Opinion

Madden v. Gribbon

Court
District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed
Sep 12, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.9%

holding there was no excessive force when officers shot suspect who was mentally unstable, armed, and moving his hands in a threatening manner

How later courts described this case

  • holding there was no excessive force when officers shot suspect who was mentally unstable, armed, and moving his hands in a threatening manner
  • holding deadly force to be permissible when perceived threat of harm is severe even when officer did not attempt to use non-deadly force first
  • “Excessive force claims are necessarily fact- intensive.”
  • holding that the use of force must be proportionate “to the situation”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States District Court

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JAMES MADDEN, Individually and as §

Father and Representative of the Estate of = §

Rashad Madden, and SHABREEKA §

KENNEDY, as Next Friend of Minor §

Child, M.M. §

§

Vv. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-1168-S

§

JASON GRIBBON, DUDLEY §

NOSWORTHY, OTHER JOHN DOE §

DALLAS POLICE OFFICERS, and THE §

CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses Defendants Jason Gribbon and Dudley

Nosworthy’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity (“Motion”) [ECF No.

38]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, Defendants Dudley Nosworthy and Jason Gribbon’s Brief

in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity [ECF No. 39},

Plaintiffs’ Response and Brief in Support to Defendants Dudley Nosworthy and Jason Gribbon’s

Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity [ECF No.

43] (“Response Brief’), Defendants Jason Gribbon and Dudley Nosworthy’[s] Reply Brief in

Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 45], the summary judgment evidence

presented,! and the applicable law. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

' Defendants filed their Appendix in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity

(“Appendix”) [ECF No. 39-1], and both parties manually submitted USB flash drives, see ECF Nos. 41, 44. The

evidence contained therein includes the following: footage obtained from Defendant Jason Gribbon’s body-worn

camera, see App. 1; declarations from Defendants Jason Gribbon and Dudley Nosworthy, see App. 2-4, 244-46; a

Special Investigation Unit file containing affidavits from witnesses, investigation materials, and an autopsy report, see

App. 15-231; documents from the Dallas Police Department’s Internal Affairs Division Investigation, see App. 232-

43; and audio from witness Mitchell Wallace’s 9-1-1 call related to the incident, see App. 247.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs James Madden, individually and as the father and representative of Rashad

Madden’s estate, and Shabreeka Kennedy, as next friend of minor child, M.M. (collectively

“Plaintiffs”), filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants officers Jason

Gribbon (“Gribbon”) and Dudley Nosworthy, II (“Nosworthy”) (collectively “Defendants”) used

excessive force in connection with the arrest of the late Rashad Madden (“Madden”).

On May 28, 2019, at approximately 7:50 p.m., Dallas Police Department (“DPD”) received

a 9-1-1 phone call from Mitchell Wallace (“Wallace”), the owner of a truck dealership. See App.

247 (“9-1-1 Call”). Wallace told police that Madden approached him on his dealership lot with a

drawn handgun and pointed the weapon at him. /d. at 04:27-04:50; Witness Sheet, App. 58.

Wallace, “fearing for his safety,” pulled out his own handgun in defense. /d. Madden stopped

walking, pointed his handgun at his own neck, and threatened to pull the trigger. 9-1-1 Call at

04:27-04:50; Witness Sheet, App. 58. Madden began to verbally threaten suicide and “‘shout[]

about his daughter.” 9-1-1 Call at 00:05-00:16.

While on the phone with DPD, Wallace urged Madden not to take his life. Jd. at 01:04-

02:37 (telling Madden “not to do that,” “at least talk about it first,” and “it’s going to be okay”).

Wallace attempted to comfort Madden and told him that the police are coming to help him and

“get his daughter.” Jd. Madden continued to threaten suicide. See id. After a few minutes, Madden

“racked” the gun, pulling the “slide” or part of the gun that recoils back towards himself, and

ejected a live bullet. /d. at 02:36-02:40. He picked the bullet up and put it back in his gun. /d.

