Mosley v. Bill E. Waybourn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

BRANDI R. MOSLEY,

INSTITUTIONAL ID NO. 2415074,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-0795-P

SHERIFF BILL E. WAYBOURN,

ET AL.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

This civil-rights action stems from a traffic stop that led to Plaintiff

Brandi R. Mosely’s state drug convictions.1 Mosley claims that

Defendants violated his constitutional rights during his arrest and

subsequent state criminal proceedings. Proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis (“IFP”), Mosely seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the following reasons, the Court

DISMISSES Mosley’s Amended Complaint.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Nature of Claims

Before a district court adjudicates the merits of a pro se prisoner’s

claim, it should review and decipher the underlying nature and essence

of the claim, regardless of the title affixed to the suit. See Odom v. West,

174 F.3d 198, 1999 WL 153008, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United

States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983)). A § 1983 action is

the appropriate remedy for recovering damages for illegal state action.

Taylor v. Cass Cnty. Dist. Ct., 178 F.3d 1291, 1999 WL 236119, at *1

(5th Cir. 1999) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). The writ

of habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy for a state prisoner

challenging the fact or duration of his confinement. See Preiser v.

1According to the “Inmate Information Details” found on the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice’s website, Mosley was convicted in Tarrant County, Texas on two

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d

789, 792–96 (5th Cir. 1993). If a complaint contains both habeas and §

1983 claims, the district court should, if practicable, separate the § 1983

claims from the habeas claims. See Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136

F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1998).

B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915

A district court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint if, at any

time, it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against

a defendant that is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); see also Norwood v. O’Hare, 404 F. App’x 923, 924 (5th

Cir. 2010).

1. Frivolity

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.

Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). “A complaint lacks

an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputable meritless legal

theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest

which clearly does not exist.” Id. (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105

F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)).

2. Failure to State a Claim

Dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e) are reviewed

de novo, using the same standard applicable to dismissals under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 497 (5th

Cir. 2011) (citing Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 430 F.3d 1208,

1209 (5th Cir. 2005)). Under the 12(b)(6) standard, all well-pleaded facts

are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff

must allege facts that support each element of the cause of action in

order to state a valid claim. See City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride

Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 154–55 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”)). The court does

not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” City of Clinton, Ark.,

632 F.3d at 153 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must

allege that (1) some person has deprived him of a federal right; and (2)

that the person acted under color of state or territorial law. See Arnold

v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Gomez v. Toledo,

446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).

1. State Actor

Private individuals generally are not considered to act under color of

state law. See Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 518 (5th Cir. 2005). A

defense attorney, whether privately retained or appointed by the court,

when exercising his independent professional judgment in a criminal

proceeding, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. Small v. Dallas

Cnty., Tex., 170 F. App’x 943, 944 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Hudson v.

Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996)); see Mills v. Criminal Dist.

Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988).

2. The Heck Doctrine

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States

Supreme Court considered the effect of a criminal conviction on a

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. Thomas v. Pohlmann, 681 F. App’x 401, 406 (5th

Cir. 2017) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)). The

Heck court held that a plaintiff is not permitted to use a § 1983 action to

challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence unless he

demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been reversed or

invalidated. Id. The Supreme Court imposed this requirement on § 1983

plaintiffs to avoid collateral attacks by plaintiffs on convictions that are

still outstanding. Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1996)

(citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487)). Thus, when a defendant who has been

convicted of a crime brings a § 1983 claim, “the district court must first

consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his § 1983 claim

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” See

Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Heck, 512

U.S. at 487)). If so, the claim is barred unless the plaintiff proves that

his conviction or sentence “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to

make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id.

3. Absolute Immunity

The doctrine of absolute immunity denies a person whose federal

rights have been violated by a government official from obtaining any

type of remedy, regardless of the conduct. Beck v. Texas State Bd. of

Dental Exam’rs, 204 F.3d 629, 634 (5th Cir. 2000). Because absolute

immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability, it is appropriate for district courts to resolve the question of

absolute immunity before reaching the Heck analysis when feasible. See

Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)). If a defendant is dismissed on

absolute immunity grounds, it becomes clear that the § 1983 plaintiff

will never have a viable claim against the defendant based on the

particular facts alleged, even if the plaintiff is a state prisoner who

eventually satisfies the precondition to a valid § 1983 claim under Heck.

Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284.

Criminal prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from claims for

damages asserted under § 1983 for actions taken in the presentation of

a state’s case. Boyd, 31 F.3d at 285 (citing Graves, 1 F.3d at 318).

Prosecutorial immunity applies to the prosecutor’s actions in initiating

the prosecution and in carrying the case through the judicial process. Id.

This means that prosecutors are absolutely immune with respect to

activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process.” See Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 631-32 (5th Cir.

