Opinion

Nilhan Financial, LLC

Court
United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Jun 30, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.0%

recognizing how the inherent interest of the familial relationship can benefit “the entire family unit.”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing how the inherent interest of the familial relationship can benefit “the entire family unit.”
  • holding that “a reverse pierce should be permitted in only the most carefully limited circumstances.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2023

JamABuees7

United Statés Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

In re:

Case No. 8:17-bk-03597-BAJ

NILHAN FINANCIAL, LLC, Chapter 7

Debtor.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SUSTAINING AMENDED OBJECTION TO CLAIM THREE (3

This Case came before the Court for a two-day trial that began on February 8, 2023, on

the Second Amended Objection to Claim 3 of SEG Gateway, LLC (the “Claimant”)! (Doc.

721), filed by Niloy Thakkar (““N. Thakkar”) and the joinder to the Claim Objection (Doc. 733),

filed by interested party, Chittranjan Thakkar (“C. Thakkar”) (collectively, the “Thakkar

Parties”). Claim 3 asserts liability based on the theory of reverse veil-piercing, in connection

with a debt owed by C. Thakkar.” If the Claimant prevails, it will receive 50% of the sole

remaining asset in the Debtor’s estate, a $2,344,392.88 distribution paid to the Debtor from a

' References to SEG Gateway, LLC, include its successors-in-interest.

> Claim 3 is supported by judgments entered in favor of Good Gateway, LLC (“Good Gateway”) and SEG

Gateway, LLC (“SEG Gateway”) against various parties including C. Thakkar.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy case in Georgia. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the matter

under advisement and directed the parties to submit post-trial briefs. (Docs. 936, 937, 939).

For over six years, this Case has been pending before the Court.3 From the inception of

the Case, a substantial amount of litigation has occurred, and the present issue will hopefully

bring closure to this portion of the saga that has unfolded. While a myriad of issues have been

raised, the first key issue is whether Georgia or Florida law applies to the reverse veil-piercing

claim. The Court finds that Florida law applies. For the reasons set forth below, although the

Court finds that the Debtor is a Florida limited liability company, to which Florida law and the

“Familial Exception” could apply, the weight of evidence is not sufficient to meet the extremely

stringent standard applicable to reverse veil-piercing.

Findings of Fact

On March 21, 2017, an involuntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United

States Bankruptcy Code was filed against the Debtor.4 The Case was filed in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida and subsequently transferred to the

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. (Docs. 19, 20).5

The Debtor is a limited liability company, which was controlled and managed by C.

Thakkar. As of the petition date, the Debtor’s sole members were N. Thakkar and Rohan

Thakkar (“R. Thakkar”).6 The Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, listed

3 On November 8, 2022, the Case was reassigned to me. Previously, the Case was assigned to the Honorable

Michael G. Williamson, who served the Middle District of Florida Bankruptcy Court with great distinction for

over two decades until he passed away on November 3, 2022.

4 The involuntary petition was filed by Moffa & Breuer, PLLC, who claimed on the petition that it was owed

attorney’s fees from the Debtor in the amount of $328,301.91. (Doc. 1).

5 On July 10, 2017, the Debtor consented to the Amended Voluntary Petition and requested that the case be

converted to a case under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The Court granted the request, and

an Order Converting Case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 was entered. (Doc. 62). On December 15, 2017, the case

was reconverted to Chapter 7. (Doc. 155).

6 C. Thakkar is the father of N. Thakkar and R. Thakkar.

the Debtor as a “Florida Limited Liability Company” as of December 17, 2009. (Cl.’s Ex. 49).

The Debtor and the Thakkar Parties have repeatedly referred to the Debtor as a Florida limited

liability company. Further, the Debtor states in its Answer to the Involuntary Petition that its

“only significant asset is a promissory note secured by a mortgage on real property owned by

Orlando Gateway Partners, LLC,” that is located in Florida. (Cl.’s Exs. 50-56).

On September 26, 2017, the Claimant filed Proof of Claim 3 in the amount of

$13,972,435.58. A few weeks later, the Claimant filed an Amended Proof of Claim 3, which

included a complaint against the Debtor for allegedly receiving fraudulent transfers from C.