Wallace continued to tell Madden to stop, offering to help him. Jd. at 2:40-3:46. Holding the

handgun and threatening suicide, Madden then crawled under one of the vans on the dealership

lot. Id. at 03:46.

Approximately five minutes into Wallace’s phone call with police, officers Thomas Foster

(“Foster”) and Dylan Nelson arrived on the scene. /d. at 04:58. Foster claims that upon arrival, he

observed Madden under the van, holding a handgun and foaming at the mouth. Foster Aff., App.

77; Investigation Documents (“Inv. Docs.”), App. 28, 235. Nosworthy and six other officers

arrived shortly after. Inv. Docs., App. 28. Wallace begged the officers not to shoot Madden. 9-1-1

Call at 05:20-05:34 (exclaiming “please don’t shoot him”); Nosworthy Decl., App. 244. According

to Nosworthy, Nosworthy unholstered his firearm and told Wallace to move to the other side of

the lot. Nosworthy Decl., App. 244. Nosworthy then holstered his gun and drew his taser, believing

he “could better resolve the incident” that way. /d. at 244-45. Foster also had his taser drawn, while

the other officers held guns. Inv. Docs., App. 28.

In his affidavit, Foster asserts that he crouched near the front driver’s side wheel of the van

under which Madden hid and instructed Madden to drop the handgun. Foster Aff., App. 77. Around

the same time, Nosworthy moved to the corner of a nearby truck facing the white van where

Madden hid on the opposite side of Foster. Nosworthy Decl., App. 245. Madden refused to drop

the weapon and continued to “scream[] incoherently about his daughter.” Foster Aff., App. 77.

Again, Foster commanded Madden to drop the gun, and Madden refused to comply. /d. Foster

attempted to “talk [Madden] down,” but Madden stated he “needed to protect his daughter” and

that “the had taken cocaine.” Jd. Foster described Madden’s statements as “incoherent.” Jd. Madden

again placed his gun under his chin and “scream[ed] that he would kill himself.” Jd. Madden then

told the officers he wanted the police to kill him. /a@, While Foster attempted to speak with Madden

again, he heard “what sounded like [Madden] racking” his gun. Madden then announced he “put

a bullet in the chamber” and “would kill [the officers] if [they] did not kill him.” Jd. Madden began

to roll around underneath the van with his gun in hand, positioning his body with his back towards

Foster. According to Nosworthy, Madden repeated his threat to kill the officers multiple times.

Nosworthy Aff., App. 234.

Meanwhile, at approximately 7:55 p.m. that day, Gribbon and his partner officer Matthew

Rushing received a “Priority 1 crisis intervention call” over the radio in their squad car. Gribbon

Decl., App. 2. The radio transmission reported that a man with no shirt was pointing a handgun at

himself in the parking lot of a car dealership. Gribbon’s Body-Worn Camera, App. 1 at 00:50-

01:20. When Gribbon arrived, there were at least four police cars and eight officers. See id

Gribbon exited the vehicle with his gun drawn, ran to the parking lot, and joined the other officers

there.’ Id. at 04:50-05:10.

Gribbon maintains in his declaration that he saw Madden underneath the van surrounded

by other vehicles and officers who had their weapons out. Gribbon Decl., App. 3. Gribbon slowly

approached the van with his weapon, at first remaining approximately twenty feet away. Gribbon’s

Body-Worn Camera, App. | at 04:05-05:10. Gribbon warned the officers near him to watch the

crossfire and moved closer to Madden. /d. at 05:05. After telling officers to “get some cover,”

Gribbon approached Nosworthy, who remained bent down at the rear of a nearby van

approximately ten to fifteen feet away from the van covering Madden. Jd. at 05:16-05:18.

According to Foster, Foster tased Madden on his backside after he rolled on the ground with his

gun and positioned his back towards Foster. Foster Aff., App. 77. Madden screamed in response,

but Foster did not observe any other reaction. /d.; see Gribbon’s Body-Worn Camera, App. 1 at

05:19. Approximately one second after, Gribbon pointed at Madden and exclaimed “what the f**k

is he doing?” /d. at 05:20. Gribbon then squatted next to Nosworthy. Id.

