Commonwealth v. Lora

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SJC-12887

COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSE LORA.

Worcester. February 9, 2024. - June 24, 2024.

Present: Budd, C.J., Wendlandt, Georges, & Dewar, JJ.

Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Disclosure

of evidence, Assistance of counsel, Failure to object,

Argument by prosecutor, Cross-examination by prosecutor,

New trial. Evidence, Prior violent conduct, Self-defense,

Disclosure of evidence, Prior misconduct, Impeachment of

credibility, Prior inconsistent statement, Cross-

examination, Argument by prosecutor, Photograph, State of

mind, Intent, Motive, Opinion. Constitutional Law,

Assistance of counsel. Self-Defense. Mental Impairment.

Social Media. Jury and Jurors.

Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court

Department on May 20, 2016.

The case was tried before Paul D. Wilson, J., and a motion

for a new trial, filed on September 10, 2021, was considered by

him.

Jillise McDonough for the defendant.

Nathaniel R. Beaudoin, Assistant District Attorney, for the

Commonwealth.

2

WENDLANDT, J. In June 2015, the victim, David Luyando, was

shot in the head as he was visiting the burial site of a friend

in a Worcester cemetery; the victim was an innocent bystander

caught in a line of fire targeting Kevin Parker, who was a part

of the group that accompanied the victim at the cemetery. Six

days earlier, Parker, who was a member of the Providence Street

Posse (PSP), a Worcester-based gang, had shot the defendant,

Jose Lora, ostensibly because the defendant, a member of a rival

gang, the Kilby Street Posse (KSP), was in the PSP's apparent

"territory." Finding himself face to face with Parker so soon

after being shot, the defendant took the opportunity for

revenge; he discharged his firearm six times in Parker's

direction, fatally striking the victim with one bullet.

Following the killing, the defendant disposed of the murder

weapon, cleaned the car in which he was travelling, and

eventually absconded to the Dominican Republic.

The defendant was returned to the Commonwealth, and

following a jury trial in Superior Court, he was convicted of

murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate

premeditation. In this consolidated appeal, the defendant

maintains that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury

to consider Parker's known history of violence in connection

with their assessment as to whether the defendant had a

reasonable apprehension of Parker at the time of the killing,

3

and that the judge abused his discretion in denying the

defendant's motion for a new trial because the prosecutor

delayed disclosure of material evidence prejudicing his defense,

and because he was provided with ineffective assistance of

counsel. After carefully reviewing the defendant's claims on

appeal and having conducted an independent review of the entire

record, we discern no error and no reason to exercise our

extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a

new trial or to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree

to a lesser degree of guilt. Accordingly, we affirm the

conviction.

1. Background. The jury could have found the following

facts from the evidence presented at trial.

a. Commonwealth's case-in-chief. i. Cemetery shooting.

On the afternoon of June 25, 2015, the victim, his aunt, Dawn

Sims, his cousin, Ashayla Burrell, and his cousin's friend,

Caytlin Pizarro, were at a Worcester cemetery. Sims had driven

the victim's group to the cemetery in her Chevrolet Equinox

after learning from Burrell's boyfriend, Parker, that a

headstone was missing from the burial site of a mutual friend.

As discussed supra, Parker was a member of the PSP, a Worcester-

based gang prominent in the eastern side of the city. Parker

joined the victim's group at the cemetery, arriving separately

in a black Hyundai Elantra, along with fellow PSP gang member,

4

Kevin Mulready. Neither Parker nor Mulready was armed. The two

vehicles parked on opposite sides of the road near the

gravesite.

Sims called the city police department to report the

missing headstone. The victim's group waited approximately

forty-five minutes, but the police did not arrive.

As the victim's group prepared to leave, Parker sat in the

Elantra's driver's seat. The victim and Mulready were in the

back passenger seats; the victim was on the driver's side.

A third vehicle, a Mazda, approached the two cars. The

vehicle pulled close to the Elantra. One of the Mazda's windows

opened, and Mulready saw a firearm "c[o]me up." Parker saw the

defendant in the Mazda. As Parker tried to drive away from the

Mazda, he heard five to seven shots. Sims, who was in the

Equinox, saw the defendant hanging out of the Mazda1 and

discharging his firearm in the direction of the Elantra.

Pizarro was on her cellular telephone at the time of the

shooting leaving a voicemail message for her doctor. The

voicemail recording captures the sounds of six gunshots.

Pizarro saw the window of the Mazda close following the

shooting.

1 Burrell also saw the defendant leaning out from the Mazda.

5

After driving away from the Mazda, Parker turned and saw

that the victim appeared to have suffered a gunshot wound to the

head; he was struggling to breathe and was choking on his own

blood. Parker drove to the hospital. The victim died later

that day from a gunshot wound to his head.

ii. Nightclub shooting. As discussed supra, the defendant

was a member of the KSP, a Worcester-based gang engaged in a

decades-long feud with the PSP. Parker and the defendant had an

ongoing "rivalry" that sometimes had turned "physical." At

trial, the prosecutor's theory was that the shooting at the

cemetery was in retaliation for a shooting that had occurred six

days earlier. Specifically, on June 19, 2015, Parker had shot

at the defendant as the defendant was in a vehicle near a

nightclub in the PSP's "area" on the eastern side of the city;

one bullet struck the defendant's arm.2

iii. Defendant's activities prior to and after the

cemetery shooting. On the day of the cemetery shooting, the

defendant asked his friend, Ashley Forget,3 for a ride to another

2 A responding police officer, who had been nearby, searched

the defendant and his vehicle and found no firearm. The

defendant was treated for relatively minor injuries to his arm.

3 Forget testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement with

the Commonwealth.

6

KSP gang member's home.4 At the time, Forget was in Crystal Park

in Worcester with Janeshley Delossantos, and a KSP gang member,

Fred Taylor.5 Forget, accompanied by Delossantos and Taylor,

drove her Mazda to the defendant's home, where the group picked

him up. En route to the KSP member's home, Forget drove,

Delossantos was in the front passenger's seat, and the defendant

and Taylor were in the back seat. The defendant was on the

driver's side.

As the defendant's group neared the cemetery, Forget

suggested that they stop to see whether a headstone for their

deceased friend had been installed.6 As they approached the

friend's gravesite, the group saw two vehicles. Taylor surmised

that the vehicles belonged to their friend's family, and Forget

pulled the Mazda behind one of the vehicles.

4 The defendant's vehicle was impounded in connection with

the police investigation of the nightclub shooting. As a

result, the defendant sought transportation from his friend,

Ashley Forget. Specifically, on the day before the cemetery

shooting, Forget gave the defendant a ride to the house of a

fellow KSP gang member. As discussed infra, on the day of the

cemetery shooting, the defendant had asked Forget for a ride to

this same KSP gang member's home.

5 A Worcester police officer testified that Taylor was a

member of the KSP. Taylor denied that he was a gang member.

