Campbell v. Barr

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

IN RE CASEY CAMPBELL No. 4:21-cv-0881-P

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 133) and Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 140). For the reasons listed below, the Court grants

Defendants’ Motion and denies Plaintiff’s Motion.

INTRODUCTION

This is a hostile work environment and employment discrimination

case. Plaintiff Casey Campbell is a Baptist chaplain at the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (the “BOP”). Campbell alleges a Catholic chaplain at

the BOP, Defendant William Onuh, violated his religious rights and

created a hostile work environment. Campbell also alleges that the BOP

failed to take corrective action to resolve Onuh’s complaints after an

administrative decision instructed it to do so. Campbell thus also named

the Attorney General as a Defendant, as head of the BOP.

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims asserted by

Campbell, contending that Campbell’s claims under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) fail. First, they assert that the evidence

presented does not demonstrate a hostile work environment. Second, as

to the religious discrimination claims, they assert that Campbell did not

exhaust administrative remedies and cannot show an adverse

employment action taken on a discriminatory or retaliatory basis.

Defendants also argue that Campbell’s Religious Freedom Restoration

Act (“RFRA”) claims fail because Title VII preempts them, and Campbell

cannot show a substantial burden on his exercise of religion. In the same

motion, the Attorney General individually moves for summary judgment

on his counterclaim for monies previously paid to Campbell under an

administrative decision that Campbell elected to relitigate de novo in

this action.

Campbell moves for partial summary judgment on several discrete

points. The Court ultimately concludes that none of his arguments are

meritorious and accordingly denies Campbell’s motion.

BACKGROUND

This case has a convoluted procedural history that need not be

exhaustively rehashed to rule on the present motions. The Court will

give a brief synopsis of the essential background, including the

administrative proceedings that predated this lawsuit, before turning to

its analysis.

Campbell initiated this process by filing an administrative complaint

with the BOP’s internal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)

process in May 2017. He alleged that Onuh created a hostile work

environment and violated Title VII by discriminating against Campbell

based on his religion. ECF No. 58 ¶¶ 2–3. The allegations were

investigated by an outside contractor. ECF No. 135-1 at 144–65. This

investigation produced about 60 pages of materials, including written

responses to interrogatories from BOP employees and Campbell, but not

oral testimony or in-person hearings. Id. at 87–90, 141, 163–65. The

Complaint Adjudication Office (“CAO”)—an office within the DOJ’s Civil

Rights Division—considered the limited paper record and then issued a

decision in May 2019 stating that the “record support[ed] a claim of

harassment based on religion.” ECF No. 58 at 30–55.1 The CAO

determined that Campbell was entitled to compensatory damages and

attorneys’ fees. Id. at 53–54. Then, in September 2019, the CAO

determined Campbell was entitled to $15,000 in non-pecuniary

damages, $1,000 in attorneys’ fees, and the restoration of leave hours.

ECF No. 135-1at 90–91.

Three months later, Campbell filed a second EEO complaint, alleging

“the religious discrimination and relation against [him] continue[d]” and

“no corrective action ha[d] been taken to stop Chaplain Onuh’s illegal

conduct.” ECF No. 135-1 at 199. In March 2020, that second EEO

1To match the style of Defendants’ brief, page references to Campbell’s

amended complaint are to the page numbers appearing at the top of each page,

as generated by the ECF system. See ECF No. 134 at n.6.

complaint was administratively dismissed based on its overlap with this

lawsuit. ECF No. 58 at 74–75.

As mentioned, this lawsuit has a tortured procedural history. In

short, this case was transferred from the Dallas Division (when it was

nearly a year old) and then consolidated with another existing lawsuit

on the Court’s docket. See ECF Nos. 50, 52. Relevant here, Campbell’s

operative pleading is his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 58),

wherein Campbell requests de novo review of the CAO final agency

decision and asserts claims under both Title VII and RFRA. See

generally ECF No. 58. Campbell seeks damages and

declaratory/injunctive relief.