* According to Gribbon, moments before arriving at the location, another officer relayed to him that Madden was

inside a vehicle with a female. Gribbon was “concerned that this situation could turn into a barricaded person with a

hostage.” Gribbon Decl., App. 3.

* Due to the camera angle, Madden remains out of view throughout the duration of the video.

A few seconds later, Gribbon claims he watched Madden, still facing Defendants, reach

for the pistol under his body, fumble it in his hands, then gain full control of it. Gribbon Decl.,

App. 3. Gribbon shouted at Madden, “Drop it. Drop it. Drop it. Drop it. Drop the Gun.” Gribbon’s

Body-Worn Camera at 05:26. Gribbon asserts that at the same time he shouted the demands,

Madden started turning the gun in Gribbon and Nosworthy’s direction. Gribbon Decl., App. 3.

Nosworthy tased Madden. Nosworthy Decl., App. 245; see Gribbon Decl., App. 3. Almost

simultaneously, “[rJight as the barrel [of Madden’s gun] was to the point where [Madden] could

shoot and kill [Gribbon],” Gribbon fired a single shot. Gribbon Decl., App. 3; see Gribbon’s Body-

Worn Camera at 05:26-05:28; Nosworthy Decl., App. 245. Madden did not appear to react to the

tasing, and the bullet from Gribbon’s shot missed Madden, striking the van’s front right wheel.

Id.; see Autopsy Report, App. 156-62 (indicating no gunshot wound); Inv. Does., App. 195.

Gribbon and other officers continued shouting at Madden to drop the gun; Madden still refused.

Gribbon’s Body-Worn Camera at 05:31-06:03.

Nosworthy and Gribbon continued to watch Madden with their weapons drawn. See id.

According to Foster, Madden “rolled onto his stomach” and “attempted to crawl away” with his

gun still in his hands. Foster Aff., App. 77. Foster tased Madden for the second time. Gribbon’s

Body-Worn Camera at 06:03-06:05. Foster did not notice a reaction from Madden. Foster Aff.,

App. 77. Madden began to crawl out from under the van. /d. Foster grabbed Madden, pulled him

off the floor, placed his arm behind his back, and recovered his weapon. /d. Other officers helped

Foster handcuff Madden and take him to a nearby curb. /d.

According to internal DPD investigation documents, including affidavits from officers, the

autopsy report, and investigation summaries, Madden still had foam around his mouth and was

conscious when police removed him from underneath the van. Inv. Docs., App. 61, 72; Autopsy

Report, App. 161. Officers immediately took him to a grassy area, “placed him on the ground,”

and put him “in an upright position.” Inv. Docs., App. 239. Madden “appeared responsive” and

spoke to the officers. Jd. One officer reported that he checked Madden for injuries and noticed cuts

and scrapes on Madden’s torso and legs and taser prongs in his upper torso. Jd. at 82. Another

officer noted that he saw two taser prongs in Madden’s torso. Jd. at 70, 82. Several minutes later,

Madden appeared to be “having an adverse reaction to drugs,” id at 61, and became

“unresponsive,” Autopsy Report, App. 161. When paramedics arrived, Madden remained

“minimally verbal” but “maintained a stable heart rate and blood pressure.” Jd. The paramedics

removed the taser prongs from Madden, Inv. Docs, App. 76, and transported him to the hospital

by ambulance. /d. at 61, 72. On route, one officer noted Madden had his eyes open, although he

did not appear to blink during the ride. /d. at 72.

According to the Autopsy Report, Madden, still conscious, arrived at the emergency room

with a “right pneumothorax,” “possible liver laceration,” and “right flank hematoma.” Autopsy

Report, App. 157. There, Madden suffered a seizure and was intubated. /d. at 161. His drug screen

tested positive for cocaine, amphetamines, and cannabinoids. /d. First responders from Dallas-Fire

Rescue reported their “primary impression” of his condition to be “Drug Use/Overdose —

Cocaine.” Prehospital Care Report Summary, App. 146. Over the course of the next two months,

Madden’s condition “deteriorated,” as he suffered “[ml]ultiorgan system failure,” “fungemia,”

“necrotic extremities” and brain hemorrhages. Autopsy Report, App. 161-62.

