Debtor’s discharge is not denied.

In its ruling on the parties’ motions for summary judgment,79 the Court

narrowed the issues of fact and ruled that a trial would be scheduled to determine

whether Debtor’s discharge should be denied on the following grounds:

(1) under § 727(a)(2), based on Debtor’s fraudulent transfer or concealment

of the Pool Funds and the Truck;

(2) under § 727(a)(3), based on Debtor’s failure to keep adequate books and

records related to the Pool Funds and payments from BCC or BCR; and

(3) under § 727(a)(4), based on the four false oaths allegedly made by

Debtor in his bankruptcy schedules.80

78 Doc. No. 129-6, Def’s Ex. 6; Doc. No. 129-7, Def’s Ex. 7.

79 Doc. Nos. 93, 94, 97, and 98.

80 The factual issues are identified in the Court’s August 3, 2022 Amended Order (1) Denying Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, and (2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 118). The Amended Order identifies a fifth alleged false oath related to

whether Debtor had any interest in a non-exempt life insurance policy, but Plaintiff did not pursue

its claim regarding the insurance policy at trial.

To promote the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of providing debtors with a fresh

start, objections to discharge are construed liberally in favor of the debtor and strictly

against the objecting party.81 Additionally, “[b]ecause denial of discharge is so drastic

a remedy, courts may be more reluctant to impose it than to find a particular debt

nondischargeable.”82 Denial of a debtor’s discharge is a harsh and drastic penalty

that is reserved for the most egregious misconduct by a debtor.83

Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4005, “[a]t the trial on a

complaint objecting to discharge, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the

objection.”84 The party objecting to a debtor’s discharge under § 727(a) bears the

burden of proving each element of its objection by a preponderance of the evidence.85

1. Section 727(a)(2)

Under § 727(a)(2), the Court shall grant the debtor a discharge unless the

debtor transferred or concealed property within one year before the bankruptcy case

with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.86 For a debtor’s discharge to

be denied under § 727(a)(2), a plaintiff must prove that the transfer or concealment

was within one year of the bankruptcy and was with actual intent to hinder, delay,

81 In re Delgado, 2020 WL 4005786, at *6 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. July 14, 2020) (citations omitted).

82 In re Gonzalez, 302 B.R. 745, 751 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) (citing In re Johnson, 98 B.R. 359, 367 (Bankr.

N.D. Ill. 1988)).

83 In re Delgado, 2020 WL 4005786, at *6 (citations omitted).

84 Fed. R. Bank. P. 4005.

85 In re Delgado, 2020 WL 4005786, at *7 (citations omitted).

86 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).

or defraud a creditor.87 “[T]he key is the debtor’s intent. In other words, failure to

disclose, alone, does not warrant denial of a discharge: a debtor’s failure to disclose

—i.e., concealment of—property must be with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or

defraud creditors.”88

At trial, the issues of fact under § 727(a)(2) were whether Debtor (a)

fraudulently transferred the Truck within one year before the date he filed his

bankruptcy case (the “Petition Date”), and (b) fraudulently concealed the Pool

Funds.89

a. The Truck. Debtor testified that he sold the Truck for $17,000.00 in

August 2018 because he could not afford the payments, and Chad confirmed that

approximately $17,000.00 was owed on the Truck at the time of the sale. After the

sale, the Truck was used by employees of BCC or BCR, including Debtor, who only

drove the Truck for business purposes. Although title to the Truck was not

transferred to BCR until May 2019, the Court finds, first, the net value of the Truck

appears to have been nominal, and second, that Plaintiff did not meet its burden of

proving that Debtor transferred the Truck within one year before the Petition Date

with the actual intent to defraud his creditors.

87 In re Delgado, 2020 WL 4005786, at *7 (citation omitted).

88 In re Suwaity, 638 B.R. 201, 218-19 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2022) (emphasis in original).

89 Doc. No. 118, ¶ 6(a).

b. The Pool Funds. Debtor asserts that he did not initially disclose the Pool

Funds as an asset because he believed that he and Barbara had gifted the Pool Funds

to Chad in 2016 and that the Pool Funds were not an asset belonging to Debtor on

the Petition Date. Debtor and Chad did not document the arrangement in writing,

and at trial they testified that they both considered the Pool Funds to be a gift. Debtor

testified that he never asked Chad to repay the Pool Funds, and Chad testified that

the repayments were voluntary.90

Although Debtor and Chad previously referred to the Pool Funds as a loan in

their depositions,91 Debtor explained at trial that he used the term “loan” because

Chad had considered it a loan and paid back what he could afford.92 Whether the

Pool Funds were a gift or a loan, the Court finds that Debtor’s belief that the Pool

Funds were not a reportable asset is supported by the informal nature of the

arrangement, the three and a half years that had passed between the transaction and

the Petition Date, and the source of the Pool Funds from Debtor’s exempt entireties

property.93

90 Doc. No. 149, p. 10.

91 Doc. No. 148, p. 16.

92 Doc. No. 144, Trial transcript, pp. 40-44.

93 Doc. No. 148, p. 16.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff did not meet its burden of proving that the

Pool Funds were an asset belonging to Debtor on the Petition Date, or that Debtor

concealed the Pool Funds with actual intent to defraud his creditors.