6 Taylor testified, on cross-examination during the

defendant's case, concerning a letter he had written to

Delossantos shortly after the cemetery shooting in which he had

posited that the defendant suggested the group go to the

cemetery, knowing that rival gang members were there.

7

But Taylor was wrong. Instead of their friend's relatives,

the defendant's group encountered Parker. Forget noticed Parker

"slunched" low in the driver's seat in the vehicle directly

across from hers. The defendant started "freaking out" and said

"f*** them."

Delossantos, who was familiar with rumors that Parker had

shot the defendant six days earlier,7 testified that she saw

Parker "duck[]" as if searching for something in his car. She

did not see Parker with a firearm, however. Instead, she saw

that the defendant carried a firearm and heard him "clock[]" it.

Forget, who began to drive away, heard multiple gunshots coming

from her Mazda; Delossantos also heard the gunshots.

Near the back entrance of the cemetery, the defendant told

Forget to stop the car, which she did. The defendant and Taylor

alighted from the car. The defendant instructed Taylor to

dispose of the firearm.

The defendant's group then drove back to Crystal Park and

warned KSP members to "get out of there" in light of the

shooting that had occurred. Thereafter, Forget drove to

Delossantos's home, where Forget and the defendant cleaned the

interior of Forget's Mazda. The defendant also smashed his

7 Taylor later testified, in connection with the defense,

that he also had heard that Parker was the rival gang member

responsible for the nightclub shooting of the defendant just six

days earlier.

8

cellular telephone and discarded the pieces. He remarked to

Forget and Delossantos that he hoped that he had "hit KP."

Delossantos testified that "KP" was Parker's nickname.

Days after the shooting, the defendant fled to the

Dominican Republic, where he stayed for several months. While

there, he made several posts on his social media account. In

one post, which was dated approximately three weeks after the

shooting, the defendant stated, "I will never drop my stripes[.]

I did too much to get them[.]" In another post that same day,

the defendant stated, "[G]od protect me from my friends[.] [I]

can take care of my enemies[.]"

A .380 caliber firearm was found at the cemetery near the

crime scene. Along the road where the shooting occurred, five

spent shell casings were recovered; ballistic testing showed

that the casings had been ejected from the .380 caliber firearm.

One spent projectile, matching the caliber of the weapon found

at the scene, was recovered from the Elantra in which the victim

had been shot.

b. The defense. At trial, the defendant asserted that,

although he had shot the victim, he had acted in self-defense.

The defendant, who took the stand in his own defense, testified

that when Forget pulled behind one of the vehicles near the

gravesite of their friend, Taylor grabbed the defendant's leg

and gave him a "paranoid" look.

9

The defendant then saw Parker holding a firearm "right in

[the defendant's] face."8 The defendant ducked down, cocked his

own weapon, and fired "wildly" in Parker's general direction.

He asserted that he did so to defend himself and his friends.

The defendant acknowledged that he disposed of his weapon and

cellular telephone following the cemetery shooting, explaining

that he did so because he feared being arrested.

The defendant also testified to two incidents that he

claimed affected his state of mind at the time of the cemetery

shooting. The first occurred in October 2014, approximately

eight months before the cemetery shooting. At that time, the

defendant witnessed the drive-by shooting of his best friend,

Christian Obeng, as the two were leaving the defendant's

relative's apartment in Worcester. After Obeng's death, the

defendant "didn't know what to do with [him]self" and "felt lost

in the world."

The second incident was the shooting of the defendant by

Parker outside of a nightclub in the eastern side of Worcester;

as discussed supra, this shooting transpired just six days

before the cemetery shooting. Although the defendant did not

obtain a firearm after Obeng's death, he testified that he

8 Although Delossantos and Taylor both testified that they

saw Parker leaning down or grabbing something from his vehicle,

no witness other than the defendant testified that Parker was

armed.

10

obtained a firearm after he was shot because "too much stuff was

happening in [his] life."9 Following the nightclub shooting, the

defendant testified, he was afraid and no longer wanted to leave

his house or live in Worcester.10 While the nightclub shooting

had affected his state of mind, the defendant testified that he

did not know that Parker had shot him. Dr. Eric Brown, a

clinical and forensic psychologist, testified for the defense.

He opined that witnessing Obeng's death and then being shot

himself outside the nightclub left him in a state of "acute fear

and paranoia." According to Brown, the defendant exhibited

symptoms of paranoia, hypervigilance, and depression. Based on

a psychiatric assessment, Brown opined that the defendant had

posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on the day of the cemetery

shooting.

Taylor also testified on the defendant's behalf; he stated

that, as Forget pulled her car near the two vehicles parked near

9 On cross-examination, the prosecutor impeached the

defendant, showing that his testimony that he had not possessed

a firearm until June 2015 and that he had not sold drugs were

inconsistent with his 2011 juvenile delinquency adjudication for

illegally carrying a firearm and his 2017 guilty pleas to

charges related to trafficking heroin, respectively.

10The defendant's statement that he did not leave his house

in the days before the cemetery shooting was contrary to

Forget's testimony that she provided a ride to the defendant to

his fellow KSP gang member's house on the day before the

shooting.

11

their friend's gravesite, Taylor identified Parker and said,

"That's Kevin."11 Taylor noticed that Parker appeared to be

surprised and reached under his seat to try to grab something

and pull it up. Taylor could not identify the object.

On cross-examination, Taylor acknowledged his grand jury

testimony that the defendant had told him that the shooting was

"payback." He also acknowledged a letter he had written to

Delossantos a few days after the cemetery shooting in which

Taylor stated that the defendant "basically set us up to be his

ride" to the cemetery and someone must have called the defendant

and told him "where the ops[12] were." As discussed supra, Forget

had testified that it was her idea to stop by the cemetery.

2. Procedural history. The defendant was indicted for

murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; carrying a

firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and carrying

a loaded firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n). The

Commonwealth dismissed the firearm charges, and a jury convicted

the defendant of murder in the first degree on the theory of

deliberate premeditation. The defendant timely filed a notice

of appeal. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied by

11Although Taylor was on the Commonwealth's witness list,

he was not called in its case-in-chief.

12Taylor explained that "ops" was a term for rival gang

members.

12

the trial judge. We consolidated the defendant's timely appeal

from that order with his direct appeal.

3. Discussion. The defendant maintains that the trial

judge erred by not instructing the jury to consider Parker's

known history of violence in connection with their assessment as

to whether the defendant had a reasonable apprehension of Parker

at the time of the killing, and that the judge abused his

discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial

because the prosecutor delayed disclosure of material evidence,

and because the defendant was provided with ineffective

assistance of counsel. We address each contention in turn.

a. Jury instruction. The defendant first maintains that

the judge erred by not instructing the jury to consider Parker's

prior violent conduct when considering the defendant's claim

that he acted in self-defense. In connection with a claim of

self-defense, the defendant may offer "evidence of specific

violent acts by the victim that were previously known to the

defendant" to "demonstrate . . . the defendant's reasonable

apprehension of the victim." Commonwealth v. Souza, 492 Mass.