The crux of Campbell’s claims stems from Onuh’s allegedly hostile

and discriminatory behavior on a multitude of occasions. A sampling of

these allegations is sufficient to give a flavor of Campbell’s complaints.

Campbell alleges that during two masses held in 2017, Onuh stated

during his homilies (at which Campbell was not present) that

Campbell’s Protestant ministry was “only entertainment” and referred

to a supervisor chaplain as “that boy.” ECF No. 135-1 at 166. He further

alleges that Onuh sometimes refused to escort non-Catholic volunteers

into the facilities. On occasion, Onuh also refused to supervise activities

he was assigned to cover. Id. at 166. This sometimes resulted in other

chaplains working overtime. Grievances like these form the basis of

Campbell’s EEO complaints and his claims presently before the Court.

See ECF No. 58.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions,

admissions, disclosure materials on file, and affidavits, if any, show

there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (c)(1). A

fact is material if the governing law identifies it as having the potential

to affect the suit’s outcome. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). While the moving party “must demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact, it does not need to negate the

elements of the nonmovant’s case.” Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362,

371 (5th Cir. 2010). An issue as to a material fact is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Id. To show a genuine dispute as to the material

facts, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Co., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving

party must show evidence sufficient to support the resolution of the

material factual issues in their favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citing

First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)). When

evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255

(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).

ANALYSIS

The Court will first address Defendants’ Motion, starting with the

request for summary judgment on Campbell’s Title VII claims, followed

by his RFRA claims. Then, the Court will analyze Defendants’ request

for summary judgment on the Attorney General’s counterclaim. Finally,

the Court will move to Campbell’s Motion.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Campbell’s

Title VII claims.

Defendants contend that, reviewing de novo, Campbell’s Title VII

hostile work environment claim and his discrimination/retaliation

claims fail. The Court agrees and grants summary judgment in

Defendants’ favor on these claims.

1. Because Campbell requested de novo review, the questions of

liability and remedy must be determined anew.

Title VII allows a federal employee to bring a civil action if he is

“aggrieved” by his employing agency’s decision on his EEO complaint.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). The employee may file two types of actions: (1) a

suit to enforce the administrative decision, where courts examine only

“whether the agency has complied with the decision,” or (2) a suit for de

novo review of the agency’s decision. Massingill v. Nicholson, 496 F.3d

382, 384 (5th Cir. 2007). Campbell elected for de novo review. ECF No.

58 ¶ 19.2 This entails de novo review of “both liability and remedy.”

Massingill, 496 F.3d at 385 (quoting Scott v. Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, 472

(D.C. Cir. 2005)); see ECF No. 152 at 20 (Campbell acknowledging that

“all questions of liability and remedy must be determined anew based

on the new record created in this litigation” (quoting ECF No. 134)).

Accordingly, Campbell recognizes that “administrative findings are

merely evidence—that, like any other evidence, can be accepted or

rejected by the trier of fact—requires [the plaintiff to] put his employing

agency’s underlying discrimination at issue in the case.” ECF No. 134 at

20 (quoting Laber v. Harvey, 483 F.3d 404, 421 (4th Cir. 2006)).

It is therefore undisputed that the underlying CAO decisions are

merely evidence for the Court to consider in its review of Campbell’s

claims. Notably, the Parties engaged in extensive discovery that

produced a record far more voluminous than the limited record available

to the CAO. ECF No. 134 at 15. This includes about 60 hours of oral

deposition testimony (the CAO had none), thousands of pages of

document production (that were not considered by the CAO), and several

rounds of written discovery (building upon the limited paper record

available to the CAO). See id. The Court therefore has the benefit of

considering the robust record produced during discovery to review

Campbell’s claims.

2. Campbell’s arguments that Defendants made judicial admissions

as to their liability are unfounded.