Thakkar (collectively, the “Claim”). On December 10, 2018, the Claimant again amended the

Claim to reduce the amount of the Claim to $9,500,0007 and reflect the assignment of the Claim

from SEG Gateway to Good Gateway. (Cl.’s Ex. 1). The Claim was further amended on June

17, 2019, to include supporting documents for the assignment of the Claim. (Cl.’s Ex. 2).

On May 18, 2018, a Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement Pursuant to

Bankruptcy Rule 9019 was filed by the Chapter 7 Trustee, SEG Gateway, and Good Gateway

(the “Settlement Agreement”).8 On September 6, 2018, the Court approved the Settlement

Agreement.9 (Docs. 210, 292). Under the Settlement Agreement, the Claim would be allowed

as an unsecured claim in the amount of $9,500,000, and upon the Georgia Trustee’s liquidation

of certain real property located in Georgia (the “Georgia Property”), “the Trustee and SEG

agreed that fifty percent (50%) of the sale proceeds will be used to pay down Claim 3 and the

7 The claim was amended pursuant to the Order Granting Joint Motion by Good Gateway, SEG Gateway, and the

Chapter 7 Trustee to Approve Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 292).

8 The Settlement Agreement resolved various claims, adversary proceedings, and appeals. (Doc. 210).

9 In approving the Settlement Agreement, the Court overruled the Supplemental Objections filed by C. Thakkar

and N. Thakkar. (Doc. 292).

other fifty (50%) will be distributed to Nilhan Financial or its equity holders.” (Doc. 210, pp.

6-7).

On August 23, 2018, N. Thakkar filed an Amended Objection to Claim 3, and C.

Thakkar filed a Notice of Joinder. (Docs. 262, 334). On January 27, 2022, N. Thakkar filed a

Second Amended Objection to Proof of Claim Number 3 (the “Amended Claim Objection”),

and C. Thakkar again filed a Notice of Joinder. (Docs. 721, 733). Additionally, C. Thakkar

filed a Motion to Determine that Good Gateway, LLC’s Proof of Claim is Not Entitled to Prima

Facie Validity Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f) (the “Motion to Determine”). (Doc. 435).

The core argument of the Amended Claim Objection is that the facts do not support a claim

based upon reverse veil-piercing, particularly when the Debtor is a limited liability company.

(Doc. 721, pp. 2-3).

On March 31, 2021, Judge Williamson entered an Order on the Amended Objection to

Claim and the Motion to Determine. (the “Claim Objection Order”) (Doc. 627). In the Claim

Objection Order, Judge Williamson found that the Florida Supreme Court would permit a veil-

piercing claim when there is a familial relationship. Id. at p. 6. Judge Williamson also declined

to restrict a familial relationship to a husband and wife and stated that “there is evidence that

[C.] Thakkar and his sons treat the Debtor as a family corporation.” Id. at p. 7. Additionally,

Judge Williamson found that the Claimant was not collaterally estopped from reverse veil-

piercing. Id. at pp. 7-9.

Prior to the trial commencing on January 31, 2022, Judge Williamson ruled that the only

witnesses permitted to testify at the trial were C. Thakkar and Clay Townsend (“Mr.

Townsend”). (Docs. 715, 868, 880). Specifically, Mr. Townsend was “authorized to testify as

SEG Gateway and Good Gateway’s corporate representative.” (Doc. 828). Although Mr.

Townsend testified solely as a fact witness for purposes of the trial, he and his law firm have

served as counsel to Good Gateway and SEG Gateway since 2010 on a matter brought against

C. Thakkar individually, as well as his affiliates and entities, for breaching their fiduciary duties

and committing conversion and fraud. (Doc. 929, Tr. pp. 15-18). The litigation related to a

real estate development project adjacent to the Orlando International Airport and resulted in

judgments in excess of fourteen million dollars against C. Thakkar and his various affiliates,

not including the Debtor. The Claim relates to these judgments. Notably, Mr. Townsend

testified that his law firm was retained on a base contingency fee of 40%10 and that he will

personally receive 15% to 20% of the fee paid to his firm. (Doc. 929, Tr. pp. 92-94).