2. Section 727(a)(3)

Under § 727(a)(3), the Court shall grant the debtor a discharge unless the

debtor has concealed or failed to keep any recorded information from which the

debtor’s financial condition might be ascertained, unless the failure was justified

under the circumstances.94 For a debtor’s discharge to be denied under § 727(a)(3),

an objecting party must prove (a) that the debtor concealed or failed to keep recorded

information, and (b) that it is impossible to ascertain his financial condition as a result

of the conduct.95 “[T]he standard under § 727(a)(3) is not whether the Debtor

followed best bookkeeping practices. The standard under § 727(a)(3) is whether the

Debtor’s failure to make or keep records makes it impossible to ascertain his financial

condition and business transactions.”96

At trial, the issues of fact under § 727(a)(3) were whether Debtor failed to keep

adequate books and records related to (a) the Pool Funds, and (b) deposits of checks

from BCC and BCR.97

94 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3).

95 In re Delgado, 2020 WL 4005786, at *7 (citation omitted).

96 In re Suwaity, 638 B.R. at 211 (emphasis in original).

97 Doc. No. 118, ¶ 6(b).

a. The Pool Funds. Debtor provided the Pool Funds to his son, Chad, in

October or November 2016, more than three years before the Petition Date. Plaintiff

does not dispute that Chad used the Pool Funds to install a pool at his home.

Evidence of the arrangement includes the Synovus and SunTrust loan modifications

from which the Pool Funds originated,98 Chad’s monthly checks to “repay” the Pool

Funds,99 and Debtor’s 2018 and 2019 SunTrust bank statements reflecting his deposit

of the checks.100 Plaintiff did not show that it was unable to follow Debtor’s

transactions because Debtor did not keep additional documents regarding the Pool

Funds. Based on the evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not meet its burden

of proving that Debtor unjustifiably failed to keep records of the Pool Funds, or that

the absence of additional records regarding the Pool Funds makes it impossible to

ascertain Debtor’s financial condition.

b. Checks from BCC. In 2018 and 2019, Chad wrote 19 checks to Debtor on

BCC Account 9029. The checks totaled $20,492.28, and Debtor deposited the checks

into Joint Account 5597. Debtor was employed by BCC or BCR during this period,

and his duties included purchasing materials for the companies’ jobs. Debtor testified

that he periodically purchased the materials with his personal credit card, that he

then turned over the receipts to Chad at BCR, and that BCR reimbursed him for the

98 Doc. No. 129-19, Def’s Ex. 19.

99 Doc. No. 131-6, Pl’s Ex. 16.

100 Doc. No. 129-6, Def’s Ex. 6; Doc. No. 129-7, Def’s Ex. 7.

purchases with checks from BCC Account 9029. The transactions are evidenced by

written records, including Debtor’s Employee Pay History,101 his tax returns for 2018

and 2019,102 the reimbursement checks,103 and the 2018 and 2019 SunTrust statements

for Joint Account 5597 reflecting deposit of the checks.104

Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not meet its burden

of proving that Debtor unjustifiably failed to keep records of the reimbursement

checks from BCC Account 9029, or that the lack of additional records regarding the

reimbursement checks makes it impossible to ascertain Debtor’s financial condition.

3. Section 727(a)(4)

Under § 727(a)(4), the Court shall grant the debtor a discharge unless the

debtor made a false oath in the case.105 For a debtor’s discharge to be denied under

§ 727(a)(4), a plaintiff must prove that a false oath was (a) fraudulently made, and (b)

related to a material fact.106 A false oath “made by inadvertence or mistake will not

suffice.”107 And as this Court held in In re Delgado, a debtor’s discharge should not be

denied because of minor errors or statements that do not relate to the debtor’s

business dealings or assets.108

101 Doc. No. 129-9, Def’s Ex. 9.

102 Doc. No. 129-11, Def’s Ex. 11; Doc. No. 129-12, Def’s Ex. 12.

103 Doc. No. 132-8, Pl’s Ex. 31.

104 Doc. No. 129-6, Def’s Ex. 6; Doc. No. 129-7, Def’s Ex. 7.

105 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4).

106 In re Delgado, 2020 WL 4005786 at *9 (citations omitted).

107 In re Vecchio, 2022 WL 16828243, at *8 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2022).

108 In re Delgado, 2020 WL 4005786 at *9.

At trial, the issues of fact under § 727(a)(4) were whether Debtor made false

oaths regarding (a) whether he was a sole proprietor, (b) whether he had any

connection with any business within four years prior to his bankruptcy petition, (c)

whether Chad owed him any money for the Pool Funds, and (d) whether he

transferred the Truck before the Petition Date.109

a. Sole Proprietor/Operation of a Business. Debtor stated on his

bankruptcy petition and SOFA that he was not a sole proprietor and that he did not

have any connection to a business within four years before his bankruptcy case.

