The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
DARE MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 4:22-CV-0471-P
E. GREEN, ET AL.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Stephanie Springer’s (ECF No. 38)
and Defendant E. Green’s (ECF No. 41) motions to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because Plaintiff Dare
Matthews fails to state a claim against either defendant, the Court
DISMISSES the case.
BACKGROUND
Parsing out Matthews’s disorganized complaint, Matthews trained
at a mixed martial arts gym owned by Springer and her husband. ECF
No. 35 at 4–7. Soon after joining the gym, Matthews left the gym because
Springer communicated that the clothes that Matthews wore to the gym
were inappropriate. Id. at 6. One month later, Springer called the police
and reported Matthews for following the gym owners around town. Id.
at 7. Matthews then hired an attorney to send Springer a letter asking
her to stop “harassing” Matthews. Id.
A few months later, Springer posted a message on social media
“blast[ing]” Matthews and calling her “crazy, nuts, [and] deranged.” Id.
at 8. Matthews and Springer exchanged several profanity-laced emails.
Id. at 8–19. Springer then reported Matthews to the Arlington Police
Department, alleging that Matthews was “harass[ing]” her family and
took pictures of Springer’s minor daughter. Id. at 8–9.
Green—a detective for the Arlington Police Department—was
assigned to the case and allegedly listened to Springer’s reports without
doing his due diligence in assessing whether the reports were true. Id.
at 8–17. For example, Springer told Green that Matthews had taken
pictures of Springer’s minor daughter and sent them to her. Id. at 21.
But Matthews asserts that the images and videos that she sent to
Springer were publicly posted by Springer’s daughter to the daughter’s
various social media accounts. Id.; see also id. at 21–23, 28–32. Green
used this allegedly false information to file an affidavit supporting an
arrest warrant. Id. at 25. The magistrate judge then issued an arrest
warrant based on that affidavit. Id.
After obtaining the arrest warrant, the Arlington Police Department
left a note on Matthews’s porch, stating that Matthews would be
arrested. Id. The next day, Matthews went to the police department and
was later detained for 18 months, despite having a “waiver” issued by a
judge.1 Id. Matthews therefore contends that Green’s lack of due
diligence in determining the veracity of Springer’s reports ultimately led
to her arrest. Id.
While detained, Matthews was required to undergo unwanted
medical care, given unsanitary clothing, locked in a bathroom for 18
hours while giving a urine sample, and forced to agree not to possess a
firearm and drink alcohol when she was released from jail. Id. at 25–26.
Matthews sued Springer, Green, and the State of Texas under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. ECF No. 35. Matthews’s complaint fails to
clearly delineate her causes of action and against whom each claim is
asserted. Id. at 32–35. To the extent that the Court can parse out her
claims, she alleges that, in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
(1) Green caused Matthews to be arrested without probable cause (id. at
32); (2) Green caused her to be “prosecuted without probable cause” in
violation of state law and the Constitution (id. at 34); and (3) Green and
Springer conspired to cause Matthews to be maliciously prosecuted (id.).
1 The complaint is imprecise regarding what the “waiver” would do, but Matthews
insinuates that the waiver should have prevented her detainment. ECF No. 35 at 25.
In violation of state law, Matthews asserts that (1) Springer caused
Matthews to be falsely imprisoned (id. at 35); (2) Springer caused
Matthews to be assaulted (id.); and (3) Springer’s social media posts
constitute slander and libel (id.). Matthews also seeks a “declaratory
judgement [sic] that the Texas harassment statute is [u]nconstitutional
both facially and as applied to [Matthews].” Id. Springer and Green each
move to dismiss. ECF Nos. 38 (Springer), 41 (Green).
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). The Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, drawing all
inference in favor of and viewing all facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194
(5th Cir. 2009).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“Section 1983 provides a claim against anyone who ‘under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State’
violates another’s constitutional rights.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d
631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “To state a [§] 1983
claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation omitted).
C. Qualified Immunity
Green asserts qualified immunity, which “shield[s] [government
officials] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). When a defendant asserts the qualified immunity
defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that (1) he alleged a
violation of a constitutional right, and (2) “the defendant’s conduct was
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time
of the incident.” Waltman v. Payne, 535 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
A. The State of Texas as Defendant
As an initial matter, the Court addresses Matthews’s declaratory
judgment claim against the State of Texas. A plaintiff must serve a
defendant within 90 days after a complaint is filed. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
If a plaintiff fails to do so, the Court “must dismiss the action without
prejudice against that defendant.” Id.
Matthews never served the State of Texas. See ECF Nos. 6, 7, 12.