Madden ultimately died on July 28, 2019. Cause of Death Report, App. 141. The sole cause

of death indicated in his medical records was the “[t]oxic effects of cocaine and amphetamines.”*

Id. And the manner of death was listed as “accident.” Cause of Death Report, App. 141; Autopsy

‘ In their Response Brief, Plaintiffs argue—without offering evidence—that the officers’ tasing of Madden was a

“direct causation” of Madden’s death. Resp. Br. 4.

Report, App. 156-62. The autopsy explains that the drug effects, “superimposed on psychiatric

disease likely exaggerated [Madden’s] bizarre behavior” leading to the police confrontation where

“he was tased . . . with several discharges . . . [and] became unresponsive after several minutes

following taser discharge.” Autopsy Report, App. 161. The origin of the pneumothorax was

“unclear as there were no rib fractures identified by CT scan or autopsy.” Jd.

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants, other officers,> and the City of Dallas on May 21,

2021. See ECF No. 1. Defendants now move for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIv. P. 56(a); see also Brumfield v. Hollins, 551

F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.”

Anderson y. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists

“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” □□□

The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant meets his burden by informing the Court

of the basis of his motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no

genuine material fact issues. /d.; FED. R. Civ. P. 56.

When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must decide

all reasonable doubt and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,, 853

> Plaintiffs filed suit against “Other John Doe Police Officers” but have not amended their Complaint to identify

these parties. See Second Am. Compl. [ECF No. 26].

F.2d 355, 358 (Sth Cir. 1988). The Court cannot make a credibility determination in light of

conflicting evidence or competing inferences. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. As long as there appears

to be some support for the disputed allegations such that “reasonable minds could differ as to the

import of the evidence,” the motion for summary judgment must be denied. /d. at 250.

The nonmoving party, however, “cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory

allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.’” Davis v. Fort Bend Cty.,

765 F.3d 480, 497 n.20 (Sth Cir. 2014) (citing Little y. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th

Cir. 1994)).

B. Qualified Immunity

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, private citizens may sue public officials for violations of their

federal statutory or constitutional rights. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).

Section 1983, however, shields public officials from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified

immunity “so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)

(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). This “gives government officials

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5 (2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The qualified immunity defense has two prongs: (1) whether an official’s conduct violated

a statutory or constitutional right of the plaintiff; and (2) whether the right was “clearly

established” at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001), overruled

in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223. “A court may rest its analysis on either prong.” Dyer v. Houston,

964 F.3d 374, 380 (Sth Cir. 2020) (citing Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 385 (5th Cir. 2011)

(en banc)); see Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

An officer’s invocation of qualified immunity “alters the usual summary judgment burden

of proof.” Brown y. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010); see Hathaway v. Bazany, 507

F.3d 312, 319 (Sth Cir. 2007). Once the movant asserts the affirmative defense of qualified

immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “rebut the defense by establishing that the official’s

allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that genuine issues of material

fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the official’s conduct.” Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective

& Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir. 2008). However, “all inferences are [still] drawn in

[the plaintiff's] favor.” Brown, 623 F.3d at 253.

“To negate a defense of qualified immunity and avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff

need not present ‘absolute proof,’ but must offer more than ‘mere allegations.’” Manis v. Lawson,

585 F.3d 839, 843 (Sth Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). The Court should not accept the

plaintiffs version of the facts when the video evidence “‘blatantly contradict[s]’ and ‘utterly

discredit[s]’” them. Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hanks v. Rogers,

853 F.3d 738, 744 (Sth Cir. 2017) (citation omitted)).

Ill. ANALYSIS

A. Violation of Constitutional Right

The Fourth Amendment confers the right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A seizure is unreasonable if it involves excessive force. Graham

vy. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). To state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) an injury (2) which resulted directly and

only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly

unreasonable.” Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016). Because “inquiries regarding

whether a use of force was ‘clearly excessive’ or ‘clearly unreasonable . . . are often intertwined,’”

courts often consider those questions together. Hanks, 853 F.3d at 744 (quoting Poole v. City of

Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012)). An injury is “generally legally cognizable when it

results from a degree of force that is constitutionally impermissible—that is, objectively

unreasonable under the circumstances.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501 (5th Cir. 2008).