Campbell repeatedly asserts in his Response that Defendants’

arguments are irrelevant because Defendants made judicial admissions

to liability. Campbell is mistaken. He previously raised this argument

in the brief supporting his first motion for summary judgment. See ECF

No. 69 at 4–5, n.12. The Court rejected that argument and denied the

motion. See ECF No. 81. This issue has been exhaustively briefed

multiple times (see ECF Nos. 69 at 4–5; 72 at 17–20; 134 at 13–16; 161

2When Judge Lindsay granted Campbell leave to amend his pleadings

(before this case was transferred and consolidated), he warned Campbell that

the amended pleadings “must be limited to either an enforcement suit under

the APA or a civil action seeking de novo review of the agency decision under

Title VII, but not both.” ECF No. 31 at 4 (emphasis in original).

at 30; 163 at 1–3). That briefing solidifies the Court’s conclusion that

Campbell’s argument that Defendants judicially admitted liability fails

for two reasons.

First, in their discovery responses, Defendants acknowledged the

contents of the CAO decisions, see, e.g., ECF No. 60 ¶ 4 (statements in

answer admitting that the CAO issued a decision and noting the

contents of that decision), which Campbell suggests constitutes judicial

admission. He is incorrect, however, because Defendants did not admit

to liability by simply acknowledging the existence of the CAO decisions

and their contents. Second, for similar reasons, posting the EEO notice

at the prison does not constitute a judicial admission by Defendants. The

notice merely summarized the CAO decisions and was posted at the

direction of the CAO. Thus, reviewing de novo, the Court finds no reason

to conclude that Defendants’ actions constituted a judicial admission as

to their liability in this dispute.

3. Campbell’s hostile work environment claim fails.

Campbell’s central Title VII allegations raise a hostile work

environment claim. ECF No. 58 ¶¶ 36–167. To establish a prima facie

hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) he belongs

to a protected group, (2) he was harassed, (3) the harassment was based

on his protected class, (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or

privilege of employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have

known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Price v. Wheeler, 834 F. App’x 849, 859 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Ramsey v.

Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002)). The Court considers the

“totality of the circumstances,” including “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening

or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at

859–60 (citation omitted).

Defendants contend that Campbell failed to allege a prima facie

hostile work environment claim for three reasons: Campbell cannot

show (a) actionable harassment, (b) a connection between the alleged

harassment and his protected status, and (c) that management did not

take action to remediate Campbell’s concerns. ECF No. 134 at 16. The

Court addresses these arguments below and ultimately agrees with

Defendants on each point. Campbell’s failure to demonstrate a prima

facie hostile work environment claim on these elements, even with the

benefit of extensive discovery, provides several independent grounds for

granting summary judgment for Defendants.

a. Campbell’s allegations of harassment did not affect a term or

condition of employment.

Defendants’ first argument cuts to the core of Campbell’s claims: they

contend Campbell was not subject to actionable harassment. The “legal

standard for workplace harassment in this circuit is . . . high,” regardless

of the type of harassment alleged. See Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp.

Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 509 (5th Cir. 2003) (allegations of discrimination

based on disability). For alleged harassment to “affect a term, condition,

or privilege of employment,” it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th

Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Determining

whether a work environment is actionably hostile depends on a totality

of circumstances. See id. This analysis “focus[es] on factors such as the

frequency of the conduct, the severity of the conduct, the degree to which

the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, and the degree to

which the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.” Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 194 (5th

Cir. 1996). Defendants contend that Campbell failed to show that the

alleged harassment affected Campbell’s work performance, was severe

or pervasive, or was physically threatening or humiliating. ECF No. 134

at 17–24. The Court agrees.

i. Lack of sufficient adverse impact on employment

Defendants point to Campbell’s excellent employment record to show

that the allegedly hostile work environment did not adversely impact

Campbell’s employment. Campbell states he “has routinely been

evaluated as an exemplary employee” at FMC Carswell. ECF No. 58 ¶

37. Campbell’s deposition testimony confirmed that he has always

received positive performance reviews, has never been formally

disciplined, and has consistently advanced up the company’s career

advancement scale with corresponding pay increases, bonuses, and

awards. ECF No. 135-1 at 15–19. This testimony is corroborated by

Campbell’s consistent “excellent” and “outstanding” ratings on his

annual performance (which were not available to the CAO). See ECF No.