During the trial, C. Thakkar testified extensively, and his testimony demonstrated that

he is the brains of the Thakkar entities, including the Debtor. Notably, Mr. Thakkar previously

testified in a deposition that he “was the one who was primarily handling” the monetary

transactions of the Debtor and that, in the year prior to filing bankruptcy, his children were the

only people besides him who were authorized to handle such transactions. (Cl.’s Ex. 38, p. 48).

Additionally, C. Thakkar testified in the underlying State Court Action that “[a]ll of our entities

are the Thakkar’s family. We don’t differentiate.” (Cl.’s Ex. 6, p. 39). Despite Mr. Thakkar’s

breadth of knowledge and experience as to the Debtor and other Thakkar affiliates and entities,

when he was questioned about certain financial transactions his recollection was almost

nonexistent.

10 Mr. Townsend testified the firm’s contingency rate “[s]tarted at 40[%] and has some additional amounts

depending on appeals and bankruptcies.” (Doc. 929, Tr. p. 92).

Conclusions of Law

This is a difficult case, which presents many layers of complexity. The Debtor is a

limited liability company, and the sole members as of the petition date were N. Thakkar and his

brother R. Thakkar. The Claimant seeks to hold the Debtor liable for a judgment against C.

Thakkar under the theory of reverse veil-piercing.11 Ultimately, the Claimant seeks payment

of 50% of a $2,344,392.88 distribution that the Debtor was previously awarded from a Chapter

11 bankruptcy case in Georgia. As a threshold matter, the Court must first determine whether

Florida law or Georgia law applies to the analysis of Claim 3.

A. Choice of Law - Florida Law Applies

The choice of law issue is of significant importance in this Case. Although the standard

for reverse veil-piercing in Florida is extremely stringent, the theory is nevertheless allowed

under Florida law. Conversely, neither reverse veil-piercing nor any exception to the bar

against it is recognized under Georgia law. Corrugated Replacements, Inc. v. Johnson, 340 Ga.

App. 364, 369 - 70, 797 S.E.2d 238 (2017) (disapproved on other grounds by Reid v. Morris,

309 Ga. 230, 845 S.E.2d 590 (Ga. 2020)); see also In re Webster, 629 B.R. 654, 668 (Bankr.

N.D. Ga. 2021) (recognizing that “any prior confusion that existed as to whether Georgia

recognizes a claim for reverse veil-piercing has now been resolved by the Georgia appellate

courts. Georgia recognizes no such claim nor any exception to the bar against it.”). The Thakkar

Parties seek a finding that Georgia law applies because if Georgia law controls, the Claim must

be disallowed. The Court, however, finds that Florida law clearly applies.

Although the Thakkar Parties make some creative arguments as to why Georgia law

should apply, the inescapable conclusion based on the evidence is that Florida law applies. The

11 The Thakkar Parties’ argument that the Claimant somehow waived or abandoned its reverse veil-piercing claim

when it amended the Claim is without merit and not supported by the record.

Court reaches this conclusion for the following reasons: (i) the Florida Department of State,

Division of Corporations, lists the Debtor as a “Florida Limited Liability Company” as of

December 17, 2009 (Cl.’s Ex. 49)12; (ii) N. Thakkar’s Second Amended Objection to Proof of

Claim filed by SEG Gateway, LLC, specifically refers to the Debtor as a “Florida Limited

Liability Company” (Cl’s Ex. 50, p. 2); (iii) the complaint filed by the Debtor against Orlando

Gateway Partners, LLC et. al., states in the general allegations: “Nilhan is a Florida limited

liability company qualified to do business in the State of Florida” (Cl.’s Ex. 51, p. 1); (iv) in an

adversary proceeding brought by Orlando Gateway Partners, LLC, third party defendants, N.

Thakkar, R. Thakkar, and Saloni Thakkar13 referred to the Debtor as a “Florida limited liability

company with its principal place of business in Miami-Dade County, Florida” (Cl.’s Ex. 52, p.