1) Reasonableness of Force

The Court must determine the reasonableness of the use of force “from the perspective of

a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396. “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers

are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Jd. at 396-

97. This inquiry “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Jd. at 396; see also Joseph on behalf of Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319,

342 (3th Cir. 2020) (holding that the use of force must be proportionate “to the situation”); Deville

v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (Sth Cir. 2009) (“Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-

intensive.”). The totality of the circumstances must justify the particular use of force. See Ramirez

v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 2008).

The ultimate inquiry is whether the force used was reasonable “under the facts as a

reasonable officer would perceive them.” Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313 (Sth Cir. 2016)

(emphasis in original). In analyzing Defendant’s use of force, the Court considers “only the facts

10

that were knowable” to Defendant at the time. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per

curiam); see Brown, 623 F.3d at 253 (“An official’s actions must be judged in light of the

circumstances that confronted him, without the benefit of hindsight.”).

i. Gribbon’s Use of Force

Plaintiffs’ only charge of excessive force against Gribbon is the firing of a single shot from

his duty weapon. Resp. Br. 5-6. The bullet did not strike Madden. See id.

Gribbon’s gunshot during the confrontation between the officers and Madden was

objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Of the factors identified in Graham, “whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others” is of utmost importance in

this case. 490 U.S. at 396. For cases where deadly force is involved, the Fifth Circuit has narrowed

the excessive force inquiry to “whether the [officer] was in danger at the moment of the threat that

resulted in the [officer’s] shooting.” Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Bazan ex rel. Bazan y. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 493 (5th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, the Court

“need not look at any other moment in time.” Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 993 (Sth Cir.

2011). Where a suspect poses a “significant and imminent threat of serious harm” to one or more

officers, the use of deadly force in response to the threat is justified. Rockwell, 664 F.3d at 991-

92; see also Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506, 510 (Sth Cir. 2012) (“The use of deadly force is

constitutional when the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.”’).

When considering the threat posed to an officer, the Fifth Circuit gives great weight to

whether a suspect is armed and defiant. In Knoulton, the Fifth Circuit held that an officer’s shooting

of an “armed, emotionally unstable, and potentially suicidal” suspect in a car was reasonable. 542

F.3d at 131. The suspect there refused to obey orders to show his hands, the officers saw he held

a gun, and the suspect briefly put his hands together in what “could reasonably be interpreted as a

11

threatening gesture.” /d. Similarly, in Garza v. Briones, the Fifth Circuit held that officers who

fired sixty-one shots at an armed suspect at a truck stop—shooting him eighteen times and killing

him—was reasonable when the suspect refused to obey requests to drop his weapon and raised a

gun in the direction of an officer. 943 F.3d 740, 748 (Sth Cir. 2019). And in Wilson v. City of

Bastrop, the Fifth Circuit held that the officers’ shooting and killing of an armed, fleeing suspect

was reasonable when the suspect previously ran toward an officer and refused multiple demands

to drop his gun. 26 F.4th 709, 715-16 (Sth Cir. 2022).

The Fifth Circuit has also upheld the use of deadly force when a suspect does not carry a

firearm but refuses to obey instructions. See Elizondo, 671 F.3d at 510 (holding that officer acted

reasonably when he shot a suicidal suspect four times when the suspect failed to comply with

commands to drop his knife, moved closer to the officer, and “raised the knife in a threatening

motion”); Mace vy. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 624-25 (Sth Cir. 2003) (holding that it was not

unreasonable for officer to shoot intoxicated suspect who brandished a sword after he failed to

respond to officers’ directives to drop the weapon and raised the weapon at the officers from

approximately eight to ten feet away); Rockwell, 664 F.3d at 991-92 (holding that it was

objectively reasonable for officers to shoot a suspect who carried two knives and charged in the

direction of “one or more” officers).