615, 621 (2023), citing Commonwealth v. Fontes, 396 Mass. 733,

735-736 (1986).13 The jury may consider such evidence if the

13"To establish that the defendant did not act in proper

self-defense, the Commonwealth must prove at least one of the

following propositions beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the

defendant did not have a reasonable ground to believe, and did

13

defendant knew of such conduct. See Fontes, supra; Model Jury

Instructions on Homicide 28 (2018).

At trial, the judge discussed with the prosecutor and trial

counsel the appropriateness of giving an instruction regarding

Parker's prior violent conduct in view of the defendant's

testimony that he was not aware that Parker had been the person

who had shot the defendant six days prior to the cemetery

shooting. Trial counsel did not object to the judge's

conclusion to forgo the instruction. Therefore, "our review is

limited to whether the [failure to give the] instruction was

erroneous and, if so, whether it created a substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice." Commonwealth v.

Mercado, 456 Mass. 198, 205 n.14 (2010).

When determining whether to provide a self-defense

instruction, including an instruction regarding the jury's

consideration of a victim's prior violent conduct, the evidence

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.

Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 253 (2022), S.C.,

491 Mass. 247 (2023). Here, while the defendant testified that

not believe, that he was in imminent danger of death or serious

bodily harm, from which he could save himself only by using

deadly force; or (2) the defendant had not availed himself of

all proper means to avoid physical combat before resorting to

the use of deadly force; or (3) the defendant used more force

than was reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of the

case." Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 167 (2008).

14

he did not know that Parker shot him,14 Taylor testified that the

defendant told Taylor that the cemetery shooting was "payback."

Forget and Delossantos also testified that, following the

shooting, the defendant stated that he hoped he had "hit KP."

Coupled with Delossantos and Taylor's testimony that they had

heard rumors that Parker had shot the defendant, and viewed in

the light most favorable to the defendant, the jury could

reasonably find that the defendant was aware that Parker was the

person who had shot him outside the nightclub a few days

earlier. See id.

Assuming, arguendo,15 that the judge erred in not giving the

instruction regarding the defendant's knowledge of Parker's

prior violent conduct, we turn to consider whether the judge's

failure to do so resulted in a substantial likelihood of a

miscarriage of justice. See Mercado, 456 Mass. at 205 n.14. To

find that the defendant held a reasonable apprehension based on

14The Commonwealth proceeded under a theory of transferred

intent, that is, that the defendant's intent to kill Parker

transferred to the victim, making Parker's prior violent conduct

relevant. See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 540

(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 837 (2021)

("If a defendant intends to kill one person, and mistakenly

kills another, under the doctrine of transferred intent the

defendant is treated as though he or she intended to kill the

other individual").

15We do not conclude the judge erred in not providing this

instruction where, as here, trial counsel did not request it --

a decision that was manifestly reasonable. See note 17, infra.

15

Parker's prior violent conduct, the jury would have had to

discredit the defendant's testimony that he was unaware that

Parker had shot him. Such a conclusion that the defendant

testified falsely under oath would have undermined the self-

defense theory; after all, the theory required the jury to

believe the defendant, who was the only witness to testify that

Parker was armed at the cemetery. Indeed, the instruction may

have had the ill effect of bolstering the prosecutor's theory

that the shooting was motivated by the defendant's desired

vengeance.16 Under the circumstances, any purported error in

failing to instruct the jury as to their consideration of

16The defendant also contends that the judge, sua sponte,

should have instructed the jury as follows in connection with

their assessment of the defendant's claim of mental impairment

at the time of the shooting:

"You may consider the defendant's mental condition at the

time of the killing, including any credible evidence of

mental impairment . . . in determining whether the

defendant actually believed that he was in immediate danger

of serious bodily harm or death . . . ."

Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 29. The defendant did not

request this instruction, and "[a]bsent a request from a

defendant, . . . a judge is [not] required to instruct the jury

on [a mental impairment] defense." Commonwealth v. Santiago

(No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 422 (2020). We address in part 3.c.i,

infra, whether trial counsel's failure to request a mental

impairment instruction constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel.

16

Parker's prior violence did not create a substantial likelihood

of a miscarriage of justice.17 See note 21, infra.

b. Delayed disclosure of evidence. We turn next to the

defendant's claim that the judge abused his discretion in

denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground

that the prosecutor delayed disclosing (1) two posts from the

defendant's social media account, which were posted three weeks

after the killing and in which the defendant stated, "[G]od

protect me from my friends[.] [I] can take care of my enemies,"

and "I will never drop my stripes[.] I did too much to get

them" (social media posts); (2) a letter written by Taylor

shortly after the cemetery shooting in which Taylor told

Delossantos that the defendant had "set [them] up," suggesting

that the defendant had planned to take them to the cemetery

knowing that rival gang members were there (Taylor letter); (3)

the defendant's statement to Worcester police Officer Peter

Roberge on the night of the Obeng shooting, denying his gang

affiliation (defendant's gang statement); and (4) Roberge's

statement that the defendant's friend group returned fire on the

night of the Obeng shooting (Roberge statement).

17For the same reason, any claim that trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to request the prior violent conduct

instruction also fails. Commonwealth v. Gumkowski, 487 Mass.

314, 325, 327 (2021) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim

for failure to object to jury instructions assessed under same

"substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" standard).

17

In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial, we

"determine whether there has been a significant error of law or

other abuse of discretion, . . . and whether any such error

create[d] a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. 171, 176 (2021),

quoting Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 355 (2016).

Where, as here, the motion judge was also the trial judge, we

extend special deference to the judge's decision because he "was

in a 'superior position to assess the credibility of the

defendant's claims.'" Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 162

(2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 792 n.14

(2004), S.C., 451 Mass. 1006 (2008). See Rodriguez-Nieves,

supra.

When addressing a claim that the prosecutor has delayed

disclosure of material evidence,18 we consider whether "[t]he

18The Commonwealth had an obligation to disclose the social

media posts and the letter authored by Taylor, who was on the

Commonwealth's witness list. See Mass. R. Crim. P.

14 (a) (1) (A), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005) ("The

prosecution shall disclose to the defense . . . each of the

following items . . . provided it is relevant to the case

. . . : (i) Any written or recorded statements . . . made by

the defendant . . . (vii) Material and relevant police reports,

. . . and statements of persons the party intends to call as

witnesses"). Moreover, because the defendant's gang affiliation

and gang rivalry were central to the case, the prosecutor should

also have disclosed the defendant's statement to Roberge and

Roberge's information concerning the Obeng shooting. See id.

Cf. Commonwealth v. Correia, 492 Mass. 220, 225 (2023)

(prosecution had obligation to disclose defendant's rap lyrics

brought forth for first time on defendant's cross-examination).

