Rascon v. Perryton Independent School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | Nowrtinevpisie □□ □□

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PILED

AMARILLO DIVISION

ANGELICA RASCON, § creak US. DISTRICT CONRT

Plaintiff, : SEE

V. : 2:21-CV-068-Z-BR

PERRYTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL :

DISTRICT, et al., §

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (ECF No. 41),

filed on May 13, 2022. Having considered the Motion, pleadings, and relevant law, the Court

GRANTS the Motion and renders summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on all claims.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Perryton Independent School District (“Perryton ISD”) employed Plaintiff

Angelica Rascon (“Plaintiff”) for nine years as a teacher and behavior coordinator at multiple

schools. ECF No. 42 at 9. During the 2017-18 school year, Plaintiff worked as a special education

teacher at Wright Elementary School and served as a mentor to Samantha Latham, a teacher at

Williams Intermediate School. /d. at 10.

In early February 2018, Latham reported Defendant Read Cates — principal of Williams

Intermediate School — to the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) for

“improper conduct.” Jd. Plaintiff advised Latham to file said report. Jd. But Plaintiff did not

witness the reported event or make her own report. /d. Nor was Plaintiff interviewed for the DFPS

investigation into the incident. Jd. Neither Defendant Perryton ISD nor DFPS initiated disciplinary

action against Defendant Cates. Id.

During the 2018-19 school year, Plaintiff served as a campus behavior specialist at Wright

Elementary School. /d. In June 2019, the principal of Wright Elementary School recommended

Plaintiff for the position of assistant principal. Jd. However, Plaintiff previously failed the requisite

Texas principal certification exam five times and was therefore ineligible. Jd. Defendant Perryton

ISD ultimately decided not to fill the assistant principal position for the 2019-20 school year in

order to recover from a two-year budget deficit. Jd. at 10-11. Accordingly, Plaintiff continued to

serve Wright Elementary School as a campus behavior coordinator during the 2019-20 school

year. Id. at 10.

In October 2019, an unnamed teacher reported to Defendant Cates that Plaintiff was using

a Perryton ISD printer “to print materials for a business that Plaintiff ran outside of her school

responsibilities.” Jd at 11. Because Defendant Cates was neither Plaintiffs supervisor nor

assigned to Plaintiff's campus, he forwarded the teacher’s report to Defendant Perryton ISD’s

then-serving superintendent. Jd. Although Plaintiff originally alleged she used a printer she had

purchased herself and that Defendant Cates’ report was made in retaliation, Plaintiff has since

conceded her initial allegations were untrue. /d. In fact, Plaintiff printed documents for her

personal business on the school’s computer for which the school did not seek reimbursement. Jd.

During the summer of 2020, Defendant Perryton ISD hired Defendant James Mireles as

superintendent and Defendant Maria Gomez-Rocque as assistant superintendent. Jd. For the 2020—

21 school year, Defendant Perryton ISD promoted Plaintiff to a new, two-year contracted central

administration position as the district’s instructional and behavior support services coordinator. □□□

In this new role, Plaintiff would be responsible for “coordinating instructional support programs

and behavior services for general and special education students in Pre-Kindergarten through 12th

grade.” Jd. at 12. As the district behavior support services coordinator, Plaintiff was tasked with

training, modeling, and supporting district staff in implementing appropriate student services. Jd.

Plaintiffs new position required her to complete a needs assessment for special education staffing

at Defendant Perryton ISD’s campuses. Jd. For the assessment, Plaintiff would compare the

number of special needs students to special education staff at each campus to determine whether

staffing levels required adjustments. Jd.

In October 2020 — while performing the needs assessment — Plaintiff discovered

confidential information about a Williams Intermediate student who Plaintiff previously taught at

Wright Elementary. Jd. Plaintiff contacted the student’s parents without informing Williams

Intermediate staff. Jd. Defendant Cates characterized this action as a “breach of confidentiality”

because he believed it was inappropriate for Plaintiff to use student information for purposes

irrelevant to her needs assessment duty. /d. at 13.

That same month, Perryton High School administrators complained about the plan Plaintiff

developed. Jd. This plan involved fundamental changes to the special education program and

schedules for students and staff. Jd. Soon after, Defendant Gomez-Rocque promulgated a “consent

for services” form (““Rascon Form”) campus administrators were required to sign before Plaintiff

could implement her recommendations. Jd. Defendant Gomez-Rocque designed and initiated use

of the Rascon Form to ensure campus administrators agreed on the scope of services to be

provided. Id.