2); (v) in the Debtor’s answer and affirmative defenses in two separate adversary proceedings

it referred to itself as a Florida limited liability company (Cl.’s Exs. 53, 54); (vi) in the Debtor’s

response to the Motion to Transfer Venue the Debtor states “[b]ecause Nilhan Financial’s

principal place of business is located in Sunny Isles Beach, Florida, the Bankruptcy Court for

the Southern District of Florida was a proper venue for the commencement of the involuntary

proceeding against it” (Cl.’s Ex. 55); and (vii) in the Debtor’s Answer to Involuntary Petition

the Debtor states that its “only significant asset is a promissory note secured by a mortgage on

real property owned by Orlando Gateway Partners, LLC,” which is located in Florida (Cl.’s Ex.

56).

12 The Division of Corporations lists the Debtor’s “Principal Address” as 17885 Collins Avenue, Unit #4001,

Sunny Isles Beach, FL 33160. The sole reference to Georgia is a mailing address of 3985 Steve Reynolds Blvd.,

L-101, Norcross, Ga. 30093. (Cl.’s Ex. 49).

13 Saloni Thakkar is married to C. Thakkar.

Based on the above, the Court finds that the overwhelming weight of the evidence

reflects that the Debtor is a Florida limited liability company, to which Florida law applies. For

the Court to find otherwise would require legal gymnastics, with at best a tenuous explanation,

that would inevitably lead to an erroneous result.

B. The Law of the Case is that Florida Law

Would Recognize a Familial Relationship

The Thakkar Parties argue that the Claimant cannot prevail on its reverse veil-piercing

theory because C. Thakkar was not a controlling member of the Debtor. The law of the case

provides otherwise. In the Claim Objection Order, Judge Williamson concluded that “the

Florida Supreme Court would permit a veil-piercing claim when there is a familial

relationship.” In re Nilhan Fin., LLC, 627 B.R. 529, 533 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2021). In reaching

this conclusion, Judge Williamson relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s prediction that the Florida

Supreme Court would recognize a “familial-relationship” as an exception to the general rule

that veil-piercing is only available against a controlling shareholder. Id. at 532-33, (discussing

Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1136-39, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2011)

(recognizing how the inherent interest of the familial relationship can benefit “the entire family

unit.”)). Notably, Judge Williamson also declined to restrict a familial relationship to a husband

and wife and stated that “there is evidence that Thakkar and his sons treat the Debtor as a family

company.” Id. at 533; see also In re Trujillo, 607 B.R. 734, 740 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2019) (stating

that “[t]here is no factual distinction between the presumed economic benefit and consequent

availability of alter ego as a theory of recovery arising from the bonds of family, and the

presumed economic benefit arising from actual equitable ownership if so proven.”). Therefore,

the law of the case dictates that a veil-piercing claim is permitted when there is a familial

relationship, which is present in this Case. During the two-day trial, C. Thakkar testified

extensively. As C. Thakkar acknowledged in a deposition, the Debtor functioned as a lending

arm for the Thakkar affiliates. (Cl.’s Ex. 38, p. 47). Additionally, C. Thakkar testified that he

“was the one who was primarily handling” the monetary transactions of the Debtor and that, in

the year prior to the bankruptcy filing, the only people other than him who had the authority to

make monetary transactions were his children. Id. at p. 48. As C. Thakkar testified in the

underlying state court litigation, “[a]ll of our entities are the Thakkar’s family. We don’t

differentiate.” (Cl.’s Ex. 6). Therefore, based on the law of the case, the Claimant’s reverse

veil-piercing strategy is not defeated solely because C. Thakkar was not a controlling member

of the Debtor.