18

defendant has . . . made a showing of bad faith on the part of

the prosecution." Commonwealth v. Stote, 433 Mass. 19, 23

(2000). In the absence of bad faith,19 we consider "whether the

defendant has shown that he was prejudiced in his ability 'to

make effective use of the evidence in preparing and presenting

his case' when he first learned of the evidence in the heat of

trial." Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. at 177, quoting

Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 755 (1978), S.C., 397

Mass. 751 (1986). "[I]t is the consequences of the delay that

matter, not the likely impact of the nondisclosed evidence."

The defendant supported his contention that the information was

not disclosed pretrial with an affidavit of trial counsel, which

the judge was warranted in crediting. Commonwealth v. Sylvain,

473 Mass. 832, 838 (2016) (motion judge may "properly rel[y] on

the affidavits submitted in support of the defendant's motion

for a new trial").

19The judge found that the prosecutor did not act in bad

faith, crediting the prosecutor's affidavit, in which the

prosecutor averred that he had "never intentionally withheld

evidence or delayed the disclosure of evidence to a defendant,"

that he and trial counsel "were in fairly close contact during

the build-up to trial," and that he "continued to provide [trial

counsel] with discovery as [he] received it, including in the

days before trial began." The defendant speculates as to the

prosecutor's motives based on allegations regarding the conduct

of prosecutors at the office of the district attorney for the

middle district. In the circumstances, the judge's decision to

credit the affidavit was not clearly erroneous. See Upton, 484

Mass. at 164 (motion judge, who was also trial judge,

"explicitly endorsed the prosecutor's specific, credible, and

repeated on-the-record denials of an undisclosed plea agreement"

[quotation and alteration omitted]).

19

Rodriguez-Nieves, supra at 179, quoting Commonwealth v. Almeida,

452 Mass. 601, 609-610 (2008).

i. Social media posts. The defendant contends that if the

prosecutor had disclosed the social media posts timely, trial

counsel would have filed a motion in limine to exclude them.

Because the social media posts reference, albeit vaguely, past

actions by the defendant that suggest involvement in misconduct

against "enemies" and misconduct to merit apparent esteem within

a gang, they should be analyzed as prior bad act evidence. See

Commonwealth v. Correia, 492 Mass. 220, 229-230 (2023) (prior

bad act evidence includes statements "convey[ing] ideas or acts

that themselves could be considered bad acts"). "Although

evidence of prior or subsequent bad acts may not be offered to

prove bad character or criminal propensity, such evidence may be

admitted for another purpose where its probative value is not

. . . outweighed by the danger of prejudice" (quotation and

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 712

(2016). Evidence of subsequent bad acts is admissible to "show

the whole transaction of which the crime was a part," so long as

the evidence is "connected with the facts of the case" and "not

. . . too remote in time." Commonwealth v. Samia, 492 Mass.

135, 148 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass.

427, 434 (2001).

20

Here, the posts were relevant to the defendant's state of

mind at the time of the cemetery shooting, were probative of the

defendant's retaliatory intent, and had a tendency to show that

the defendant did not act in self-defense. See Commonwealth v.

Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 466 (2004) ("Evidence of the defendant's

spending habits after the murder was admissible because it was

probative of his mental state at the time of the murder"). See

also Correia, 492 Mass. at 228-230 (defendant's statements akin

to bad act evidence admissible to show state of mind); Mass. G.

Evid. § 404(b) (2024). Although the posts were made

approximately three weeks after the killing, they were not too

remote in time to be probative of the defendant's state of mind.

See Cardarelli, 433 Mass. at 434 (evidence of defendant's

gambling spree two weeks after killing wife was "properly

admitted to establish motive" that defendant wanted to kill his

wife to spend their joint assets). In addition, the posts did

not highlight any specific acts of violence. Cf. Correia, supra

at 232 (rap lyrics' prejudicial effect outweighed probative

value where lyrics "highlight[ed] living a life of crime,

neighborhood wars, and disliking the police [and] hardly were

probative of the defendant's self-defense claim"). Accordingly,

the judge did not err in concluding that the proposed motion in

limine would have been unsuccessful and that the defendant did

not show prejudice from the delayed disclosure.

21

ii. Taylor letter. During his grand jury testimony,

Taylor was questioned about a letter he had written to

Delossantos in the aftermath of the cemetery shooting. In that

letter, Taylor stated that "[the defendant] basically set us up

to be his ride," that someone must have called the defendant and

told him where the "ops" were, and that "we [(Taylor and

Delossantos)] both know [Taylor] didn[']t have nothin[g] to do

with that or knew it was happenin[g]. [The defendant] did." At

trial, Taylor testified contrary to these statements;

accordingly, the prosecutor used the letter to impeach him.

The defendant asserts that had he known about the Taylor

letter prior to the commencement of the trial, he would have

filed a motion in limine to exclude it. The judge concluded

that such a motion would have failed. We agree. See

Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 400 (2013), quoting

Commonwealth v. Basch, 386 Mass. 620, 623 (1982) ("A party has a

right to impeach [a] witness's testimony by means of prior

inconsistent statements . . .").20

20The defendant wrongly contends that the judge limited

trial counsel's redirect examination regarding the Taylor

letter. In context, it is clear that the judge limited trial

counsel's questions whether Taylor was badgered by the

prosecutor during cross-examination; an issue the judge

determined the jury could "judge for itself whether that was

badgering." This was not an abuse of discretion.

22

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the

letter showed the defendant went to the cemetery knowing that

rival gang members were present. See Commonwealth v. Denson,

489 Mass. 138, 149-150 (2022) (prosecutor's reference in closing

to prior inconsistent statement "not for impeachment purposes

. . . but as substantive evidence . . . improperly employed the

statement for its truth"). Nothing about the timing of the

disclosure of the letter prevented trial counsel from objecting

to the argument. See Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. at 179,

quoting Almeida, 452 Mass. at 609-610.21

21Trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's use

of the Taylor letter, which itself was contradicted by Forget's

testimony, did not create a substantial likelihood of a

miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 492 Mass.

559, 568 (2023). Other evidence strongly indicated that the

defendant did not act in self-defense. Of the nine people who

witnessed the shooting and testified, only the defendant stated

that he saw "someone" in Parker's car holding a firearm. The

defendant's testimony that, upon seeing the gun, he ducked and

shot wildly out the window is belied by the testimony of

witnesses who saw the defendant hanging out of the Mazda's

window and shooting directly toward Parker's car. The

ballistics evidence, including the five shell casings strewn on

the road where the shooting occurred, supported these witness

accounts. There was no return fire, and the spent casings found

at the crime scene only belonged to the defendant's firearm.

The voicemail recording played for the jury confirms that the

defendant shot at Parker's vehicle six times as it sped away.

