abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), to the extent the Court concluded therein that a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief”
How later courts described this case
- abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), to the extent the Court concluded therein that a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief”
- “[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss”
- explaining that “[w]e examine only the allegations within the four corners of the complaint”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
BRENT ALAN ETHRIDGE, §
(TDCJ No. 02406773), §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-469-O
§
TARRANT COUNTY §
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
OPINION and ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Now pending is the motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and
incorporated brief filed by remaining defendants Aaron Shaw, D.O. (“Shaw”) and Physician’s
Assistant Heather Johnson (“Johnson”) (collectively “Defendants”). Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 22.
Plaintiff Brent Alan Ethridge (“Ethridge”) has not filed any response. After considering the
remaining claims for relief asserted by Ethridge, the record, the briefing and the applicable law,
the Court finds that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be GRANTED, and that all Plaintiff
Ethridge’s remaining claims against Shaw and Johnson must be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
Ethridge is a former Tarrant County Jail inmate and current inmate in a Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) unit. While at the Tarrant County Jail, Ethridge was
assigned to work in the kitchen cleaning pots and pans. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1; More Definite
Statement (“MDS”) 1, ECF No. 9. While working, Ethridge injured his finger. MDS 1, ECF No.
9. He sued Shaw and Johnson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he was dissatisfied with delays in
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his medical treatment. The Court has already dismissed Ethridge’s claims and causes of actions
against other defendants, and his causes of action to the extent they are asserted against Shaw
and Johnson in their official capacities. Op. and Order 10-11, ECF No. 11.
B. Factual Allegations
Ethridge alleges facts in both his complaint and more definite statement as set forth
below. Ethridge was incarcerated in the Tarrant County Jail, where he worked in the kitchen
cleaning pots and pans. Compl. 3, ECF No. 9. Around 4 p.m. on November 21, 2021, his left
ring finger was broken when a heavy pan hit his hand. MDS 3, ECF No. 9. He reported his injury
to corrections officers, who told him that they called medical but that “medical was busy.” Id. at
2. He was sent to medical the following morning, on November 22, 2021 around 10 a.m. Id. at 3.
He received x-rays and, around 8 p.m., he was seen by Dr. Sara Haynes, an orthopedist. Id. Dr.
Haynes told Ethridge she would prescribe Ibuprofen to reduce his swelling and pain. Id. Ethridge
did not receive the medication until he met with Johnson on November 24, 2021, who prescribed
Tylenol and Ibuprofen. Id. According to Ethridge, Johnson “would not allow” him to get
Ibuprofen prescribed by Dr. Haynes until he was seen by Johnson. Id. at 4.
Dr. Shaw is the Medical Director of Tarrant County Jail and “is generally in charge of
ensuring provision of medical care to prisoners and specifically for scheduling appointments
outside Greenbay facility.” Id. at 4. Ethridge complains that, when a corrections officer called
medical to report his emergency medical need, he “should have been seen for a minimum or
triage and evaluation of [his] injury.” Id.
Ethridge underwent surgery relating to his injury on December 6, 2021. Compl. 15, ECF
No. 1. Ethridge also alleges that, on two occasions after his surgery, Shaw and Johnson did not
“follow the orthopedic surgeon’s plan of care by not updating or approving [Plaintiff’s]
medications for the nerve damage to [his] finger caused by the incision from the surgery.” MDS
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6, ECF No. 9. Ethridge alleges that he “was in severe pain that could have been prevented by
updating my medications in a timely manner.” Id.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Applicable Law
1. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) is generally viewed with disfavor. Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247
(5th Cir.1997). The court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461
(5th Cir. 2010) (citing True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)). Rule 12 must be
interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim
for relief in federal court and calls for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court cannot look beyond the face of the
pleadings in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty, Sch. Dist.,
649 F.3d 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[w]e examine only the allegations within the
four corners of the complaint”), aff’d on rehearing en banc, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012). A
plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal.
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1431 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also Taylor v. Books A
Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss”) (citation
omitted)). Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the
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plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and his
“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), to the extent
the Court concluded therein that a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss “unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would
entitle him to relief”). Then, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified that review of a
12(b)(6) motion is guided by two principles: (1) a court must apply the presumption of
truthfulness only to factual matters and not to legal conclusions; and (2) only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-
680. If the pleadings fail to meet the requirements of Iqbal and Twombly no viable claim is stated
and the pleadings are subject to dismissal.
B. ANALYSIS
Ethridge’s § 1983 cause of action against Shaw is based on his allegations that (1) he did
not receive medical care on the afternoon or evening following his injury, and (2) Shaw failed to
timely approve his medications consistent with the post-operative plan of care. MDS 4, 6. ECF
No. 9. Ethridge’s § 1983 cause of action against Johnson is based on his allegations that (1) she
would not allow him to get Ibuprofen prescribed by Dr. Haynes until after he met with her, and
(2) she, like Dr. Shaw, failed to timely approve his medications consistent with the post-
operative plan of care. Id.
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After review and consideration of the combined motion to dismiss of Shaw and Johnson,
the Court finds and determines that the motion to dismiss must be granted for the alternative
reasons set forth. First, Ethridge has failed to allege facts to support a claim that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs for the alternative reasons presented in the motion to
dismiss at section 1 (A) through (C). Furthermore, Defendants have shown that they are entitled
to qualified immunity because Ethrdige has failed to ultimately plead a constitutional or statutory
violation, and because he has not shown that either Defendant violated a right that was clearly
established, as set forth in the motion to dismiss at section 2(A) and (B) .
III. ORDER
It is therefore ORDERED that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) of defendants Shaw and Johnson (ECF No. 22) is GRANTED, such that all
plaintiff Brent Alan Ethridge’s remaining claims against Shaw and Johnson are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED on this 19th day of April, 2023.
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