135-2 at 584–633.

Defendants contend that this evidence undermines Campbell’s

claims that the alleged hostile work environment adversely affected his

job performance. ECF No. 134 at 22 (citing Kenyon v. W. Extrusions

Corp., No. 98-CV-2431-L, 2000 WL 12902, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2000))

(explaining that, although the court found the conduct at issue

“offensive and despicable,” the plaintiff failed to produce evidence

showing she failed to perform her job, was discouraged from continuing

to work, or failed to advance in her career as a result of the harassment).

Campbell counters by offering only conclusory statements that his

“hostile work environment affected the terms, conditions[,] and

privileges of his employment.” ECF No. 161 at 33. He cites no evidence

or authority to support his contention and instead relies on the already-

rejected argument that Defendants admitted liability. See id. at 33–34.

Campbell’s argument does not cut the mustard; his conclusory

statements that the hostile work environment negatively impacted his

job performance is insufficient to demonstrate that Defendants’ conduct

was objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive, so much so that he

was unable to succeed in the workplace. The Court thus agrees with

Defendants and concludes that this factor weighs against finding that

the alleged harassment affected a term or condition of Campbell’s

employment.

ii. Conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive

Defendants next contend that the alleged harassment was not so

severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of Campbell’s

employment. ECF No. 134 at 17. For harassment to be severe or

pervasive enough to be actionable under Title VII, the conduct must be

both subjectively and objectively offensive. See Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). In other words, the Court considers

whether a reasonable person would find the conduct hostile and abusive

and asks whether the victim perceived the conduct as such. See id.

To be sure, Campbell perceived Defendants’ actions to be hostile and

abusive. See generally ECF No. 134 at 17 (describing Defendants’

allegedly hostile and abusive behavior). So, the central question here is

whether a reasonable person would similarly find Defendants’ conduct

hostile and abusive.

Accepting Campbell’s allegations as true, Onuh’s workplace sins

were primarily ones of omission. For example, Onuh “regularly l[eft]

work early,” and Onuh’s behavior caused other chaplains at the BOP,

including Campbell, “to temporarily perform tasks that Campbell

thought Onuh should have done.” ECF No. 134 at 17 (citing ECF No.

135-1 at 29–42, 61–63, 128–34). Some of those tasks include “escorting

volunteers, locking or unlocking doors, or performing other

administrative-type tasks.” Id. But the evidence reflects that these sorts

of tasks were expected to be performed by any BOP chaplain. Id. (citing

id. at 6–7). And even if not, Campbell has neither produced evidence nor

caselaw supporting his contention that a reasonable person would find

Onuh’s alleged shirking of his work responsibilities sufficiently hostile

and abusive to constitute a Title VII violation.3

Campbell’s complaints against Onuh fall well short of his burden of

proving that Onuh’s conduct is subjectively and objectively hostile and

abusive to be actionable under Title VII. And because Campbell

identifies no caselaw demonstrating that the dynamic between

Campbell and Onuh creates an actionable hostile work environment

claim, the Court concludes that this factor also weighs against finding

that the alleged harassment affected a term or condition of Campbell’s

employment. See ECF No. 161 at 32–35.

3Defendants correctly point out that in many instances, Campbell’s

complaints against Onuh have no connection to Campbell. See ECF No. 164 at

4. Because Campbell fails to delineate how Onuh’s actions that did not affect

Campbell created a hostile work environment for Campbell, the Court rejects

his argument on those points.

iii. Conduct was not physically threatening or humiliating

Defendants next contend that none of the alleged conduct was

physically threatening or humiliating. ECF No. 134 at 20–21 (citing

Weller, 84 F.3d at 194). Indeed, Campbell confirmed that Onuh was

never physically violent with him or engaged in any kind of mean-

spirited practical joke. ECF No. 134 at 64–65. Cf. La Day v. Catalyst

Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 476, 482 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a

plaintiff showed his supervisor’s harassment was physically humiliating

where the supervisor inappropriately touched his private parts and spat

tobacco juice on him). Accordingly, this factor weighs against Campbell’s

hostile work environment claim as well.

