Opinion

Schneider v. Attorney General Page v. Attorney General

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Filed
Jun 27, 2024
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.0%

The opinion

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SJC-13609

SJC-13610

JOHN SCHNEIDER & others1 vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL & another.2

MAX PAGE & others3 vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL & another.4

Suffolk. May 22, 2024. - June 27, 2024.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges,

& Wolohojian, JJ.

Initiative. Constitutional Law, Initiative petition. Attorney

General. Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System

Examination.

Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for

the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2024.

The case was reported by Wolohojian, J.

1 Sixty-eight registered voters of the Commonwealth. We

refer to Schneider and the additional sixty-eight voters in case

no. SJC-13609 collectively as the Schneider plaintiffs.

2 Secretary of the Commonwealth.

3 Sixty-five registered voters of the Commonwealth. We

refer to Page and the additional sixty-five voters in case no.

SJC-13610 collectively as the Page plaintiffs.

4 Secretary of the Commonwealth.

2

Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for

the county of Suffolk on May 9, 2024.

The case was reported by Wolohojian, J.

The cases were submitted on briefs.

Henry C. Dinger for John Scneider & others.

Sarah K. Grossnickle, of Maine, & Thomas O. Bean for Max

Page & others.

Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, Anne Sterman &

Phoebe Fischer-Groban, Assistant Attorneys General, for the

defendants.

Frank J. Bailey, John C. La Liberte, & Nicholas M.

O'Donnell, for Pioneer Public Interest Law Center & others,

amici curiae.

WOLOHOJIAN, J. The plaintiffs in these paired cases

challenge, pursuant to G. L. c. 54, § 53, the title and one-

sentence "yes/no" statements prepared by the Attorney General

and the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) with respect

to Initiative Petition 23-36, "A Law Requiring that Districts

Certify that Students Have Mastered the Skills, Competencies and

Knowledge of the State Standards as a Replacement for the MCAS

Graduation Requirement" (petition). Although they give

different reasons, both sets of plaintiffs argue that the title

and the one-sentence statements are "false, misleading or

inconsistent with the requirements of" § 53, and ask that we

3

amend them. We conclude that the title and one-sentence

statements satisfy § 53, and accordingly deny the relief sought.5

Background.6 Under our existing law, students attending

public schools and students educated with State funds must

satisfy a "competency determination" as a condition for high

school graduation. See G. L. c. 69, § 1D (i); Student No. 9 v.

Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 758 (2004). Competency, in turn,

is measured by a student's performance on what are known as the

Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) tests. See

G. L. c. 69, §§ 1D (i), 1I; 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 30.03 (2022).

5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Pioneer

Interest Law Center, Michael Contompasis, and James A.

Caradonio.

6 The Page plaintiffs and Schneider plaintiffs filed their

complaints in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County on

May 9 and 16, 2024, respectively. A single justice paired,

reserved, and reported the two cases for consideration by the

full court.

Both complaints were timely filed within twenty days of

publication of the title and one-sentence statements, which did

not occur until April 26, 2024. See G. L. c. 54, § 53.

"[B]ecause we make every effort to resolve ballot cases before

the voter information guide and ballots are sent for printing in

early July," Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 671-672

(2016), we find ourselves once again put in the undesirable

position of deciding a § 53 challenge at the "proverbial

eleventh hour." See id. We reiterate our request that the

Attorney General and Secretary "consider preparing and

publishing the title and one-sentence statements under § 53 no

later than twenty days in advance of February 1 of the election

year" so that "challenges brought under the statute [can]

proceed in the normal course, at a more orderly pace, and not,

as here, at the proverbial eleventh hour." Id.

4

The one-paragraph petition proposes redefining competency

by ending MCAS tests as the relevant measure and, instead,

requiring a student to

"satisfactorily complet[e] coursework that has been

certified by the student's district as showing mastery of

the skills, competencies, and knowledge contained in the

state academic standards and curriculum frameworks in the

areas measured by the MCAS high school tests . . . , and in

any additional areas determined by the board."