C. The Extraordinary Relief of Reverse Veil-Piercing

is not Supported by the Weight of the Evidence

As previously recognized by Judge Williamson, “[u]nder Florida law, courts are

permitted to disregard the corporate form (and pierce the corporate veil) only in the most

extraordinary cases.” In re Checiek, 492 B.R. 918, 920 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013). In Checiek,

Judge Williamson concluded that, based on a review of Florida law governing conventional and

reverse veil-piercing, reverse veil-piercing is unavailable “absent evidence that the corporate

form was used for a fraudulent or improper purpose.” Id. at 921; see also Cargill v. Hedge, 375

N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. 1985) (holding that “a reverse pierce should be permitted in only the

most carefully limited circumstances.”). To successfully pierce the corporate veil the moving

party must prove that:

1) a corporation is a mere instrumentality of the shareholder, i.e. the

shareholder dominated and controlled the corporation to such an extent that

it did not have an independent existence and the shareholder was in fact an

alter ego of the corporation; 2) the shareholder engaged in improper conduct,

i.e. the corporate form was used fraudulently or for an improper purpose;

and 3) the fraudulent or improper use of the corporate form caused injury to

the claimant.

In re Big Foot Properties, Inc., No. 3:11-BK-6868-JAF, 2012 WL 6892645, at *4 (Bankr. M.D.

Fla. May 25, 2012) (citing Priskie v. Missry, 958 So. 2d 613, 614–615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)).

“Conversely, a corporation may be held liable for the debts of controlling shareholders, a

remedy known as reverse corporate piercing, when the shareholders have formed or used the

corporation to secrete assets and thereby avoid pre-existing personal liability.” Big Foot

Properties, 2012 WL 6892645, at *4.

The Thakkar Parties argue that there are two primary flaws to the Claimant’s reverse

veil-piercing theory. (Doc. 939, p. 7; Doc. 936, p. 5). First, they assert that “no evidence

whatsoever has been presented during trial to directly or circumstantially establish that Nilhan

was formed for an improper purpose or used after formation to mislead creditors or perpetuate

a fraud upon creditors” Id. The second alleged flaw is that Georgia law, which does not allow

reverse veil-piercing, applies. The Court, however, has already found that Florida law applies.

Therefore, the focus of the Court’s analysis will be on whether the Debtor was formed or used

for a fraudulent or improper purpose.

Although this case presents many complexities, the Court ultimately must weigh the

evidence and the testimony presented at trial to reach a determination. As determined by Judge

Williamson, the only witnesses permitted to testify at the trial were C. Thakkar and the

corporate representative of the Claimant, Mr. Townsend. For various reasons, the Court will

only afford minimal weight to either witness’s testimony. C. Thakkar, by his own testimony,

is an extremely accomplished and savvy businessman, who has achieved great financial success

over his lifetime. Although C. Thakkar gave leadership designations to his sons, at least in

“name,” C. Thakkar is undoubtedly the mastermind behind the creation and success of the

Debtor and other Thakkar businesses. C. Thakkar’s breadth of knowledge and experience as to

the Debtor and other family-owned businesses was at times impressive during his testimony.

At other times, especially when it came to questions about various financial transactions of the

Debtor, C. Thakkar’s recollection was almost nonexistent. Despite the Court’s hesitancy, as to

which matters C. Thakkar has vivid recall versus other matters in which he has virtually no

recall, the Court did find C. Thakkar was genuine during certain portions of his testimony.

Concerning Mr. Townsend, although the Court found him to be very knowledgeable as

to the extensive background of events surrounding this matter, his pecuniary interest is notable.

Although Mr. Townsend testified solely as a fact witness, and not in his capacity as the

Claimant’s attorney, the fact remains that Mr. Townsend’s law firm was retained on a base

contingency fee of 40%, of which he will personally receive 15% to 20% of the fee paid to his

firm from the recovery of funds through the litigation. (Doc. 929, Tr. pp. 92-94). This is a

substantial amount, considering that under the terms in the Settlement Agreement, the Claimant

would be entitled to 50% of 2.3 million dollars.14 While the Court does not entirely disregard

Mr. Townsend’s testimony, there is a slight appearance of impropriety, which gives the Court

pause.15

In addition to the above issues with the testimony, the parties’ long history of having a

contentious relationship is also troubling. Although the Court understands that matters like this

are inherently adversarial, this case as repeatedly reflected by the record, obviously became

14 If the Claimant were to prevail, it would receive $1,150,000, which is 50% of the approximately $2,300,000

claim that the Debtor was awarded from the Nilhan Developer’s bankruptcy estate. Therefore, Mr. Townsend’s

firm would receive a minimum fee of $460,000, of which Mr. Townsend would individually receive between

$69,000 and $92,000.