Plaintiff contends that the statements are false because Debtor reported income on

his 2018 and 2019 tax returns from a “construction remodeling, home remodeling”

business.110

Debtor testified that he has not operated a business since Porky’s in 2011 and

that the income on the tax returns represents rental income from the Cape Coral

Property, from his employment at BCR, or some small side jobs. The tax returns

reflect relatively nominal earnings from BCC and BCR and nominal additional

income from a “remodeling” business.

Plaintiff did not present any evidence that Debtor owned an actual

“remodeling business” in 2018 and 2019. For example, Plaintiff did not introduce any

109 Doc. No. 118, ¶ 6(c).

110 Doc. No. 148, p. 22.

evidence that Debtor solicited jobs, entered contracts, or performed construction

work for customers either in his own name or through a business. And even if

Debtor’s additional income did constitute income from the operation of a sole

proprietorship or business—which the Court does not find—the omission of this

information in Debtor’s bankruptcy petition is not material. The Court concludes that

Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving that Debtor fraudulently made a

material false oath on his bankruptcy schedules.

b. The Pool Funds. Debtor stated on his original bankruptcy schedules

that he was not owed any money by anyone, such as on an unpaid loan. Plaintiff

contends that the statement is false because Chad had been repaying the Pool Funds

since 2017 and continued to write monthly checks to Debtor as of the Petition Date.111

As set forth above, Debtor and Chad provided inconsistent testimony regarding the

Pool Funds.112 But even if the Pool Funds were a loan, Debtor’s belief that he was not

required to disclose them is supported by (i) the source(s) of the Pool Fund from

Debtor’s exempt entireties property; (ii) the informal nature of the arrangement with

Chad; (iii) and the three and a half years that had passed between the transaction and

the Petition Date.113

111 Doc. No. 148, p. 21.

112 Doc. No. 148, p. 16.

113 Id.

On this record, the Court finds that Debtor’s omission of the Pool Funds in his

original bankruptcy schedules was not material and that Plaintiff failed to meet its

burden of proof to show that Debtor fraudulently made a materially false oath on his

bankruptcy schedules.

c. The Truck. Debtor stated on his SOFA that he did not sell any property

to anyone within two years before the Petition Date, other than in the ordinary course

of business. Plaintiff contends that the statement is false because (i) Debtor received

$17,000.00 from BCC for the Truck in August 2018; (ii) the Truck was transferred to

BCR in May 2019; and (iii) Debtor filed his bankruptcy case in February 2020—within

two years of both the payment and the transfer.114 But Debtor and Chad both credibly

testified that the Truck was sold for close to its fair market value, and Chad testified

that the outstanding loan on the Truck was nearly $17,000.00.115

In In re Moore, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s

ruling that the debtors’ initial failure to disclose the sale of two vehicles for $35,000.00

in their bankruptcy schedules was neither intentional nor material.116 Here, the Court

agrees that Debtor should have disclosed the sale of the Truck on his original

bankruptcy schedules. But on the record before it, the Court finds that Debtor’s

114 Doc. No. 148, pp. 21-22.

115 Doc. No. 149, pp. 20-21.

116 In re Moore, 619 F. App’x. 951 (11th Cir. 2015).

nondisclosure was not material, and that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden to prove

that Debtor fraudulently made a materially false oath on his bankruptcy schedules.

III. CONCLUSION

Early in this case, Plaintiff asserted its belief that Debtor had fraudulently

concealed his ownership or control of BCC and BCR, and that Debtor was using the

companies to disguise his property interests as income.117 Although Plaintiff has

never introduced any evidence to support this assertion, in the course of

investigating its claims, Plaintiff discovered errors or omissions in Debtor’s

schedules relating to the Pool Funds, the Truck, and payments from BCC, BCR, or

other sources.

Clearly, Debtor did not maintain complete records of his transactions with

Chad, BCC, or BCR, and he amended his schedules and SOFA after Plaintiff’s

discovery efforts uncovered the Pool Loan and the sale of the Truck. But Debtor’s

errors and omissions are not the type of “most egregious misconduct” that is

required for denial of a discharge under § 727(a).118 Based on the evidence admitted

at trial, and for the reasons explained above, the Court finds that Debtor is entitled

to claim the Pool Funds as exempt entireties property and that Plaintiff has not met

its burden of proof on its objections to Debtor’s discharge.

117 See Main Case, Doc. No. 17, ¶ 6; Doc. No. 64, ¶ 6; and Doc. No. 82, ¶ 4.

118 In re Delgado, 2020 WL 4005786, at *6.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Objection to Exemption (Main Case, Doc. No. 100) is

OVERRULED, and the Court will enter an order to that effect in the Main Case.

2. The discharge of Debtor, John Steven Jeffries, is not denied under 11

U.S.C. § 727(a).

3. The Court will enter a separate Final Judgment in favor of Debtor, John

Steven Jeffries, and against Plaintiff, Webber Commercial Properties LLC.

The Clerk’s Office is directed to serve a copy of this Order on interested parties via

CM/ECF.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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