On February 22, 2021, Defendants Mireles and Gomez-Rocque met with Plaintiff to

discuss concerns about Plaintiff's job performance. Jd. The meeting followed complaints from

administrators across multiple campuses, all of which requested Plaintiff not provide services at

their campuses. /d. at 14. The parties discussed eliminating Plaintiff's behavioral support

job duties. Jd. But no changes were made, and Plaintiff's contract remained intact — giving her an

additional year to improve her performance. Jd.

In April 2021, Plaintiff accepted a position with Prosper Independent School District as a

campus behavior specialist. Jd. Plaintiff did not inform Defendant Perryton ISD she would need

to resign from her position until the first week of July 2021. Id. On April 13, 2021, Plaintiff sued

Defendants for violations of: (1) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 79; and (2)

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seg. Defendants

now move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if its existence or non-existence “might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

“{T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” /d. at 248. A genuine issue of

material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Jd. The movant must inform the court of the basis of the motion and show from

the record that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327

(1986). “The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the

record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.” Ragas

v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (Sth Cir. 1998).

When reviewing summary-judgment evidence, the court must resolve all reasonable doubts

and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Walker v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). A court cannot make a credibility determination

when considering conflicting evidence or competing inferences. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. If

some evidence supports a disputed allegation, so that “reasonable minds could differ as to the

import of the evidence,” the court must deny the motion. Jd. at 250.

ANALYSIS

Title II of the ADA provides “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

42 US.C. § 12132. Like Title II, Section 504 provides that no qualified individual with a disability

“shall solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

“The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act generally are interpreted in pari materia.” Frame v.

City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (Sth Cir. 2011). Each is “enforceable through an implied

private right of action.” Jd. at 224. And each is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas three step

burden-shifting framework requiring: (1) a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; (2) a

defendant must then put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action;

and (3) the plaintiff must then prove the defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual. See Jenkins v.

Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 316-17 (Sth Cir. 2007); Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d

1112, 1121-22 (Sth Cir. 1998).

A. Plaintiff Fails to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title II

and Section 504 because Plaintiff's evidence is based on her own “subjective beliefs,” rather than

a genuine issue of material fact. ECF No. 42 at 14-15. The prima facie elements of an unlawful

retaliation claim under Title II and Section 504 are essentially the same. See Feist v. Louisiana,

730 F.3d 450, 454 (Sth Cir. 2013) (Title II); Calderon v. Potter, 113 F. App’x 586, 592 & n.1 (5th

Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (Section 504). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff

must show: (1) she engaged in “protected activity”; (2) her employer took an “adverse employment

action” against her; and (3) a “causal connection” existed between the “adverse employment

action” and “protected activity.” Calderon, 113 F. App’x at 592 & n.1.

1. Plaintiff engaged in protected activity.

The first prong requires Plaintiff to show she engaged in a “protected activity.” Section

504 incorporates the standards used to determine employment discrimination under Title I (42

USS.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), Sections 501-504, and 510 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-04, 12210) of the ADA.

See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). Section 12203 of the ADA prohibit retaliation and coercion against

individuals engaged in ADA-protected conduct.

(a) Retaliation

No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has

opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such

individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.

(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual

in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or

enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual

in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.

Section 504 also incorporates the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in the Civil Rights Act

of 1964’s Title VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seg.) and Section 706(e)(3) of Title VII (42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5) applying to claims of discrimination in compensation. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).

Plaintiff alleges she engaged in protected conduct by: (1) “[a]dvising and directing that

Latham file a report with DFPS after Latham witnessed [Defendant] Cates dragging a student with

a disability across the floor of the school and into a classroom”; (2) “[a]dvocating during a public

school board meeting that the incident should be investigated in the best interest of the student;

and/or” (3) “[a]dvocating, over [Defendant] Cates’ opposition, that the student with special needs,

M.R., be permitted to return to campus from homebound status because it was in his best interest.”

ECF No. 48 at 9-10.' Defendants do not argue Plaintiff did not engage in a “protected activity.”

Instead, Defendants focus on the legality of their own actions. See generally ECF No. 42.