2003) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Conduct

falling within this category is not limited only to the act of initiation

itself and to conduct occurring in the courtroom, but instead includes all

action which occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate

for the State. See Cousin, 325 F.3d 632 (citations omitted). Moreover,

absolute immunity shelters prosecutors even when they act

“maliciously, wantonly, or negligently.” Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895,

897 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Morison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d

242, 248 (5th Cir. 1985)).

ANALYSIS

After reviewing Mosley’s Amended Complaint and Answers to the

Court’s Questionnaire, the Court concludes that he raises both habeas

and § 1983 claims in this action. The Court will address each category

below.

A. Habeas Claims

Mosely filed his Amended Complaint on September 15, 2022. At that

time, he was a pretrial detainee confined in Tarrant County Jail, where

he was presumably awaiting trial on the possession charges. Eight days

later, he was convicted. Mosley seeks to have the “charges dropped.” See

ECF No. 5 at 4.

To the extent that Mosley is challenging legality of his pretrial

detention and asking the Court to interfere in his state criminal

proceedings, the Court concludes that his claim is habeas in nature and

not cognizable under § 1983. See Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1282–

84 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Kentucky,

410 U.S. 484 (1973)). Moreover, the Court concludes that such pretrial

habeas claims have been rendered moot by his conviction. See Yohey v.

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Fassler v. United States,

858 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1988)).

To the extent that Mosely is challenging the fact and legality of his

current detention on the ground that his state conviction was unlawfully

obtained, the Court likewise concludes that his claim is habeas in nature

and not cognizable under § 1983. Under these circumstances, the Court

would normally sever Mosley’s post-conviction habeas claims from this

action. However, the Court declines to do so because Mosley, in essence,

admits that he has not exhausted his available state remedies, which is

required before seeking federal habeas relief.2 Instead, the Court

2To be eligible for habeas relief under § 2241, a pretrial detainee must be “in

custody” and must have exhausted his available state remedies. Dickerson v. State of

La., 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). The exhaustion doctrine is designed to protect

the state courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state

judicial proceedings, as it gives state courts the first opportunity to review and correct

all claims of constitutional error. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982). A

prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement when he has fairly presented the factual

and legal basis for a federal claim to the highest state court for review in a procedurally

correct manner. See Satterwhite v. Lynaugh, 886 F.2d 90, 92–92 (5th Cir. 1989). In

Texas, this means that a prisoner must present his claims to the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”). See Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir.

1997). In his Answers to the Court’s Questionnaire, Mosley admits that he has not

challenged the legality of his pretrial detention or conviction in the TCCA. See ECF

No. 14 at 4.

concludes that these claims should be dismissed without prejudice for

lack of exhaustion.

B. § 1983 Claims

Mosely seeks to recover monetary damages from Defendants,

presumably in their individual capacities,3 for the same constitutional

violations that he contends led to his arrest and conviction.

1. Detective Mitchell

Mosley’s arrest and conviction stem from a traffic stop. On April 22,

2021, City of Euless police officers initiated a traffic stop of Mosely’s

vehicle and found methamphetamine inside. Mosley was transported to

the City of Euless Jail, where he met and conferred with Defendant

Detective Mitchell. Mosley alleges that Detective Mitchell released him

from custody the same day in return for Mosley’s help in locating a

known drug dealer named Richard Wiley. Mosely did not locate Wiley

and was arrested “months later” for possessing the drugs that were

found in his vehicle on April 22. See ECF Nos. 5, 14.

Mosely claims that Detective Mitchell violated the Fourth

Amendment because he did not have probable cause to initiate his arrest

based on criminal conduct that occurred months prior. Mosley argues

that any probable cause Detective Mitchell may have originally had to

arrest him on April 22, in essence, expired. See ECF No. 14 at 5.

In accordance with Heck, the Court must consider whether a

judgment in Mosley’s favor would necessarily imply the validity of his

conviction. The Court concludes that it would. See Cormier v. Lafayette

City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 493 F. App’x 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We

33To the extent that Mosley seeks to recover monetary damages from Defendants

Mitchell, Waybourn, Brown, and Nguyen in their official capacities, the Court

concludes that Mosley fails to state a plausible § 1983 against them. As discussed

below, these defendants are municipal employees. Suits brought against municipal

employees in their official capacities “generally represent only another way of pleading

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” See Monell v. New York

City Dep’t of Social Serv.’s, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In other words, in order to recover

damages under § 1983 from municipal employees in their official capacities, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the municipality itself is liable for the alleged unlawful

conduct. But municipalities are only liable if official policies or customs cause injuries

to the plaintiff. Id. Here, Mosley does name the City of Euless or Tarrant County as

defendants in this case. Nor does he even allege, much less plead any facts to show,

that these entities’ policies and/or customs led to his alleged unlawful arrest and

conviction.

have specifically noted that false-arrest and malicious-prosecution

claims challenge the existence of probable cause and, thus, by their

essence are collateral attacks on a criminal judgment’s validity.”)