Overwhelming evidence also supported the prosecutor's

theory that the defendant shot Parker with deliberate

premeditation because of their personal and gang rivalry as well

as the nightclub shooting. See Commonwealth v. McGann, 484

Mass. 312, 326 (2020) ("The jury were free to reject the

defendant's testimony and instead credit the evidence presented

by the Commonwealth"). The defendant obtained a firearm after

23

iii. Defendant's gang statement. On cross-examination,

the defendant stated that he had been a member of the KSP for

well over a decade. Referencing a police report, the prosecutor

asked the defendant whether he had, on the night of the Obeng

shooting, told Roberge that he was not in a gang. The defendant

responded, "If that says it, yeah." When asked whether he "lied

to the police then, too," the defendant responded, "Yes."

The defendant contends that, if the police report had been

disclosed prior to trial, he would have moved to exclude

reference to it. However, the report recorded the defendant's

prior inconsistent statement and was used to impeach him; the

judge properly concluded that the statement would not have been

excluded for this purpose by a pretrial motion. See Parent, 465

Mass. at 400.

iv. Roberge statement. On cross-examination, the

prosecutor asked Roberge whether "the individuals who shot Mr.

Obeng were also shot at by the individuals with Mr. Obeng."

the nightclub shooting, suggesting that he was planning his

vengeance. As several witnesses testified, the defendant

recognized Parker as the person in the car in the cemetery as

Forget pulled the Mazda near it. Upon seeing Parker, the

defendant exclaimed "f*** them." He then "clocked" and fired

his firearm six separate times while hanging out the window

adjacent to Parker's car. Thereafter, he directed Taylor to

discard the gun, destroyed his cellular telephone, and cleaned

Forget's car. Days later, he fled to the Dominican Republic.

The defendant also explained to Taylor that the cemetery

shooting was "payback," and told Forget and Delossantos that he

hoped he hit Parker.

24

Roberge responded, "Correct." The prosecutor then asked, "And

one of those individuals with Mr. Obeng was [the defendant]?"

Roberge again responded, "That is correct." Trial counsel did

not object. But he later averred that, if he had known Roberge

would testify to someone firing back during the Obeng shooting,

he would have attempted to impeach Roberge's testimony with

eyewitness statements that there was only one shooter or moved

to exclude the testimony. The judge found that the defendant

was not prejudiced by any delay in disclosing Roberge's account

of the Obeng shooting because nothing prevented trial counsel

from impeaching Roberge at trial when he made the statement and

the statement "was not crucial to either parties' case." Given

the extensive evidence supporting the defendant's guilt, we

cannot say the judge abused his discretion in so concluding.

See note 21, supra. See also Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. at

177; Stote, 433 Mass. at 24-25 (no prejudice where "defense

counsel was permitted to cross-examine [witness] extensively"

and timely disclosure "would not necessarily have aided [the]

defense").

c. Ineffective assistance of counsel. We turn next to the

defendant's claim that the judge abused his discretion in

denying the defendant's motion for a new trial because trial

counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. "When

reviewing a defendant's appeal from the denial of a motion for a

25

new trial in conjunction with the direct appeal of a conviction

of murder in the first degree, 'we do not evaluate [the]

ineffective assistance claim under the traditional standard set

forth in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).'"

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 492 Mass. 559, 568 (2023), quoting

Commonwealth v. Melendez, 490 Mass. 648, 656-657 (2022).

"Instead, we apply the more favorable standard of G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E, and review the defendant's claim for a substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice." Gibson, supra.

Specifically, we consider "'whether defense counsel committed an

error in the course of trial,' and if there was error . . .

'whether it was likely to have influenced the jury's

conclusion.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46,

62 (2018).22 "Where a defendant challenges tactical or strategic

decisions by trial counsel, the court will find ineffective

assistance 'only if such a decision was manifestly unreasonable

when made.'" Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 808 (2016),

aff'd, 582 U.S. 286 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Diaz, 448

Mass. 286, 288 (2007).

22The judge properly applied the Saferian standard. See

Commonwealth v. Norris, 483 Mass. 681, 686 n.4 (2019) ("The

defendant incorrectly states that his motions for a new trial

were entitled to plenary review by the motion judge pursuant to

G. L. c. 278, § 33E").

26

i. Mental impairment instruction. First, we consider

whether trial counsel's failure to request a mental impairment

jury instruction as part of the self-defense instruction

constituted ineffective assistance. Specifically, the defendant

urges that trial counsel should have requested the following

model jury instruction:

"You may consider the defendant's mental condition at the

time of the killing, including any credible evidence of

mental impairment . . . in determining whether the

defendant actually believed that he was in immediate danger

of serious bodily harm or death, but not in determining

whether a reasonable person in those circumstances would

have believed he was in immediate danger."

Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 29.23

"'[W]here evidence of the defendant's mental impairment is

significant and where it is a critical aspect of [the

defendant's] defense, the failure to instruct the jury that they

could consider evidence of that impairment' is error."

Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 492 Mass. 341, 352 (2023), quoting

Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 799 (2011). Brown's

testimony that the defendant suffered from PTSD at the time he

shot the victim provided a basis for the mental impairment

23In his brief, the defendant fails to quote the portion of

the instruction instructing the jury not to consider the

defendant's mental impairment "in determining whether a

reasonable person in those circumstances would have believed he

was in immediate danger." Model Jury Instructions on Homicide

29.

27

instruction.24 See Armstrong, supra at 352-353, quoting

Commonwealth v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416, 426-427 (2020)

("To be entitled to a mental impairment instruction, 'a

defendant must, at a minimum, introduce evidence that such an

impairment existed at the time of the conduct in question'").

Nonetheless, the defendant has not shown that trial

counsel's decision not to request such an instruction was

manifestly unreasonable. See Weaver, 474 Mass. at 808. While

the model instruction permits the jury to consider the

defendant's mental impairment in determining whether the

defendant "actually believed" he was in imminent damager at the

time of the killing, it also instructs the jury to disregard

such evidence when determining "whether a reasonable person in

those circumstances would have believed he was in immediate

danger." Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 29.25 It was not

24Based on a psychodiagnostic interview with the defendant

and after reviewing the police reports and other statements

pertaining to the defendant's case, Brown opined that the

defendant suffered from PTSD when he killed the victim. Brown

explained that the defendant exhibited the five required

conditions for PTSD: he experienced a situation in which his

life was acutely endangered ("he was shot at and wounded, and

. . . his friend was killed"), he had intrusive experiences, he

became avoidant ("he was really freaked out about going

anywhere"), he experienced alterations in mood ("he began to

become very paranoid"), and he experienced arousal (he was

"hypervigilant" and "looking around all the time").

25Evidence of mental impairment bears upon the subjective

portion of self-defense -- whether the defendant actually

believed he was in imminent danger –- but not in determining

28

manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel to reject this

instruction in favor of the one given by the judge, which

allowed the jury to "consider all of the circumstances bearing

upon the defendant's state of mind at that time."