And more than 90 days have passed since she filed this suit. See ECF
No. 1. Therefore, the Court dismisses Matthews’s claims against the
State without prejudice—including the declaratory-judgment action—
given that Matthews has not shown good cause for her failure to timely
serve the State of Texas.
B. Claims Against Stephanie Springer
1. Federal Claim
Matthews asserts that Springer violated the Fourth Amendment by
conspiring with Green to cause Matthews to be arrested and maliciously
prosecuted without probable cause. ECF No. 35 at 32–34. According to
Matthews, this is actionable under § 1983. Matthews is incorrect.
Matthews sued Springer, a private citizen, in her individual capacity.
See ECF No. 35. “A private party will be considered a state actor for
§ 1983 purposes only in rare circumstances,” Gordon v. Neugebauer, 57
F. Supp. 3d 766, 773 (N.D. Tex. 2014), such as when “the challenged
conduct may be fairly attributable to the State,” Bass v. Parkwood
Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999).
Matthews pleaded no facts indicating that Springer’s actions could
be “fairly attributable to” the State. See id. And, tellingly, Matthews
neglected to address this issue in her response to Springer’s motion to
dismiss. See generally ECF No. 42. Matthews has failed to allege that
Springer acted “under color of state law,” and the Court therefore
dismisses Matthews’s § 1983 claim against her. James, 535 F.3d at 373.
2. State-law Claims
Matthews contends that Springer’s statements to Green caused
Matthews to be (1) falsely imprisoned; (2) assaulted during her
detainment, and (3) maliciously prosecuted.2 ECF No. 42 at 11–12.
a. False Imprisonment
There are three elements to Texas false imprisonment: “(1) willful
detention; (2) without consent; and (3) without authority of law.” Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Castillo, 693 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).
The parties dispute only the first element. ECF Nos. 38 at 10–11; 42 at
12.
Matthews contends that the first element is satisfied because
Springer “instigat[ed]” Matthews’s detention. See ECF No. 42 at 12.
Under the “instigation standard,” “a plaintiff must show that the
defendant clearly directed or requested the arrest.” Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tex. 2002). The standard is
extremely high; “instigation is the equivalent, in words or conduct, of
‘Officer, arrest that man!’” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 45(a) (AM. L. INST. 1965)).
Matthews’s allegations do not meet the instigation standard. She
states only that “Springer caused Plaintiff arrested [sic] through her
false statements to Defendant Green.” ECF No. 42 at 12. Even if the
statements were false, the statements still do not amount to a clear
direction from Springer to have Matthews arrested. The Court therefore
dismisses the claim.
2 Matthews’s complaint loosely asserts that Springer’s comments constitute
slander and libel. ECF No. 35 at 35. But Matthews provides no specific factual
allegations supporting those claims, nor does she brief these claims in her response to
Springer’s motion to dismiss. See generally ECF No. 42. Without more, Matthews’s
blanket assertion that Springer’s comments constitute slander and libel are conclusory
and without factual support. The Court therefore dismisses the claims.
b. Assault
There are two elements to civil assault in Texas: “(1) the defendant
intentionally or knowingly caused physical contact with the plaintiff,
and (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have believed that the
plaintiff would regard that contact as offensive or provocative.” Solis v.
S.V.Z., 566 S.W.3d 82, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet.
denied).
Matthews contends that Springer’s false statements to Green
constituted assault because the statements caused her arrest, which
“foreseeably caused the assault.” ECF No. 42 at 12. As described above,
Matthews did not plead facts indicating that Springer intended to or
knowingly caused Matthews’s alleged false imprisonment. So the Court
cannot say that Springer intended or knew that her statements—even
if false—would result in unwanted physical contact by a third party well
after Matthews was detained. Matthews has therefore failed to establish
the first element to her assault claim, and the Court consequently
dismisses the claim against Springer.
c. Malicious Prosecution
A plaintiff must establish seven elements to state a malicious
prosecution claim in Texas:
(1) the commencement of a criminal prosecution against
the plaintiff, (2) causation (initiation or procurement) of
the action by the defendant, (3) termination of the
prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor, (4) the plaintiff’s
innocence, (5) the absence of probable cause for the
proceedings, (6) malice in filing the charge, and (7) damage
to the plaintiff.
Dangerfield v. Ormsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2008, no pet.).
Without much analysis, Matthews summarily concludes that each
element is met. ECF No. 42 at 13. Springer counters that Matthews
failed to establish the second element—causation. ECF No. 45 at 3. The
bar to establish causation is high, like the false imprisonment
instigation standard. Id. (citing Wal-Mart, 92 S.W.3d at 509). It is
satisfied only if “a person’s actions [are] both a necessary and a sufficient
cause of the criminal prosecution.” Id. “Thus, a person cannot procure a
criminal prosecution when the decision whether to prosecute is left to
the discretion of another person, a law enforcement official, or the grand
jury.” Id. Further, “it must appear that [the defendant’s] desire to have
the proceedings initiated, expressed by h[er] direction, request, or
pressure of any kind, was the determining factor in the official’s decision
to commence the prosecution.” Id. (emphasis added).