Because the factors weigh against finding that Campbell was subject

to work in a hostile environment, the Court concludes that Campbell

fails to allege actionable harassment. See Ramsey v. Henderson, 286

F.3d 264, 268. Summary judgment for Defendants is therefore granted

on this claim.

b. Campbell’s claim is not connected to a protected status.

Defendants next challenge Campbell’s assertions that he was

harassed because of his Baptist religion. They argue nearly all of Onuh’s

objectionable behavior is disconnected from Campbell’s status as a

Baptist. ECF No. 134 at 24. Prior emails produced during discovery did

not suggest that Onuh was “engaged in some form of religious

discrimination against Campbell (as opposed to just personally

disagreeable or uncivil behavior).” (ECF No135-1 at 179–82). As

discussed above, Campbell alleges that Onuh shirked work and

performed poorly. But there is no evidence that Campbell’s Baptist

status somehow caused or motivated Onuh to behave in that way. ECF

No. 134 at 25.

Campbell offers only a perfunctory, conclusory response to this

argument. ECF No. 161 at 31–32. He argues that he is Baptist and

“suffered an adverse employment action when BOP denied him

preferential treatment that Defendant Onuh was allowed because of

Campbell’s religion.” Id. at 32. Without supporting evidence, he

complains that the “denial of favored job conditions given to Onuh”

constitutes an adverse employment action taken against Campbell

because he is Baptist. Id. Campbell leans again on the inapposite

argument that the Final Agency Decision is a binding admission of

liability, which the Court again rejects. Id. at 33.

Because Campbell presented no competent summary judgment

evidence that the harassment complained of was based on his Baptist

status, Campbell’s Title VII claim also fails under this element.

c. The BOP responded to Campbell’s complaints.

Defendants assert that even though the of which conduct Campbell

complains does not constitute actionable harassment, the BOP

nevertheless took steps to minimize contact between Campbell and

Onuh. ECF No. 134 at 25. Defendants specifically note that Campbell

and Onuh’s “work schedules have not substantially overlapped over the

years—particularly [considering that] essentially all chaplains work

Sundays but are busy doing inmate services and other activities such

that they do not have much interaction.” ECF No. 134 at 25 (citing ECF

No. 135-1 at 24–25, 73, 289–305). Additionally, in recent years, when

“Campbell and Onuh have been scheduled to work on the same days,

one has been assigned to the camp facility while the other will be

assigned to the main facility, thus further ensuring that they are not

continually working in the same area.” Id. (citing ECF No. 135-1at 120–

21). Campbell does not meaningfully respond to this argument. See ECF

No. 134 at 32–35. Therefore, even if Campbell had demonstrated an

actionable Title VII claim, he fails to rebut Defendants’ assertion of

actions adequate to remedy his complaints.

4. Campbell’s religious discrimination/retaliation claims fail.

Finally, though the Complaint is less than artfully drafted,

Campbell’s pleading may allege religious discrimination or retaliation

claims. He alludes to discrete adverse employment actions (such as a

failure to hire or promote) that are ostensibly distinct hostile work

environment claims. While the former entails specific instances of

discrimination, the latter involves a more prolonged course of conduct.

See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002)

(“Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts.”).