Moreover, assuming arguendo that the failure to request the

instruction was manifestly unreasonable, the defendant has not

shown that the failure created a substantial likelihood of a

miscarriage of justice. Because of the strong evidence that the

defendant premeditated his killing of the victim, see note 21,

supra, the requested mental impairment instruction was not

likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion. See Gibson,

492 Mass. at 568.26

"whether a defendant's belief concerning his exposure to danger

was reasonable." Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 576

(1997) ("[s]ince malice does not require any actual or

subjective intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm,

there is no basis in our law for the defendant's suggestion that

provocation should be viewed subjectively . . . [and] [t]he same

holds true for the self-defense test" [quotation and citation

omitted]).

26In addition, Brown's opinion rested on the defendant's

alleged fear of going outside and general paranoia; yet the

evidence was to the contrary. Forget testified that the

defendant went out on the day before the cemetery shooting as

well as on the day of the killing. Following the shooting, the

defendant accompanied his friends to Crystal Park and warned

fellow KSP gang members. In the weeks that followed the

cemetery shooting, the defendant posted photographs on social

media of himself at a beach in the Dominican Republic. Also,

although Brown's opinion rested on the defendant's scores on the

Trauma Symptom Inventory Standardized Test for defensive

avoidance, depression, and intrusive experiences, each of these

was barely above the cut-off for "clinically significant"

29

ii. Prior firearm adjudication. The defendant maintains

that trial counsel erred during the defendant's direct

examination by asking the defendant whether he had a firearm

from October 2014, the time of the Obeng shooting, to June 2015,

the time of the nightclub shooting. He contends that this line

of questioning was manifestly unreasonable because it allowed

the prosecutor to raise on cross-examination evidence of the

defendant's juvenile firearm adjudication, which trial counsel

successfully had excluded before trial through a motion in

limine. We agree with the judge that the defendant has not made

the requisite showing. To begin, trial counsel did not aver

that these questions lacked a strategic basis. In fact, the

questions elicited the defendant's testimony supporting his PTSD

diagnosis and his claim of self-defense.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, trial counsel

strategically limited the time frame of the questions so as to

avoid opening the door to the defendant's prior firearm

adjudication. Rather, the defendant opened the door on cross-

examination when he testified affirmatively to the prosecutor's

question whether his position was that he "never handled a gun

scores. Cf. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. at 799 (failure to instruct on

mental impairment warranted new trial given defendant's "long

history of serious mental illness"); Commonwealth v. Gould, 380

Mass. 672, 678 (1980) (same, given expert testimony that

defendant "had suffered from a severe and long-standing mental

illness").

30

until June of 2015." This statement by the defendant, and not

his responses to trial counsel's more limited questions during

his direct examination, allowed the prosecutor to raise the

defendant's prior adjudication. See Commonwealth v. Roderick,

429 Mass. 271, 275 (1999) ("when the defendant answered

untruthfully that he had never carried a gun, he opened the door

to admission of the evidence of his prior conviction for gun

possession").

iii. Failure to object during cross-examination. The

defendant raises several instances in which trial counsel

purportedly should have, but failed to, object during the

prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant. We examine

each of these decisions in turn to determine whether there was

error and, if so, whether the error created a substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See Gibson, 492 Mass.

at 568.

A. Gang "lifestyle." The prosecutor cross-examined the

defendant as follows:

Q.: "And you're a Kilby Street Posse member?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "Been one for well over a decade?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "That lifestyle involves guns, drugs, violence?"

A.: "No."

31

Q.: "It doesn't involve any of that?"

A.: "Not to me –-"

Q.: "You've never been involved in –-"

A.: "I've never done drugs in my life."

Q.: "You never sold drugs in your life?"

A.: "Nah."

After this exchange, the prosecutor impeached the defendant with

a 2017 heroin trafficking conviction that previously had been

excluded by trial counsel in a pretrial motion in limine. Trial

counsel did not object.

Trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's

questions regarding the defendant's "lifestyle" and drug

activities did not create a substantial likelihood of a

miscarriage of justice. See Gibson, 492 Mass. at 568. First,

the judge gave a limiting instruction that the jury could

consider prior convictions only for impeachment purposes, and

that the jury could not consider the convictions as proof that

the defendant committed the crime at hand or that the defendant

had a criminal personality or bad character.27 See Commonwealth

27 The judge's instruction stated in full:

"The defendant is not charged with committing any crime

other than the murder charge contained in the indictment.

You have heard mention of other crimes as to which the

defendant pleaded guilty or was otherwise convicted. You

are not to take that as a substitute for proof that the

defendant committed the crime charged here, nor you -- may

32

v. Bly, 444 Mass. 640, 653 (2005) (no substantial likelihood of

miscarriage of justice from prosecutor's improper discussion of

details underlying prior convictions where "limiting instruction

as to the proper use of prior convictions adequately addressed

the prosecutor's error"); Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714,

721 (2005) (where judge allows introduction of prior conviction,

"potential prejudice may be ameliorated by an appropriate

limiting instruction"). See also Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 473

Mass. 415, 427 (2015) ("Jurors are presumed to follow [the

judge's] instructions"). Moreover, the evidence of the

defendant's deliberate premeditation was overwhelming. See note

21, supra.

B. Social media photographs. The defendant argues that

trial counsel's failure to object to two photographs depicting

the defendant in the Dominican Republic was error because the

photographs portrayed the defendant as "callous" and were

unrelated to the issues of deliberate premeditation and self-

defense. Counsel averred that his failure to object was an

oversight and not strategic. However, the photographs, which

were posted within months of the cemetery shooting, were

you consider it as proof that the defendant had a -- has a

criminal personality or a bad character. Specifically, you

may not use this evidence to conclude that if the defendant

committed other crimes, he must also have committed this

crime."

33

evidence of the defendant's state of mind; they raised doubt as

to the defendant's theory that he was isolated due to PTSD,

because they show him out in public in the company of others, as

opposed to being "wounded" and "really freaked out about going

anywhere" as Brown testified. Any objection by trial counsel

would have been futile. See Mendes, 441 Mass. at 466-467

(postcrime conduct admissible to show state of mind).

C. Prearrest silence. The prosecutor questioned the

defendant regarding his failure to contact the police after the

shooting. Specifically, the prosecutor asked:

Q.: "Did you call the police after you shot and killed

David Luyando?"

A.: "No."

Q.: "Did you call the police after you got back from

Crystal Park?"

A.: "I actually did call the police."

Q.: "Oh, you called the police –-"

A.: "And you can check it on record. I did call the

police. I was going to tell them what happened, but I was

too scared for myself, so I didn't tell them."

The prosecutor raised the issue a second time, asking

whether the defendant was dropped off at the police station

after the shooting, whether he turned himself in and claimed

self-defense and, again, whether he called the police. In his

closing argument, the prosecutor also alluded to the defendant's

34

prearrest silence, stating that the defendant is "not being

dropped at the police station to claim self-defense."

While the Commonwealth rightly concedes that the

prosecutor's questions and closing argument were improper, see

Commonwealth v. Gardner, 479 Mass. 764, 769 (2018) ("the

defendant's prearrest silence typically is of limited probative

value" because "there may be many reasons why a defendant does

not wish to come forward and speak to the police that have no

bearing on his guilt or innocence"), trial counsel's failure to

object did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage

of justice. Other evidence indicated the defendant's

consciousness of guilt, such as the disposal of his firearm and

cellular telephone and his flight to the Dominican Republic.