Here, Gribbon faced an “immediate threat” to his own safety and the safety of others.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. He was confronted with an “armed, emotionally unstable, and

potentially suicidal” suspect. Knoulton, 542 F.3d at 131. Despite being directed several times to

drop his weapon, Madden defied the orders, continued to shout and threaten suicide, and moved

around under the van with a weapon in possession. See Wilson, 26 F.4th 709 at 715-16 (permitting

deadly force where armed suspect refused requests to drop his weapon while he fled from police).

12

Madden then pointed his gun directly at Gribbon from no more than fifteen feet away.® Clearly

responding to much more than a “threatening gesture,” Gribbon fired a single shot. Knoulton, 542

F.3d at 131; see Garza, 943 F.3d at 748 (permitting deadly force against suspect who pointed gun

at officer); see also Wilson, 26 F.4th at 714 (“[W]e have never required officers to wait until a

defendant turns towards them, with weapon in hand, before applying deadly force to ensure their

safety.”) (quoting Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 279 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016)).

The undisputed facts demonstrate that Gribbon resorted to deadly force only after Foster

attempted to calm Madden down, Foster and Nosworthy tased Madden, and other officers

repeatedly shouted at Madden to drop his weapon. See Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332-33 (describing that

“measured and ascending actions that correspond to a suspect’s escalating verbal and physical

resistance” are constitutionally permissible); see also Knoulton, 542 F.3d at 131 (holding deadly

force to be permissible when perceived threat of harm is severe even when officer did not attempt

to use non-deadly force first). Gribbon, operating under rapidly evolving circumstances, was “not

require[d] .. . to wait until [Madden shot his gun] to confirm that a serious threat of harm exist[ed].”

Id. at 130 (quoting Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Wilson, 26 F.4th

at 715 (holding that even if suspect never aimed his gun at the officer, officers “could have

reasonably thought [suspect] posed a serious threat to onlookers”), Gribbon responded with actions

that corresponded to Madden’s escalating verbal and physical resistance, acts he “reasonably

perceived” to constitute a threat to his life and the lives of others. Griggs, 841 F.3d at 313.

Plaintiffs’ allegations that Gribbon “did not know what was on Madden” or what Madden “was doing under the van”

is belied by the objective evidence. Resp. Br. 4. The body-worn camera footage submitted by both parties clearly

demonstrates that Gribbon knew Madden was armed and suicidal. See Gribbon’s Body- Worn Camera at 00:50-01:20

(officer transmitting information to Gribbon via radio before he arrived on the scene that Madden was pointing a

handgun at himself); id. at 05:26 (Gribbon commanding Madden to drop his gun multiple times before Gribbon

discharged his weapon); see also Gribbon Decl., App. 3. The video evidence, therefore, “‘blatantly contradict|s]’ and

‘utterly discredit[s]*” Plaintiffs’ version of the facts. Renfroe, 974 F.3d at 599 (citation omitted) (quoting Hanks, 853

F.3d at 744),

13

Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Gribbon, encountering an

armed, noncompliant suspect, used objectively reasonable force when he discharged his firearm

in Madden’s direction.

iii Nosworthy’s Use of Force

In viewing Gribbon’s body-worn camera footage and reconciling it with other evidence in

the record, the Court discerns three distinct taser discharges: one at 05:19 by Foster; the second at

05:26 by Nosworthy, occurring on video less than a second before Gribbon shot his firearm; and

the last at 06:03 by Foster. See Gribbon’s Body-Worn Camera; see also Inv. Rept., App. 28. On

the issue of Nosworthy’s use of force, the Court turns to whether the second taser discharge was

unreasonable.

The Court considers “[t]he timing, amount, and form of a suspect’s resistance” when

determining whether the force was reasonable. Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332-33 (internal citations and

quotations omitted). A suspect’s failure to obey commands “may indicate physical force is

justified.” Jd. When selecting a constitutionally appropriate degree of force, the officer must use

“measured and ascending actions that correspond to a suspect’s escalating verbal and physical

resistance.” Jd. Active resistance likely justifies more force than passive resistance. See id.