Specifically, Campbell alleges that he was not selected to be a

supervisory chaplain at FMC Carswell in 2015, and he vaguely suggests

he should have been placed in some unspecified “special rate” or

“retention pay” position carrying a higher salary. See ECF No. 135-1 at

26–29, 122–25. Campbell asserts that failure to promote because the

warden allegedly told him to stop complaining about Onuh or other

issues in the Religious Services department. Id. at 26–29. Campbell

acknowledged, however, that he did not file an EEO complaint about not

being selected, and “[t]he person whom they selected is a white

Protestant male who graduated” from the same seminary as Campbell,

evidencing that there was any possible discrimination was not based on

Campbell’s religion. Id. at 27–28.

Defendants assert that these types of accusations are properly

considered discrete adverse employment acts. See ECF No. 134 at 26

(citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (“Discrete acts such as termination,

failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to

identify.”)). Defendants thus move for summary judgment on Campbell’s

ostensible discrimination or retaliation claims, as distinct from his

hostile work environment claims. Id. (citing EEOC v. USF Holland,

LLC, No. 3:20-CV-270-NRB-RP, 2021 WL 4497490, at *2 (N.D. Miss.

Sept. 30, 2021)) (“Failure to hire is a ‘discrete act’ which is easy to

identify and distinguished from hostile work environment claims . . . .”).

Defendants argue, however, that such claims are barred because

Campbell failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies, and he

failed to establish a prima facie case. ECF No. 134 at 28. Campbell

almost entirely ignores Defendants’ arguments on these points in his

Response.

Before suing in federal court under Title VII, a federal employee

asserting a claim of employment discrimination must first exhaust

administrative remedies by complying with the EEO regulations set

forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 et seq. See Thomas v. Napolitano, 449 F.

App’x 373, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2011). These regulations require a federal

employee claiming discrimination to contact an EEO counselor about

the alleged incident “within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to

be discriminatory” and then file an administrative EEO complaint if the

issue is not resolved through the counseling process. 29 C.F.R.

§§ 1614.105(a)(1), 1614.106(a). Generally, “absent a defense of waiver,

estoppel, or equitable tolling,” failure to timely notify the EEO bars such

a claim from proceeding. Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir.

1992).

Campbell indicated he was not promoted to supervisory chaplain in

2015, but he did not file an EEO complaint until years later, in 2017.

Even then, his tardy complaint neglected to mention the allegedly

discriminatory failure to promote him to supervisory chaplain. Because

Campbell did not timely initiate the EEO process on his failure-to-

promote claim, that claim is barred. See id.

So too for Campbell’s vague claim that he should have been placed

on a “special rate,” “retention pay,” or other similar position. Campbell

failed to show that he applied for any positions that would entitle him

to these benefits. Nor did Campbell demonstrate that he initiated—let

alone exhausted—an EEO complaint on this lack-of-benefits claim. See

ECF No. 134 at 29.

Finally, Campbell presented no evidence showing he is entitled to a

defense of waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling. Because he never filed

an EEO complaint addressing his failure-to-promote and his lack-of-

benefits claims, these defenses are inapplicable. See, e.g., Eberle v.

Gonzales, 240 F. App’x 622, 627 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[The]doctrine of

equitable tolling does not permit plaintiffs to suspend the time for filing

discrimination complaints indefinitely when they discover instances of

disparate treatment of other employees months or years after their

discharge.” (citation and quotation omitted)).

Because the Court concludes these claims were not administratively

exhausted and thus barred from proceeding, the Court declines to

undertake the McDonnel Douglas analysis to determine whether

Campbell pleaded a prima facie case. Defendants are therefore entitled

to summary judgment on Campbell’s Title VII claims.

B. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Campbell’s

RFRA claims.

Defendants also move for summary judgment on Campbell’s RFRA

claims, arguing that these claims are preempted by Title VII.

“[T]itle VII provides the exclusive remedy for employment

discrimination claims raised by federal employees.” Kaswatuka v. U.S.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 7 F.4th 327, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 1996)). When “both the

RFRA and Title VII claims that [a federal employee] plaintiff has alleged

in [his] complaint are based on identical facts . . . the RFRA claims

plaintiff has asserted against [the federal agency] defendants are

preempted by the Title VII claims asserted against those same

defendants.” Tagore v. United States, No. H-09-0027, 2009 WL 2605310,

at *10 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2009) (explaining the interaction between

Title VII and RFRA and the corresponding caselaw).