See Correia, 492 Mass. at 236 ("Where there is other, properly

admitted evidence of consciousness of guilt, e.g., flight, . . .

a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice is unlikely").

And, as detailed in note 21, supra, the evidence that the

defendant did not act in self-defense was overwhelming. See

Gardner, supra at 773 (prosecutor's references to defendant's

prearrest silence did not create substantial likelihood of

miscarriage of justice "because the defendant's testimony and

self-defense claim were extensively and primarily undermined by

other evidence at trial").

35

D. Badgering. The defendant contends that trial counsel

improperly failed to object to the prosecutor's aggressive

cross-examination. To be sure, some28 of the exchanges between

the prosecutor and the defendant were testy, with the

prosecutor's questioning crossing the line. But, as the judge

noted, the defendant held his own and was "no shrinking violet."

And, because the judge interjected to control the exchanges, it

was not manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel to decide to

forgo further objections.29

28The defendant alleges the following questions on cross-

examination were improper: whether "the person you actually

killed, was an unarmed twenty-two year-old non-gang member";

whether the victim "deserved to be killed" because the victim

had "throw[n] up" gang signs in pictures; whether the

defendant's actions were the "actions of a hero"; whether "the

only person who agrees with you is you" about seeing a gun in

Parker's car; and whether "all these people [(Delossantos and

Taylor)] knew who shot you, but you had no idea?" Also, in

response to the defendant repeatedly stating that he was

"defending [him]self," the prosecutor remarked, "You keep saying

that" and "That's a great phrase." The prosecutor's sarcastic

remarks –- about the victim deserving to be killed, the

defendant acting as a hero, and the defendant's claim to self-

defense being a "great phrase" –- were improper. See

Commonwealth v. McDermott, 493 Mass. 403, 413 (2024) (prosecutor

badgered defendant by stating, "You're a pretty good shot" in

response to defendant's assertion he did not see victim while

shooting); Commonwealth v. Cadet, 473 Mass. 173, 186 (2015)

(sarcastic questions improper).

29For example, when the defendant repeatedly noted he was

"defending [him]self" and the prosecutor responded, "That's a

great phrase," the judge said, "I think we understand both

party's positions. Let's move on." In response to the

prosecutor's "actions of a hero" question, see note 28, supra,

the judge said, "That's a little argumentative . . . . Let's

just move on." And during a particularly contentious back-and-

36

The judge indicated that the prosecutor's questions that no

witness besides the defendant testified to seeing anyone in

Parker's car with a gun "did at least come close to asking [the]

[d]efendant to comment on the credibility of other witnesses."

See Commonwealth v. Fahey, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 310 (2021),

quoting Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 567 (1986)

("[i]t is a fundamental principle that a witness cannot be asked

to assess the credibility of his testimony or that of other

witnesses" [quotation omitted]). However, the prosecutor did

not ask the defendant directly to comment upon the witnesses'

credibility, highlighting "that there were inconsistencies

between the defendant's testimony and that of other witnesses"

(alteration and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. McDermott,

493 Mass. 403, 415 (2024) (no error where defendant "was not

asked whether [other witnesses] lied" but "to square his version

of the facts" with their testimony). Moreover, any error did

not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice

given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.30 See

forth in which the prosecutor and the defendant were talking

over each other, the judge directed both the prosecutor and the

defendant to "please stop" and, turning to the prosecutor, the

judge admonished, "I will ask you to ask another question that's

not argumentative." When the prosecutor followed with another

argumentative question, the judge said, "I'm going to sustain my

own objection to that question. It's been asked and answered,

and it's argumentative."

30 See note 21, supra.

37

Commonwealth v. Pierre, 486 Mass. 418, 435 (2020) ("Considering

the strength of the evidence against the defendant, we conclude

that these impermissible comments by the prosecutor did not

create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice").

E. Defendant's gang affiliation. The defendant alleges

trial counsel erred by failing to object to cross-examination

regarding the defendant's gang affiliation.31 "Evidence of gang

affiliation may be admissible to show motive." Commonwealth v.

Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 604 (2018). "We have, however, urged

caution in admitting gang-related evidence because of the risk

of suggesting that the defendant may have a propensity for

criminality or violence." Id.

Here, any objection to questions regarding the defendant's

gang affiliation would have been futile because gang rivalry,

and the defendant's and Parker's role in it, was relevant to

show motive. See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 471

(2019) ("Evidence of animosity between the gangs was admissible

31The prosecutor asked the defendant if he "brag[ged] on

social media about being a gang member." Regarding one of the

defendant's social media photographs, in which the defendant and

a group of men were holding up three fingers, the prosecutor

asked whether the defendant and his associates were "throwing up

threes . . . a Kilby Street gang member sign." The prosecutor

also asked whether the friend the defendant was with on the

night he was shot, and the friend whose house the defendant was

going to on the day of the cemetery shooting, were KSP members.

At one point, the prosecutor pointed to certain individuals

watching the trial and asked if they too were KSP members.

38

. . . to establish the defendant's motive for committing the

crimes"); Lopes, 478 Mass. at 604 ("long-standing and ongoing

dispute between" three gangs admissible to show defendant's

motive and intent). The Commonwealth theorized that the

shooting was part of a larger, decades-long gang feud between

the PSP and the KSP. The prosecutor's questions highlighted

that the defendant was with fellow KSP members during crucial

events leading up to the cemetery shooting: the defendant

witnessed the shooting of Christian Obeng, a KSP member, in

October 2014; the defendant was with Fabian Beltran, another KSP

member, when shot by Parker; and the defendant had visited a

third alleged KSP member on the day before the cemetery

shooting. Obeng's and Beltran's gang affiliation particularly

was relevant to show that the defendant may have shot at Parker

in retaliation for two past shootings involving himself and

other KSP members. See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658,

672 (2017) (evidence admissible to support Commonwealth's theory

that murder was motivated by "retaliation for the defendant's

and [a fellow gang member's] injuries from . . . [an]

altercation with a leader of [a rival gang]").

The prosecutor's conduct -- pointing to certain individuals

who were watching the trial and asking, "Who is a member of

Kilby Street Posse? . . . Those guys right there?" -- was

improper. However, trial counsel objected to the question, and

39

the judge struck the defendant's response32 and directed the

prosecutor "not to go there." See Gonzalez, 473 Mass. at 427.

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. See

Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 488 Mass. 827, 844-845 (2022) ("it is

difficult to see what more trial counsel could have done" beyond

successfully objecting to prosecutor's insinuation that member

of gallery was intimidating witness).