The Fifth Circuit has upheld qualified immunity defenses where officers tased unarmed

suspects who failed to comply with police demands. See Buchanan v. Gulfport Police Dep’t, 530

F. App’x 307, 314 (Sth Cir. 2013) (“[W]here a suspect resists arrest or fails to follow police orders,

officers do not violate his right against excessive force by deploying their tasers to subdue him.”);

Poole, 691 F.3d at 626 (holding the use of tasers was not unreasonable where a suspect resisted

arrest and officers ceased the use of the taser after “arrestee was handcuffed and subdued”); Cloud

v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384-85 (Sth Cir. 2021) (holding officer’s use of taser multiple times on

14

suspect was reasonable when suspect’s actions prevented officer from completing the arrest and

explaining that the Fifth Circuit pays “particular attention to whether officers faced active

resistance when they resorted to a taser”).

In Carroll v. Ellington, the Fifth Circuit held that an “officer’s application of a [t]aser to

an unarmed, seated suspect who fail[ed] to comply with an order to get on the ground” constituted

reasonable force. 800 F.3d 154, 174 (Sth Cir. 2015). There, an officer tased the suspect five times

in a short time period when the suspect continued to ignore police directions. Jd. Similarly, in

Ramirez v. Escajeda, the court granted an officer qualified immunity when he responded to a 9-1-

1 call regarding a suicidal suspect, found the suspect in the process of hanging himself, the suspect

refused the officer’s commands to show his hands, the officer tased him in response, and the

suspect died soon after. 44 F.4th 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2022). In determining whether the officer’s

conduct was reasonable, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the suspect was out of custody, creating

a tense and uncertain situation for the officer, and the officer feared the suspect had a weapon,

increasing the threat of harm. /d. at 293-94; see also Ramirez, v. Guadarrama, 844 F. App’x 710,

717 (Sth Cir. 2021).

Here, Madden posed a significant and immediate threat of harm to himself and others. First,

Madden was not in custody, presenting a greater threat than if he was subdued. See Escajeda, 44

F.4th at 293-94 (highlighting that officer did not have suspect “subdued” or under his control when

he tased him, creating a “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situation”) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Madden openly brandished a gun and refused to obey multiple police requests to

drop his weapon. See Wilson, 26 F.4th at 715-16. Madden threatened to use his firearm on himself

and officers. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 7 (reversing the denial of qualified immunity where suspect

“threatened to shoot police officers” and “was moments away from encountering” police). Finally,

15

Madden pointed the weapon in Nosworthy and Gribbon’s direction. See Garza, 943 F.3d at 748.

In light of this threat, Nosworthy deployed non-lethal force. He gave Madden the opportunity to

comply with Foster’s attempted negotiation, orders, and taser stun first before using his own taser.

Contra Newman vy. Guedry, 703 F.3d 7557, 762-763 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding police tasing

unreasonable where officer “immediately resorted to taser and nightstick without attempting to use

physical skill, negotiation, or even commands”).

As such, the Court finds that Nosworthy acted reasonably under the totality of the

circumstances and did not violate Madden’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force.

2) Causation of Injury

Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs fail to establish the

causation element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which requires a plaintiff to prove that the injury

resulted “directly and only from” the use of excessive force. Cooper, 844 F.3d at 522. For an injury

to result “directly and only from” excessive force, the force must be a “contributory cause” of

death or injury. See Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 444 (Sth Cir. 1998); Goode v.

Baggett, 811 F. App’x 227, 231 (Sth Cir. 2020); see also Jones v. Hosemann, 812 F. App’x 235,

238 (Sth Cir. 2020)(“Only when those individual actions ‘proximately cause[]’ the

plaintiff's injury can that plaintiff seek relief under § 1983.”).