Here, Campbell relies on the same factual allegations for both his

RFRA and Title VII claims. Compare ECF No. 58 ¶ 168 (relying on the

allegations in paragraphs 20 through 147 for Campbell’s Title VII

claims), with ¶ 174 (relying on the allegations in those exact same

paragraphs for his RFRA claims). Thus, Defendants argue that

Campbell’s RFRA claims are directly related to his Title VII claims, so

his RFRA claims are preempted by Title VII. ECF No. 134 at 40.

In response, Campbell did not cite a single case permitting a RFRA

claim for religious discrimination in federal employment, nor is the

Court aware of any. See, e.g., Holly v. Jewell, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1088

(N.D. Cal. 2016) (collecting district court cases from across the country

holding that Title VII preempts a federal employee’s RFRA claim).

Campbell’s two-sentence conclusory counterargument is insufficient to

pass muster. He merely states that he “is employed by the [BOP], not by

Defendant Onuh,” ECF No. 161 at 34, and consequently concludes that

because Onuh is not his employer, Defendants’ preemption defense fails.

But he cites no evidence or authority to support his conclusory

arguments. The Court therefore finds that Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment also on Campbell’s RFRA claims.

C. The Attorney General is entitled to summary judgment on his

counterclaim to recover monies paid to Campbell.

Finally, Defendants assert that the Attorney General is entitled to

summary judgment on his counterclaim for the monies paid to Campbell

pursuant to the CAO decisions. See ECF No. 60. The Attorney General

asserts that a federal agency may pursue such a counterclaim in a de

novo employment-discrimination case to “offset against any recovery by

[the plaintiff] and judgment against [the plaintiff] if no liability is found

or the offset is greater than the recovery.” Massingill, 496 F.3d at 386–

87; see also Smith, 341 F. App’x at 37 (acknowledging that if a de novo

review finds no liability or a lower award is granted, the agency can

counterclaim against the plaintiff “to recover the amounts paid in excess

of the ultimate award”).

Here, the uncontested evidence shows Campbell received $15,000 in

non-pecuniary damages and $1,000 in attorneys’ fees from the BOP, as

awarded by the CAO. See ECF No. 14 at 6, 17; see also ECF No. 135-1

at 90–91. The Attorney General contends that he is entitled to recover

the $16,000 in total monies paid to Campbell at the administrative level.

See ECF No. 134 at 44–45 (citing Massingill, 496 F.3d at 386–87).

Multiple cases to support the Attorney General’s position. See, e.g.,

Hodge, 257 F. App’x at 730 (affirming grant of federal agency’s

counterclaim in a de novo employment-discrimination case to recover

funds paid to the plaintiff in accordance with the challenged EEOC

award, as the plaintiff had demonstrated no error in granting summary

judgment against her on her discrimination and retaliation claims, and

the EEOC had awarded her the funds in dispute based on those claims);

Young v. Buttigieg, No. 19-CV-01411-JCS, 2022 WL 1471416, at *4–6

(N.D. Cal. May 10, 2022) (denying plaintiff’s motion to dismiss federal

agency’s counterclaims in a de novo employment-discrimination case to

recover funds paid to the plaintiff in accordance with an EEOC award,

in large part as “there is no dispute that [the plaintiff] would owe the

government money if she does not”).

Campbell entirely ignores the Attorney General’s argument that the

Attorney General would be entitled to summary judgment if the Court

found no liability in its de novo review. See ECF No. 161. At most,

Campbell makes a cursory reference in the brief supporting his own

dispositive motion to his alleged efforts to mitigate damages. See ECF

No. 141 at 38. This single paragraph merely states that “Campbell took

every opportunity to mitigate his damages” without pointing to any

substantiating evidence. Id. Thus, absent evidence to the contrary, the

Court concludes that Campbell did not mitigate his damages.