15 Notably, Claimant’s counsel acknowledged that Mr. Townsend “is not particularly relevant,” and that his

testimony “was only to establish the amount of the debt.”’ (Doc. 932, Tr. p. 257).

personal between C. Thakkar and Mr. Townsend a long time ago.16 For these reasons and

reasons previously stated, the Court finds that C. Thakkar and Mr. Townsend’s testimony is

plagued with credibility concerns. Therefore, the Court will only afford minimal weight to their

testimony and will give the most consideration and weight to the documentary evidence

presented.

Piercing the corporate veil is an extraordinary remedy, and the theory of reverse veil-

piercing is an even more extreme remedy. The harsh nature of the theory is illustrated by the

fact that settled case law in Georgia plainly holds that reverse veil-piercing is not a remedy that

is recognized under the laws of Georgia. Johnson, 340 Ga. App. at 369-70. While the theory

is recognized in Florida, it is preserved solely for extraordinary cases. The evidence presented,

however, does not support a finding that this case qualifies as extraordinary for the purpose of

reverse veil-piercing.

First, as acknowledged by the Claimant’s attorney, the Debtor was not formed for an

improper purpose. (Doc. 932, Tr. p. 249). As C. Thakkar testified, the Debtor’s business “was

set up with the intent of the money that was borrowed from Wells Fargo then would be re-lent

to single-asset entities that would buy property and [the Debtor] would finance the acquisition

of the properties.” Id. at p. 228. Therefore, the question before the Court is whether at some

juncture the Debtor ceased operating for a proper purpose and was dominated by C. Thakkar to

the extent that it lost its corporate existence.

The Claimant’s theory is that business “went bad in a hurry” for C. Thakkar, with multi-

million-dollar judgments being entered against him and two of his entities. (Doc. 932, Tr. p.

16 Although the parties showed more decorum throughout the course of this trial than what the record reflects from

previous hearings, hostilities still simmered, and the Court had to redirect and issue multiple warnings to C.

Thakkar and Mr. Townsend.

250). Wells Fargo then ceased lending and defaulted loans held by the Thakkar entities. This

led to foreclosures on real properties in Georgia, and eventually to the bankruptcy filings of

various Thakkar entities and affiliates in Georgia. Id. During closing arguments, Claimant’s

counsel summarized its theory by stating:

So this entity set up to be a lender, that was for a little bit, then became used for

an improper purpose. And the purpose was to move money in and out of some

source, and to benefit him and his family, and hinder legitimate collection

efforts, and while not paying creditors who ultimately, after appeal, were found

to have valid claims, in excess of a million dollars. We think that rises to that.

While we don't have, you know, a statement by him, an email saying, boy, I am

sure putting one over, I'm going to use this entity for a criminal enterprise, I

think the silence and the inability to explain, along with having no tax

documents, no financial records, shows you that Nilhan Financial ceased being

a business. It just became a way to move money from one column to the other,

and we know it benefitted them. Id. at 257.

Conversely, C. Thakkar and N. Thakkar maintain that despite the Claimant having

years to take discovery, issue numerous subpoenas, and review bank records, essentially their

evidence directly traceable to C. Thakkar operating the business for an improper purpose “is a

few line items in 2016, very few over $5,000” which personally go to C. Thakkar. Based on

the lack of direct evidence, N. Thakkar’s counsel stated in his closing argument that “the

allegations that there’s some kind of shell game being played here is more argument than it is

proof, and more supposition than it is fact.” (Doc. 932, Tr. p. 264). Upon reviewing the

evidence, or lack thereof, the Court agrees.

The core evidence involves eight U.S. Trust bank statements (the “Bank Statements”)

and two American Express credit card statements. (Cl.’s Exs. 28-37). Seven of the Bank

Statements are consecutively dated from January 1, 2016 to July 31, 2016, as well as an

additional statement dated January 1, 2017 to January 31, 2017. Ultimately, the Court must

determine the “lens” under which the transactions should be viewed. The Claimant wants the

Court to focus on C. Thakkar’s purported lack of knowledge as to certain financial transactions,

coupled with the allegation “that the source of the money is either Chuck Thakkar, or a

company, owned by his family members but controlled by Chuck Thakkar.” (Doc. 937, p. 15).