F. Gang opinion evidence. Roberge, an officer in the

Worcester police department's gang unit, testified for the

Commonwealth regarding the cemetery shooting; he was called to

testify again by the defendant about Parker's nightclub shooting

of the defendant. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited

from the officer that, based on his training and experience as a

gang unit member, gang members do not carry firearms all the

time; instead, Roberge testified, they do so for specific

purposes with an intent to use them.

Roberge's testimony that gang members generally carry

firearms only when they intend to use them was improper.

Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 128 (2021) (expert gang

testimony improper where "general comments regarding gangs in

the Boston area went beyond what was probative of the

32The defendant said that he did not know the people at

whom the prosecutor was pointing and then said, "No, that's my

cousin and family members."

40

defendants' criminal liability" and suggested propensity to

commit violence). Trial counsel's failure to object, however,

did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of

justice because the defendant's gang membership was undisputed,

the judge gave a limiting instruction on the use of gang

evidence,33 and the judge questioned potential jurors during voir

dire to screen out those with biases against gang members.34 See

id. at 128-129 (improper gang testimony not reversible error

where defendant's gang membership not in dispute and "judge gave

an effective limiting instruction"); Commonwealth v. Phim, 462

Mass. 470, 478 (2012) (judge limited prejudicial effect of gang

evidence by issuing limiting instruction and asking jurors

during voir dire whether gang evidence would affect their

impartiality). Cf. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 467-468, 470, 472

33The judge gave a lengthy instruction during the

Commonwealth's case-in-chief regarding gang evidence. Among

other things, the judge instructed that "[the defendant] is not

on trial for being a member of the Kilby Street gang" and that

"[y]ou may consider the evidence of his membership in that gang

as bearing upon his motive for the alleged murder of [the

victim], but you may not consider it for the purpose of showing

that [the defendant] is or was a bad person or has the

propensity to commit criminal acts or the propensity to be

violent." The judge restated this instruction after closing

argument.

34On the juror questionnaire, potential jurors were asked

whether they could be fair and impartial when hearing evidence

about possible gang affiliation. The judge struck several

potential jurors from service for their response to that

question.

41

(expert gang testimony constituted reversible error where expert

testified to defendant's gang affiliation without sufficient

factual support and judge "placed virtually no limitation on the

use of the evidence"). Moreover, the defendant himself

testified that he did not carry firearms generally but did so

only after the nightclub shooting. This was consistent with

Roberge's testimony. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395,

399, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008), S.C., 493 Mass. 1037

(2024) (even if expert gang testimony "constituted . . .

improper opinion evidence[,] . . . any error was harmless

because . . . other witnesses testified from personal knowledge

essentially to the same effect").

G. Appeal to jury's sympathy. The victim's father

testified that his son cared for the son's sick mother, that he

was devastated when he received a telephone call about his son's

shooting, and that it was a heart-wrenching decision to "pull

the plug" on his son. The emergency room physician testified at

length to the gruesome details of the victim's injuries and to

the attempted life-saving measures used on the victim. The

prosecutor compared the victim's fatal gunshot wound with the

defendant's slighter wound to the arm during the nightclub

42

shooting,35 and referred to the victim as an "unarmed twenty-two

year old non-gang member."

"It is well settled that a prosecutor may not appeal to the

jury's sympathy." Commonwealth v. Doughty, 491 Mass. 788, 797

(2023). In particular, a prosecutor may not "emphasize

'personal characteristics [that] are not relevant to any

material issue,' if such emphasis would 'risk[] undermining the

rationality and thus the integrity of the jury's verdict.'"

Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 791

(2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022). However, a

prosecutor may "tell the jury something of the person whose life

had been lost in order to humanize the proceedings." Doughty,

supra at 798, quoting Fernandes, supra.

Here, failure to object to the prosecutor's reference to

the victim as an "unarmed twenty-two year old non-gang member"

was not error because, as the judge noted, the prosecutor "did

not excessively highlight" this fact. See Commonwealth v.

Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 471-472 (2022) (no error in prosecutor's

statement that victim was an "unarmed, defenseless sixteen year

35Regarding the defendant's wound stemming from the

nightclub shooting, the prosecutor asked the defendant on cross-

examination, "You knew you weren't struck in the head?"; "No

bullet entered the left side of your skull and exited the right

side of your skull, did it?"; and "You were determined a

Priority 3 to the hospital . . . [b]ecause you were shot in the

arm?"

43

old" because it was true in fact and referenced sparingly).

However, excessive appeals to sympathy that did not pertain to

any material issue at trial -- such as the victim taking care of

his mother, the father's experience of the victim's death, and

the physician's extensive lifesaving efforts –- were improper.

See Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 211-212 (2022)

(testimony of victim's son detailing victim's work ethic and

relationship with son improper); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425

Mass. 491, 497 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39,

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998) (testimony of victim's sister

discussing her "own experience concerning the victim's death"

improper). The physician's gruesome description of the victim's

wounds and the prosecutor's comparisons between the victim's and

the defendant's injuries were also improper because they did not

serve the Commonwealth's theory that the defendant killed with

deliberate premeditation. See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472

Mass. 587, 608 (2015) (prosecutor's description of crime scene

as "[a] blood pool, a puddle of blood . . . seeping out of [the

victim's] body" improper). Cf. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493

Mass. 303, 317-318 (2024) ("description of the extent of the

victim's injuries did not amount to error" because, unlike here,

prosecutor proceeded on theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty).

Nonetheless, trial counsel's failure to object to these

improprieties did not create a substantial likelihood of a

44

miscarriage of justice because, inter alia, they did not

unfairly discredit the defendant's theory of self-defense. See

Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 213 (no substantial likelihood of

miscarriage of justice where "the improper statements did not go

to the heart of the defense strategy and were irrelevant to any

disputed issue of fact"). In addition, the judge instructed the

jury that they may not decide the case based "on sympathy for

any party, or witness, or anyone else." See Camacho, 472 Mass.

at 609 (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice

where judge instructed jury "not to be swayed by . . . sympathy"

and "jury have the ability to discount hyperbole and other

improper statements" [citation omitted]). The strong evidence

of the defendant's guilt, as discussed in note 21, supra,

further renders the "improper appeals to sympathy . . . less

crucial." Fernandes, 487 Mass. at 791, quoting Commonwealth v.

Kent K., 427 Mass. 754, 761 (1998). See Doughty, 491 Mass. at

799.

H. Delayed disclosures. While the defendant claims that

trial counsel erred by not objecting to the prosecutor's delayed

disclosures,36 as discussed supra, the disclosures did not likely

influence the jury's verdict.

As discussed supra, trial counsel objected to the

36

admission of the social media posts.

45

I. Cumulative error. The defendant contends that, even if

no single error created a substantial likelihood of a

miscarriage of justice, they do in sum. We disagree. As

discussed supra, the evidence of the defendant's deliberate

premeditation was strong.

d. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. For the same reason,

we discern no basis for providing relief under G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E, to reduce the defendant's verdict.

4. Conclusion. The defendant's conviction of murder in

the first degree is affirmed. The order denying the defendant's

motion for a new trial is also affirmed.

So ordered.