The Court reviewed Campbell’s claims for hostile work environment,

religious discrimination and retaliation, and RFRA violations de novo.

Because the Court granted summary judgment against Campbell on

each of these claims, the Court concludes there is no basis for liability

for Campbell’s claims against Defendants. Thus, the Court grants

summary judgment for the Attorney General on his counterclaim to

recover the monies paid to Campbell due to the CAO decisions. The

Attorney General is therefore entitled to recover $15,000 in non-

pecuniary damages and $1,000 in attorneys’ fees paid to Campbell in the

earlier administrative proceedings. See ECF No. 14 at 6; see also ECF

No. 135-1 at 90–91.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Campbell’s brief in support of his Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment is heavy on verbiage but light on substance. See ECF No. 141.

The 38-page brief contains just seven pages of analysis and zero

convincing arguments. See id. at 32–38. The Court addresses and

disposes of each in turn.

First, Campbell repeats the tired argument that “the final agency

decision here is not mere evidence, [but is instead] a judicial admission.”

Id. at 33, 35–37. The Court rejected this argument multiple times, both

in a previous order denying Campbell’s first dispositive motion, (ECF

No. 81), and in the analysis of Defendants’ Motion above. The Court

declines to rehash its analysis and merely incorporates its reasoning and

conclusion detailed above. In short, Campbell’s argument holds no

water.

Second, Campbell offers a terse argument for summary judgment on

his hostile work environment claim. See id. at 34–35. After reciting the

elements for such a claim, Campbell lists a handful of conclusory

statements to bolster his argument. See id. But his statements amount

to little more than threadbare recitations of the elements of a hostile

work environment claim reconfigured to include the Parties’ names. He

cites: two distinguishable cases (one of which is out-of-circuit), the CAO

decision, Defendants’ Answer, an old Motion to Dismiss from an earlier

case, and Onuh’s Motion to establish qualified immunity. Id. at 35–36.

None of these constitute sufficient or persuasive summary judgment

evidence or authority. The dearth of supporting evidence is particularly

noteworthy because the Parties engaged in extensive discovery in this

case, as detailed above. The Court thus summarily denies Campbell’s

Motion on this claim.

Third, Campbell counters Defendants’ contention that Title VII

preempts his RFRA claim. See id. at 37–38. In his three-sentence

argument, Campbell posits that the evidence in this case shows

conclusively that he is employed by the [BOP], not by Defendant Onuh.

Id. Campbell cites no evidence or authority to support this contention.

The Court therefore incorporates its analysis on this point where it

granted summary judgment for Defendants on its preemption

argument. The Court therefore denies Campbell’s Motion on this claim.

Finally, Campbell contends that Defendants’ mitigation of damages

affirmative defense is not supported by evidence. He argues that this

“defense requires an injured party, following a breach, to exercise

reasonable care to minimize his damages” using reasonable efforts. Id.

at 38. Campbell then argues, again without citing any evidence or

authority, that “the evidence here on mitigation is conclusive that there

was a failure to mitigate, as Campbell took every opportunity to

mitigate.” Id. But Campbell fails to detail how he ostensibly mitigated

damages. See id. The Court therefore denies Campbell’s Motion on this

claim as well.

ORDER

For the reasons detailed above, the Court rules as follows:

Defendants Merrick B. Garland and William Onuh’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 133) is GRANTED. Accordingly,

Plaintiff Casey Campbell’s hostile work environment, religious

discrimination, retaliation, and RFRA claims are each DISMISSED

with prejudice.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Attorney

General’s counterclaim is GRANTED. The Court therefore ORDERS

the Attorney General is entitled to recover the $15,000 in non-pecuniary

damages and $1,000 in attorneys’ fees paid to Campbell as a result of

the prior administrative decisions.

Finally, Plaintiff Casey Campbell’s Second Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 140) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on this 16th day of September 2022.

MARK T. PITTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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