This includes a transfer into the Debtor’s bank account on January 10, 2017, for $339,780 with

the notation “Originate Nilhan Financial 401(k) PSP” and a transfer out the same day to

checking account 3536 for $342,000.17 (Cl.’s Ex. 35, Doc. 929, Tr. pp. 214-16). Additional

examples highlighted by the Claimant are C. Thakkar’s lack of knowledge as to the following

transactions: (i) a payment of $41,000 received by Community Bank; (ii) a payment of

$100,000 received by Wells Fargo; (iii) a transfer of $105,000 was transferred to American

Express on behalf of Niloy Thakkar; (iv) a transfer of $206,695 was transferred to

Manufacturers & Traders Bank, and (v) transfers to Sunny Isles Residential. (Cl.’s Ex. 38, Doc.

937, p. 15). Conversely, C. Thakkar argues that the Claimants were not able to point to much

more than a handful of transactions for more than $5,000 that went solely to him personally.

The Court has spent an extensive amount of time considering this issue. Certainly, there

are a lot of question marks surrounding the $4 million in deposits and $4 million in withdrawals

in 2016 that went into and out of the Debtor.18 However, there is not sufficient evidence to

connect the questions surrounding these financial transactions directly to C. Thakkar.

Although the Court finds that the Debtor is not subject to reverse veil-piercing, the

decision is not to be construed as the Court condoning some of the questionable behavior C.

Thakkar engaged in and the decisions he made. The Court’s decision primarily hinges on the

17 C. Thakkar testified that he had “no knowledge” of the Debtor having a 401(k). (Doc. 929, Tr. p. 214).

18 At the hearing, the Claimant’s attorney questioned C. Thakkar about a deposit originating from Nilhan Financial

401K PSP on June 30, 2016, in the amount of $339,680, as well as a transfer out later that day to Taylor Law

Offices for $325,000. (Doc. 929, Tr. pp. 227-28). The Court notes that there is a notation on the $325,000 wire

transfer out that states, “Funding for New Buildings at Sugarloaf.” (Cl.’s Ex. 33).

extremely high bar required to prevail on a claim for reverse veil-piercing. While not

insurmountable, copious evidence is required to succeed. As recognized by the Claimant’s

attorney, proving that the Debtor was being used for an improper purpose is a “high level,” and

his client does not “get to win by supposition.” (Doc. 932, pp. 254, 257). Without question,

there is a lot of “smoke” surrounding the Debtor’s monetary transactions in 2016. However,

there is more supposition than evidence produced by the Claimant which directly shows that C.

Thakkar used the Debtor for an improper purpose. While the Court commends Claimant’s

counsel for putting together a solid case with the available evidence, it is not enough to convince

the Court that the case rises to the extraordinary level needed to invoke the harsh and rarely

used theory of reverse veil-piercing.

Conclusion

This portion of the saga that has unfolded in this Case has finally reached its conclusion.

As stated by Judge Williamson in the Claim Objection Order, the Claimant bears “the burden

of producing evidence of the validity of its claim, as well as the ultimate burden of proving its

claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” Nilhan Fin., 627 B.R. at 535. The Claimant,

however, failed to prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds: (i) Florida law, not Georgia law, is the

choice of law applicable to the Claim; (ii) the “law of the case” provides that Florida law would

recognize a familial relationship and that such a relationship is present in the Case; and (iii) the

evidence falls short of the high burden necessary for the Court to utilize the extreme remedy of

reverse veil-piercing.19 Therefore, the Court will enter a separate order consistent with these

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and sustain the Amended Objection to Claim.

19 To the extent the Court did not address some of the parties’ ancillary arguments, the Court finds those matters

to either be moot or not necessary to the Court’s determination.

Attorney Edmund S. Whitson, III is directed to serve a copy of this order on all interested parties who

are non-CM/ECF users and to file a proof of service within three days of entry of the order.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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