“An individual engages in protected activity under the ADA when he ‘oppose[s] any act or

practice made unlawful by [the ADA].’” Girasole v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-

01560-X, 2022 WL 3081576, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2022) (quoting St. John v. Sirius Sols.,

LLLP, 299 F. App’x 308, 309 (Sth Cir. 2008)) (alteration in original). “The individual need not

ultimately be correct about the unlawfulness of the activity in question.” Jd. “Common examples

of protected activities are formal complaints of discrimination or reporting a public school’s failure

to provide a free, appropriate public education to students with disabilities.” Huber v. Blue Cross

& Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., No. 20-3059, 2022 WL 1528564, at *6 (E.D. La. May 13, 2022); see

also Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Protected activities

are those statutorily protected under the ADA, including opposing or complaining about

discrimination based on disability.”). Based on the actions Plaintiff alleges, the Court FINDS

Plaintiff engaged in “protected activity.”

The Court acknowledges Plaintiff's Response characterizes her former Title II claim as a Title VII claim under the

Civil Rights Act of 1964. See ECF No. 48 at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). Recognizing that

the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are interpreted in pari materia and Defendants’ acknowledgement that the method

of analysis for retaliation claims is the same under Title VII as applied to claims under Section 504 and the ADA, the

Court construes Plaintiff's Title VII claim in her Response as a retaliation claim under Title II and Section 504. See

ECF No. 42 at 15 n.2.

2. Defendants did not take “adverse employment action” against Plaintiff.

The second prong requires Defendant to take “adverse employment action” against

Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges Defendants took seven “adverse employment actions” against her. To

prove an “adverse employment action” occurred, Plaintiff must show “that a reasonable employee

would have found the challenged action materially adverse.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).

“Materially adverse” means the action at issue would have dissuaded a reasonable worker

from engaging in the protected conduct because it produces “injury or harm.” Jd. at 67-68.

Materially adverse employment decisions include “discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals

to promote, and reprimands.” Juarez v. Aguilar, 666 F.3d 325, 332 (Sth Cir. 2011). But trivial

harms such as “petty slights, minor annoyances and simple lack of good manners” do not constitute

materially “adverse employment actions.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. “Even taken in a light

most favorable to [the nonmovant], allegations of unpleasant work meetings, verbal reprimands, _

improper work requests, and unfair treatment do not constitute actionable adverse employment

actions as discrimination or retaliation.” King v. Louisiana, 294 F. App’x 77, 85 (Sth Cir. 2008).

a. Defendant did not take “adverse employment action” against Plaintiff by declining to

promote her to assistant principal.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants denied her the assistant principal position because she

reported an incident involving Defendant Cates and a disabled student. ECF No. 48 at 10-11.

In June 2019, Wright Elementary School recommended Plaintiff for the position of assistant

principal — a position Plaintiff ultimately failed to obtain.? ECF No. 48 at 11-12.

2 At this time, Defendants Mireles and Gomez-Roque were not yet employed by Defendant Perryton ISD, and

Defendant Cates was not involved in Wright Elementary School’s hiring decisions. ECF No. 42 at 17.

To earn a principal certificate issued by the State Board of Educator Certification, Texas

law requires an educator to complete an approved principal preparation program and pass the

appropriate exam. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 241.20. A candidate seeking certification cannot retake

the exam more than four times, absent good cause. /d. § 230.21. Plaintiff failed the exam five times

and was, therefore, ineligible to take the exam again. ECF No. 42 at 17. Defendants claim Plaintiff

was not hired for this reason.

Plaintiff argues Defendants’ “lack of certification” reason is pretext because a school

district may assign an educator to perform the duties of an assistant principal under a teacher

contract while the educator works to complete state-law requirements to become a principal. ECF

No. 48 at 11. Plaintiff notes Defendant Perryton ISD has hired assistant principals who have failed

to pass the principal exam multiple times and remain uncertified. Jd. Plaintiff — however —

cannot point to another candidate for the assistant principal position who has failed the principal

certification five times and, therefore, is disqualified from obtaining the relevant certification. ECF

No. 48 at 11. Defendants did not refuse to promote Plaintiff to assistant principal; they could not

promote Plaintiff to assistant principal. Moreover, Plaintiff's claim of adverse retaliatory action is

weakened by the fact that Defendants promoted Plaintiff to district behavior support services

coordinator. ECF No. 42 at 18. Accordingly, the Court FINDS Defendants did not take “adverse

employment action” against Plaintiff by declining to promote her to a position for which she was

disqualified — and perhaps, by extension, unqualified — under Texas law.

b. Defendant did not take “adverse employment action” against Plaintiff in any other of

the six manners alleged.