Matthews pleaded no facts suggesting that Springer’s desire to
“pursue prosecution” was “the determining factor in the official’s
decision to commence the prosecution.” Id.; ECF No. 42 at 13. In fact,
the pleadings contain no facts regarding the official’s decision to
commence prosecution. Besides, Green investigated Springer’s
allegations and then presented an affidavit to a magistrate judge who
signed and issued an arrest warrant based on that affidavit. So
Matthews’s pleadings indicate that other factors were at play in the
decision to prosecute Matthews. She has therefore failed to meet the
high bar to establish causation, and her claim against Springer must be
dismissed.
C. Claims Against Detective E. Green
After two attempts, Matthews’s amended complaint still fails to
clearly list the claims it asserts and against whom. See ECF No. 35 at
32–35. Matthews briefs only three claims in her response to Green’s
motion to dismiss: conspiracy, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.
See ECF No. 42 at 6–11. Given that the brief is the only document that
clearly states the claims asserted against Green, the Court analyzes
only those three claims.
1. Conspiracy
As discussed above, Matthews contends that Green conspired with
Springer to deprive her Fourth Amendment rights. ECF Nos. 35 at 34.
But Matthews neglects to brief the issue in her response to Green’s
motion to dismiss, asserting her conspiracy claim only against Springer.
ECF No. 42 at 14. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court
nevertheless considers Matthews’s conspiracy claim against Green.
It is unclear whether Matthews’s conspiracy claim is asserted under
federal or state law, but regardless, a conspiracy claim requires an
agreement between two or more people. See, e.g., United States v. Fisch,
851 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying federal law); Leigh v. Danek
Med., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (applying Texas
law). Matthews has asserted no facts to support her conclusion that an
agreement between Green and Springer existed. She merely states that
she was prosecuted without probable cause, which resulted from a
“conspiracy with . . . Springer.” ECF No. 35 at 34. Matthews also admits
throughout her complaint that she does not know what communication
took place between Springer and Green. See id. at 6, 11, 13–19, 21–22,
29, 31. Without more, the Court cannot say that there are facts
supporting Matthews’s conspiracy claim, and thus Matthews failed to
allege a deprivation of a constitutional right. See Waltman, 535 F.3d at
346. Green is therefore entitled to qualified immunity, so the Court
dismisses the claim against him.
2. False Arrest
Matthews contends that she was arrested without probable cause,
and thus her arrest violates the Fourth Amendment. ECF Nos. 35 at 34;
42 at 7–10. She specifically asserts that the facts Green provided in his
affidavit supporting the warrant were false, and thus the arrest warrant
was invalid. ECF No. 42 at 9–10.
The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements demand that an
affiant assert specific facts supporting the warrant that allow a
magistrate judge to independently determine whether there is probable
cause to arrest the suspect. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164–
65 (1978). The Court assumes that the facts presented are truthful, but
that “does not mean . . . that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit
is necessarily correct.” Id. at 165. However, the information put forth
must be “believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” Id.
Matthews alleges no facts in her complaint or response to Green’s
motion to dismiss that he did not believe Springer or inappropriately
accepted Springer’s allegations as true. She merely concludes that
Springer’s complaints were false, and that Green failed to corroborate
Springer’s story. See ECF No. 42 at 9-10. Even if Springer’s complaints
were false, Matthews must assert facts that Green knew that the
complaints were untrue. Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. Matthews did not do
so here. The Court therefore concludes that probable cause supported
the arrest warrant, and Matthews thus failed to assert a prima facie
false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment. Green is thus entitled
to qualified immunity on this claim.
3. Malicious Prosecution
Matthews contends that she was maliciously prosecuted because
there was not probable cause supporting her detainment and
subsequent prosecution. ECF No. 42 at 10-11. Even if Matthews stated
a prima facie claim, she does not cite a similar case supporting her
assertion that the caselaw clearly establishes that Green’s actions were
unconstitutional, especially considering he did not prosecute Matthews.
See Waltman, 535 F.3d at 346; ECF No. 42 at 10-11. Matthews has
therefore failed to overcome the second qualified immunity prong, and
the Court consequently finds that Green is entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim as well.
CONCLUSION
Because the State of Texas was not timely served, Matthews failed
to allege a prima facie claim against Springer, and Green is entitled to
qualified immunity, the Court DISMISSES each of Matthews’s claims
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 19th day of January 2023.
MARK T. PITTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE