The opinion
[Cite as Hamblin v. Trustees of St. Clair Twp., 2024-Ohio-2525.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
MICHAEL HAMBLIN, :
Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2024-02-035
: OPINION
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:
TRUSTEES OF ST. CLAIR TOWNSHIP, :
Appellee. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CV 2021 12 1894
Freking Myers & Reul, LLC, and Niroshan M. Wijesooriya, for appellant.
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin J. Gerrity, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
S. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Michael Hamblin, appeals the decision of the Butler County Court
of Common Pleas denying his motion for relief from judgment brought pursuant to Civ.R.
60(A), (B)(1) and (5). For the reasons outlined below, and when properly construing
Hamblin's motion for relief from judgment as a motion for reconsideration, we reverse the
common pleas court's decision and remand this matter to the common pleas court for
Butler CA2024-02-035
further proceedings.
{¶ 2} On December 16, 2021, Hamblin filed with the common pleas court a notice
of appeal from an administrative decision of appellee, the Board of Township Trustees of
St. Clair Township, terminating his employment with the St. Clair Township-New Miami
Life Squad effective July 12, 2021. This appeal followed a two-day termination hearing
held on September 13, and November 22, 2021, upon which a final decision was made
to terminate Hamblin's employment pursuant to the St. Clair Township-New Miami Life
Squad's standard operating procedures. Hamblin filed his appeal with the common pleas
court pursuant to R.C. 505.38(A), a statute that allows firefighters to appeal their
termination to the court.1
{¶ 3} On January 10, 2022, Hamblin's original attorney, Jeffrey Silverstein, filed
his notice of appearance with the common pleas court. Approximately two months later,
on March 9, 2022, Hamblin's backup attorney, Niroshan Wijesooriya, also filed his notice
of appearance with the common pleas court. There is no dispute that Attorney
Wijesooriya was added due to concerns regarding Attorney Silverstein's ability to remain
on the case following an emergency health scare that required Attorney Silverstein's
hospitalization. There is also no dispute that, at all times relevant, Attorneys Silverstein
and Wijesooriya were employed with the same law firm, one in the firm's Dayton office
and the other in the firm's Cincinnati office.
{¶ 4} On March 25, 2022, the common pleas court scheduled the matter for a
status report hearing to take place on the morning of April 28, 2022. A clerk attempted to
send notice of that hearing to both Attorneys Silverstein and Wijesooriya at their
respective law offices via ordinary mail. However, as the record indicates, both mailing
1. The parties disagree as to whether Hamblin was employed with the St. Clair Township-New Miami Life
Squad as a firefighter or merely as a paramedic.
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addresses that the clerk used to send that notice to Attorneys Silverstein's and
Wijesooriya's respective offices were incorrect. Nevertheless, the record indicates that
the clerk also emailed the notice to Attorney Wijesooriya at his office email address and
that, upon Attorney Wijesooriya's receipt of that email, Attorney Wijesooriya forwarded it
on to a paralegal within his office to review.
{¶ 5} On April 8, 2022, Hamblin moved the common pleas court for leave to file
instanter a motion requesting the court grant him permission to file additional evidence in
support of his appeal. Ten days later, on April 18, 2022, a common pleas court magistrate
issued an order granting Hamblin his requested leave. In so doing, the magistrate noted
that the court would consider whether Hamblin's motion seeking permission to file
additional evidence in support of his appeal as if it had been properly filed. The magistrate
also noted that the board had seven days in which to respond to Hamblin's motion
requesting permission to file that additional evidence.
{¶ 6} On April 28, 2022, neither of Hamblin's two attorneys, Attorney Silverstein
or Attorney Wijesooriya, appeared before the common pleas court for that morning's
status report hearing. Counsel for the board, however, did. The record does not contain
a transcript of what transpired at this hearing. The record does indicate, however, that
counsel for the board moved to have Hamblin's appeal dismissed for want of prosecution
under Civ.R. 41(B)(1).
{¶ 7} On May 10, 2022, and seemingly in response to the board's motion, the
common pleas court issued an order summarily dismissing Hamblin's appeal "without
prejudice" for want of prosecution. Eight days later, on May 18, 2022, Hamblin filed a
motion for relief from the common pleas court's judgment of dismissal. Rather than as a
motion for reconsideration, Hamblin instead filed his motion pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A),
(B)(1) and (5).