(citations omitted). Thus, Mosley has no viable claim for damages

against Detective Mitchell unless he can demonstrate that his conviction

has been invalidated. Mosely has not done so. Although Mosley contends

that his detention was invalidated by the 396th Judicial District Court,

Tarrant County, Texas, his statement is belied by public record.4 See

ECF No. 14 at 3. Further, he admits that he has not yet challenged the

legality of his pretrial detention and/or conviction in the TCCA. Id. at 4.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Mosley’s claims against

Detective Mitchell are barred by Heck and, therefore, not cognizable

under § 1983.5

2. Bill E. Waybourn

Mosley claims that Tarrant County Sheriff Bill E. Waybourn

unlawfully held him in Tarrant County Jail while his state criminal

proceedings were pending. He alleges that his detention there was

unlawful because City of Euless police officers had no probable cause to

arrest him and that his bond was excessive. Because a ruling in Mosley’s

favor on this claim would implicate the invalidity of his otherwise

unchallenged conviction, the Court concludes that his claim against

Waybourn is barred by Heck and, therefore, not cognizable under § 1983.

3. Mike Brown

Mosley sues Defendant Mike Brown, the “Chief of Euless City Jail.”

He claims that Brown is the supervisor of Mosley’s arresting officers

and, therefore, is responsible for their alleged unlawful arrest of him.

Mosley is incorrect.

Under § 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of

subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability. See Thompkins v. Belt,

4After conducting an online search via www.texascourts.gov, the Court takes

judicial notice of the fact that, to date, there is no public record that shows Mosley has

challenged his pretrial detention or conviction in the TCCA.

5See Anderson v. Galveston Cnty. Dist. Clerk, 91 F. App’x 925 (5th Cir. 2004)

(finding district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint as

frivolous given that the damages claim raised therein was Heck-barred and thus had

no arguable merit); see also Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996).

28 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). However, a

supervisor may be held liable if there exists either (1) his personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional violation. Id. Supervisory liability can be established

without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory

officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the

constitutional violation. Id. at 304 (citations omitted). Existence of a

constitutionally deficient policy cannot be inferred from a single

wrongful act. Id.

Here, Mosley does not allege that Brown was personally involved in

his arrest or that his conduct otherwise led to his arrest. For example,

Mosley does not allege that Brown directed City of Euless Police officers

to initiate his arrest or that Brown was, in any way, personally involved

in making the decision to do so. Nor does Mosley argue or plead any facts

to demonstrate that Brown implemented or otherwise adopted an

unconstitutional practice or policy of any kind.

The Court, therefore, concludes that Mosley has failed to state a

plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant Mike Brown.

4. Paul Nguyen

Mosley alleges in a conclusory statement that Tarrant County

District Attorney Paul Nguyen “conspired” to unlawfully indict him. But

he does not plead any facts in support of this claim. Importantly, Mosley

does not allege that Nguyen was, at any relevant time, not acting in his

role of representing the district attorney’s office during Mosley’s

criminal proceedings. See ECF No. 14 at 6.

Because the decision to file criminal charges is protected, the Court

concludes that Mosley’s § 1983 clam against Nguyen is barred by the

doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

5. Harold Johnson

Mosley also sues his court-appointed attorney, Harold Johnson.

Mosley alleges in a conclusory manner that Johnson lied under oath and

received compensation for services that the did not provide. See id. at 7.

Because Johnson is not considered a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983

and Mosley does not plead any facts to demonstrate that Johnson’s

actions, at any relevant time, were taken outside the course of his

professional representation of Mosely in his criminal proceedings, the

Court concludes that Mosely fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim

against Johnson.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mosley’s habeas claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of exhaustion.®

Mosley’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Detective Mitchell and

Sheriff Bill E. Waybourn are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to

their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met. See

Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).

Mosley’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Paul Nguyen are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by the doctrine of

absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Mosley’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Mike Brown and Harold

Johnson are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a

claim.

Lastly, in his October 17, 2022 letter to the clerk of Court, Mosley

complains that his former fellow inmate at Tarrant County Jail took

personal property from his cell. See ECF No. 10. Because this claim is

wholly unrelated to the claims raised in Mosley’s Amended Complaint,

the Court will not adjudicate its merits here. However, if Mosley wants

to file a separate lawsuit to address this new claim, he may file a new

complaint on the proper form, which is available in his unit’s library.

SO ORDERED on this 10th day of January 2023.

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6This dismissal does not prohibit Mosley from attempting to seek federal habeas

relief after he has fully exhausted his available state remedies. However, should he

choose to do so, the Court expresses no opinion whatsoever on the underlying merits

of his claims.