First, Plaintiff claims Defendants took an “adverse employment action” by excluding her

“from working with the very students she was hired to serve and [from] collaboration with her

colleagues in order to provide those services.” ECF No. 1 at 9. As district behavior support services

coordinator, Plaintiff's core employment role was to train and model behavior interventions for

teachers to implement with students. ECF No. 42 at 12. Plaintiff was not hired to provide direct

services to students or intervene in helping students make educational decisions. /d. at 12; ECF

No. 43 at 95-97. But even if she was, changes in employment duties that do not alter core

employment criteria are not “adverse employment actions.” See Williams v. Barnhill’s Buffet Inc.,

290 F. App’x 759, 762 (Sth Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Prew v. Llano Indep. Sch. Dist., No. A-13-

CA-144-SS, 2013 WL 3994188, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2013). Because Plaintiffs core

employment role remained the same during her tenure as a district administrator, Plaintiff fails to

allege an “adverse employment action.”

Second, Plaintiff claims Defendant took an “adverse employment action” by imposing

“restrictions and requirements prior to servicing students with disabilities that are not imposed on

any other instructional coach, including the requirement to obtain written consent before servicing

a student at certain campuses.” ECF No. 1 at 9. In October 2020, Defendant Gomez-Rocque and

Plaintiff the Rascon Form in response to complaints from campus administrators that Plaintiff

continually acted beyond the scope of her job duties. ECF No. 42 at 19. Plaintiff alleges the Rascon

Form’s creation constitutes an adverse action because it restricts her ability to serve students with

disabilities. Jd. But again, alterations in employment duties do not constitute actionable “adverse

employment actions.” See Williams, 290 F. App’x at 762 (“An employee does not suffer a tangible

employment action when a supervisor merely ‘change[s] her work schedule and ask[s] her to

perform tasks which she had not previously been asked to perform.’” (quoting Watts v. Kroger

Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (Sth Cir. 1999))).

Third, Plaintiff claims “false accusations by [Defendant] Cates that [Plaintiff] was using

school property for personal use and that she breached student confidentiality” constituted

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“adverse employment actions.” ECF No. 1 at 9. As for the first of these allegedly false accusations,

Plaintiff agrees she used a school printer for personal business. See ECF No. 43 at 29-31.

Therefore, Defendants rightly assert Defendant Cates accurately reported Plaintiff's misconduct.

ECF No. 42 at 20. And as for the second, Defendant Cates believed it was inappropriate for

Plaintiff to use student information for a purpose other than her assigned duty to complete the

needs assessment. Jd. Defendant Cates neither served as Plaintiff's supervisor nor was Plaintiff

reprimanded for Defendant Cates’ report. ECF No. 42 at 20-21. Defendant Cates’ accusations are

akin to “verbal reprimands, improper work requests, [or] unfair treatment,” which do not constitute

actionable “adverse employment actions.” King, 294 F. App’x at 85 (internal marks omitted).

Fourth, Plaintiff claims “threats by [Defendant] Cates that [Plaintiff] would be reported to

the Texas Education Association and lose her teaching certification” constituted “adverse

employment actions.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Empty, verbal threats failing to cause injury are not “adverse

employment actions.” Cf, Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (Sth Cir. 1997).

Fifth, Plaintiff claims “threats that [Plaintiff's] contract would be amended to exclude her

role as behavioral specialist, would not be renewed and/or that she would be reassigned to an

undesirable position within the district” constituted “adverse employment actions.” ECF No. 1 at

9. In February 2021, Defendants Mireles and Gomez-Rocque met with Plaintiff to address

complaints related to Plaintiff's job performance. ECF No. 42 at 21. Despite these complaints,

Defendants did not terminate Plaintiff. Jd. at 22. Instead, Plaintiff retained her job for the next

school year. Jd. Defendants — however — clarified performance expectations for that year. Jd.

If placing an employee on a performance improvement plan is not an “ultimate employment

decision” constituting an “adverse employment action,” then discussing job-related complaints

with Plaintiff is not either. Welsh v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 941 F.3d 818, 824 (Sth Cir. 2019).