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{¶ 8} To support his motion, Hamblin initially argued that he was entitled to relief
because, had notice of the court's upcoming status report hearing simply been mailed to
Attorneys Silverstein's and Wijesooriya's correct addresses, "it is possible that the staff in
Mr. Silverstein's office would have calendared the April 28, 2022 [hearing] and it would
have been added to Mr. Wijesooriya's calendar." Hamblin also argued, in pertinent part,
the following:
Mr. Wijesooriya received an email from the clerk of court's
office asking him to update his address, with the Notice of the
4/28/2[2] Report date attached. Mr. Wijesooriya forwarded
the email to a paralegal in the office who filed a Notice of
Appearance, but failed to register the Report date in the
Notice, and thus failed to add it to his calendar.
{¶ 9} Hamblin argued that this "oversight" was nothing more than "human error"
that should be excused under these circumstances. Hamblin also argued that the
interests of justice and fairness required the common pleas court to provide him with relief
from its judgment of dismissal by reinstating his appeal so that it could be decided on the
merits. The common pleas court failed to issue a decision on Hamblin's motion for several
months. Given this delay, on October 31, 2022, Hamblin refiled his administrative appeal
with the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 505.38.
{¶ 10} On August 30, 2023, the common pleas court dismissed Hamblin's refiled
appeal upon finding it was not timely filed as required by either R.C. 505.38 or 2505.07.
Within that decision, the court seemingly determined that its decision dismissing
Hamblin's originally filed appeal "without prejudice" was an "oxymoron and inoperative"
based on the Eighth District Court of Appeals' decision in McCann v. Lakewood, 95 Ohio
App.3d 226, 231-233 (8th Dist. 1994). By separate entry issued contemporaneously with
this opinion, Hamblin's appeal of that decision has been dismissed as moot. See Hamblin
v. Board of Township Trustees of St. Clair Township, 12th Dist. No. CA2023-09-110 (July
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1, 2024) (Accelerated Calendar Judgment Entry).
{¶ 11} On February 2, 2024, nearly two years after Hamblin had filed his motion
for relief from the court's judgment of dismissal, the common pleas court issued an entry
denying Hamblin's motion. The court issued this entry approximately one week after
Hamblin had petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus and/or a writ of procedendo to
compel the court to issue a decision on his motion for relief from judgment brought
pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A), (B)(1) and (5). In its entry, the common pleas court noted that
Hamblin had admitted within his motion that Attorney Wijesooriya had received notice via
email of the April 28, 2022 status report hearing. The court also noted that, despite having
already dismissed Hamblin's refiled appeal as untimely, because the dismissal of
Hamblin's originally filed appeal was purportedly done "without prejudice," Hamblin was
"free to re file [his] case" once he was ready and able to proceed on the matter, something
that Hamblin had, in fact, done on October 31, 2022.
{¶ 12} On February 29, 2024, Hamblin filed a timely notice of appeal from the
common pleas court's February 2, 2024 decision. Following briefing from both parties,
oral argument took place before this court on June 3, 2024. Hamblin's appeal now
properly before this court for decision, Hamblin has raised the following single assignment
of error for review.
{¶ 13} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S CIV.R. 60
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.
{¶ 14} Hamblin argues the common pleas court erred by denying his motion for
relief from judgment brought pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A), (B)(1) and (5). However, before
addressing Hamblin's specific argument, we must first determine whether Ohio's Rules
of Civil Procedure are applicable to administrative appeals like the one brought by
Hamblin in this case. For the reasons outlined below, and insofar as it relates to motions
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for relief from judgment brought pursuant to either Civ.R. 60(A) or (B), we find that they
are not.
{¶ 15} R.C. 2506.04 provides that, in an administrative appeal, "[t]he judgment of
the court may be appealed by any party on questions of law as provided in the Rules of
Appellate Procedure" and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, R.C. Chapter 2505.
Thus, given the plain language of the statute, neither Civ.R. 60(A) nor (B) provide an
alternative method to challenge the court's judgment other than appealing the matter to
the appropriate court of appeals. This is because, when conducting its review of
administrative matters, the common pleas court is sitting as an appellate court tasked
with weighing the evidence and determining whether the administrative decision being
appealed is "unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported
by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole
record." R.C. 2506.04.
{¶ 16} "The Civil Rules apply to all legal proceedings except 'special statutory'
proceedings where they are 'clearly inapplicable.'" Gordon v. Mt. Carmel Farms, LLC,
2024-Ohio-1313, ¶ 37 (12th Dist.), quoting Civ.R. 1(C). "An administrative appeal filed
pursuant to statute is a special statutory proceeding." Middlebrook v. United Collection
Bureau, Inc., 2017-Ohio-8587, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). Moreover, as noted by the Ohio Supreme
Court, "[an] administrative appeal is more akin to an appeal than a trial." AT&T
Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch, 2012-Ohio-1975, ¶ 14. Therefore, because
neither Civ.R. 60(A) nor (B) apply in administrative appeals such as this, it was improper
for Hamblin to style his motion as a Civ.R. 60 motion for relief from judgment. What
Hamblin intended to file, and what the common pleas court should have construed
Hamblin's motion as, was a motion for reconsideration.
{¶ 17} Generally, motions for reconsideration in the common pleas court are a
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nullity. See Pitts v. Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 380 (1981). However, as noted
above, "the rules of Appellate Procedure can be applied to administrative appeals when
they are relevant and not in conflict with Chapter 2505 of the Revised Code." Miller v.
Sts. Peter & Paul School, 126 Ohio App.3d 762, 764 (11th Dist. 1998); but see
Breckenridge v. Ohio State Bd. of Nursing, 2010-Ohio-3291, ¶ 5-9 (10th Dist.) (rejecting
the notion that motions for reconsideration may be entertained by a common pleas court
on appeal from an administrative decision); and Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals v.
Abrams, 2010-Ohio-1058, ¶ 18-30 (8th Dist.) (same). Therefore, because the common
pleas court was not functioning as a trial court in this instance, but was instead sitting as
an appellate court when reviewing Hamblin's administrative appeal, the court could have,
and should have, considered Hamblin's motion for relief from judgment as if it were a
motion for reconsideration under App.R. 26(A)(1)(a). See generally State ex rel. Andrews
v. Chardon Police Dept., 2013-Ohio-4772, ¶ 3 ("[a] request for reconsideration of a
judgment rendered by an appellate court in an original action is a nullity because App.R.
26(A) is inapplicable").
{¶ 18} Pursuant to App.R. 26(A)(1)(a), "[a]pplication for reconsideration of any
cause or motion submitted on appeal shall be made in writing no later than ten days after
the clerk has both mailed to the parties the judgment or order in question and made a
note on the docket of the mailing as required by App.R. 30(A)." Hamblin filed his motion
on May 18, 2022, eight days after the common pleas court issued its judgment of
dismissal, thereby rendering Hamblin's motion for reconsideration timely filed. We review
the denial of a timely filed motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Carlson
v. Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio-591, ¶ 39 (1st Dist.). "An abuse of discretion connotes more
than an error of law or judgment; it implies the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily,
or unconscionably." Bowman v. Leisz, 2014-Ohio-4763, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.), citing
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Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 19} Upon review of the record and—limited to the unique facts and
circumstances presented in this case—we find the common pleas court abused its
discretion by denying Hamblin's motion for reconsideration. To hold otherwise would
divest Hamblin of the opportunity to have his appeal decided on the merits rather than
based upon a fluke happenstance where a single hearing date was not included on
Attorney Wijesooriya's calendar. Such a harsh penalty is not warranted in this case. This
is particularly true here when considering it was the common pleas court's original intent,
given the court dismissed Hamblin's original appeal "without prejudice," to have Hamblin
simply refile his case once he was ready and able to proceed on the matter. In reaching
this decision, we note that the Ohio Supreme Court has "long recognized the fundamental
tenet of judicial review in Ohio that courts should decide cases on the merits." State ex
rel. Montgomery v. R & D Chem. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 202, 204 (1995). This is because
"[f]airness and justice are best served when a court disposes of a case on the merits."
DeHart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 189, 193 (1982). Therefore, under the unique
facts and circumstances presented in this case, and in the interests of fairness of justice,
we sustain Hamblin's single assignment of error and reverse and remand this matter to
the common pleas court for further proceedings.
{¶ 20} Judgment reversed and remanded.
HENDRICKSON and PIPER, JJ., concur.
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