Pursuant to art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts

Constitution, the Attorney General certified the petition and

prepared the following summary of its provisions:

"This proposed law would eliminate the requirement that a

student pass the [MCAS] tests (or other statewide or

district-wide assessments) in mathematics, science and

technology, and English in order to receive a high school

diploma. Instead, in order for a student to receive a high

school diploma, the proposed law would require the student

to complete coursework certified by the student's district

as demonstrating mastery of the competencies contained in

the state academic standards in mathematics, science and

technology, and English, as well as any additional areas

determined by the Board of Elementary and Secondary

Education."

No one (whether the plaintiffs here or any other set of voters)

has challenged either the Attorney General's certification or

her summary.

Thereafter, the Attorney General and Secretary published in

the Massachusetts Register the ballot question title and one-

sentence statements that are at issue in this case. They state

as follows:

5

Title: "Elimination of MCAS as High School Graduation

Requirement."

"Yes" one-sentence statement: "A YES VOTE would eliminate

the requirement that students pass the [MCAS] in order to

graduate high school but still require students to complete

coursework that meets state standards."

"No" one-sentence statement: "A NO VOTE would make no

change in the law relative to the requirement that a

student pass the MCAS in order to graduate high school."

The one-sentence statements are slated to appear on the November

Statewide election ballot together with the petition and the

Attorney General's summary. See G. L. c. 54, § 42A. They will

also appear, together with the title, petition, summary, and

other information, in the Information for Voters guide mailed to

voters. See G. L. c. 54, §§ 53, 54.

Discussion. General Laws c. 54, § 53, in relevant part,

instructs the Attorney General and Secretary to prepare jointly

"a ballot question title" and "fair and neutral [one]-sentence

statements describing the effect of a yes or no vote." Section

53 allows any fifty voters to file a petition seeking to have

the title or statements be amended. G. L. c. 54, § 53.

However, such relief will be granted "only if it is clear" that

the title or one-sentence statements are "false," "misleading,"

or otherwise "inconsistent with the requirements of [§ 53]".

Id. "[W]e afford deference to 'the Attorney General's and the

Secretary['s] reasonable judgments in deciding what to include

in the [title and the] one-sentence statements." Anderson v.

6

Attorney Gen., 490 Mass. 26, 34 (2022), quoting Dunn v. Attorney

Gen., 474 Mass. 675, 688 n.12 (2016). "Such deference is

entirely appropriate, given the challenge of creating a title

that fairly characterizes a sometimes complex petition and of

drafting a single sentence that fairly and neutrally describes

the consequence of a 'yes' or 'no' vote regarding such a

petition." Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 668 (2016).

The crux of the arguments advanced by both sets of

plaintiffs is that the title and one-sentence statements are

misleading because they are incomplete. The Page plaintiffs

argue that the title and one-sentence "yes" statement are

misleadingly incomplete because they mention only that the

petition will eliminate MCAS as a graduation requirement,

without also stating that MCAS would be replaced with something

else. They accordingly ask that we make the amendments set out

in the margin.7 The Schneider plaintiffs assert that the title

and one-sentence statements are misleadingly incomplete because,

by referencing only the elimination of MCAS as a graduation

7 The Page plaintiffs ask us to substitute the term

"elimination" with the term "replacement" in the title and to

amend the one-sentence "yes" statement to be as follows: "A YES

VOTE would require that for a student to graduate high school,

the school district must determine that the student

satisfactorily completed coursework certified by the district as

demonstrating mastery of state curriculum standards instead of

passing the MCAS."

7

requirement, they do not disclose that the petition would

prohibit the use of any uniform Statewide assessment as a

graduation requirement. The Schneider plaintiffs' proposed

amendments also appear in the margin.8

We assess these arguments keeping in mind that the title

and the one-sentence statements generally "'cannot, and should

not, attempt to describe all the elements of a proposed measure'

because 'that would undermine their usefulness as a shorthand

reference for voters'" (alteration omitted). Anderson, 490

Mass. at 34, quoting Dunn, 474 Mass. at 688 n.12. Instead, they

are designed to be concise, and "conciseness and completeness

are often incompatible." Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,

320 Mass. 230, 243 (1946). In determining whether a title or

one-sentence statement is misleadingly incomplete, we consider

it "in the context of the other information that will be

furnished to voters in the information guide prepared by the

Secretary and on the ballot." Hensley, 474 Mass. at 669. An

incomplete title or one-sentence statement is clearly misleading

only where, in the context of other information provided to

voters, its incompleteness results in a significant

8 The Schneider plaintiffs ask us to substitute the term

"MCAS" with "any uniform statewide assessment" in both the title

and one-sentence statements.