In the present case, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ actions—‘having two or more

police officers discharge their tasers, if not simultaneously, very close in time together immediately

after another police officer discharged his firearm”—“direct[ly] caus[ed]” or “played an integral

part” in Madden’s death. Resp. Br. 4, 6. Plaintiffs further claim Madden’s “symptoms at the time

of [hospital] admission,” including “cardiac arrest, seizure[,] RT Pneumothorax, and other severe

16

medical complications” “were directly consistent with known effects of tasing and more

specifically excessive tasing.” Second Am. Compl. § 13.

The Cause of Death Report and Autopsy Report, however, state unequivocally that the

cause of Madden’s death was the “[t]oxic effects of cocaine and amphetamines” and that the

manner of death was an “accident.” App. 141, 156; see also id. at 146 (Prehospital Care Report

Summary noting the healthcare providers’ primary impression as “Drug Use/Overdose—

Cocaine”). Plaintiffs present no evidence otherwise. Plaintiffs have not proved that Madden’s

death or injuries resulted directly and only from Gribbon’s missed gunshot or Nosworthy’s tasing.

While the autopsy report indicates the origin of Madden’s pneumothorax is unclear, Plaintiffs do

not submit any evidence to support their claim or negate the medical records regarding Madden’s

cause of death. Accordingly, their claims are relegated to “mere allegations.” Manis, 585 F.3d at

843.

B. Clearly Established Right

In addition, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity

because Plaintiffs have not met their “heavy” and “demanding” burden of showing that

Defendants’ use of force violated a clearly established right. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870,

874 (Sth Cir. 2019); Mendez v. Poitevent, 823 F.3d 326, 331 (Sth Cir. 2016).

To constitute a violation of a clearly established right, case law must place the

constitutional question “beyond debate.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “Pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest

or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government

agent that what the defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.” Pierce v. Smith,

117 F.3d 866, 882 (Sth Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted). “[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly

17

instructed that clearly established law is not to be defined at a high level of generality. This is

particularly true in recent years.” Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 173 (Sth Cir. 2021)

(emphasis in original) (citing City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019); Kisela v.

Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018); Mullenix, 577 U.S. 7). “[O]utside of an obvious case, the law is

only clearly established if a prior case exists where an officer acting under similar

circumstances ... was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Hanks, 853 F.3d at 747

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting White, 137 S. Ct. at 552).

Plaintiffs do not cite any case law that supports the conclusion that Defendants violated a

clearly established right. Indeed, they cannot do so. The Fifth Circuit has denied the existence of

a clearly established right in cases where officers shot and killed suicidal or potentially violent

suspects. See, e.g., Mace, 333 F.3d at 624-25 (holding there was no excessive force when officers

shot intoxicated suspect who brandished a sword and refused to obey orders to drop the weapon);

Knoulton, 542 F.3d at 131 (holding there was no excessive force when officers shot suspect who

was mentally unstable, armed, and moving his hands in a threatening manner); Harris, 745 F.3d

at 770, 772-73 (finding no constitutional violation where officers breached open bedroom door

and shot suicidal suspect after he raised a knife over his head and advanced toward them).

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has denied finding a clearly established right where an officer fired

multiple taser strikes in a short timespan at a suspect who remained seated, unarmed, and did not

threaten violence. See Carroll, 800 F.3d at 174 (holding that officer who fired taser five times at

an “unarmed, seated suspect who fail[ed] to comply with an order to get on the ground” did not

violate clearly established law). Thus, even when officers used more force than that utilized by

Defendants, against suspects who posed less of threat than Madden, the Fifth Circuit has declined

finding a violation of a clearly established right.

18

Plaintiffs have not identified any clearly established law that is particularized to the facts

at issue. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. As the Fifth

Circuit recently held, “[t]he specificity requirement assumes special significance in excessive force

cases, where officers must make split-second decisions to use force.” Harmon v. City of Arlington,

Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1166 (Sth Cir. 2021).

IV. CONCLUSION

Viewing the facts and deciding all reasonable doubt and inferences in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs, Defendants Jason Gribbon and Dudley Nosworthy’s Motion for Summary

Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity [ECF No. 38] is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED September 12, 2022.

DO Pole

eee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.