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Sixth, Plaintiff claims “since the time [Defendant Perryton ISD] received notification that

[Plaintiff] retained counsel, unlawful discrimination and/or retaliation and imposition of additional

work directives that cannot reasonably be accomplished” have occurred and constitute “adverse

employment actions.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Defendants assert Plaintiff is unable to identify “additional

work directives that were not consistent with her job description, which Plaintiff assisted in

developing.” ECF No. 42 at 22. Plaintiff only identifies minor requests for assistance. For instance,

being asked to help with reading instruction twice a week and to complete “Rage to Reason”

behavioral program training for certain staff at Williams Intermediate. Jd. at 23. These directives

did not constitute “adverse employment actions.” See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. Again, an

“adverse employment action” must be “materially adverse.” That is, it must dissuade a reasonable

worker from engaging in protected conduct because the action produces “injury or harm.” Jd. at

67-68. Trivial harms — such as “petty slights” and “minor annoyances” — do not constitute

materially “adverse employment actions.” Jd. at 68; see also King, 294 F. App’x at 85

(“[A]llegations of...improper work requests...do not constitute actionable adverse

employment actions as discrimination or retaliation.”).

c. Defendant did not take “adverse employment action” against Plaintiff in any other of

the six manners alleged.

The third prong requires Plaintiff prove a “causal connection” existed between the “adverse

employment action” and “protected activity.” Even if the Court were to find Defendants’ actions

prevented Plaintiff from engaging in “protected activity,” Plaintiff cannot prove a “causal

connection.” To prove a “causal connection,” Plaintiff must evidence more than a subjective belief

that the challenged conduct was retaliatory. Gollas v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 425 F. App’x

318, 321 (5th Cir. 2011). Referencing “conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated

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assertions” is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Jd. (quoting Ramsey v. Henderson, 286

F.3d 264, 269 (Sth Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff argues Defendants took the allegedly adverse actions to punish Plaintiff for

counseling Latham to report Defendant Cates’ conduct to DFPS. ECF No. 1 at 3. Defendants

respond the temporal proximity of Plaintiff's and Defendants’ actions cannot support a “causal

connection.” ECF No. 42 at 23. The Court agrees with Defendants. More than a year passed

between Plaintiffs report and Defendants’ actions at issue. See Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co.,

278 F.3d 463, 472 (Sth Cir. 2002). The evidence supplied does not demonstrate a causal link and,

in fact, Plaintiff received a promotion after making the relevant report. Accordingly, the Court

FINDS no “causal connection” exits between Plaintiff's actions and Defendants’ actions.

B. Because Plaintiff Fails to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation, the Court

Need Not Address the Other McDonnell Douglas Factors

Having found Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the Court does not

directly address whether Defendants provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the

employment actions or whether Plaintiff can prove such reasons are pretextual. The Court notes

— however — Defendants have provided myriad, ample justifications for their actions.

C. Defendants Mireles, Cates, and Gomez-Rocque Are Each Individually Entitled to

Summary Judgment

“Actions for damages against a party in his official capacity are, in essence, actions against

the governmental entity of which the officer is an agent.” Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d

391, 403 (Sth Cir. 1980). Such actions are “redundant and unnecessary because any disputed issues

that must be resolved in conjunction with the official capacity claims are the same as those

requiring resolution in the claims against the school district.” Doe v. Rains Indep. Sch. Dist., 865

F. Supp. 375, 378 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 66 F.3d 1402 (Sth Cir. 1995) and 76

F.3d 666 (Sth Cir. 1996).

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Plaintiff raises Title II and Section 504 claims against all Defendants generally.

Because Plaintiff's claims against district employees mirror those raised against Defendant

Perryton ISD, resolution of the claims against Defendant Perryton ISD will also resolve the claims

against the district employees. The Court therefore FINDS summary judgment in favor of the

district employees in their official capacities to be appropriate.

And if Plaintiff intends to bring her claims against the district-employee Defendants in

their personal capacities, Plaintiff must confront qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects

a government official if his conduct was objectively reasonable under existing federal law.

McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 327 (Sth Cir. 2002) (en banc). Qualified immunity

shields government officials from liability for performing their discretionary functions, unless a

reasonable person would have known that an official’s conduct violated “clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Because Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, she does not show a

violation of clearly establish law and fails to overcome Defendants’ assertion of qualified

immunity. Accordingly, the Court FINDS summary judgment in favor of the district employees

in their personal capacities to be appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.

SO ORDERED.

August 2022 Maan —

MATJHEW J. KACSMARYK

UNWIED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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