8

mischaracterization of the petition's substance. See, e.g., id.

at 668-669.

Here, the short petition addresses a single regulatory

issue (high school graduation requirements), and the title and

one-sentence statements accurately characterize what the

petition proposes to do (eliminate MCAS tests as a graduation

requirement). It is true, as the plaintiffs point out, that the

petition would also (i) replace the MCAS requirement with a new

assessment scheme and (ii) prohibit any future Statewide

assessment from being used as a graduation requirement. But

these are not distinct regulatory features of the petition. The

title and one-sentence statements do not need to describe every

feature of the petition. See Hensley, 474 Mass. at 669 n.28

(even though petition would also legalize, regulate, and tax

"hashish" and "food products with tetrahydrocannabinol [THC],"

title did not need to reference these products). Here, we defer

to the Attorney General and Secretary's reasonable decision that

the information did not need to be included. See Anderson, 490

Mass. at 34. And we see no risk that the missing information

would mislead voters given that the short, one-paragraph

petition, and the Attorney General's equally short and concise

one-paragraph summary, explicitly and clearly explain the

details of the petition and provide context for the title and

one-sentence statements.

9

The features of the petition omitted from the title and

one-sentence statements here are not analogous to the

information missing from the title that gave us concern in

Hensley. See Hensley, 474 Mass. at 668-669. There, the

petition contained a long and complicated scheme that had three

distinct regulatory features: the legalization of marijuana,

its regulation, and its taxation. Id. at 669. The title,

however, referred only to "Marijuana Legalization," and we

accordingly concluded that it was clearly misleading because it

did not include reference to the two other major features of the

petition. Id. At the same time, Hensley teaches that not all

omissions from a title or one-sentence statement are clearly

misleading. For example, we concluded that the title did not

need to include the term "adult use," reasoning that an average

voter would reasonably understand that the legalization of

marijuana would not extend to people under the age of twenty-

one.9 See id. at 669 n.28. Here, as we have already noted, what

are omitted from the title and one-sentence statements are not

distinct regulatory features of the petition.

We now turn to two additional arguments forwarded by the

Page plaintiffs. First, the Page plaintiffs argue that the one-

We used "average voter" in Hensley as shorthand for the

9

objective inquiry of whether voters would be clearly misled by

an omission in the title.

10

sentence "yes" statement is misleading because it does not

explicitly state that the new proposed assessments standard

would be a graduation requirement. Under the Page plaintiffs'

reading, the "yes" statement categorizes the assessments

standard as a general academic requirement rather than as a

graduation requirement. We are not persuaded. The petition

itself only addresses graduation requirements, and thus the one-

sentence "yes" statement is reasonably understood as referencing

graduation requirements.

Second, the Page plaintiffs argue that the word "still" in

the one-sentence "yes" statement incorrectly implies that

students are required under current law to complete coursework

meeting State standards to graduate high school, and that the

statement accordingly fails to explain that such coursework

would be a replacement graduation requirement under the proposed

law. This argument depends on accepting the Page plaintiffs'

contention that "still" is used to mean "continually." But a

natural reading of the one-sentence statement makes clear that

the term "still" is used to mean "nevertheless." Merriam-

Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com

/dictionary/still [https://perma.cc/8T9P-83E9]. Thus, contrary

to the Page plaintiffs' contention, the "yes" statement explains

that the petition would replace the MCAS graduation requirement.

11

Conclusion. The matter is remanded to the county court for

entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General and

Secretary's title and one-sentence statements describing the

effects of a "yes" vote and a "no" vote are in compliance with

the requirements of G. L. c. 54, § 53.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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